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Ladies and Gentlemen, colleagues, friends, and guests.
Welcome to the fIfth annual conference of the New Zealand Agricultural and Resource
Economics Society, and the 23rd as a branch of the Australian Agricultural and Resource
Economics Society. Our theme this year is "Public -v- Private interests - the role of the State
in agriculture".
Over the past 15 - 20 years there has been a world-wide movement, of which New Zealand is
a part, to reduce the size and scope of Government. In New Zealand the size of Government,
as measured by spending relative to GDP, has continued to climb upwards, albeit with a
downward blip following the 1991 budget. It currently stands at around 36 - 37% ofGDP. In
an article in The Economist last year, they noted that after 18 years of Thatcherism the size of
Government has crashed from 42% of GDP to 41 %. So much for the reduction in
Government.
In New Zealand, there has been a raft of policy and legislation changes relative to agriculture
and resource use, as well the impact of broader policy changes. And of course we still have
the debate on the producer boards. So the state continues to be a major player in the.New
Zealand rural sector.
Over the next two days a number of these issues will be addressed. We have some excellent
invited speakers to address us; this morning covering legislation and science policy, tomorrow
covering producer boards. I am also pleased to note that we have a very full book of
submitted papers for our concurrent session - in fact too full. The maximum number of papers
we can handle is 33, and we had 35 submitted. While it is unfortunate that some miss out, it is
very heartening to get the response we did. The next thing to work on is to get the papers
submitted on time.
Anyhow, I would invite you to relax, to listen, to enjoy, and to debate the issues over the next





1998 PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE AGM 
This year has proved to be a very busy one for the NZARES committee. Apart from the 
organisation of this conference, we have had a number of issues to deal with including the 
NZARES name, our constitution, agricultural statistics, and the upcoming 1999 AARES 
Conference which we will be hosting in Christchurch. Each of these will be dealt with in more 
detail later in the meeting. 
At the last two AGM's we have discussed the possibility of shifting the Conference to a new 
location. This was fully investigated by my committee, the result being that of the two 
alternatives we looked at Nelson was booked out and Flock House was extremely difficult to get 
in and out of by air. Hence we are back in Blenheim Given that our next Conference will be part 
of the AARES in Christchurch, the 1999/2000 Committee can consider an appropriate location 
and venue for our 2000 Conference. 
The 1997/98 AARES Undergraduate Student Award was presented to Douglas Watt from 
Lincoln. This award was announced at the AARES Conference in January at Armidale. The 3 
winners of the NZARES Post Graduate Award are: 
Gary Kelk, Waikato 
Richard Moore, Massey 
Nick Giera, Lincoln 
On behalf of the society I would like to extend my congratulations to all three of these 
outstanding students for their academic achievements. 
Following on from our last AGM, NZARES made an application to AARES to award Dr. Robin 
Johnson their (fIrst ever) award of Distinguished Fellow of the Society. I discussed this at the 
AARES Committee meeting in January, and am pleased to (re) announce that the application was 
accepted unanimously. The award will be presented to Robin at the Christchurch Conference. 
Our heartiest congratulations to Robin on this award. 
The major event coming rapidly over the horizon is of course the 1999 AARES Conference which 
we will be hosting. Katie Bicknell as President will have the unenviable task of heading up the 
local organising committee, and I would ask all members of NZARES to assist Katie and the LOC 
as much as possible. Some planning has already gone into this event and I am sure it will be a 
major success. 
With respect to AARES, I attended their Conference and committee meetings, (3!) in Armidale, 
Australia, in January, and Katie represented NZARES at the May meeting. Nothing of great 
moment to report - AARES is having some constitutional wrangles, which they generally sorted 
out at the 1998 AGM. This did not affect NZARES directly as a branch of AARES. There was 
some discussion of problems with Blackwell Publishers, but hopefully this is now sorted out. 
(ii) 
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Finally, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the outgoing committee; Irene Parminter 
(Secretary), Dan Marsh (Treasurer), Katie Bicknell (President Elect), Caroline Saunders, Brian 
Bell, and Ganesh Rauniyar. I would also like to thank our Secretariat Sue and Ron Shepherd, for 
all their valued assistance. And fInally extend my best wishes to Katie and the incoming 
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Ladies and gentlemen
Thank you for the invitation and opportunity to address your conference.
My topic is very broad and enables many issues to be covered under the title of "The Impact
ofGovemment Legislation on the Agricultural Sector".
However, it is important that I use the time to focus on some of the key issues.
So what do I intend to cover and what is my main message?
I will look at a few historical examples ofgovernment legislation to remind us of how wrong
government can be and how hopeless their intervention in the economy can be.
In looking at some specific pieces oflegislation I will cover:
the Reserve Bank Act
Stamp Duty
the Resource Management Act
TariffPolicy
And conclude with some comments on the main proposed legislative changes of the
moment - producer board reform.
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My main message about what the agricultural sector needs from government legislation is
simple:
Governments must create a business environment for farmers conducive to their
success. This means that, by having as little involvement in the economy as possible,
ensuring that we have an open and competitive economy and, beyond that, keeping out
ofour way.
My comments tend to be direct and do not necessarily represent Federated Farmers policy -
and this is particularly the case in relation to producer board issues where these issues are still
being debated at the present time.
Some History
I am aware that in speaking to this conference most ofyou are well versed in these issues and
that covering some history may seem a bit redundant. However many wise people have made
comments along the lines:
If we don't siudy and learn from past mistakes we are bound 10 repeal Ihem.
We do have a great capacity to forget about many of these past issues and it may also be
possible that some ofyou were government policy advisers back in the dismal days and that
you want to forget.
So what were some of the worst examples ofgoverilment legislative intervention that affected
farmers?
In a nutshell all the legislation that provided for agricultural subsidies; that regulated our
financial markets; that protected inefficient New Zealand industries and forced higher costs on
the rest ofus; and the legislation that allowed the size ofthe state to expand to the point
where it ran nearly half of the economy and choked off private sector initiative.
The agricultural subsidy regime was a disaster. The government picked a few winners by
offering supplementary minimum prices to just a few mainstream farming sectors and thereby
effectively constrained diversification and innovation.
And the further subsidies ofcheap finance ensured that farmers paid too much when buying
land so that, when reality arrived and the subsidies had to go, there was a painful adjustment
period as land prices fell.
When we look back why was it that wool was subsidised but flower production was not? Why
was producing lamb so important compared to venison production?
When we look back the really evil part ofthis regime was the way farmers got hooked into the
system whether we liked it or not.
I\)
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It seems absurd that subsidies encouraged sheep numbers to expand to 70 million head when
there was really no market for the last third ofour lamb production. The fact that sheep
numbers have fallen back to less than 50 million is a compelling example of how wrong
government policy can be.
The agricultural subsidies were established because ofthe dopey policies being followed in the
rest of the economy. Financial market regulation meant that at times it was not possible to get
a loan so we ended up with a special farmers bank. Import licensing and tariff protection
raised the cost of many farm inputs that much that the government introduced fertiliser input
subsidies and one-off livestock retention payments.
Wasn't it wonderful how the number ofanimals being farmed expanded quite significantly
when these per head payments were dreamt up.
In some ways perhaps the worst outcome of all was the overall management of the economy
which saw the size of the state continue to grow at the expense of the private sector which
was being ravaged by high inflation. Farmers in particular focused on the purchase ofreal
assets ahead of return on investment.
All of these aspects conspired to keep New Zealand agriculture in a relative time warp with
little growth in new industries and much emphasis on buying real estate to keep as many sheep
and cattle as possible.
While very few people argue that we should ever consider such policies again, I am amazed at
the large number ofpeople who argue against privatisations because they doubt the judgement
and motives of the business barons who would run those companies in the future.
These same people, faced with reality of the dismal past and present performance of both
politicians and their officials in running state businesses, seem willing to accept that these
misguided morons should continue to do so.
Provided there is competition we have no reason to fear private sector industry and the people
who own and run these businesses. On the contrary we have every reason to fear politicians
who have the legislative authority to tax us to perpetuate their view of the world. Compared
to the private sector their officials are not accountable and have a track record of failure.
The Reserve Bank Act
The effect of this 1989 Act on the agricultural sector has been significant. Prior to this, high
inflation eroded the competitiveness of New Zealand farmers and the only cure was running a
weak dollar. And ofcourse we had periods where the dollar was not weak and the export
sector really struggled.
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A falling dollar in tum raised input prices and the unhealthy spiral seemed to have a perpetual
nature to it.
As noted earlier the response of many farmers was to take advantage of borrowing money at
interest rates well below the inflation rate to purchase land and let inflation payoffthe loan, so
to speak.
The years of low inflation we have recently experienced have served to shift the basis of
agricultural sector investment towards return on investment rather than reliance on expected
capital gain. However, as judged by farm values and return on investment, there still appears
to be some way to go to. Perhaps this reality serves to show that it can take a long time to
undo the damage caused by stupid past government policy.
Despite the obvious benefit of the RBA in delivering price stability and keeping meddling
political fingers out ofthe equation, it has been the subject ofcriticism by some farmers.
They have argued that the raising of interest rates by the Reserve Bank to dampen the New
Zealand economy and inflationary pressures has often pushed up the value of the NZ dollar
and hurt the export sector. While there is some truth in this, it is easy to undervalue the
benefits derived from the Act at other times.
Federated Farmers has argued for the last two years that the real problem has been the failure
of the government to constrain its own spending and that stupid fiscal policy has placed an
unnecessary burden on the monetary policy role of the Reserve Bank. This has cost farmers
and exporters and ultimately the whole country.
The situation the economy is in right now bears this out.
Stamp Duty
It is important to include stamp duty as a key issue to highlight the fact that we still have some
quite arbitrary taxes in the economy that serve no purpose other than to crudely raise revenue
for the government. And the emphasis should be on crudely!
Stamp duty has been abolished on all transactions other than commercial property. Shares,
private dwellings, and forestry cutting rights are free ofstamp duty but it persists on farm land.
Ofcourse there is a first farm exemption but that too is arbitrary.
The worst part ofstamp duty is the way it can constrain rural sector restructuring. The long
term trend for real food prices to decline means that it is imperative that farm amalgamations
continue in our traditional farming industries to provide the scale ofoperation to retain
viability.
Stamp duty is a barrier to this occurring because ofthe large tax cost incurred. First farm
exemptions do not help established farmers who have to make these changes. It can be argued
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that it is really the seller ofthe land who pays through receiving a lower price. This may be
true but we have many potential sellers who are farmers of retirement age or beyond who are
reluctant to sell at a lower price.
There are also many examples oftransactions within families where the net effect is to transfer
a large sum of money to the government, and again a great reluctance to incur this cost.
In other words this tax is distorting behaviour. Some rationalisation is not occurring. The
average age of farmers has crept high enough without archaic government policy helping to
push it higher.
The Resource Management Act
The RMA is an el(ample of an Act ofparliament which is largely meritorious but which has
partly fallen down through the devolution ofdecision making to district and regional councils.
The outcome for many farmers has been a massive raising of their costs with no change to
their fanning practises and no environmental benefit.
What has gone wrong?
Essentially the problem is that we have local government in New Zealand. Local government
is even harder to control than central government. We have 86 (1 think) territorial local
authorities and a very diverse range of skills and attitudes to contend with in these councils.
While we have many good councils and many good councillors the sad reality is that many
TLA's are not well run and staffagendas have moved well away from representing the
requirements of the business sector and farmers in particular.
We still have a large measure of the old Town and Country Planning Act mentality in some
councils where the attitude is that all activity must be controlled through prescriptive rules.
This is quite contrary to the original intent of the RMA which is effects based.
The councils that have got it wrong have created an expensive army of planners and regulators
and policemen to handle resource management issues. If the McShane "Thinkpiece" and our
own experience is anything to go by we have many examples ofcouncil staffgoing offat a
tangent and trying to impose their misguided personal views on the community. In the spirit of
user pays they want to recover the cost of these people from resource user applicants.
Not surprisingly the costs for resource users have ballooned.
Within Federated Farmers we are spending around $700,000 per year on staffcosts alone in
dealing with RMA issues. This does not count the enormous voluntary input of farmers who
are assisting with their time to put together submissions on the various plans that are having to
be dealt with around the country.
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There are cases of individual farmers having to spent as much as $20,000 to obtain consents to
construct stock water dams and extract gravel. In one case a piggery owner has spent in
excess of $170,000 and has yet to gain a consent to carry on his long-standing business.
In addition to these crazy outcomes we have many examples offarmers property rights being
undennined through decisions on amenity values and significant natural areas. In some
districts large tracts ofprivate land are being deemed significant natural areas at the expense of
the landowners concerned.
It appears that the community has little or no input into detennining whether these areas
should be designated and the plans often reflect little more than the views ofconsultants who
cruise into the country from the cities and try to appease their consciences for having created a
concrete jungle where they live.
One sure way to undennine a modem market economy is to undermine the property rights that
underpin the investment that is made. If the community really values these areas, the
community should be prepared to pay compensation to the affected landowners.
Can I emphasise again that the principles ofthe RMA are fine. We must provide for the
sustainable use ofour natural resources. However we must keep the focus on achieving
positive environmental outcomes and rid ourselves ofthe costly bureaucratic RMA
implementation nightmare that is enveloping business in New Zealand.
TariffPolicy
It is astounding the rubbish that is talked about New Zealand's tariff policy. It makes us
wonder how many people understand the fundamentals involved.
At one extreme it is interesting to observe Pauline Hanson in Australia promoting obscene
policies that include introducing import tariffs to "protect Australian farmers". How on earth
will raising the cost of imports protect Australian farmers given that, like farmers in New
Zealand, their focus is on exporting and procuring their imports and inputs at the lowest cost?
Sadly, some people think she is right and that New Zealand needs this solution.
NZ First's tariff policy in the 1996 election campaign was absurd for other reasons. At that
time they argued that retaliatory tariffs would be invoked on goods coming to New Zealand
from countries that maintained trade barriers against our exports. But the effect ofsuch a
policy on farmers would be a double penalty. Not only would we suffer losses from the trade
barriers in other countries but our own government would raise our input costs for good
measure.
To some observers our tariff reduction policy has been followed with undue haste. The reality
from the agricultural sectors viewpoint is the opposite. We had to adapt to live without
support virtually overnight back in the mid-1980's while tariff protected industries are still
Jil,.
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squealing about the pace ofchange 13 years later. Each year that this process has been
dragged out, it has cost farmers a lot ofmoney; it has cost consumers a lot of money; and it
has cost economic growth and employment in the whole economy.
Yes it has cost us jobs. While it is true that the immediate impact for some industries has been
job losses, the track record of import protection removal for the whole economy has been very
positive in terms of total employment.
Before reforms started we had around II percent unemployment. By the time 92 percent of
tariffs had been wiped earlier this year we had unemployment fall as low as 6.5 percent.
Why this has happened is simple. Tariffs erode the competitiveness ofother industries and
depress output and employment. When the tariffs are removed those industries expand and
create new jobs.
As well, some of the protected industries have shaped up and become internationally
competitive and grown much bigger than they were while protected. The manufacturing sector
has numerous examples of this as evidenced by the growth ofmanufactured exports following
removal of import protection.
The most recent action to remove tariff protection for our motor vehicle assembly industry is a
victory for common sense. We could never be competitive assembling cars in New Zealand
and it was obscene that vehicle buyers were paying new vehicle taxes that equated to
$160,000 per employee per year to the assembly industry.
As has been said many times:
The problem with common sense is lhat il is not all that common
It is still astounding that our politicians accept the arguments about the merits of tariff removal
but do not want to follow their own logic. Surely the sooner we remove the remaining tariffs
the sooner New Zealand gets the benefits of this.
Perhaps part of the gap between logic and action arises because there is not enough
understanding of why it makes good sense for New Zealand to undertake unilateral tariff
reductions. Many people keep watching our trading partners and argue that we should only
reduce tariffs in line with their reductions.
The well respected Economist magazine countered this view strongly in an issue a few months
ago when they argued that matching other countries protectionist follies was no recipe for
success. From New Zealand's point ofview ifother countries join in an reduce their tariffs it is
a bonus : certainly not a prerequisite for our action.
Another misunderstood aspect of tariffs concerns the negative impact on industries that do not
suffer the direct impact of tariffs on their inputs. This particularly concerns agriculture where
we now have virtually no tariffs on our direct inputs. The fact is that the interdependence of
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our industry sectors means that if higher costs are created by tariffs in one sector they
invariably feed through in the general cost structure.
So to finish on the tariff issue the sad reality is that the agricultural sector has suffered
unnecessarily high input costs for many years but that we are rapidly approaching the final
demise ofall tariffs.
Producer Boards
How well have our producer boards served farmers and has this statutory intervention been
justified? Given that the boards are all different and there are many issues involved, this is a
question that really requires more than a simple yes or no answer.
The NZ Business Roundtable argues unequivocally that these boards have gone well past their
use by date and that they are constraining development of our main primary industries. In
response the boards argue that the NZBR is pursuing an ideological argument that will also let
its member companies grab a share ofthese primary sector businesses for their own gain.
Such arguments are nonsense and take the focus offthe real issues. Ifany Business Rountable
company wants to gain a share of the dairy, wool or meat business they will have to buy it.
Nobody is going to give them anything and they will only acquire a share ofany of these
industries if farmers or other owners are willing sellers.
Their other option is to start from scratch and build new processing and marketing businesses.
This will be futile unless farmers are willing to supply their produce to them.
Back to the real issue.
[fwe focus on the meat industry there is little doubt that until the Meat Board Act was
amended late last year, investment in the meat industry was constrained. This happened
because until December 1997 the Board had the power to intervene and take control ofall
marketing.
Faced with this (unlikely) prospect most meat companies continued to focus on short-term
issues and we did not see the level of investment one would have expected in branding and
marketing arrangements in particular.
From a producer viewpoint the Government has changed the presumption regarding producer
boards. Until recently the Government appeared happy to leave producer boards in place
unless a solid body offarmer opinion emerged calling for a change.
Under Prime Minister Shipley the Government now says that it will not continue to force
statutory arrangements on producers, but producers are entitled to use the Commodity Levies
Act to continue the present arrangements if the majority so wish.
c.n
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It is hard to fault this reasoning as fanners have the power to detennine their own futures.
An infuriating argument against such deregulation is that some people argue that we cannot
trust fanners to understand all the issues and make the right decisions. This is rubbish.
I have far more faith in fanners (who have their money and futures on the line) to make the
right decisions compared to the politicians in Government and the producer boards.
The dairy industry has quite a different set ofcircumstances. There is no doubt that the Dairy
Board provided the critical mass and strength to successfully export when the industry had
literally hundreds of small manufacturing dairy companies.
Today we have two large manufacturing companies handling about 75 percent of total dairy
production and seven other companies of small to smaller size. The two big companies have
the potential to use the powers the Dairy Board Act for their own advantage at the expense of
the other companies.
In the global marketing environment it seems to make a lot ofsense for an entity like the Dairy
Board to continue to be a strong player on behalfof New Zealand dairy fanners. The real
question is whether we need to have it operating under a statute that compels all dairy exports
to be handled by it directly or under licence.
The answer is that changing the Dairy Board to a fully commercial entity with a shareholding
structure appears to be the best option. Ifit is good enough it will continue to voluntarily be
asked to handle the vast bulk ofmanufactured dairy products for export. Ifit does not
measure up it is hard to sustain an argument that producers should continue to be compelled
to export only through the Dairy Board.
So the long answer about the role of the boards is that we need to focus on the jobs to be
done and the issues to be handled and then detennine what structures need to be in place to
most effectively and profitably do this. The current position of the Government seems to be
consistent with this approach and it enables producers to have the ultimate say.
So the producers boards as we have known them in the past probably have had their day but
this need not mean that they will disappear. In the case ofthe Dairy Board it would be a
tragedy if the value it has created was broken up and dissipated.
Key meat industry functions such as quota market allocation still have to be handled and
producers need to consider how farm production research will be handled in the absence of the
current arrangements established by the present boards.
The key issue for farmers is growing revenue and lifting our net returns.
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SummaI)'
So what can be conclude about the impact ofGovernment legislation on the agricultural sector
of the New Zealand economy?
At the outset I said my main message was that the role ofGovernment should be as small as
possible in order to achieve the creation of a business environment conducive to the success of
fanners.
We have seen progress in reducing the role of the Government through the enacting ofthe
Reserve Bank Act to achieve much needed price stability.
While we have made some progress compared to the disastrous days of the Muldoon era,
there still appears to be a significant body of legislation impacting negatively on the fanning
sector.
Remaining tariffs should be quickly removed; stamp duty on commercial land transactions
should be abolished; the Resource Management Act must be amended; and producer board
refonn must be progressed.
And there are many more issues but they will have to wait for another day.
..... ends
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IS THE MORSTIFRST/CRI MODEL DELIVERING?
INTRODUCTION
Because there is little information before the science restructuring, it is difficult to
conclude with any absolute certainty that current science structures are superior.
Nevertheless, based on anecdotal evidence and the observed cultural changes that have
taken place, involving researchers and science research end-users, I argue that the
nation is better of than it was before. But I also argue that the reforms have not fully
lived up to expectations. The reasons for my views will be outlined, but first we need
to understand the past science structures and the changes that have taken place.
THE PAST SCIENCE SYSTEM
Research undertaken by the old science departments (DSIR, MAP, MoF) made
significant contributions to the nation's quality oflife. Much of today's agriculture,
horticulture, forestry geothermal development and minerals exploitation is based on a
strong research base. Our appreciation of the environment, and the understanding of
how to maintain it to underpin our life support systems and our quality oflife, also
depend on research. However, the traditional structures ofthe science system
hindered, rather than helped, the utilisation ofresearch. That much was achieved,
depended more on the initiative of individual researchers, managers and laboratories,
than the encouragements ofthe science structures.
The real problem, which became apparent in the mid -eighties, was not that research
was unable to deliver benefits, but was that Government had lost the assurance that
RS&T expenditure was delivering value for money. Scientists were seen by many
users ofresearch as a new religious priesthood who believed that what was good for
science was good for the nation. While the end-users felt that scientists were unable to
come down to earth and show how the research could be used, scientists felt that end-
users were failing to utilise their brilliant endeavours.
The science structures were also top heavy and, as for other departments, designed to
benefit Government bureaucracy rather than the nation. Many stories can be told of
how the structures encouraged behaviour which opposed, rather than enhanced, the
uptake ofscientific research, eg lack of flexibility in use ofresources; end ofyear
'spend-ups'; prohibiting commercial links with the private sector end-users etc.
Because overseas travel was limited (it required Cabinet permission), much scientific
endeavour was about duplicating overseas work rather than advancing what was
already known.
It is important to put these issues in the context ofthe day. As I mentioned, much
valuable research was being done. The failure was that the stakeholders, effectively
the customers of research, were unconvinced that the nation was getting value for its
investment.
To recapitulate, within the old structures:
• there was no adequate system ofestablishing the value of research;
• there was no adequate system ofallocating resources to either areas of research, or
research programmes;
• there was little accountability and transparency within research structures so that
Government had little idea ofwhere the funding was going and whether it was
effective;
• researchers were isolated from their customers - the nation they served.
THE SCIENCE REFORMS
Inevitably, in the mid-1980s, when the nation was facing severe financial difficulties,
Government significantly reduced its research funding in the beliefthat the lost funding
would be recouped from the end-users of research. Because agriculture had the
strongest commitment to technology transfer, and therefore had a well-define user
group, it was worst hit by the reductions. A significant fraction ofthe 40% reductions
in this area was for the farm advisory service.
However reduced funding and user-pays were insufficient to improve the delivery of
research to the nation. By creating a contestable science market, the Public Good
Science Fund (PGSF) in 1990, to purchase research outputs, Government was able to
shift its focus from input funding to one based on purchasing outputs in order to let the
market optimise the allocation of resources and deliver the desired efficiencies. Two
years later, the Government research departments were restructured into the Crown
Research Institutes - Crown-owned companies with commercial powers.
THE SCIENCE PURCHASING MARKET AND THE
CROWN COMPANY STRUCTURES
The establishment of a purchasing market involving the PGSF and the Technology
schemes - all operated by the Foundation for Research Science and Technology
.......
(FRST) - allowed the competitive market to optimise Government's purchasing of
RS&T. The theory was that such a market would:
• ensure researchers were sensitive to customer's needs;
• allow decisions to be made by those best able to make them;
• allow the market, rather than detailed government intervention, to determine the
optimum resource allocation.
Associated with the purchasing market, the company structures ofthe CRIs and other
research institutes allowed:
• flexibility to adapt to change;
• the business to focus on efficient resource management;
• rational capital management;
• cost savings;
• customer focus;
• the Crown companies to benefit from research innovations through W, joint
venture etc.
• detailed resource decisions to be delegated to the Foundation for Research Science
and Technology and to the research providers.
Within these structures, Government could then focus on policy issues and the broad
picture ofGovernment's investment in RS&T.
THE GAINS OF THE NEW SCIENCE STRUCTURES
The new science structures addressed the major perceived weaknesses in the previous
science systems.
• Government was able to set the high level priorities of research funding.
• Within the overall framework, researchers were able to develop coherent research
programmes using their own creativity and initiatives.
• Research that was unlikely to be ofbenefit was no longer purchased.
• CRI management structures were mission oriented and were far more likely to
drive research to benefit the nation than the previous structures.
• Government was confident in the RS&T investment.
• The private sector was much more involved with setting research priorities and
sector strategies than was the case before. (Currently, the Foresight process is
taking this a step forward and encouraging the end-user clusters to define their
desirable futures and from these to define their research needs.)
• There was better information about where the research funding and effort was
targeted and therefore there was a better appreciation ofwhere the returns to
research are.
• The integrated framework spanning the Marsden Fund, the PGSF, the Technology
NZ and the Fellowship schemes showed where resources were targeted, enabling
. Government to make informed priority decisions.
• ForCRIs:
Shareholder's equity increased from $140 million to $247 million in six years.
The CRI profit reinvested in the CRIs in 1997/98 was $35.5 million.
More positions are becoming available for young scientists, noting that the
relative number ofyoung scientists in CRIs is 2.5 times those in universities.
• Career research opportunities are developing outside Government.
• The benefits ofRS&T are becoming more apparent and there is the hope that the
outcomes of research will be more clearly recognised, encouraging increased
Government support.
THE PROBLEMS
While the many good things outlined above are happening, there are some difficulties
and problems with the current science system in practice, as Government is not itself
under market discipline and its behaviour is not optimised in the market sense. On the
one side, we have a contestable market for the supply ofRS&T, but the overall market
behaviour has more in common with a medieval feudal market than the ideal market of
economic theory. Government stands outside the science market as the owner ofCRIs,
the RS&T policy maker and as the (near) monopoly purchaser in the market;
analogous to a feudal landowner. The market does not correct Government mistakes
as it does for others and, worse, Government mistakes are carried by the research
providers and the nation.
Ofall the providers, the CRIs, are in the worst situation as they are bonded to the
Crown as their owner and purchaser in a way that would not be acceptable for a
rational economic agent.
Some examples of where the Crown's over-arching power has created difficulties in the
science market as follows.
• Within three months ofAgResearch being established, Government, through its
priority process, decided to reduce Government support ofAgResearch's main
business and focus its purchase on the market end of the value chain. AgResearch's
directions and staffcapability was quite inappropriate for the new priorities. While,
from a national point ofview, the new priorities might have been sensible,
AgResearch's first few years have, ofnecessity, been focussed on massive
restructuring to position itselffor the new market when, with a little bit of
planning, they could have been set up for the new, rather than the old,
environment.
• The Step Priority Framework reduced Government's investment in environmental
research, causing staff losses and restructuring. However, three years later, under
the SPIR framework, Government changed its mind and environmental research
was considered a priority.
• The purchaser (the Foundation), on behalfofgovernment, has also been defining
its purchasing requirements through trial and error rather than a rational process.
It has taken several years before the Foundation, as a purchaser, was able to
balance the relative importance ofscientific excellence and national relevance.
The Failure of the Market to Correct Government Behaviour
(»
In a true market, even it" not ideal, a confused and erratic purchaser would pay a
premium for poor behaviour. Eventually the discipline of the market would improve
the performance ofthe purchaser so that the market worked well. That this correction
mechanism does not exist in the science market means that Government does not
correct its purchasing behaviour, and others bear the cost.
Prices are not set by thl'l market itself, but by Government's rationing process. In
effect, its priority system rations the available funds irrespective of the quality - ie the
returns to the nation of particular research. Better programmes seldom receive higher
prices as one might expect in a real market. As better quality programmes often cost
more, in a fixed pricing regime, the economic driver is to lower the research quality to
meet the market price.
Providers such as the CRIs and the Research Associations must fully fund their
research if they are to survive in the long term. The pricing ofresearch must cover
profits, staff training, equipment, "redundancies", return on assets and profit.
However, not all providers need to do this. In particular, many universities do not
have appropriate financial systems in place or the commercial drivers to identitY the
true costs and, therefore, realistic prices for research. Through ignorance, many
universities appear to price their research at a level which requires hidden subsidies
from other areas of the business. While universities deny this, they cannot demonstrate
that they have been properly priced, and their understanding ofwhat constitutes an
adequate price seems limited. The evidence is that they are a destabiliser in the market.
In a true market, transaction costs are limited by the market to a level where the
increased costs are no longer justified by the increased returns. However, in the
science market, the transactions costs that Government imposes as purchaser and
policy setter are not constrained. The driver for Government is to continue to increase
transaction costs well beyond the level which would occur if the market limited costs.
Unless well managed, the lack ofmarket discipline will divert more and more resources
into the transaction processes, reducing the overall gains ofthe reformed system.
Universities and the PGSF
In order for the reforms to have maximum impact on the well being of the nation,
significant university involvement in the contestable funding schemes is essential. The
purchaser has greater choice; linkages between research providers is encouraged; and
the culture of the universities will be to, some extent, better influenced by the needs of
the nation. However, the way the universities have accessed the PGSF have inhibited
rather than enhanced the effectiveness of the science system. There have been two
significant management failures over university entry. The first involves the level of
funds transferred to the PGSF, the second involves the accountability arrangements
required of university in accessing the PGSF.
Universities transferred $8.7 million to the PGSF (and $2 million to the Marsden Fund)
when they had the capacity to immediately compete for about $50 million: noting that
their overall research level is about $100 million. As university researchers are such a
large group, their entry has destabilised the provider market. Even if the quality of
university research programmes is not superior to others, universities will still increase
their market share to about $50 million by shear numbers alone: displacing similar
quality programmes. The opportunity cost ofdisplacing the $50 million ofworthwhile
programmes is many times the investment. In essence there are too many people
chasing too little funding. In only four years, universities have increased their PGSF
funds to $18 million and will double this again over the next few years, irrespective of
quality.
A further problem occurs as university involvement in the PGSF has virtually no risk.
In contrast to eRIs and research associations, university staff have secure funding,
irrespective of the funds they gain from the PGSF. Worse, universities are not using
their increased research income to generate new staffpositions. Over the last few
years, the extra $15 million income from the PGSF and Marsden funds should have
generated about 100 new positions. However, as this has not happened, career
positions for performing staffare being displaced by temporary positions within the
universities. If university access to the PGSF displaced non-performing staffor poor
research programmes, the nation would be better off, but there is no evidence that this
has been the case for much university research.
The difficult environment in the science system Stops it performing as well as it should.
Because of instability in funding due to excessive competition and an erratic
purchasing market, CRIs are limited in their ability to maintain and expand their skill
bases. Redundancy is a continual threat for the performing scientists and there is no
well defined career path essential to build up strong capability. Instead ofCRIs being
able to make sufficient profit to develop new capabilities and human capital for the
future, many are in a survival mode.
eRIs Are Neither "Fish nor Fowl"
A further problem is that CRIs are neither 'fish nor fowl'. They have all the downside
risks of being in a market with an owner who, in a market sense is non-rational, yet
are, for many reasons, not able to gain the benefits of being in a market. For example,
they cannot profit maximise and so:
• cannot reap the real rewards oftheir endeavours as once these are significant (eg a
new process or a new plant variety), the right to capitalise on the innovations is
passed to others;
• benefit to NZ overrides profit taking;
• Government has its 'hands in the till' and expects CRIs to provide free services.
Examples ofthe free services the owners expects from CRIs include providing
expertise in relation to technical problems such as BSE, RCD and aromatics in petrol;
expert advice in relation to trade issues; and financial support for Crown social goals in
the social arena. CRIs have raised the issue of these compliance costs with the owner;
suggesting that a dividend could be extracted from the CRIs to fund these, no doubt,
worthy causes. This would align Government behaviour as a company owner with
behaviour in the private sector. The reaction has been that it would be illegal to
extract a dividend and use it to fund activities that do not have specific Budget
approval. Yet, such activities are currently funded in a non-transparent manner.
The conclusion is that, unless the science environment is managed well there will be
pressure to privatise large sections ofthe CRIs. University-based research institutes
would then be able to merge with the remaining CRI capability, allowing the new
co
institutes to operate within the university, rather than the CRI, framework.
In summary, the above points show that there are a number ofissues Government must
deal with if it is to correct current market deficiencies to improve the operation and
delivery ofRS&T benefits to the nation. These include:
• protecting university research funds so that the PGSF does not crowd out or
displace university funded research;
• increasing science funding till it reasonably matches the capability ofthe market to
ensure universities do not extract research funding by numbers alone;
• ensuring universities establish permanent positions from PGSF funds to allow for
stable career development;
• Government not abusing its ownership/purchasing power- ie develop consistent
priority directions and purchasing signals;
• Government managing the market so that the purchasing side is more diverse ego
by contracting out operational research.
SUCCESSES OF THE REFORMS
The above has dealt with the difficulties of the science system as it is at present.
However I need to make it clear that the kind of research being funded is now more
clearly beneficial to NZ than in the past and, what is more important, the culture ofthe
nation has changed. In many instances, end-users and researchers are jointly
developing research programmes to benefit the nation. The criticisms above while not
unimportant, must be seen in the context ofthe significant improved delivery ofRS&T
to the benefit of the nation.
Some examples where research has produced new products or new understandings
with clear beneficial outcomes are listed below.
• The development of surface hardening pinus radiata - for high value specialty uses.
• More fully understanding eco-systems - water quality, sustainable rivers.
• IdentifYing the DNA fragments that mediate TB virulence.
• IdentifYing how weather systems work for NZ and SW pacific
• The development of population models for off·shore fish stocks.
• Detailed maps of the ocean floor ofthe EEZ.
• Breeding new crops: squash, echinacea, wasabi, ginseng, truffles.
• Discovering and extracting ant- cancer drugs in sponges.
• The establishment ofan advanced NZ ceramic industry.
• The identification ofalkali aggregate reactions to minimise concrete failure (worth
$5 million per year)
THE IMPORTANCE OF RS&T TO NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Trapitional economics cannot explain the massive economic growth experienced by
western countries in the last \00 years. Solow, a Nobel Laureate, has shown that 87%
ofthe US economic growth is due, not to capital and labour, but to a factor which
relates to doing things better: ie the economy is driven by applying new knowledge.
This knowledge can be captured in equipment; in processes; or in people as know-how
or education. Traditional economics does not adequately recognise that this multiplier
by enhancing the value ofcapital and labour is the key to sustainable growth. As a
consequence, society under.invests in knowledge creation and utilisation.
Knowledge is not an economic good like an apple or a service. Iff have a
conventional good such as an apple and give it to you I no longer have it. Iff consume
it, it exists no more. On the other hand, iff have knowledge or know-how, I can pass
it on to you at very little cost (compared with the cost ofdiscovery) and we both gain.
Today many New Zealanders have access to computers which, a couple ofdecades
ago, were only available to the world's largest businesses (eg defence) and which were
worth millions ofdollars. This millions ofdollars worth ofknowledge, captured in
chunks ofmetal, silicon and plastic, is now virtually free (allowing for a few hundred
dollars of proprietary software). The returns to global well being of this increasing
knowledge, multiplying the effectiveness ofall our activity whether in IT,
infrastructure, new products or process, and in medical services, are enormous.
CONCLUSION
New Zealand is better positioned to implement RS&T than most countries ofsimilar
resource limitations. Fine turning, however, is needed to ensure the system delivers
effectively.
New Zealand's future is not in improved efficiency but in creating and exploiting
knowledge.
Current economic- thought is likely to limit NZ's sustainable development because the
framework for valuing the benefits ofRS&T are inadequate.
...Jo. 
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MOVING BEYOND PRODUCER BOARDS 
This session on producer boards may be the last on this topic to be held by the New 
Zealand Agriculture and Resource Economics Society. The government's recent 
decision to remove their statutory backing should make it irrelevant to future 
conferences except as a matter of historical interest. 
It is regrettable that discussion of producer boards was not relegated to conferences on 
economic history a decade or more ago. The snail's pace of progress in this area of 
economic policy in New Zealand contrasts markedly with the progress that has been 
made in many others since the mid-1980s, and developments with statutory marketing 
arrangements in Australia, South Africa and elsewhere. 
Partly this has been due to the power of entrenched interests. But entrenched interests 
did not prevent the removal of nearly all government assistance to agriculture and 
industries in other sectors of the economy, and the deregulation of other markets. 
People with entrenched interests in marketing boards may exert influence over some 
politicians, bureaucrats and academics seeking research funds, but they should be no 
match for the voting power of well-informed farmers. In my view the critical factor 
which explains why the statutory backing of producer boards has been maintained for 
so long is the lingering attachment of many farmers to the idea that the boards serve 
their interests. Without this, farmers would have shrugged off producer boards a long 
time ago. 
I continue to be stunned by the superficiality of many of the comments of farmer-
politicians and board representatives in the producer board debate. Just recently, for 
example, Andra Neely presumably thought she was making a profound point by 
reciting the mantra that 'not all producer boards are the same.' For years, Sir Dryden 
Spring seemed to believe his comment that 'producer boards work in practice even if 
they don't work in theory' disposed of the arguments. Currently, many farmers are 
clearly bewildered by the prospect of deregulation, largely because the boards have 
kept them in the dark and fed them a diet of rhetoric and misinformation for so long. 
We saw exactly the same behaviour by trade union leaders in the debate over labour 
market deregulation in the 1980s, including the contention that ruination would follow 
from the removal of enforced collectivism. Ultimately arguments and ideas won out, 
and support by the majority of the workforce for a regulated labour market has long 
since collapsed. 
The important role of ideas has been described in the following terms in an article in 
the American lournal of Agricultural Economics which draws out the implications for 
other countries of New Zealand's reform experience: 
First, ideas have consequences and economists can play an important 
educational role in political reform .... Public recognition of the 
inequities and inefficiencies of current programs is essential in breaking 
the existing dominant coalition. In New Zealand, economic analyses of 
various restrictions on competition helped change the intellectual 
climate.! 
The authors also noted, however, that there had been little substantive reform of 
international marketing of New Zealand agricultural products. At the time their article 
was written they estimated that 80 percent of New Zealand's agricultural and 
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horticultural exports were heavily influenced by marketing boards and export 
authorities. 
The 1992 ACIL report published by the New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR) 
made path-breaking contributions to public discussion of agricultural marketing issues 
in New Zealand, and I think it has played an important role in setting the agenda for 
reforms.2 The analysis in the ACIL report was endorsed at the time by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) and the Treasury. Indeed, as far back as 1984 the 
Treasury was promoting the reforms to producer boards which are now coming to 
pass. 
It is unfortunate that agricultural economists, especially those whose work is funded 
by New Zealand taxpayers, have not played a bigger role in challenging popular 
misconceptions about the effects of marketing boards. It would be more obvious that 
the New Zealand public was obtaining value for money for research funding if more 
effort had been made to test claims about the effectiveness of producer boards, rather 
than to support the various patch-up exercises that have hitherto substituted for 
fundamental reform in this area. There have also been few enlightening contributions 
from New Zealand academics - a fact which is not easy to reconcile with claims that 
are sometimes made about the alleged benefits to the broader community of public 
funding of universities. 
The transparency problem 
Are there other reasons why it has not been obvious to farmers that their interests have 
been poorly served by statutory marketing boards? It is difficult to accept that 
farmers, as a group, would be particularly gullible or particularly fond of government 
intervention. 
I think another explanation is that statutory marketing has removed normal market 
tests of competitiveness. The problem is most severe where marketing boards have 
been granted export monopolies. 
In this situation, producer boards often point to their ability to sell the product on 
international markets as an indicator of their performance. However, it does not 
require a great deal of expertise in economics to recognise that the ability to sell a 
valuable product does not tell us much at all about the relative economic efficiency of 
the firm making the sales. When suppliers of the product have no alternative other 
than to sell it to you, and you are basically obliged to accept it, it is not all that 
difficult to 'dispose' of whatever quantities are offered, deduct your costs and pay 
suppliers what is left over. Only in that sense do we know that the Dairy Board, for 
example, 'works'. 
A recent exchange between Daniel Silva of the Importers Institute and the public 
affairs manager of the Dairy Board illustrated this point. Neville Martin cited the 
usual figures on the Board's increased sales as a measure of its performance. Silva 
replied: 
2 
We know that the performance of those monopolies is indeed very 
good, mainly because they keep saying that it is. It is, however, 
apparent that it is not good enough to withstand competition from 
other exporters. We also know that we come into frequent contact 
ACIL, Agricultural Marketing Regulation, Reality Versus Doctrine, New Zealand Business 
Roundtable, 1992. 
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with traders who, having identified export opportunities, are unable to 
follow them through with eXfort sales, because the New Zealand state 
prevents them from doing so. 
A further reason why it has not been obvious to farmers that they are not well served 
by statutory marketing boards is the bundling of investment returns in payouts 
received for farm produce. This means that farmers do not know how much of the 
payout represents a rate of return on investment in processing and marketing and how 
much of it represents the price they are receiving for the sale of raw materials. They do 
not even know the equity value of the compulsory investments in cooperatives and 
boards that have been made on their behalf in the past. 
Over time, all the old arguments used to justify producer board controls have been 
whittled away. Last year the Dairy Board reduced its case to the proposition that the 
rest of the world was not a 'fair place': "If that were the case there'd be no need for a 
Dairy Board", the chief executive acknowledged. Implicitly this was an admission 
that earlier arguments - that competitive exporting would result in 'weak selling', that 
it would prevent scale economies from being achieved, and that multinationals would 
enter the market and 'rip off' farmers - had no substance. The 'unfair world markets' 
argument was comprehensively rebutted in a recent study.4 As for the bundling issue, 
a former chief executive of the Dairy Board remarked to me when the ACIL report was 
published: "You're absolutely right about bundling, and the industry is moving far too 
slowly to deal with it." Nearly six years later there has still been no serious effort to 
address this problem and the only effective solution - corporatisation and 
conventional shareholding - is not even in prospect. Meanwhile national economic 
losses from this distortion alone are running at somewhere between $168 million and 
$480 million a year.s Those from the export monopoly may well be larger. Thus 
change to date has been painfully slow and far greater speed is required. 
The context of reform 
The timetable for the removal of the statutory backing of producer boards should be 
set primarily with regard to domestic efficiency objectives, rather than in response to 
international pressures and trade negotiations. Many farmers will be glad to be free of 
producer boards, but there are still some who say that New Zealand should not give 
up producer boards until it gets something in return. This is foolish. It is not in New 
Zealand's interests to continue to suffer from self-inflicted damage. Just as the main 
benefits from the removal of tariffs flow from unilateral decisions to eliminate their 
harmful effects on resource allocation and use, so too will the largest benefits from 
producer board reform accrue from domestic deregulation and restructuring. In both 
cases any international spin-off will be icing on the cake. The estimates quoted above 
of the economic benefits of removing just one distortion in one industry (albeit a large 
one) may be compared with the government's estimates of the entire gains to New 
Zealand from the Uruguay Round, which were put at $150-230 million per annum.6 
3 
4 
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The minister for trade and agriculture made a good point recently in discussing
whether removal of New Zealand's state trading monopolies should depend on the
outcome of future international trade negotiations. Dr Smith said:
... we will gain nothing from being behind the trade liberalisation race,
and trying to play poker at the international table. We are kidding
ourselves if we believe that we will get anywhere trying to playa tit for
tat game. Influence for a country as small as New Zealand can only
come from moral leadership?
A strong argument against further delay in deregulating producer boards is the
lacklustre performance in recent years of industries based on agricultural resources.
The post-1984 economic liberalisation programme could have been expected to
improve the growth prospects of agriculture, as has occurred with other industries
based on natural resources such as forestry and tourism. New Zealand still has
comparative advantages in many forms of agriculture. Yet the contribution of
agriculture to gross domestic product (GDP) has continued to decline, despite
relatively high rates of productivity growth in farming. Capital returns have been
abysmal, implying that land and other assets are overvalued.
Some"tnay find nothing remarkable in the fact that the contribution of farming to New
Zealand's GDP has continued to decline over the past decade. Such a decline is a
common characteristic of advanced economies. It is often attributed to the
substitution of off-farm inputs, provided by suppliers and processors, for farm labour
and other inputs.
However, even when related activities involved in processing, input supply to farming,
input supply to processing, transport, and wholesale and retail trade are included as
part of the agricultural sector, the contribution of all these activities has remained at 15
percent in recent years. Over the last five years a small increase in the relative
contribution from processing has merely offset a decline in the contribution from
farming.s This is a disappointing result given the removal or reduction of many of the
former distortions in the New Zealand economy - high inflation, import protection,
excessive port charges and so forth - which previously held agriculture back.
Agriculture-based exports still represent a large proportion of total exports, but they
are the most slowly growing component. The contribution of agriculture-based exports
to total exports declined from 57 percent of New Zealand's total exports of goods in
1992 to 53 percent in 1997. While agriculture-based exports increased by 12 percent
over this period, forestry products exports increased by 30 percent and exports of
other goods increased by 27 percent. Within the agricultural sector, some products
performed markedly better than the average - for example, wine exports increased by
111 percent from 1992 to 1997.
No doubt the recent export performance of major agricultural products can be largely
explained by movements in international commodity prices. This is the most obvious
reason why, for example, earnings from dairy product exports have increased
substantially, while earnings from other pastoral-based exports have declined. An
important issue which arises in this context, however, is the effect of producer boards
on the vulnerability of farmers to the instability of international commodity markets.
7 Dr the Hon Lockwood Smith, 'Producer Board Reform', address at Warkworth, 11 June 1998.
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Potential benefits of reform
The most obvious problem associated with statutory producer boards, particularly
those with export monopolies, is their tendency to result in too many eggs being put
into one basket - an excessive reliance on the strategy of a single marketing firm to sell
particular commodities. There has also been an excessive reliance on a strategy of
achieving competitive advantage through large-scale production of standard products.
Two recent examples of the activities of the Dairy Board illustrate this point. The first
involves forward exchange cover. MAP has recently reported that "because of the
Dairy Board's forward exchange rate cover, the depreciation of the New Zealand
dollar will be of little direct benefit to dairy farmers this season".9 It is ironic that the
Dairy Board, which was one of the most vocal proponents of the view that the New
Zealand dollar was overvalued, did not apparently put its money where its mouth
was. When individual marketing firms take forward cover to alter their exposure to
foreign exchange risks, the results of these transactions are normally reflected in their
returns to shareholders rather than in the prices they pay to their suppliers. If the
Dairy Board had to compete with other firms to acquire and market dairy products,
the incomes of dairy farmers would not depend so heavily on a single foreign exchange
strategy.
The second example relates to New Zealand's dispute with the European Union (EU)
over whether spreadable butter qualifies for reduced duties under New Zealand's
butter quota access. This dispute involved, among other things, criminal charges being
brought against employees of three subsidiaries of the Dairy Board. Although the
Board's case may be won, it illustrates the potential for New Zealand dairy farmers to
be exposed to substantial commercial risks under single desk selling arrangements.
Marketing firms are inevitably exposed to risks from the exercise of powers by foreign
bureaucrats and courts, but it is not sensible to maintain a situation where commercial
judgments made 'by a single firm can damage the whole industry - and indeed
implicate the New Zealand government because of the Dairy Board's statutory
backing.
The existence of producer boards tends, almost inevitably, to result in a focus on how
to dispose of commodities that have been produced rather than on how agricultural
land and other resources might best be used to meet potential market requirements.
Despite the adoption of the rhetoric of market orientation by some producer boards,
their control powers deter activities that would otherwise emerge spontaneously in
search of profit-making opportunities. The potential for a marketing board to shut out
certain activities or to dissipate the rewards for innovation can only blunt the
incentives of other players to search for opportunities to profit by developing new
products, new processes and new markets.
In my view the importance of competition in improving the efficiency of organisational
arrangements has not been sufficiently recognised in this context. This may be partly
because of the tendency of agricultural economists who have an interest in policy
issues to focus on price distortions.
Price distortions are important, but the problems arising from producer boards cannot
be solved merely by the adoption of more efficient pricing policies. The fallacy of
trying to simulate the pricing outcomes that would emerge in a competitive market is
reminiscent of the 1930s socialist calculation argument that efficient central planning is
possible because it can be assumed that planners "have exactly the same knowledge, or
lack of knowledge, of the production functions as the capitalist entrepreneurs have".




Von Mises and Hayek were able to demolish this argument by pointing out that it was
pure fiction to speak of all the information relevant to the decisions of individual firms
as being available to a central planning authority.1O One of Hayek's main messages
was that almost every individual has unique knowledge of which beneficial use might
be made, but only if decisions depending on it are left to individuals or are made with
their active cooperation. l1
This message is relevant to thinking about the benefits that are likely to flow from the
removal of statutory marketing. Governments have given producer boards the power
to act as though they have knowledge of production possibilities and market
opportunities that they could never possess. In doing so they have suppressed the
'decision rights' of farmers and potential investors in processing and marketing. For
example, the Dairy Board's export monopoly suppresses decision rights relating to the
use of agricultural land, livestock and investments in processing and marketing. What
this does, in effect, is to remove the incentive for potential innovators to make effective
use of their particular knowledge of production and market opportunities.
Michael Jensen and William Meckling have shown that individual firms have to make
trade-offs between information costs (including costs of ill-informed decisions) and
agency costs (including costs of decisions that are inconsistent with the owners'
objectives).12 Information costs can often be reduced by decentralisation of decision
making, but this tends to raise agency costs. There are reasons to believe that producer
boards are not very good at dealing with information and agency costs, but I want to
make a different point here.
My point is that, in a contestable market, the potential for competition from other
firms with lower information and/or agency costs helps to determine the boundaries of
the firm. This competitive discipline does not exist when the firm is a producer board
and the boundaries of its activities are determined by legislation rather than by its
ability to compete in the market.
The spontaneous nature of market processes makes it impossible for anyone to know
what activities have been suppressed as a result of the statutory powers bestowed on
producer boards, or where growth will occur when these powers are withdrawn.
Comparisons with the development of agribusiness in Australia suggest that the
greater influence of producer boards in New Zealand has suppressed diversity. For
example, in the dairy industry in Australia there is greater diversity in terms of the
ownership of processing facililities, the scale of plant and the nature of products
produced.
It seems likely that the pattern of industry development following the withdrawal of
statutory powers will involve the growth of clusters of related industries. It is also
likely to involve information networks and strategic alliances to enable more effective
use to be made of dispersed knowledge of production possibilities and market
opportunities. Some remarks by Richard Riddiford, managing director of Palliser
Estate Wines and a former chairman of the Game Industry Board, to an export sector
economic summit in December 1996 are relevant in this context. Although they were
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made at a time when exporters were being hurt by exchange rate appreciation, his
challenge has more general relevance:
I also challenge this Summit to identify the successful companies in
today's climate, and to find out why they are successful. It would be a
much more constructive use for the energy and collective intelligence in
this room not to apportion blame for monetary policy but rather to look
at which companies are performing well against international best
practice ... and to learn how to do it too. That would really turn the
balance of payments around quickly and ease internal pressures.13
The experience of Palliser and other firms in the wine industry shows how successful
exporting is possible in a difficult market environment.
Public goods and industry levies
Most economists can agree fairly readily about the general superiority of spontaneous
market processes over political processes in deciding what economic activities should
be performed and who should perform them, Most economists can also agree that
there may be circumstances where government intervention in markets can help
individuals and firms to make better use of scarce economic resources. For example,
statutory intervention may help reduce the costs of individuals and firms in
transacting with each other, ensure the provision of public goods and correct for
externalities.
Such arguments have commonly been used to justify the use of compulsory levies to
fund the research and promotion activities of producer boards. The NZBR has
previously considered this argument in some depth in a submission on proposed
legislation for the meat and wool industries.14 Our analysis suggests, among other
things, that it is not likely that meat and wool producers would voluntarily choose to
fund these activities at current levels given the prospective benefits that they might be
able to obtain from such expenditures. Recent events in the meat industry provide
concrete evidence to back up that assertion - many farmers are making it plain that
they would rather have these funds in their own pockets.
Our analysis also suggests that the grounds for intervention to fund research and
promotion in agriculture are weak, and any benefits are unlikely to exceed associated
costs. Treasury reached a similar conclusion in its advice to the incoming government
in 1984:
Treasury is of the view that in most cases voluntary market groupings
funded by voluntary contributions provide an environment in which the
appropriate incentives exist for the efficient provision of market
services. Compulsory levies, in comparison, do not provide adequate
incentives for the efficient provision of market services and thus cannot
be considered superior in rectifying the ... general market imperfections
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SUMMARY
Government currently has a role in assisting those who cannot be assisted locally but the
government's role is vastly diminished on that which prevailed through the 70's and 80's.
And yet the magnitude of the problems facing the viability of farms is as great now as
any previous time. This paper looks at the drought, it's impact nationally, the
government response to this and previous droughts, and raises some questions for
discussion.
Key words: drought, costs, government assistance.
1. THE 1998 DROUGHT
There is no doubt that the drought which affected the East Coast of both islands in
varying degrees is the worst since farms were established on the East Coast by pioneers
last century. Rainfall records indicate indicate this drought event has a frequency of one
in up to 145 years, depending on the region.
Drought extends from Wairoa to North Otago and now affects regions which include
45% of the nation's sheep, 31% of the nation's beef cattle, 38% of deer, and 13% of the
nation's dairy cattle.
The total gross cost of the drought on fann gate returns for affected fanners Is
estimated to be In the order of:
$260 million for 1997/98 (June 30th end of year)
• $240 million for 1998/99.
The drop attributable to the drought Is estimated at 2.6 % of total national fann
gate revenue for 1997/98 and 2.2% for 1998/1999.
Broadly speaking fann gate returns make up 5% of GDP whereas value added
agricultural products contribute 15% so the significance of the drought is larger
obviously than just on fann affects. Various multipliers have been talked about; I
suggest that a mUltiplier of between two and three is about the magnitude of the flow-on
impacts.
Provincially, Hawke's Bay is worst affected with impacts on the significant pipfruit
sector as well as the sheep and beef sector. The Wairarapa is also badly affected.
Marlborough sheep and beef farmers have experienced the most prolonged period of
drought but the significant wine growing area, which was largely unharmed, offset sheep
and beef loses. Canterbury fanning is hard hit but Canterbury has a more diverse
economy.
In 1998/99, the ongoing impact will mostly affect the sheep, beef and deer sectors. The
national cost is estimated to be in the order of $240 million. This cost includes a
significant decrease in lambing percentages, flock and herd rebuilding costs, higher death
rates and lower wool weights. It is estimated that the recovery period to pre 1998 levels
of production will take at least 3 years.
On-farm and orchard fmancial impacts by property type are summarised as:
1.1 Sheep and Beef
A typical drought affected 450 hectare sheep and beef farm is expected to face
additional costs and/or lost revenue in the order of $30,000 this year and a
further $40,000 in 1998/99. This is relative to normal gross farm income expectations
of$220,000. A sample of representative Hawke's Bay and Wairarapa farms indicates
that 40% will have financial losses for 1997/1998, with this increasing to a forecast 60%
in the 1998/1999 fmancial year.
1.2 Dairying
On drought affected farms production of milk solids is down 12% (lost revenue
$21,000 on average) even after an additional $20,000 to $30,000 has been spent on
grazing and supplementary feed costs. If the winter is cold and wet there is likely to be
a significant effect on next season's production on some farms owing to the shortage of
off farm grazing.
1.3 Arable
The impact on this sector occurred in 1997/98 and was very variable, reflecting the
availability of adequate irrigation. Canterbury as the major cropping area has incurred
the biggest regional financial loss. Recovery in 1998/99 is expected providing conditions
favour winter wheat planting and small- seed crop establishment.
1.4 Pipfrult
Sunburn and other quality problems related to the drought have reduced budgeted
pipfruit export packouts by 45% in Hawke's Bay. Combined with a low deferred
payment from the previous season the fmancial situation for many orchardists is critical.
Gross revenue for 1996/1997 for a sample of 35 Hawke's Bay orchards was $235,000.
This dropped to $167,000 in 1997/1998.
The drought will have significant flow-on effects to rural communities and businesses
servicing the rural sector. These are expected to he greatest in Hawke's Bay.
2. DROUGHT RELIEF AND RECOVERY ASSISTANCE TO DATE
Government has provided financial assistance directly to five regions through Federated
Farmers. Funding for the assistance was derived from the Minister of Agriculture's
discretionary fund, which allows up to $400,000 to be spent annually on adverse events.
Direct Government assistance approved to 30 June 1998 is summarised as:
Rural Coordinator grants, 1: 1 matching community inputs.
Technical Assistance.
Community funding 1:1 to match community inputs.
In the case of Marlborough, Army assistance with water cartage.
Throul:h Income Support:






























3. COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO 1998 DROUGHT PACKAGES
This section contains observations relating specifically to Marlborough and Canterbury
rural community responses to the drought and Government relief packages.
3.1 Attitude
2.1 Government Adverse Events Polley
• Plus NZ Army assistance for water deliveries
•• Note this does not include income support payments
An official declaration of an Adverse Event is not needed.
2.2 Types of Assistance
A view expressed on more than one occasion by those closely involved in organising
responses is that they would not like to return to Government "doing everything for us"
again. The feeling was they can be more responsive to the needs of the community than
Government agencies can, no matter how well intentioned.
While no studies have yet been undertaken, anecdotal evidence gathered from contact
with both affected and unaffected farmers and support personnel indicates that the
Government approach has been of more value to those involved than the monetary value
would indicate. Farmers on the whole appear comfortable with the thrust of Government
policy being to support people and animal welfare instead of businesses, and that
business risk management is best left to the farmer. The packages have been viewed in
the main as recognition by the politicians and the rest of the country of the severe
situation farmers face, which was further reinforced by visits to the affected areas at
various times by the Minister of Agriculture and the Prime Minister. Recognition, while
not solving any problems, helps by reassuring many that they are not facing this crisis
alone in a social, ifnot monetary, sense. However, the severity of the drought is testing
this view.
3.2 Community ownership
Considerable media attention was generated from time to time over the summer and
autumn, particularly in Marlborough where journalists were covering a significant
missing persons case at the same time. Public meetings were inevitably followed by
television interviews of affected and stressed farmers who to varying degrees gave the
impression to viewers that the Governments packages for relief fell well short of their
expectations, both in content and focus.
$377,900**Total
Government has an expectation that rural communities are primarily responsible for
supporting themselves.
Only when the adverse event becomes beyond the capability of the local community to
cope will government interfere. Government also uses a yardstick of "national
signiflCance"when deciding to offer assistance. The I in 50 year rarity of event criterion
is also applied.
Policy changed in 1993 to a refocussed government involvement in adverse events.
There is an expectation from Government that rural people will develop their own risk
management strategies.
Government will assist families and animals in dire need but will not interfere with




In a drought situation the types of government assistance provided are:
Throul:h MAE-
The running costs of the drought relief office.
Local district councils supported the various drought committees activities to differing
degrees. Mayoral funds were set up, information shared and donations made. Some
pressure was brought to bear on local politicians to publicly support the cause by




The benefit of this support to individuals is difficult to quantify. The value of a visit from
a local person who understands the predicament the individual farm family faces cannot
be underestimated. While these people do not claim to be psychologists, they recognise
some of the telltale signs of stress, and have been able to guide families to those who can
help with potentially serious issues. Mostly, the value has been in face to face contact
with a sympathetic ear. The family is then made aware of what other services are
available from the support group.
3.4 Technical support
Specific funds were made available in the Marlborough package to be used as the
drought commillee wished for the provision of technical advice. Canterbury specifically
declined this type of assistance, preferring instead to receive funding for their rural
support activities. Beyond a preference that these funds not be used for individual advice
for farmers, and accountability for the funds, there were no other specifications put on
these funds by Government.
It was noted that this part ofthe package in Marlborough was not utilised in a structured
way. There are several possible reasons for this - there is a relatively low concentration
of farm management consultants in the region, there was a direct input by Wrightsons
via Agriculture NZ into one to one feed budgeting exercises, and the most pressing
issues to address were water and hay supply which fully occupied the drought commillee
for much of the time the assistance was available. However, there was also a discernible
lack of ideas and initiatives on technical farm management issues from the community -
a feeling of"not knowing what they needed to know". In previous events, Government
through MAF has addressed these issues as a mailer of course - for example, how to
introduce grain feeding to stock in potentially mob-stocked situation close to a water
source.
The need to gather information on the magnitude of the effects of the drought by doing
a survey was suggested by MAF Policy, rather than having been a natural part of a
communities planning and response to the drought event. Help with formulating the
survey and analysis ofthe results was provided by MAF Policy - again, something which
would automatically been undertaken by MAF during previous events. The survey has
helped the commillee to confidently inform the rest of the community via newspaper
articles about the effects of the drought, while drawing allention to the need to reduce
stock numbers further. It is believed that when another event occurs, the need to gather
information will be recognised earlier and undertaken as a mailer of course. For
example, North Otago recently undertook a survey based on the Marlborough format
to decide whether a request to Government for assistance was justifiable.
3.5 Service and Processing Industry
After initial disappointment with the farm service industry response to the drought in
Marlborough, the community benefilled enormously by very well organised field days
paid for predominantly by a major service company. The real success of these days
however, appears to be allributable to the focus on the farm family (entertaining guest
speakers, provision ofchild support, and food) as a priority. Relevant and high quality
presentations of positive options for farmers to consider to recover as quickly as possible
from the drought, and "no punches pulled" messages about the future from successful
farm business people contributed to the message that the future lies in the individual
farming family's hands - not Governments.
The processing industry has been very supportive of farmers plight and have generally
done everything possible to minimise delays in processing stock.
3.6 Recovery
While all this sounds positive, the future for many farms is very uncertain. The recovery
has not yet begun. Many farms have had a beller year in 1998 than they budgetted due
to planned and forced stock sales, and have a higher level of cash than usual. The
CanterburylMarlborough Hill Country model farm from MAF's Farm Monitoring
programme shows a $20,000 increase in disposable profit compared to 1997. However,
the forecast for 1999 is for a fall of $35,000, leaving a shortfall after tax, drawings and
interest of ($10,(00). There are many farms in Marlborough which are much smaller and
more climatically vulnerable than the monitor farm, and so could reasonably be assumed
to be relatively worse off than this example.
Replacement stock prices will be keenly watched. Some very careful cash management
will need to occur to ensure that farms are in a position to recover stock numbers as
quickly as possible while providing enough cash to meet the needs of the family. Added
to this now are the uncertainties about the employment situation which may affect many
farmers and farming partners who either already work off-farm or who are hoping to do
so to aid the recovery of the farm business over the next few years.
4. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE IN LATE 1980's
Given this uncertain and potentially perilous state of many East Coast farms, it is timely
to examine past Government support measures and the outcomes achieved from these
compared to the objectives of the support measure.
The current drought is not the first, nor will it be the last drought to hit farmers on the
east coast of New Zealand. While the effects on individual farms have been similar from
one event to another, Government's policy responses have changed over the last 15
years.
Government policy's operating over this time can broadly be categorised as
• almost total fmancial support to rebuild the farm business up until the mid
1980's;
encouraging restructuring ofthese businesses in the late 1980's and early 1990's;
and
support of animal and human welfare with minimal interference in the business
of farming from 1992.
...to.
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There have been several reports written covering the 1988/89 event which examine these
policies and the on-farm responses (Brown Copeland 1991; Lough 1990). This section
attempts to bring the important issues from these reports together so there can he more
informed debate about Government response to the 1998 drought and future events.
4.1 Adverse Evenis Family Income Support
As with other self-employed people, farmers are not normally eligible for Income
Support via the Department of Social Welfare. Under AEFIS, farmers who had
insufficient income to meet household expenses could receive $1801 or more per week.
About 3400 farm families received payments, totalling $31 m to the end of the scheme
on 30 April 1990.
4.1.1 Objectives
Maintain family income at a minimum level so that a reasonable level of
household expenditure could be maintained;
Stimulate regional economy and boost farmer confidence.
Compensate for percieved shortcomings in the DSW treatment of self-employed
farmers by providing support equivalent to the DSW Special Needs Hardship
Grant
4.1.2 Features of 1988/90 AEFIS scheme
farmers were knowingly treated differently from other self-employed people
some asset classes were ignored in the calculation of entitlement which would
normally be liquidated under DSW policy eg pension funds, bank accounts <
$6,000, shares etc intended for childrens education and/or retiremene
self-assessment of eligibility
off-farm income was included as part of gross farm income
all "normal cash farm expenses" being deductible in arriving at an "income
available for household spending"
intended to be taxable income, but not able to be rebated retrospectively if actual
farm income was found to be greater than estimated
4.1.3 Outcomes
significant reduction in fmancial and personal stress of recipients
estimated that 45% of AEFIS expenditure went to increased household
expenditure, 20% to increased farm expenditure, and 35% to reducing debt.
most of the household and farm expenditure was spent in the local area,
providing a welcome, albeit indirect, benefit to regional economies
20% of recipients experienced increased income in 1988/89 year
I For one child, more for additional children
2 This may have been considered fair by those who have provided for their future, the North Island scheme was
much less generous in this regard.
while surveyed farmers all believed AEFIS should be repeated in future
droughts, 15% of recipients and 60% of non-recipients believed the eligibility
criteria should be tighter
4.1.4 Discussion
The objectives were all achieved to a degree. AEFIS was considered to be consistent
with general government social welfare policies of the time. It was effective at reducing
stress and partially effective at stimulating the local regional economies. Improved
targetting, auditting and c1awback provisions would go some way to justifying its
inclusion in future support packages.
The inconsistencies in the eligibility of farmers compared with other self-employed
people was particularly felt by rural-based small businesses. The case for the exception
for farmers was based on the fact that a shortfall in income did not indicate a non-viable
business in the longer term, and the effect on the land market (and therefore other
marginal farmers) of the requirement to sell the farm before support is forthcoming.
Inconsistency and abuse arose with the definition of "normal" farm expenditure, since
one drought strategy for farmers is to "stop spending" during a drought. Therefore,
some fertiliser use and repairs etc could legitimately be self-assessed as discretionary
expenditure and increase the level of AEFIS recieved. A suggestion (Brown Copeland
1991) was to have a more stringent defmition by for example excluding non-essential
repairs and fertiliser since the aim of AEFIS is to help the family, not the farm business.
The treatment of off-farm income as part of the gross farm income acknowledged the
reality of how farm families operate with business inextricably linked to personal
activities. Justification can be provided for this departure from other self-employed
situations by explicitly acknowledging that the situation will not last for a long time and
the business is expected to recover. However, this effectively means the Government
indirectly supported farm businesses via the AEFIS.
Note the Government's Income Support package for the 1998 drought rebates off-farm
income dollar for dollar, requires assessment in conjunction with a Rural Support person,
requires 4-weekly reapplication, and has requirements to liquidate more assets than was
the case in 1989/90.
4.2 New Start Grants
Where a farmer sold the farm, a grant was made available sufficient to build the farmers'
equity on selling the farm up to $45,000 (excluding the car, household and personal
chattels and tools of trade). These were taken up by 350 farmers, and cost $14m.
4.2.1 Objectives
improve farm viability by either shifting inefficient management off the land,
changing management patterns by amalgamation or product mix, or changing
debt burden
facilitate farm sales and restart farm turnover
N
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social welfare support by providing some dignity for insolvent farmers, or
improving viability of farms so welfare assistance would not be required in future
4.2.2 Outcomes
fmanciers felt 80-90% of recipients would have been forced to leave even if there
had been no 'drought
an estimated 44% of the recipients were still living on the same farm, and 35%
were managing the farm on behalf of another owner. However, most of this last
group are thought to be family based concerns
net result is that an estimated 70% of farms have been restructured in a fmancial
sense only
benefits to fmanciers and farmers by making resolution of problems easier,
although farmers noted stress was not reduced by having the NSG scheme
Government incurred further fmancialloss from the waiving of GST, which
would otherwise have been a preferred creditor
4.2.3 Discussion
There were a number of farms thought to be insolvent at the time of the 1988/89
drought. Rural Bank exit grants, a condition of which was farmers leave the property,
had been operating but the desired restructuring was being hampered by fewer sales
occurring. Financiers were reluctant to force a sale (costs of doing so were about
$30,(00) and insolvent farmers had an incentive to remain on their farms which
provided accommodation, some food, a job and some income. The drought offered a
psychologically easier way of getting out since the drought could be blamed for the
failure.
A number of inconsistencies were accepted in this Government policy in relation to the
NSG initiative. The benefits of the restructuring of the businesses were mostly private,
unless considerable weight was given to the view that the insolvent farms were
producing less than could be produced following changes in ownership. There was
further transfer of fmancial risk to Government from the waiver of GST. The
government has not adopted any similar scheme for other businesses where managers
have made what turned out to be poor decisions. While the home is often inseparable
from the business, there are other cases where this also occurs (eg small retail shops).
The drought was not primarily responsible for the problems on these farms, but the
scheme was only offered to those within the drought areas. While exit and restructuring
was the primary aim, farmers in the South Island were allowed to lease back their farms
from the "new" owners as this arrangement met the criteria.
There were benefits of the scheme for some who exitted the industry with very low or
zero equity. The scheme is also creditted by some for kick-starting the land market in a
positive way, thus avoiding a potential collapse. Arguably, the second objective was
therefore achieved.
4.3 Drought Rehabilitation Loans
Up to $45,000 was made available to farms deemed viable in the medium term by
financiers, and where costs of debt servicing and rent exceeded 15% of GF! in the
1987/88 accounts. Interest was met by Government at Government stock rate plus 1%
for first two years, and guaranteed 80% of principal debt for frrst four years. Lenders
were able to charge interest to cover their costs, so farmers were paying 2-4% over the
first two years. The cost to Government was $17m for 2040 farmers who received
loans.
4.3.1 Objectives
make finance available to those who would not otherwise be able to borrow, but
would be viable in long tenn, to enable recovery to take place more rapidly than
otherwise
remove need for welfare assistance in medium term by preventing collapse of
viable farms, and long term by improving profitability rapidly via higher levels of
investment
boost regional economy by increasing expenditure
improve morale of rural communities
4.3.2 Outcomes
farmer confidence and morale of communities were improved
a survey of funds borrowed showed that 75% went to refmancing other debt,
19% lo expenditure on stock/feed/fertiliser, and 6% on other expenditure
(capital equipment, irrigation, even Government Stock!)
89% of recipients felt the loan had improved their long term viability
only 8% of recipients felt they would have been unable to borrow any funds had
the DRL scheme not been available. Over half thought they could have borrowed
all they needed.
most farmers had knowingly put themselves into a high physical risk position
because of financial pressures. Slightly over half said if they were certain that no
assistance would be available in future events, they would adopt less risky
physical and/or fmancial strategies.
half said the DRL made little difference to how they operated their farms
4.3.3 Discussion
The DRL scheme achieved the objectives of improving morale and confidence, and
arguably of improving the recovery rate of farms who refmanced debt. However, from
the survey results outlined, it is likely most recipient farms were viable in the short term
anyway, since they had either already financed expenditure or had strategies in place. As
little additional expenditure took place, the boost to regional economies from this
particular initiative was probably small.
The scheme worked well administratively, linking into established banking and farm
management pathways. However, issues of equity with other businesses and other
N
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farmers, distortions in long term resource allocation, and Government risk exposure
remained unanswered by this policy.
4.4 Consultancy and technology transfer packages
Farm appraisals were carried out for 899 farms at a cost of $1.3m ($1500/appraisal) to
the end of December 1989. Other consultancies were carried out for 423 farms, costing
$190,000 ($450/farm). In addition, $20,000 was spent on field days and $40,000 on a
booklet called "Drought Proofing Your Farm".
4.4.1 Objectives
help farmers assess their current situation and future opportunitIes, and
determine whether other elements of the package were appropriate eg NSG's,
DRL's
improve farming practices, recommend drought-proofmg techniques to reduce
risk in future
provide information to lenders for DRL's
4.4.2 Outcomes
information was provided to enable uptake of other parts of the package
a survey showed recommendations were taken up in 80% of cases, but
interviewers formed the view that IOOSt of this uptake would have happened even
without the advice, since the farmers had also reached the same conclusions)
the technology transfer part (field days and booklet) were well received but
farmers were not in the right frame of mind to receive what amounts to medium
term advice on "how to handle the next drought while in the middle of the
current one".
a proportion of the reports (10%, Brown Copeland 1991) were considered by
financiers to be of very poor quality, either due to lack of depth or through the
consultant losing objectivity.
4.4.3 Discussion
Provision of information was considered to be an appropriate role for Government. One
on one type activities were likely to be more effective but also more expensive, and may
serve only to reinforce the farmers' plans rather than changing the methods employed.
Never the less, the main advantage of consultancy provision was to improve long term
viability, whereas the other forms of assistance resulted mainly in propping up the
existing system. There were also many issues surrounding the quality of the consultant
activities (Engelbrecht 1991), such as consistency, appropriateness of advice, attitude,
thoroughness of the analysis, and usefulness to the farmer of the report presentation.
J It is recognised this may be somewhat unfair on the consultancy profession, as confirmation of a farmers
intention is a worthwhile outcome of consultancy
4.5 Conclusions on past assistance measures
Generally, the assistance measures of the late 1980's improved farmer confidence and
restored productive capacity. However, perhaps only minor structural and attitudinal
changes were made in the farming industry as a result. Arguably, the only policy measure
which achieved this to any extent was one on one consultancy and technology transfer
activities. AEFIS is considered to be least distortionary and is consistent with general
social welfare objectives. Some form of loan, eg modified DRL's, could be appropriate
if Government wishes to increase assistance, but this should be with the objective of
injecting confidence (Brown Copeland 1991).
Problems with equity and efficiency were accepted by Government in the 1988/89
package, and arguably as a result structural changes in the farming industry did not take
place to the extent they may have without assistance. The significance of this in relation
to following years' increases in stock and land prices would be interesting to evaluate,
particularly given that the majority of those surveyed would take less risks if they were
sure there wa~ going to be no government assistance in future (Brown Copeland 1991).
This implies that an event for which no Government assistance is forthcoming will need
to occur before farmers will be sure, and make the necessary structural adjustments.
Perhaps we are seeing the cost of this attitude among some farmers now.
5. POLICY ISSUES ARISING FROM CURRENT 1998 EVENT
5.1 Equity
Any assistance beyond that already offered raises issues of equity both alOOng farmers
and between sectors. Add to this the fact that the differences in the effects of the drought
between farms and regions appears to have been a symptom of a more fundamental
problem with farming - low profitability.
It is generally accepted that it is not only unfair to favour one group ahead of any other
(half of farmers surveyed in 1990 believed that no Government assistance should be
provided if a drought was to occur again; Walker 1994) , but it is also distortionary in
the medium to long term as resources are not used as efficiently as they would otherwise
have been. However, are there compelling arguments to support some inequitable
treatment in the short term to encourage a greater gain in the future? The evidence from
previous events does not support the view that there are. Would better targetting of
some types of assistance achieve better outcomes? For example, would well-targetted
new start grants encourage the entrance of different management personnel and business
structures to improve the average performance of the industry? Can such a scheme retain
flexibility yet effectively "pick winners"?
5.2 Business structures and management
Studies of farm accounts show that the single characteristic which separates high income
earners from average ones is the ability to make decisions early, set dates for
implementation and carry the plan out (Alexander 1991). There is no relationship
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between success and the farm physical characteristics, debt, farmer age, or expenditure.
Successful farmers have motivation and determination to maximise profit, not just
achieve a comfortable standard of living (Scales 1990). Observation suggests this to be
the case in other sectors and indeed in society.
Can these factors be learnt or encouraged by policy changes? Is a change of personnel
required?
Farm businesses are different (but not unique) from other business structures in that
there is usually no separation of business and personal ownership or fmances, and the
house is almost always part of the business structure. This leads to difficulties with
implementing social policy fairly and equitably - both in income terms via the treatment
of self-employment for income support, and in asset terms where the house cannot be
separated from the farm.
Perhaps a solution is to encourage changes in farm structure, rather than in tinkering
with social policy to try to make the situation of farmers fit which gives rise to
allegations of favoured treatment. Separation of business and personal income and
expenditure streams can be a sensible business management strategy anyway - the use
of company structures allows this to happen. Barriers to this happening may be attitude,
taxation, initial changeover costs and accounting complexity, which should be weighed
against the possible advantages for succession, income assistance, capital introduction
and others.
Separation of the personal assets from the business ones would also allow equitable
treatment of farming with other business situations. Major limitations to this are the
costs and the local government policies surrounding subdivision.
5.3 Value of farming to economy· social, environmental and economic
There is considerable debate on the value of farming to the economy of New Zealand.
On purely monetary grounds it is inconsistent with Government policy to argue that
agriculture or any component of it should be favoured ahead of any other. Recent events
outside of New Zealand's control have provided some basis for calls to support and
encourage export-based industries to reduce the impact of such events on our economy.
What are the methods by which this could be achieved?
Are there social and/or environmental net benefits of farming which will be reduced if
the current hands-off approach is continued? This is the area which requires
investigation. If the status quo continues, what will marginal farmers do? If they do not
exit the industry or restructure, what environmental effects will there be of continuing
to try to survive on their farms in an undercapitalised state? What social costs will there
be of farms being forced to restructure? What social costs will there be for rural
communities of not encouraging restructuring? What is Government's legitimate role
within the current policy framework to achieve the outcome of maximising agriculture's
contribution to New Zealand's well-being?
A self-reliant farming industry will not be achieved quickly without addressing these
issues. Continued support until very recently of farm businesses, has continued the
expectations many still have that Government will ultimately support farming ahead of
other sectors. If it is to do so, there will need to be justification on social and/or
environmental grounds which satisfies the majority of the country.
The appendix contains questions farmers have asked which reflect the issues surrounding
the value of agriculture to New Zealand..
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APpENDIX· QUESTIONS MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED BY FARMERS:
6.1 To what extent if any should government assist with freaks of nature? Would
the government not assist a major city hit by a major earthquake? Does the
community have an obligation through govenunent to help those in dire need and
maintain a productive base?
6.2 Because the drought is slow and insidious it does not get the attention from
politicians that it deserves. Slow and insidious adverse events can be just as
disastrous.
6.3 Most would agree that government should not intervene in the business, or
underwrite the risk of individual business failure. But farmers argue that it is
impossible for an individual to obtain insurance on a risk of a drought nature -
insurance policies don't exist for this.
6.4 Is govenunent adequately protecting the future earning capacity of the land, for
the good of the nation in the long term? Ifpeople are forced to sell, are there
capable farmers willing and able to buy the farming assets?
6.5 What about issues of equity, should government continue to support farmers
who don't take adequate steps themselves?
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6.6 Many rural communities do not have strong leadership and local organisations
even with head office backing may not have the resources or ability to manage
the situation locally. In all areas with drought relief offices the onus has been on
local Federated Farmers to undertake the coordination role. They have not
favoured their own members, providing a service for all despite not being
fmanced to assist non members.
6.7 Perhaps there is an argument that government should not benefit in any way
from the farmers plight. In this regard it has been argued that increased road
transport, transporting feed and animals, has netted the government more
revenue in the form of road user charges.
6.8 Should the govenunent do more environmentally? Sustainable farming initiatives
which require farmer input are unlikely to happen in drought areas. Even
focusing farmers attention on environmental issues now could be fruitless. Their
immediate concern is fmancial survival. Should the wider community be more
involved with assisting farmers in attaining environmental goals?
6.9 Rating costs for the average farm are thought to be high in relation to services
received from local and regional councils. This is widely recognised as a wealth
tax, but is it fair if the asset on which the wealth is based is incapable of
producing a consistent revenue? Should rating be linked to assets or to
revenue? This is a particular bone of contention with farmers facing increasing
rates and declining incomes.
~IMPACT OF RECENT ECONOMIC REFORMS ON





The experience of recent economic reform in Bangladesh was mixed. Though
macro-economic performance of the country has improved in recent years, the trend
growth rate of agriculture slowed down over the reform period. The decline in
growth of agriculture was attributed to a decline in growth of the crop sub-sector.
The growth of crop agriculture was affected by frequent natural calamities and
withdrawal of input subsidies. Nevertheless, the total production of crops increased
over time and the level of financial profitability per unit of land improved recently.
Farmers tended to diversify their farm business. follow intensive practices and
become more efficient in farming as a result of economic reforms in Bangladesh.
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BACKGROUND
Viewpoint
After World War II, many countries in Asia and Africa were decolonised. The
structure of those countries were significantly different from that of the developed
ones. These countries were resource poor and many of their citizens were living
below the poverty line. Since markets were imperfect and less efficient in allocating
resources in developing countries, they required the government to intervene for
building up the economy. A number of writers I believe that such intervention is
necessary in developing countries for creating infrastructure for development,
establishing social justice in income distribution and for poverty alleviation.
The economy of many developing countries in question is based on agriculture. The
density of population per unit of land in some of those countries is high and per
capita availability ofland is poor. The average size of farm is very small compared to
that of the developed countries. Lewis (1984) observed that the small farmers in
developing countries have a tendency to become heavily indebted which reduces
their ability and incentive to invest in raising the productivity of land. In the case of
industrial sector, there is a lack of adequate supply of entrepreneurs. Required
infrastructural facilities to induce private investment is non-existent. Moreover,
socio-economic environment is not very conducive to take the risk of setting up new
industries. Under such circumstances both the sectors of economy need support from
• The author is a Chief Scientific Officer and Head of Economics and Marketing Research Division at
Bangladesh Livestock Research Institute. Dhaka. Currently he is a Visiting Scholar in Commerce
Division at Lincoln University. New Zealand. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
author's and not necessarily those of any organization he is affiliated with.
I Among them. Arthur Lewis is the leading one.
the Government at the early stage of development. Indeed, several countries in Asia
adopted interventionist principles in the sixties and seventies; provided subsidies to
agriculture and protection to industries.
The myth of structuralism may be viewed as interventionism in the context of
developing countries. This was criticised for excess of government control over
economic matters that contributed to chronic inflation, retarded development of the
financial sector, proliferation of bureaucratic regulations2, fiscal imbalance and
increased external debt. The slow economic progress made by some of the
developing countries has been diagnosed as the result of excessive economic
intervention made by their own governments. In recent years, most of the developing
countries have abandoned interventionism and adhered to reform.
The recent interest in market-led development is induced by the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary
Fund (lMF)3. They lend money to governments in times of need and want that they
get the money back on maturity of lending period. It is of their interest to keep the
size of public deficit small and create a favourable balance of payment position in the
international trade of borrowing countries so that they are able to service their
existing debt and depend less on further external finance. After the recession of
1970s the IMF and the World Bank provided highly concessional soft loans to
developing countries for structural adjustment. These loans required adherence to a
large set of stringent conditions to economic policy reform. The suggested policy
regime include achievement of macro-economic stability through monetary and fiscal
discipline, avoiding price distortions, and liberalising trade and investment. So far,
the impact ofreform has been positive on the growth rate ofGDP, fiscal deficits and
intlation4 . I-I~wever, there are variations in results from country to country. This
paper presents evidence from Bangladesh to help assess the impact of recent reform
on economic development with special reference to agricultural development in the
context of a developing country.
Ban~ladesh: An Introduction
Bangladesh; is the youngest state in South Asia. Once known as East Bengal6 and
later as East Pakistan,' Bangladesh became an independent and sovereign stateS of
1 Soon (1994).
3 Both the organisations were created at a conference organised by the United Nations in 1944 in
Briton Woods. New Hamsphire. The IMF was entrusted with the responsibility of managing the
structure of exchange rates among the various world currencies and for financing short-tenn
imbalances of payments among countries. The World Bank was given the authority to provide long-
term loans for reconstruction of devasted economies after the World War 11 and for development of
the poorer countries of the World.
• See for evidence, World Bank (1997).
'Bangladesh is the local-language name of the linguistic area. The mother tongue of the people of
the country is Ban[!.la. (Bengali). Desh means country.
6 Before the partition of India in 1947, Bangladesh was a part of British ruled India and was known as
East Bengal.
7 After the partition of India. Bangladesh became the eastern wing of Pakistan and was known as East
Pakistan.
8 The independence of Bangladesh was declared by the late President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman at mid-night of 25th March and after 9-month heroic struggle of the freedom fighters, the
country was liberated from the occupation of the Pakistan anny on 16th December, 1971. For a
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Asia in 1971. It has an area of 147,570 square kilometres, and is surrounded by India
in the west, north and east, Burma in the south-east, and the Bay of Bengal in the
south. The country is situated approximately between 20.34° and 26.34° north
latitude and between 88.01() and 92.41° east longitude.
Bangladesh is the eighth most populous nation in the world. The total population of
the country is about 120 millionq. The natural resource base of the country is poor lO•
The physical features, climate and natural resource constraints have made the country
predominantly rural. Rural population accounts for about 90 per cent of the total
population.
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries of the world. Average per capita income
amounts to only US$ 260. About a half of the population is considered to be below
the poverty line.
Three Time Phases
From the last 25 years (1972/73-1996/97) of economic reconstruction and
development in Bangladesh, three successive time phases of policy changes can be
clearly identified. These are: the phase of intensive intervention, the initial phase of
Iiberalisation, and the phase of economic reform.
Phase one starts from 1972/73 and goes up to 1977/78. This phase was characterised
by the post independence reconstruction that broadly corresponds to the
implementation period of the Firsl Five Year Plan (1973/74-1977/78). The objective
of planned development was to achieve socialism in a democratic manner. All
financing organisations and industries were nationalised. There was considerable
state control over the economy. Agriculture enjoyed heavy subsidy and public sector
was responsible for inputs distribution. Domestic industries were protected from
foreign competition through import restriction. Thus the first six years of post
independence period can be identified as the phase of intensive intervention I I.
Phase two goes from 1978/79 to 1989/90. Three development plans, namely the Two
Year Plan (1978/79-1979/80), the Second Five Year Plan (1980/81-7984/85), and the
Third Five Year Plan (1985/86-1989/90) were implemented during this period. This
was a phase of army-led development12• This phase was marked by denationalisation
of industries. gradual withdrawal of subsidies from agricultural inputs and
privatisation of input distribution system. Government policies were influenced by
chronological development of events that led to the declaration of independence and for a description
on mass killing and destruction of economy by the Pakistan Anny, and the nationalist resistance led
by the Awami League (the party in majority headed by the Bangabandhu) during the liberation
struggle. see Alam (1971).
9 The density of population in Bangladesh is the highest in the World.
10 The country posses natural gas, limestone and lignite only at a limited scale.
II There was a political change on 15 august 1975 with the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman. the President of the country. This political change was not, however, immediately
translated into economic policy change. It was most likely that the two important sectors of the
economy, agriculture and industries, continued to be benefited by policies fonnulated by the
Bangabandhu until the tenninal year of the First Five Year Plan.
11 Two Generals of anny had led the country during this phase. However, they came to power in a
similar way. legitimated their positions in a similar way, and adopted the same nature of policies for
economic development.
Structural Adjustment Policies of the World Bank and the IMF. These 12 years can
be identified as the initial phase of liberalization.
Phase three starts from 1990/91 and goes up to 1996-97. During this phase, the
economy relied more on market forces and state intervention on the economy
substantially reduced. There was a marked reduction of tariff rates on imports and a
reduction of subsidy from agricultural inputs. A tight monetary and fiscal policy and
a flexible exchange rate policy were followed throughout this phase. These seven
years can be identified as a period of parliamentary democracy and a period of
economic reform 13.
MACRO-ECONOMY
Structure of the Economy
Economic structure refers to the relationship among the various sectors of the
economy. Generally three main sectors, namely primary, secondary and tertiary are
broadly recognised. An examination of the composition of GDP of a country
provides the necessary insights into the structure of the economy. Bangladesh Bureau
of Statistics (BBS) furnishes data on annual value addition created by production of
all goods and services in II groups. For convenience, we have decomposed them into
three groups: (I) agriculture (primary), (2) industry and construction (secondary) and
(3) services (tertiary) sectors. Agriculture includes, crops, livestock, forestry and
fisheries sub-sectors I4 . All residual sub-sectors IS, other than industries and
construction, have been grouped under services sector.
Figure I shows the composition of Bangladesh real GDP '6 in 1996-97. It can be
noticed that the share of agriculture to GDP is 32 per cent. The secondary sector
(industries and construction together) contributes 17 per cent to GDP, while the
services sector contributes 51 per cent. Although the relative share of agriculture to
GDP has declined over time, the contribution of agriculture to GDP in Bangladesh is
still very high J7. On the other hand, the share of industrial sector to GDP is very
low ls .
It was expected that in a growing economy, the share of agriculture to GDP would
fall and that of manufacturing would rise, followed by a rise in the share of services
sector l9. In Bangladesh, the share of agriculture has declined sharply over time from
49.8 per cent in 1972-73 to 32 per cent in 1996-97 (in 1984-85 prices) although the
total value of agricultural production increased significantly over time. In contrast,
13 There was a change of government after the parliamentary pools in mid-1996. However, this did
not affect the continuity of policies undertaken on economic refonn.
14 The contribution of mining and quarrying to GDP is insignificant and has been added with industry.
II Include power, gas, water and sanitary services; transport, storage and communications services;
trade services; housing services; public administration and defence services; banking and insurance
services; and professional and miscellaneous services.
16 BBS (1993) defines GDP as the money value of all the final goods and services produced within a
country in a year less the intennediate consumption (those used up in production of other products).
17 The share of agriculture to GDP is less than 10 per cent in developed countries, while the share of
manufacturing is over 15 per cent. In New Zealand, the contribution of agriculture to GDP is less than
6 per cent and the contribution of manufacturing is over 17 per cent.
18 For a comparison, see (Asian Development Bank,1996).
19 See for evidence and arguments, Kuznets (1971).
the share of industries to GOP remained stagnant and that of services sector increased
(Figure 2). It means that the decline in the contribution of agriculture to GOP was
compensated by a rise in the share of the services sector. The evidence suggests that
industrial sector in Bangladesh did not grow over time and the transfer of labour
occurred mainly from agriculture to low paid services rather than to industries. The
first phase of development in Bangladesh was characterised by state intervention
when almost all industries were under state control. Ouring the second phase, most of
those industries were privatised by army-led Governments in conformity with
Structural Adjustment Policies. The privatization and deregulation process was even
intensified during the third phase, Le. the phase of economic reform when the
country was under parliamentary democracy. But the relative share of the industrial
sector to GOP did not show signs of improvement. It appears from Sobhan (1990)
that the post intervention period reform policies were unable to promote competition
in the industrial sector and that there was large scale financial indiscipline and debt-
default in private industries. The frequent strike and political unrest in the early
1990s was another factor responsible for stagnation in the industrial sector. In any
case, the long-term stagnation in the share of industrial sector to county's GOP is a
cause of major concern and should be dealt with all seriousness.
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1984-85, 1987-88 and in 1988-89 due to floods that seriously disrupted economic
activities. The growth of real per capita GOP strongly recovered in 1989-90 and after
that continued to increase without any setback.
Just after independence, the country faced considerable macro-conomic imbalance.
Consumption exceeded income2o, and savings GOP ratio became negative. As a
result, the country had to depend heavily on foreign assistance to meet the resource
gap. Even today, the country's development programmes are tied to the generosity of
, Paris aid consortium'.
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To have a comparison of average annual increase in the standard of living among the
three phases, annual growth rate of real per capita GOP were calculated by fitting
semi-logarithmic trend lines. The calculation shows that the real per capita GOP
grew at the rate of 1.67 per cent over the last 25 years. The growth rates were 0.99
per cent for the first phase, 1.55 per cent for the second phase and 2.43 per cent for
the third phase. It appears that the improvement in general standard of living was
associated with the progress of economic reform.
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An important method of evaluating the performance of an economy is to concentrate
on real per capita GOP over time. The real per capita GOP is obtained by dividing
the annual real GOP by the mean population. The change in real per capita GOP in
Bangladesh over the last 25 years is shown in figure 3. It can be noticed that the
average standard of living of Bangladeshi people has improved over time. The real
per capita GOP in 1972-73 was Taka 3560 (in 1984-85 prices), that increased to Taka
5460 in 1996-97. It implies that the general standard of living of Bangladeshi people
has increased by 53 per cent over the last 25 years. There are, however, many
countries in Asia who have achieved much higher increase in real per capita GOP
over the same period.
Figure 3 shows. an overall upward trend of real per capita GOP. There were,
however, some deviations from the trend. The economy experienced a strong growth
in 1973-74, after independence, then fell during the flood year of 1974-75. After that
the economy slowly improved throughout the 1980s. There were marked falls of real
per capita GOP in 1976-77 and 1979-80 due to floods, and in 1981-82 due to drought
and political turmoil. The economy then picked up, but fell down again and again in
An important feature of recent macro economic scenario in Bangladesh is the steady
rise in the saving rate. The national saving rate has risen from -1.19 per cent in 1972-
73 to about 9 per cent in 1989-90 and further to about 15 per cent in 1996-97. The
investment-GOP ratio has also increased (Table I).
A major part the of saving has been contributed by public savings that was generated
through creation of surplus in government's budget. Another part of saving has come
from private households who received remittance from abroad but has spent only a
part of it. Moreover, recent improvement in financial discipline might have
discouraged people from consumption of unearned income that aided savings. In
addition, the real interest rate which has been positive, encouraged the formation of
private savings.
Investment in the private sector has recently increased faster than the public sector.
Since the early I990s, the relative position of public sector investment declined. This
has 'crowded in' private investment. The aggregate rate of investment in terms of
investment-GOP ratio is still lower in Bangladesh compared to other developing
20 Consumption expenditure was 101.92% oflhe GOP in 1972-73.
countries of the world. Given the steady increase in saving rate and assured
assistance from the donors, it is possible to increase the investment-GOP ratio from
the current 17 per cent to about 25 per cent in the near future.
Current Account Balance
Bangladesh has experienced a gradual reduction in current account deficit in most
recent years (Table I). The liberalization of trade has resulted in rapid increase in
volume of exports and imports, but the rate of increase in exports has been faster
than the rate of increase in imports in the early 1990s. Thus the trade deficit reduced.
Moreover, there has been a strong growth ofremittance21 for the last couple of years
that resulted in a decline in current account deficit.
1990s reaching its peak in 1993-94 to 8 months of import equivalent (Figure 5). This
level ofreserve, however, has declined in most recent years.
The high build up of foreign exchange reserve in the early 1990s was attributed to a
stronger monetary and fiscal policies that improved the macro-economic climate of
the country. In addition, high growth ofexport and wage earners' remittance have
substantially contributed to the high level of foreign exchange build up. The recent
depletion of reserve was related to the continuing downward trend in the aid
disbursements and private portfolio capital outflows driven by developments in stock
markets.
Fig.S: Level of foreign exchange reserve over time
Inflation Rate
Forej~n Exchan~e Reserye
The foreign exchange reserve level of the country had been always very low during
the 1970s and 1980s. The reserve level was equivalent to only about 1.3 months of
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Bangladesh has made significant improvement in the fiscal sector in recent years.
Total revenue. collection increased while expenditure declined in the 1990s resulting
in an improvement in the fiscal deficit. As a result, the dependence on foreign
assistance declined.
Table 2 shows a sharp increase in total revenue in the early 1990s. This was mainly
due to an increase in tax revenue since 1991-92. Tax revenue increased sharply due
to introduction of value added tax (VAT)22 in that year. In later years, the coverage of
VAT extended.
On the other hand, the total expenditure of the government, as a proportion to GOP,
has declined due to a relative decline in expenditure in the non-revenue areas,
particularly in the areas of development and capital expenditures where the private
sector could make a positive contribution. Thus the overall budget deficit of the
government improved. At the same time, the government increased its domestic
borrowing from banks23 and non-bank sources to finance its declining deficits. As a
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Recent reform in monetary policies has made a significant positive impact on the rate
of inflation. Just after liberation. in early 1970s, the country experienced a very high
rate of inflation. The inflation rate, as measured by consumer's price index, went up
to 62 per cent during the year of floods in 1974-75 (Figure 4). After the political
change of August 1975. there was a sharp decline in the rate of inflation. However,
the inflation rate increased in the following few years and was hovering around 12 to
15 per cent until the political change in 1982. The rate of inflation contracted in
1982-83, after the political change, and increased again in the following few years.
Ouring the early 1990s the rate of inflation gradually declined and came down to 1.4
per cent in 1992-93 but rose to 5.2 per cent in 1994-95 mainly due to higher food
prices. following a drought in the northern areas of Bangladesh that affected
agricultural production. Nevertheless, with good harvests in the following two years,
the rate of inflation contracted again.
I\)
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1I Workers remittence increased from 761 million US dollars in 1989-90 to 1475 million US dollars in
1996-97.
22 This was the most remarkable innovation of the then Finance Minister Mr. Saifur Rahman, who in
spite of strong opposition, was able to implement it successfully.
2 This was done when the demand for credit from the private sector was low and the banking system
was able to lend the government without facing any liquidity crisis.
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The government had to depend almost entirely on external resources for
implementation of its development programmes during the 1970s. Recent reforms in
the fiscal sector has improved the situation.
AGRlCULTURE
Al:riculture jn the Economy
Agriculture is the dominant sector of the economy contributing 32 per cent to the
GOP. Approximately 24 per cent of the GOP is derived from crops and 18 per cent
from rice alone. Livestock and fisheries each contribute around 3 per cent to the GOP
against 2.4 per cent contributed by forestry. This sector generates about 22 per cent
of the total export earnings and provides employment to about 63 per cent of the
labour force.
Although the relative share of agriculture to country's GOP, export earnings and
employment has been declining over time, this sector will remain the largest single
contributor to income and employment in the near future. This sector will continue to
play an important role in achieving self sufficiency in food production, in reducing
rural poverty and fostering economic growth. It will also continue to be the major
supplier of raw materials to a large number of industries in the country.
Growth ofAl:ricylture
The annual growth rate of agricultural GOP has fluctuated frequently over the last 25
years (Figure 6). At the same time, the annual growth rate of total GOP has also
fluctuated. The major fluctuations in growth over the years were mainly related to
floods and droughts. For example. the growth rate ·of agriculture contracted in 1974-
75. 1976-77, 1978-79. 1979-80. 1984-85, 1987-88 and in 1988-89 when there was
floods and in 1981-82 and 1994-95 when there was droughts. On the other hand, the
growth rate accelerated in 1973-74. 1975-76, 1977-78, 1980-81, 1989-90 and 1996-
97 when nature was favourable and there was no flood or drought. The growth rate
of total GOP was more responsive to the growth rate of agricultural GOP during
1970s and early 1980s and after that period, its responsiveness declined as the share
of agriculture to total GOP sharply declined.
The growth rate of agriculture was very high during the good years of 1970s when
farmers were at the initial stage of adopting new technology. For example,
agriculture has experienced a growth rate of 8.4 per cent in 1975-76 which was
higher than the highest rate of growth achieved in 1980s and 1990s. The growth
potential seemed to have gradually slowed down over time.
The average annual growth rate of agriculture for the three time phases are presented
in Table 3. One can notice that the growth rate of agriculture has declined over time
although the growth rate of other sectors increased. It appears that the growth of
agriculture was affected by the occurrence of natural calamities and by withdrawal of
subsidies. Other sectors were less vulnerable to natural calamities and were less
affected by withdrawal of subsidies.
Composition of Al:ricultural GOP
Bangladesh agriculture is dominated by crop agriculture (Figure 7). Until late 1980s,
farmers were concentrating more on crop production, particularly on rice production.
This was due to incentive structure favouring rice production and the felt need for
producing more rice to satisfy their consumption. Many farmers were seen to have
converted their fish producing areas into rice producing areas to achieve self-
sufficiency in food-grain production. However, there has been a shift of preference in
recent years that led them to diversify their farm business24 • Consequently, the share
of crop sub-sector to total agricultural GOP has declined, while the shares of
livestock. fisheries and forestry sub-sectors have increased (Table 4).















Fig.6: Growth of total and agricultural GDP over time
Year ending June
There are five main reasons that motivated farmers towards diversification. First, the
problem of food deficit has not been so acute in recent years and farmers have been
producing at near self-sufficiency level in good years. Second, crop agriculture is
prone to natural calamities. Thus there is a risk of loss due to crop failure. So the
farmers invest in alternative sources of production to minimise the loss. Third, with
the withdrawal of subsidies from inputs, crop farming became less remunerative.
Fourth, with the increase in propaganda through national news medias, farmers have
tended to produce more portein-rich food to enrich their diet. Finally, government
policies have favoured production of milk, meet, eggs and fish to reduce the
24 This time. a considerable number of paddy fields have been converted into shrimp fanns in the
southeast and southwest coastal regions.
There was a significant growth in the production of wheat (10%) over the last 25
years. Its growth rate declined from 25.5% in the first phase to 3.8% in the second
phase and then increased to 6.0% in the third phase. The production of minor grains
has sharply declined over the third phase.
The trend rate of growth of rice production increased by 2.36% over the 25 years.
The growth rate has declined from 3.8 per cent in the first phase to 2.59 per cent in
the second phase and further to 0.07 per cent in the third phase. The rate of increase
in both acreage and yield has declined over time. The total production of rice
declined by 1.2 million tons in 1994-95 compared to the previous year due to drought
and a decline in irrigation coverage under minor irrigation. A serious fertiliser crisis
during the Boro season has also contributed to the fall in production. With a good
Boro harvest in 1995-96, the total production of rice increased to 17.69 million tons
which was still one of the lowest rice crop harvested during the 1990's . However,
the total rice production reached its peak at 18.82 million tons in 1996-97 mainly due
to good weather, and stability in the input market.
Other crops
Due to the priority given to the production of food-grain crops, particularly to rice,
the acreage and production of non-cereal crops began to decline since early 1980s. It
was then felt necessary to give special attention to some selected non-cereal crops
like tubers, pulses and oils for diversified consumption as well as import substitution.
Consequently, the Crop Diversification Project (CDP) was undertaken jointly by the
Government of Bangladesh, the Ministry of Development Cooperation of the
Government of Netherlands, and the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA). The project had three implementing agencies namely, Department of
Agricultural Extension (DAE), Department of Agricultural Marketing (DAM) and
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The production of food-grains increased from 10.2 million tons in 1972-73 to 20.3
million tons in 1996-97. The annual rate of growth of food-grains production
increased by 2.58% over the 25 years. But the trend growth rate has declined from
4.13% in the first phase to 2.93% in the second phase and further to 0.44% in the
third phase. The reason for observed decline in growth of production was the decline
in growth of area and yield. Nevertheless, the average per c,:?ita availability of food-
grains from domestic production has increased over time2 due to increase in total
production. Consequently, the magnitude of imports of food-grains has recently been
declining (Figure 8).
requirements of imports and increase the volume of exports. Thus, diversification of
agriculture was promoted.
Farming in Bangladesh is characterised by small family farms. The average size of
farms is 2.26 acres. Per capita availability of cultivated land is 0.25 acre, the lowest
in the world. This is one of the main reasons why commercialisation and
specialisation of farming, particularly of crop farming was not possible in the past.
Farmers have been operating mixed farms to satisfy their consumption needs. The
recent tendency 'of diversification would mean expansion of the mixed farming
system that would lead to a higher income, employment and growth in future.
The growth of agricultural sector still depends largely on the growth of crop sector.
As mentioned earlier, due to frequent natural calamities and gradual withdrawal of
subsidies, the growth rate of crop agriculture has declined over time, while the
growth rate of non-crop agriculture has increased in recent years (Table 5). The
livestock and fisheries sub-sectors have experienced a high growth of 7.1 and 7.5 per
cent, respectively, during the third phase due to expansion of the private sector.
Crop Sub-sector
The share of crops to agricultural GDP is 73 per cent. Rice is the main crop of
Bangladesh (the staple food of Bangladeshi people) grown on 75 per cent of
cultivated land2s• Wheat and some minor food-grain crops are grown on 5.2 and 0.7
per cent of cropped acreage. Pulses, jute, oilseeds and other crops are grown on rest
of the land. The share of rice in total cropped acreage has declined in the 1990s but
the share of wheat has increased. The share of some minor food-grain crops has
declined over time due to lack of their competitiveness. Among rice, the share of
high yielding varieties (HYVs) has sharply increased, while the share of local




Oilseeds : mustard and rapeseed, groundnut, sesame, sunflower, soybean;
The effect of CDP on production of some minor crops was positive. There was a
modest increase in potato production which was attributed to growth in acreage and
yield (Table 6). The production of pulses and oilseeds also increased mainly due to
"The share of rice to total cropped area has declined from 79.7 per cent in 1977-78 to 74.7 per
eent in 1996-97 but the share of wheat increased from 1.5 per cent to 5.2 per cent over the same
r,eriod.
• The average daily per capita availability of food-grains from domestic production increased from
368 grams in the first phase to 399 grams in the second phase and further to 404 grams in the third
phase.
Pulses : lentil, blackgram, mugbean, chickpea, fieldpea, falon and arhar.
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their yield improvement in the early and mid nineties. These crops gave significantly
higher yield in 130 COP thanas (COP and DAE, 1995) than their national average
yield. Nevertheless, the growth in total production of these crops remained very
insignificant due to limited extension of those crops and decline in acreage.
Intensive farm practices
The increase in total production of food-grains over the last 25 years can be
explained by higher level of adoption of intensive farm practices in Bangladesh. One
can notice from Table 7 that the intensity of cropping, adoption of HYVs, irrigation
coverage and the use of chemical fertilisers has increased over time. It means that the
recent liberalization of input marketing and withdrawal of subsidies did not restrict
farmers from adopting the yield augmenting intensive farm practices in Bangladesh.
However, the rate of increase in adoption of new farm practices has slowed down in
recent years due to withdrawal ofinput subsidies.
Table 8 shows the average annual growth rates of selected indicators that determine
the level of adoption of intensive farm practices in crop agriculture. It can be noticed
that there was a sharp increase in adoption of new farm technologies during the
initial phase of liberalization (second phase) when inputs marketing was Iiberalised
but subsidies were retained in less proportion on some important inputs such as
deep tube well and fertilisers. But after complete withdrawal of subsidies during the
early I990s, the growth rates in adoption of new technologies declined followed by a
-decline in the growth rate of production. The financial profitability of crops also
exhibited a declining trend that seemed to have reversed in 1994-95 due to an
increase in output prices following a sharp fall in production (Figure 9)27.
3000 Fig. 9: Real net returns for different types of rice production over time
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Non-crop Airiculture
With the decline in profitability of crop agriculture in the early 1990s, farmers have
tended to shift their emphasis to non-crop agriculture. Consequently, the number of
commercial dairy and poultry farms has increased significantly in the private sector
(Alam, 1996). At the same time, the intensive cultivation of fish and shrimp also
increased throughout the country under private initiative. As a result, total production
and annual growth rate of livestock and fisheries products increased in recent years.
Also, per capita availability of milk, meat, eggs and fish increased. During this
21 For further evidence, see IRBD (1995, (996).
period, government raised its development budget for the non-crop sector28 and
geared up productivity-enhancing programmes for the farmers.
Fi2.10: Real "alue~ or exporb and imporb or non-crop agricultural products over time
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Bangladesh traditionally imports milk, exports leather and frozen shrimp. Due to
increase in domestic production, import of milk declined, while export of leather,
fish and shrimp increased (Figure 10). Very recently, import duty on powdered milk
was significantly reduced that has promoted import of milk. On the other hand,
export of leather declined due to a weakening of global demand for Bangladesh
products and a continuing decline in the supply of high grade hides from Bangladesh.
Airicultural Exports and Imports
Bangladesh has been liberalising its trade regime since I980s. It has reduced
quantitative restrictions and lowered the rate of tariff on imports significantly in early
I990s. As a -result, the volume of total exports and imports has dramatically
increased. However, the proportions of agricultural export and import to total value
of exports and imports have significantly declined29.
Table 9 shows the trend rate of growth of agricultural exports and imports for the last
25 years. It can be noticed that the growth rates of agricultural exports and imports
have improved over the time phases, but the growth of agricultural imports has
always exceeded the growth of agricultural exports. The sluggish growth of
agricultural export was attributed to a decline in traditional export of jute.
Bangladesh has, however, experienced a robust growth in the total value of exports,
mainly due to a sharp increase in export earnings by the readymade garments.
The opening up of trade regime has accelerated the growth of imports. More than two
thirds of those imports were inputs into the productive sector and consisted of basic
raw materials, intermediate inputs and capital goods. Thus a rapid increase in imports
has virtually helped the growth ofcountry's exports.
28 The development budget for livestock and fisheries increased from 2.4% in 1986-90 to 2.9 per cent
in 1990-95 and that offorestry from 1.6% to 2.0% over the same period (Alam, (995).
" The proportion of agricultural export to total value of exports declined from 98.9 per cent in 1972-
73 to 22.2 per cent in 1996-97 and the proportion of agricultural import to total value of imports
declined from 64.1 per cent to 14.3 per cent over the same period.
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Allricultural Prices and Walles
For about a decade, after independence, prices of agricultural commodities increased
at a slower rate than that of the industrial commodities. The terms of trade between
agriculture and industry was favourable to the industrial sector (Table 10). However,
in the late eighties and early nineties, prices of agricultural commodities grew faster
than that of industries. As a result, the terms of trade became favourable to
agricultural sector. Nevertheless, the early 1990s have witnessed a low rise in
commodity prices for both the sectors and the growth in prices of agricultural
commodities was lower than that of industrial commodities due to a decline in prices
of food-grains.
The index of real wages in agriculture declined during the I970s and fell down to 86
in 1981-82 (Table II). The real wage index recovered in 1980s and I990s and stood
at 104 in 1995-96. The growth of nominal wage index was faster in the 1970s but
slowed down in latter years as inflation rate gradually came under control during the
1980s and I990s. Compared to other sectors of the economy, agriculture has
witnessed the lowest growth rate in wages over time.
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
Different estimates show that the incidence of poverty in Bangladesh has declined in
1980s and 1990s (Alam, 1993). This improvement can be explained by a reduction in
inflation rate, an increase in per capita availability of food-grains and target group
oriented programmes of governmental and non-governmental organisations for
generation of employment and income (Alam, 1988a). Estimates based on per capita
calorie intake suggest that the proportion of population living below the poverty line
has come down to less than 46 per cent in recent years (Table 12).30 However, other
estimates based on cost of basic needs method indicate that the incidence of poverty
in Bangladesh is still very high at over 50 per cent (GOB, 1997). A debate on the
extent of poverty reduction has been continuing among the academics in Bangladesh.
The view that the incidence of poverty has been significantly reduced over the 1980s
and early I990s is supported by the fact that there has been a marked improvement in
the magnitude of social indicators. It is evident from data provided through different
sources (GOB, 1995; 1997) that public activities in social sectors has expanded in
recent years aiming at poverty alleviation and human resource development. These
sectors include education, health and family planning, and women in development.
As a result. the literacy rate, gross primary enrolment rate and life expectancy at birth
have increased while infant mortality and child malnutrition rate have declined. At
the same time, the population growth rate has declined due to an increase in the use
of contraceptives. Women empowerment was enhanced with their direct involvement
in income generating activities (Alam, 1997).
30 Nutrition surveys of Bangladesh carried out by the Institute of Nutrition and Food Science of Dhaka
University report a decline in daily per capita food intake in rural Bangladesh from 537 grams in
1962-64 to 523 grams in 1975-76,488 grams in 1981-82 and 452 grams in 1995-96 (lahan, 1996).
This is a contradictory evidence. One can not arrive at a conclusion on the trend of per capita food
intake from such infrequent point estimates when there is wide variations in food -grains production
by year, season and region (IRBD. 1996).
The impact of recent economic reform on the distribution of income is negative. It
can be noticed from Table 12 that the magnitude of income inequality, as measured
by Gini coefficient, has increased over time. It appears that an increase in the rate of
economic growth, in a society of unequal distribution of assets and productive
power, has resulted in further inequality in the distribution of income (Alam, 1988b).
But as the absolute level of income increased, the magnitude of poverty has declined.
A negative relationship seemed to have operated between income inequality and
poverty when the magnitude of poverty started to diminish through the conventional
trickle down process. This goes against the popular myth that poverty is reinforced
by income inequality. In fact, the problem of poverty in Bangladesh is directly
related to low level of per capita income. A high level of income with low level of
inequality will ensure social welfare in the society.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Bangladesh initiated policies of reform in late 1970s to improve overall economic
condition of the country. The speed of reform was slow and the change in policy
premises was gradual. After more than a decade of reform efforts, the country has
shown signs of improvement in her macro-economy. The growth rate of GDP has
moderately increased, fiscal deficit and balance of payment crisis have reduced,
inflation rate has contracted and dependence on foreign financing has largely
diminished in recent years. Whether or not the reform measures have created
conditions for sustained economic development is to be seen.
Agricultural reform in 1980s and 1990s has resulted in declining growth in the
agricultural sector. However, total food-grain production has increased, farming
operations has diversified and prices of agricultural commodities grew faster than
that of industries after the initial phase of reform. The decline in growth of
agriculture was attributed to natural calamities and to withdrawal of subsidies. While
natural calamities are beyond the control of the Government, input prices are
required to be kept within limit so that farmers can afford to use it in the required
quantity. Therefore, subsidies on inputs should continue until the level of uptake of
new technology reaches the maximum limit and the country achieves self-sufficiency
in food production. Enhanced public investment on agricultural inputs is particularly
required after each natural calamity to enable farmers rebuild the devastated farming
sector within the shortest possible time. This will help achieve a growth rate in food
production higher than the population growth rate and maintain a minimum average
growth level of the agricultural sector so that it does not fall much behind the rest of
the economy. In view of smallness of farm holdings and the need for enhancing
capacity of smallholders to adjust to the demands of a modern agriculture, the
declining tendency of public development expenditure in agriculture should be
reversed. This is possible by cutting back expenditure in the non-productive sub-
sectors.
Despite continuous privatization and deregulation measures taken by the government
during 1980s and 1990s, the industrial sector did not perform well in Bangladesh.
The share of industries to the country's GDP has been stagnating around 10 per cent
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which is much lower than the developed and the newly industrialised Asian
countries. The growth rate of this sector should exceed 10 per cent and this sector's
share to GDP must not be less than 20 per cent in the near future to absorb surplus
labourers from agriculture. To achieve this end, both local and foreign investments
have to be encouraged for industrial development. At the same time, political
stability should be ensured in the country. Moreover, the magnitude of rural poverty
and inequality should be narrowed and the level of real per capita income should be
substantially increased in rural areas to create effective demand for industrial
products.
The magnitude of absolute poverty has been declining but the extent of relative
poverty in terms of income inequality has been accelerating recently in rural
Bangladesh. There are, however, examples of reducing both at the same time in other
Asian countries (World Bank, 1993). Recent evidence from East Asia shows that
with rapid economic growth, an appropriately designed set of policies for the social
sector can reduce poverty and income inequality together. This is also possible in
Bangladesh through increased public investment in the social sector, particularly on
education, health care and women. More importantly, provision of safety nets to
rural poor will help avoid liquidating their productive assets in times of crises. A
comprehensive programme of employment creation and income generation targeting
the rural poor will foster growth, reduce poverty, and promote equitable distribution
of income in the society.
Bangladesh has recently moved to a market economy. It does not mean that
government should not intervene on economic matters where and when it is most
required. In a developing country like Bangladesh, government must remain effective
to make markets work efficiently, support growth, reduce poverty and income
inequality. Almost all high performing economies of Asia, except Hong Kong, have
been more or less interventionist in character while formulating policies for
economic development. Bangladesh has to follow the same path. However, a balance
has to be decided between liberalism and interventionism on the basis of economic
reality the country has been facing in recent years.
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Tabltl: Trtnd!t in !tomt 5tltrftd macrorconomic indicator!! (% of GOP)
1973-78a 1979-90b 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
Consumption 99.25 97.75 97.28 95.87 94.16 92.39 90.93 91.66 9277 9048
Private 89.78 84.93 83.28 82.12 80 78.23 7663 78.2 7912 7654
Public 9.29 12.81 13.99 13.75 13.78 14.1 14.29 13.75 13.65 13.95
Investment 8.21 13.38 12.8 11.5 12.12 14.26 1542 16.63 16.99 17.37
Private 4.40 7.12 6.41 5.82 6.63 7.85 7.83 941 10.71 10.86
Public 3.81 6.25 6.39 5.68 549 6.41 7.59 722 6.29 6.52
Trade balance -746 -11.12 -10.08 -7.38 -648 -6.66 -6.35 -8.29 -9.75 -7.86
Export 4.94 7.41 8.33 8.82 9.8 12 11.87 14.19 14.17 15.52
Import 12.40 18.53 18.41 16.2 16.28 1866 18.22 2248 2392 2338
Gross domestic savings11 0.75 225 2.72 4.13 5.84 7.61 9.07 8.34 723 952
Gross nalional savings21 3.94 9.71 9.17 10.86 13.01 11.71 13.8 13.09 11.85 14.63
Cerrent account balance -4.72 -6.36 -4.15 -2.43 -2.55 -1.63 -3.54 -3.54 -5.14 -2.75
Inflation rate (%) 21.89 10.74 9.3 8.9 5.1 1.4 1.8 5.2 4.1 3.2
a. Average of 1972/73 to 1977/78
b. Average of 1978/79 to 1989/90
11 Equals gross national saVings minus net factor income from abroad minus net private transfers from abroad
21 Equals investment minus foreign savings
Source: BBS (1993: 1997), World Bank (1997) and author's own calculation
Tahir 2: Trend!! in fj5uliccountJ (% of CUr)
1980-84a 1985-89b 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
Table 3: Trend growth rates of real total and agricultural GOP
Growth rate (%)
Year Total GOP IAgricultural I Industrial I Construction I Services
GOP GOP GOP GOP
1972173- 3.79 1.99 3.83 6.89 5.12
1996/97
1972173- 3.35 2.37 4.95 0.20 4.89
1977178
1978179- 3.60 1.95 2.44 6.51 5.12
1989/90
1990/91- 4.56 1.67 6.94 5.09 6.04
1996/97
Note: Trend growth rates have been computed by fitting semi-log functions to the data.
Source: BBS and author's calculation.
Table 4: Composition ofreal agricultural GOP (%)
Year Crop I Livestock I Fisheries I Forestry
1972173- 77.06 7.54 9.93 5.47
1977178a
1978179- 78.91 7.43 7.09 6.57
I989/90a
1990/91- 75.99 8.44 8.56 7.01
1996/97a
a. Indicates average of the time !hase.
Source: BBS and author's calculation.
Table 5: Trend growth rates of real agricultural GOP
a. Average of 1979/80 to 1983/84
b. Average of 1984/85 to 1988/89







8.9 9 9.3 9.6 10.9 12 11.7 12.1 11.9 12
7.2 7.2 7.8 7.8 8.8 9.6 9.2 9.5 9.4 9.8
18.4 16.6 17.1 16.4 15.9 17.6 18 17.6 168 17
6.4 7.7 8.8 8.7 8.3 8.9 8.8 8.8 91 8.6
-9.3 -7.5 -7.9 -7.2 -5.9 -5.9 -5.9 -6.8 -5.7 -51
6.6 6.2 4.9 5.6 4.9 4.9 3.6 3.6
Growth rate (%)
Year Crops I Livestock I fisheries I Forestry
1972/73- 1.89 2.56 1.55 3.20
1996/97
1972/73- 2.57 2.01 0.24 -0.51
1977/78
1978179- 1.92 1.29 2.36 2.57
1989/90
1990/91- 0.22 7.14 7.52 3.73
1996/97
Note: Trend growth rates have been computed by fitting semi-log functions to the data.
Source: BBS and author's calculation.
~Table 6: Trend growth rates in area, production and yield of non-cereal crops
Crops 1983/84-1989/90 1990/91-1996/97
Area Yield Production Area Yield Production
Pulses -1.44 -5.89 -7.33 -0.84 1.19 0.35
Oilseeds -1.22 -4.07 -5.29 -0.29 0.68 0.39
Vegetables 2.48 -0.84 1.64 2.75 0.50 3.25
Tubers 1.07 -1.90 -0.31 1.20 1.70 2.90
Spices -0.18 1.21 1.02 -.32 0.09 -0.23
Tea 1.32 -2.27 -0.95 0.10 2.67 2.76
Tobacco -3.55 1.29 -2.26 -1.11 3.47 2.36
Jute -6.71 2.27 -4.44 -2.88 0.22 -2.66
Sugarcane 1.07 -1.90 -0.83 -1.49 0.96 -0.53
Fruits 1.63 -1.30 0.33 1.46 -0.91 0.55
Note: Growth rates have been computed by fitting semi.logarithmic trend lines.
Source: BBS and author's calculations.
Table 7: Increase of intensive farm practices over time
Year Cropping HYV coverage Irrigation Use of chemical
intensity I (% of cropped coverage (% of fertilizers
(%) acreage)2 cropped (Kg/acre)3
acreage)2
1972-73 144.95 11.14 10.59 (9.7) 14.37
1977-78 150.74 16.59 14.81 (11.86) 21.16
1989-90 168.42 44.49 25.32 (20.85) 57.29
1996-97 185.00 56.98 36.93 (29.42) 91.13
Total cropped area
I Cropping intensity=.-.·••··-·-•••••••••·- ---•••-. x 100
Net sown area
2 Indicates food·grain crops only
3 Indicates total cropped area
"Bracketed figures indicate percentage of total cropped area
Source: BBS and author's calculation
Table 8: Average annual growth rates of gross cropped area, HYV area,
irrigated area, and fertilizer use
Growth rate (%)
Year Gross IArea under IIrrigated area I Fertilizer use
cropped area HYV
1972173- 0.43 6.57 5.20 7.78
1996/97
1972173- 0.53 6.13 5.38 6.99
1977/78
1978179- 0.89 8.63 5.62 9.20
1989/90
1990/91- -0.44 3.39 4.31 6.02
1996/97
Note: Growth rates have been computed using the formula for annual percentage compound growth
(continuous).
Source: BBS and author's calculation.
Table 9: Trend growth rates of real value of agricultural exports and
imports compared to total real value of exports and imports
Growth rate (%)
Year Agricultural IAg.ricultural I Total export ITotal import
export Import
1972173- -0.84 -1.34 5.57 3.47
1996/97
1972173- -3.34 -12.53 -1.22 0.10
1977178
1978179- -3.11 -2.36 3.37 4.48
1989/90
1990/91- 4.16 6.44 13.81 11.36
1996/97
Note: Growth rates have been computed by fitting semi-logarithmic trend hnes.
Source: Export Promotion Bureau, Office of the ChiefControler of Export
and Import, and author's calculations.
W
01
Table 10: Index of prices of agricultural and industrial commodities
(1973-74=100)
Year Agriculture Industry Terms of trade
between agriculture
and industry (%)
Index I% change Index I% change
1973-74 100 - 100 - 100
1981-82 581 481.0 667 567.0 87.1
1989-90 1276 119.6 1118 67.6 114.1
1995-96 1606 25.9 1459 26.4 110.1
Source: BBS and author's calculation.
Table II: Index of wages in the agricultural sector (1973-74=100)
Year Nominal wage Real wage
Index I% change Index I% change
1973-74 100 - 100 -
1981-82 567 467.0 86 -14.0
1989-90 1245 119.6 96 11.6
1995-96 1738 39.6 104 8.3
Source: BBS and author's calculation.
Table 12: Incidence of poverty and income inequality over time
Year Per cent of population below the Gini coefficient of income
poverty Iinel distribution
Rural I Urban I National Rural I Urban I National
1973-74 93.03 81.16 91.84 0.35 0.38 0.36
1983-84 56.97 66.36 58.05 0.35 0.37 0.36
1991-92 47.61 46.58 47.47 0.36 0.40 0.39
1995-96 45.82 45.30 45.48 0.43 0.48 0.45
I On the basis of daily calorie intake per person below 2122 calories.
Source: Household Expenditure Surveys, BBS.
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The Application of Planning Legislation:
the RMA and Forestry
R Amor, C Gan and H Bigsby
Commerce Division, Lincoln University
Ab.ttract
The paper examines for differences in treatment by district councils of forestry activities
under the RMA and explores the underlying causes of the differences which are found. An
analysis of 57 District Plans written using RMA guidelines is used to derive an index that
captures the relative restrictiveness of the treatment of forestry in a District Plan. The index is
compared to a range of demographic factors such as population, land use mixes, farming
intensities and farm size which are believed to influence the treatment of forestry. The results
suggest restrictiveness of rules generally increases with the percentage of land under agricultural
use and grazing productivity and decreases with an increase in average farm size and population
density.
I. Introduction
In 1991 the New Zealand government enacted the Resource Management Act (RMA). The
RMA is an effort to streamline planning decisions, and to provide an integrated framework to
manage New Zealand's natural resources. In particular, the RMA represented a move away from
the prescriptive, rules-based District Schemes of the previous Town and Country Planning Act
1977 (TCPA), under which district planners were directed to plan for the wise use of resources as
determined by the councils. In writing District Plans, the RMA now directs planners to achieve
the sustainable management of resources based upon environmental effects and not on what the
councils consider wise land uses.
The consequences for forestry activities are potentially significant, since during the TCPA
regime, forestry was often considered an unwise land use by agriculture-oriented councils and
planners. To stop forestry encroaching on "good" agricultural, land planners, through the District
Schemes, zoned forestry to the poorer soils and required substantial information to be supplied
with forestry investment applications (Fowler and Meister, 1983).
Planning under the RMA is now achieved through District Plans with the aim of sustainable
management of resources. The District Plans outline how activities will be controlled on the basis
of the potential environmental effect(s) the activity may have in an area. Within the District
Plans, activities are classified into five categories; permitted, controlled, discretionary, non-
complying and prohibited. This resource consent classification is used to ensure that the relative
effects of each activity are reflected in the type of consent procedure required. Applicants
seeking consent for any activity under the RMA must provide an assessment of the activity's
effects on the environment'. This effects-based approach means that different activities should be
treated equally. In other words, commercial forestry should be treated equally with all other land
uses which have the same or similar effects (Ministry of Forestry, 1995).
One problem that can emerge is that although the RMA is a national piece oflegislation, it
requires land use planning to be implemented by City and District councils. This is because
District Plans are supposed to reflect the particular resource mix and social values that are unique
to the council's area. The RMA also contains transitional provisions where the District Schemes
, Section 104 Resource Management Act 1991
and their provisions, developed under the TCPA, can form whole or part of the Transitional
District Plans and district rules under the RMA. This has resulted in many cases where
Transitional District Plans, based on old prescriptive District Schemes, were operative while the
new District Plans were being drawn up. In some cases the new District Plans are based on the
old activities based framework. This has resulted in prescriptive District and Regional Plans
under the RMA that use zoning, possibly reflecting a continuation of attitudes from the TCPA
regime in some councils.
The implication of the local application of the RMA is that there is the potential for
differences in the treatment of forestry between districts. Examination of District Plans shows
that rules applied to forestry range from permitted to non-complying activities, and to
combinations of activity types that relate to agricultural zoning within a council. Since resource
consents are required for conditional, discretionary and non-complying activities, this can be seen
as a reflection of some council's having the attitude of protecting agricultural land from uses
other than agriculture.
The purpose of this paper is to examine if there are differences in the way councils treat
forestry in their District Plans, and explain reasons for the differences if they exist. There are a
range of demographic factors such as population, land use mixes, farming intensities and farm
size which could potentially explain differences in how councils would perceive the effects of
forestry activities, and in turn the relative restrictiveness of planning rules related to forestry.
2. Methodology
Several studies have examined the application of planning legislation. The literature falls
into two main approaches which will be referred to as qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative
approach effectively describes the effects and extent of the regulations between planning
authorities or changes over time within one planning authority. Although called qualitative it can
involve numerical data. In contrast the quantitative approach measured the effects of regulations
using econometric models.
The earliest qualitative studies used dot maps or bar graphs to compare development
application numbers to evaluate green belts by comparing areas with similar characteristics but
different development regulations (Gregory, 1971). This method was later extended to show
differences in one area over time for national parks (Anfield and Curry, 1989), applications for
new dwellings inside and outside of green belts (Keyes, 1986) and applications for planning
permission to build farm houses (Gilg and Kelly, 1996). Fowler and Meister (1983) used bar
charts to measure the restrictiveness of forestry controls imposed by the TCPA, where
restrictiveness was measured as the difference between the amount of area which had potential
for forestry and the actual area of forestry. However, when using more than a few variables, a
multivariate technique is required.
Cluster analysis is a group of multivariate techniques used to classify objects or individuals
into homogenous groups called clusters when little is known a priori about the clusters or their
membership (Malhotra, 1996; Punj and Stewart, 1983 and Hair el aI., 1995). Clustering
algorithms can be classified into two general categories: hierarchical and non-hierarchical.
Hierarchical algorithms are stepwise procedures that either form nested clusters by grouping
(dividing) objects into bigger (smaller) clusters until all cases form a single (separate) c1uster(s).
In contrast non-hierarchical algorithms form clusters by placing cases within a pre-specified




Ward's minimum variance algorithm gives the best coverage of objects and handles outliers best
(Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984; Milligan, 1980). Ward's algorithm minimises the variance
within the clusters and maximises the variance between clusters (Hair et aI., 1995; Norusis, 1990
and Malhotra, 1996). Non-hierarchical algorithms, frequently referred to as k-means clustering
algorithms, form clusters by selecting clustering centres (seeds or centroids) and placing objects
closest to the seeds. Non-hierarchical methods have been shown to be superior to hierarchical
methods as the results are less susceptible to outliers (Hair et aI., 1995). However, non-
hierarchical methods have the disadvantage that the number of clusters needs to be specified a
priori.
To overcome the problem ofa priori specification of clusters in non-hierarchical techniques
Punj and Stewart (1983); Milligan (1980); Hair et af. (1995) and Malhotra (1996) suggest a two
stage approach incorporating both hierarchical and non-hierarchical algorithms. The first stage
involves using a hierarchical algorithm to obtain a preliminary solution to identitY and select the
appropriate number of clusters, identitY the cluster centroids and identitY any outlying objects.
Ward's method is one of the most popular methods for selecting the initial cluster seeds
(Malhotra, 1996; Punj and Stewart, 1983 and Helsen and Green, 1991) The second stage runs
the stage one solution through a non-hierarchical algorithm.
Cluster analysis is used in this paper to group councils based on similar demographics, land
use mix and attitudes towards forestry investment to find differences in forestry rules. To
determine the demographic factors that influence the rules written in the District Plans regression
analysis is used.
3. Data
Data on relevant demographic descriptions of factors which would determine land use rules
for forestry activities, such as population, land use mix, and farming intensity, were required for
the study. Nine variables for which district council level data could be obtained were ultimately
selected. Population is measured using population density as at 31 June 1994 (Statistics New
Zealand, 1995). Land use mix is measured by percentage ofland used for agriculture, percentage
of land used for exotic forestry production, and percentage of land used for other rural use, such
as native tree production. Area data to calculate the percentages were obtained from the 1994
Agricultural Statistics (Statistics New Zealand, 1997). Farm intensity is measured by average
farm size, number of farms and the animal stocking rate, using data sourced from the 1994
Agricultural Statistics (Statistics New Zealand, 1997). Average farm size for each district was
calculated by dividing the total area under agriculture by the number of farms (Statistics New
Zealand, 1997). Data on the animal stocking rate was obtained from dividing the weighted
average of the main classes of stock by the area used for agricultural production. Classes of
livestock are beef cattle, dairy cattle, sheep, deer and goats (Statistics New Zealand, 1994;
Statistics New Zealand, 1997). An index was derived to measure the suitability of radiata
forestry based on site indices. The suitability for forestry was derived by calculating the average
site index for each territorial authority from an iso-site index map published by the Ministry of
Forestry (1991).
The variable measuring the restrictiveness of forestry rules in the District Plans, the RMA
index, is a two-part index based on a subjective analysis of how District Plans written under the
RMA treated forestry. District plans were obtained from 57 councils. Restrictiveness was
deemed to be measured by the activity classification given to forestry and by the information
requirements for forestry-related activities. Both of these factors increase the effective cost and
difficulty of undertaking forestry.
The first part of the RMA index is a measure of the activity classification assigned to
forestry. If forestry is a permitted activity then it is assigned a value of I, if a conditional activity
a value of 2, if a discretionary activity a value of 3 and if a non-complying activity then a value of
4 If a district council has more than one zone with differences in the designation of forestry
activity, then a weighted average for the district council was calculated. Due to a lack of data on
the size of each zone in a District Council, it was assumed that each zone within the District
Council had the same proportion of forestry activity. The second component of the RMA index
was a measure of the information requirements for forestry developments. A value of I was
assigned if information was required in the district plan, and a value of 0 if no information was
required. The RMA index was formed by adding the value for the activity classification to the
value for the information requirement. The value of the RMA index could range between I, the
minimum requirement and 5, the maximum requirement.
Although Regional Plans and Policy Statements, written by Regional Councils, influence
land uses they were excluded from this study. This is because plans written by City and District
Councils are written for the purpose of land use planning while Regional Plans and Policy
Statements are written to deal with issues regarding soil, water and air. In addition, District Plans
are assumed to be consistent with their associated Regional Plans and Policy Statements,
however, this may not be the case if District Plans were written and notified before the Regional
Plans.
4. Results and Discussion
Cluster analysis was carried out using the two stage process. Stage I involved applying
Ward's hierarchical algorithm to 7 variables covering population density, average farm size,
percentage of total area under each of agricultural, forestry and other uses, number of farms,
animal stocking rate, for the 57 councils that provided details of their forestry planning rules.
Ward's algorithm was performed using the statistical package SPSS. Stage two involved a non-
hierarchical algorithm, QUICK CLUSTER in SPSS, using the cluster centres saved from the
hierarchical solution in Stage I.
There are no statistically valid procedures for determining the appropriate number of
clusters. The clustering solutions, alone, provide little information on the correct number of
clusters. This can be a problem, especially when non-hierarchical clustering procedures require
that the number of clusters be selected before any clustering takes place. In addition, hierarchical
methods usually produce a series of possible alternative solutions that range from k clusters to a
solution with one cluster (Milligan and Cooper, 1985).
In absence of a statistical test, a number of authors, including Malhotra (1996) and Hair et
al. (1995), have provided guidelines on how to determine the appropriate number of clusters.
Following Malhotra (1996) and Hair et af. (1995) solutions for different numbers of clusters were
computed. A combination of looking at the distances which the clusters combined and using
practical judgement resulted in a seven cluster solution. In addition, the averages of two
additional variables that were not used to derive the clustering solution, suitability for forestry
and the RMA index, were reported as a further check of the correct number of clusters
The cluster analysis has essentially reduced the wide variation in the application of the
RMA in terms of forestry to seven groups of councils with similar land use characteristics and
forestry planning regulations. The grouping of councils in the seven cluster are reported in Table
I and average values of the variables used in the clustering for each cluster are given in Table 2.
Because of the multi-dimensions of the clusters, communicating the results of cluster
analysis is difficult (Dunn and Walker, 1989). Graphical analysis can be useful for showing visual
differences and also expresses the results of the cluster analysis in a way that differences and
similarities between clusters can be easily seen. This study uses a simple graph that can express
multi-dimensional data in two dimensions similar to the type used by Dunn and Walker (1989).
The graph used is a radar graph with nine equally spaced rays drawn radiating from the middle of
the star. Each ray relates to a variable used to explain differences in RMA forestry rules. The
length of each ray is made p'roportional to the cluster average of the values for each cluster scaled
to fit between 0 and I. The radar graphs for each variable are shown in Figure I.
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second lowest RMA index, reflecting the fact that many of the councils in this cluster see forestry
as an important activity. For example, the Porirua City council has a policy of favouring primary
production, which includes exotic forestry, and other councils, such as, Wairoa District council
and Ashburton District council, see the benefits offorestry in soil conservation.
The Rural, Semi-Intensive Farming cluster is distinguished from the Peri-Urban, Semi-
Intensive Farming cluster by a much lower population density, smaller average fann sizes, a
higher average animal stocking rate, and 30 percent less area in plantations. A key difference
between the two clusters is that this cluster has a high RMA index, indicating rules that are less
favourable to forestry. This could be due to a carrying over of the rules from the TCPA which
were biased towards agriculture, as this cluster is more rural in nature and on average grazing is
more productive. In some cases, such as the Timaru District council, there is concern with
landscape values and the adverse effects of forestry. Some councils in this cluster have made






















































QIle1:TUlown Lakes The Intensive Farming cluster again has a large proportion ofits primary production area in
agriculture, but is identified by having a population density and average fann size which are about
half of the Rural, Semi Intensive Farming cluster, and the highest animal stocking rate of all
clusters. The districts in this cluster have dairy fanning as a major land use, and are also used for
intensive horticulture. The RMA index for this cluster is at the median value for all clusters.
Councils in this cluster, such as Manawatu District Council, New Plymouth City Council and
Hastings District Council tend to categorise forestry as an agricultural activity and do not
differentiate between land based primary production, including forestry.
w
Q)
Table 2. Variable Averages by Cluster
VaJlable IIlah P"~IJJban, R~~ [IImItYl Inlrnrtvr Soulh hland
'''''.
C1uder
Populltion Srml-Intrnllvr Srml-Intmdvr Pbabl10n Flrmlna Wut('o:nl I.bndlllah Mrdbn
Cftlin. .-analn.. "·lrmln Fon.1n Countn
JI()J' 879.50 89.58 37.06 28.46 16.38 2.03 L2 28.46
/WS 29.87 241.54 201.16 101.03 106.39 188.82 1856.94 201.16
AOI. 75.79 83.22 86.04 42.67 83.77 4525 90.10 83.22
FOR 12.20 8.52 6.03 38.42 7.17 7.88 0.33 7.88
OTH 5.75 7.57 7.22 18.25 7.21 46.78 9.15 7.57
INIl 2.52 1.11 2.40 1.57 1.77 1.00 3.00 1.77
ASR 11.43 8.72 9.90 10.79 12.25 7.53 1.08 9.90
NOI' 370.25 77218 689.75 715.14 2226.17 293.67 269.5 689.75
STE 2.51 2.48 2.60 2.46 2.93 1.41 1.17 2.48
The High Population Centres cluster is largely defined by councils with the highest
population densities. Although this cluster has a large percentage ofland in agriculture, the farms
are relatively small, and are generally life style and small holding blocks. A combination of the
small holdings and suitability for forestry mean that this cluster has the second highest percentage
of area under plantations. In spite of the forestry activity, the cluster also has a relatively high
RMA index, meaning that the forestry rules are not as encouraging to forestry. Within these
urban councils there are concerns about the effects of exotic forestry on landscape values, on the
effects of logging trucks in built up areas, and on externalities from forestry and logging
activities.
The Peri-Urban, Semi-Intensive Farming is defined by a relatively high population density
and the largest average fann size outside the South Island High Country. This cluster has the
The Extensive Forestry cluster is distinguished by having the highest percentage of primary
production area in exotic forestry. This cluster also has the second smallest average farm size
and a relatively high animal stocking rate, showing that agricultural lands are also intensively
farmed The RMA index for this cluster is relatively low, although it is not the lowest of clusters.
Since historically forestry has been important to many of the councils in this cluster, councils
would have experience with forestry activities. With the larger scale of forestry though,
identifYing forestry activities for planning may be more ofconcern than with the Peri-Urban, Semi
Intensive Farming cluster. Some councils in this cluster, such as the Thames-Coromandel district
council, have explicit policies to encourage production forestry.
The South Island West Coast cluster is distinguished by having 46 percent of it primary
production area in native forests and a very low population density. The establishment of
plantations has been actively encouraged to provide an alternative to a declining harvest of native
timber. The councils in this cluster, with a long experience with forestry and a desire to maintain
forestry employment, have made forestry a pennitted activity and do not require any infonnation
about the forestry projects.
The South Island High Country cluster is distinguished by having the largest average fann
size, the lowest animal stocking rate, the smallest population density of all of the clusters, and
almost no forestry. It comprises the South Island High Country councils where the main land use
is extensive fine wool production. The RMA index for this cluster is the highest of any cluster,
largely based on a concern about the effect of plantations on landscape values, but also reflecting
a lack of experience with production forestry (Swaffield, 1994). Although site index makes this
cluster look unsuited towards exotic forestry, this is because the index was for Pinus radiata
which is not suited to the climate of this area. There are other tree species such as Douglas Fir
which are better suited to the high country.
wltn me results or ClUsler analysIs lUt:nlllymg mal IIIt:rt: art: ulllt:rt:nct:s m mt: way planmng
rules have been applied by territorial authorities to forestry, regression analysis was then used to
determine which of the demographic factors were most important in explaining the differences in
rules. Table 3 reports the results of a regression using the forestry rules index as the dependent
variable. Independent variables were the number of farms, percentage of land in agriculture,
average farm size, population density, animal stocking rate, suitability for forestry, a South Island
High Country cluster dummy variable and a dummy variable accounting for the councils in the
High Population density cluster.
The number of farms is negative but statistically insignificant. The percentage of land in
agriculture is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The positive sign is consistent
with prior expectations and implies that councils where agriculture is a major land use have rules
which are less favourable for forestry. Average farm size is negative and statistically significantly
associated with restrictive forestry rules at the 5% level. This implies that more restrictive rules
have been written in the smaller, more intensive and usually more fertile farming districts.
Population density is also negatively correlated to the forestry index and is statistically significant
at the 5% level. As was discussed earlier, this is correlated to the average farm size and the
increase in small holdings and lifestyle blocks and population rises. Animal stocking rate is
positive but statistically insignificant. The positive relationship can be seen as a reflection that
rules have been written that are more restrictive for forestry on the more fertile land. Suitability
for forestry has a negative relationship with the forestry index and is statistically significant at the
10% level. This implies that forestry rules are restrictive on the land that is less suited to forestry,
likely reflecting the fact that forestry is most economically competitive with agriculture on less
suitable sites, and thus more likely to attract attention in those areas. The two dummy variables
are positive and statistically significant 5% and 1% respectively. This indicates that councils in
the South Island High Country and High Population Density clusters which are more restrictive









:.. Uiscussion and LonCIUSlon
The seven cluster solution provided evidence that there are differences in the way forestry
rules have been applied by the territorial authorities in the District Plans. Three clusters, High
Population Centres, Rural, Intensive Farming and South Island High Country, could be seen as
having rules that make it more difficult to undertake forestry projects. Although these clusters
had different demographic and land use mixes they had common planning stances towards
forestry. The majority of councils in all three of these clusters were concerned about negative
effects of forestry on landscape values or water catchment areas. Councils dealt with these issues
by requiring forestry investors to obtain resource consents and/or requiring information regarding
the proposed forestry project. This allowed Councils to dictate how and where the trees were
planted in order to protect landscape values and water catchment areas. Types of concerns
councils had include the adverse visual effects of forestry during harvest phase and the reduction
in visual diversity that plantation forestry caused. and minimise the impact that forestry had on
obscuring views of importance.
The remammg four clusters, Peri-Urban Semi Intensive Farming, Extensive Forestry,
Intensive Farming and South Island West Coast, had planning rules that made forestry
investments less difficult to undertake. A number of District Plans in these clusters bundled into
forestry and agriculture into a single land use called primary production, effectively treating
forestry as another agricultural crop. Councils within this group either had previous experience in
forestry or recognised the benefits of forestry, such as arresting erosion and the conservation of
soil. Some councils, such as the Thames-Coromandel District Council and the Grey District
Council had policies that encouraged forestry.
The regression analysis measured the factors that determined the restrictiveness of the
forestry rules in terms of the index created. In general, the restrictiveness of forestry rules
increases with animal stocking rate and proportion of land used for agriculture. In addition,
councils in the South Island high country and High Population Density clusters were shown to
have restrictive rules. The restrictiveness forestry rules decreases with number of farms, average
farm size, population density and suitability for forestry. It appears from the results that in some
districts, typified by the Rural, Semi-intensive Agriculture and South Island High Country
clusters, that rules are still being written to protect agriculture from forestry.
Constant
Number offarms




Site index for forestry
Dummy for S.1. high country cluster




Statistically significant at the I% level
Statistically significant at the 5% level






















In conclusion, this paper has used cluster analysis, graphical techniques and regression
analysis to show the nature of the variations in the way councils have treated forestry in the
District Plans in terms of the index of forestry rules derived in this paper. One of the main
findings of this research was that councils have changed from biasing forestry because of conflicts
with agriculture to that of using landscape values as the main reason. To write rules in the spirit
of the RMA research is required to find out what the landscape values are. It appears prima
facie that these rules are ad hoc and are not based on any research. This leads to the necessity of
further research to find out exactly what these landscape values are.
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An Exploratory Study on the Relative Weightings being put Upon
Environmental Outcomes by Waikato Farmers






In this research project the decision making of farmers was studied to identify the
criteria and weightings that underpinned the prioritisation of management practices
for resource management. Farmers were asked to score the selected management
practices in a matrix comparison which was then analysed using an Analytical
Hierarchy Process. Setting the seasonal stocking rates was the management pract icc
considered most important to realising farming goals, including resource management.
Improving animal genetics was considered the least important management practice to
realising farming goals. Improving riparian management was the highest rated
management practice specific to the resource management goal. In the study, the
aggregated objective scores had low to moderate correlations with the goal scores
(0.13 - 0.56). Weighting the scores in the Analytical Hierarchy Process did not
improve the correlations (0.09 - 0.44). Some possible problems in data collection
were identified for future study.
Key Words: resource management, analytical hierarchy process, riparian management
PREFACE
Farmers making decisions about their use of management practices have been shown
in previous research to consider the functional attributes of those practices as
important drivers for establishing their useful value for adoption (Parminter 1997).
The interactions between the practices and the prospective systems within which they
will be applied has also provided important reasons for farmers rejecting management
practices. For those studying these issues, family farming systems have been hard to
describe comprehensively in terms that are meaningful to those managing them, and
the same terms also able to be used by technology or policy agencies to analyse the
systems quantitatively (Moore 1995).
The development of concept pyramids as a way of structuring people's beliefs (goals
and objectives) about their management systems (Parminter and Perkins 1996) has
been able to provide a basis to examining their decision making in more detail
(Parminter et al 1996).
INTRODUCTION
At a series of workshops held in the Waikato, livestock farmers were asked to
develop an operational definition of "sustainable farming" (Parminter et al 1993). The
farmers gave a definition consisting of:
• efficient animal production, to have their livestock enterprises achieving production
target specifications in the least-cost manner
• contented animals, when their animals are healthy, active, and engaged in natural
behaviour (feeding, ruminating, sleeping, etc.)
• productive vegetation, when a range of plant types are present to support animal
production, and are resilient to seasonal climatic variation, variable grazing
pressure, and soil nutrient levels, and also have aesthetic value
• productive soils, that support vegetative growth, are themselves biologically active,
are uncontaminated, and maintain their structure under grazing
• clean water, that doesn't flood, is uncontaminated, and able to support diverse
aquatic life
The farmers associated the concept of sustainable farming with two common farming
goals (Parminter and Perkins 1997). One goal was to maintain the farm's natural
resources for future generations, the other was to maintain or build up the productive
potential of the farm business.
The farmers also had two other goals that they considered would need to be kept in
balance with a goal for farming sustainably. These other two goals were achieving
good annual profits, and having an enjoyable lifestyle. The fulfilment of each goal
was related by the farmers to achieving a number of objectives.
The farmers at the workshops, also identified a list of management practices that they
associated with the farming objectives contained in their concept pyramid for
sustainable farming (listed in Table I). They were considered as practices that could
make a positive contribution to improving the sustainability of existing farming
systems. Most of the management practices are familiar to all farmers and are part of
farming systems for production as well as resource management purposes. Some of
the practices could be similar and overlapping, but they were not developed any
further at the workshops.
ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESS
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) used in this study, was developed by
Thomas Saaty in the early 1970s to resolve military problems in the USA and Africa
(Saaty, 1996) and has been applied widely overseas since. The process uses a
hierarchy to define the components of decision making and how they influence each
other. The AHP assists decision makers to choose the best from a number of
alternatives based upon the level of fulfilment of a range of objectives. In the AHP
numerical weights are determined for each alternative with respect to objectives and
for objectives with respect to goals. The weights are derived from eigen values of
pairwise comparisons that reflect underlying ratio scales.
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To develop further some of the ideas about managing natural resources on a further
workshop was held (Parminter et al 1994). One of the problems considered at this
second workshop was for farmers to identify which management practices had the
greatest priority to them for resource management and how strongly they would
contribute to the realisation of resource management goals and objectives. This
information would be able to be used to realign scientific research so that resource
management as well as production outcomes were being addressed.
METHODS
The approach taken was for farmers at the workshop to use a matrix comparison to
identify weights for farming objectives and weights for selected management
practices. The weights for the objectives were to be calculated from the contribution
each made to realising each farming goal. The weights for farm management
practices could be taken directly from the matrix.
At the workshop, farmers completed the matrix in Figure I to evaluate the
management practices selected in the first workshop. This method was used as (at the
time) there was no intention to use the data in an AHP. The farmers compared the
management practices with each sustainability concept (goal or objective) listed and
marked in the matrix how much that management practice contributed to fulfilling the
concept. They were asked to use a scale of 0-20. Positive scores were used for
positive effects of the management practices on the concepts, and negative scores
when management practices would conflict with that goal or objective concept.
In the concept pyramids developed in the previous workshop, objectives were
components of goals. In this study for each management practice therefore, the sum
of the objective scores should have correlated with the scores for the resource
management goal to which they were related. To measure how much of a
contribution each objective made to each goal score their weights were calculated
using simultaneous equations. Only five variables were available for the simultaneous
equations (equal to the number of objectives to be weighted), and so five management
practices with the highest resource management scores were selected for the
calculations. These were chosen on the basis that their objective scores had the
greatest opportunity to be related to their resource management scores. The
weightings obtained from the simultaneous equations were then used within an
Analytical Hierarchy Process to calculate preference ratings for each of the
management practices in the study. Correlations were used to compare the preference
ratings with the actual goal scores in the matrix.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A total of twenty five farmers completed the matrices, their results were averaged and
are shown in tables I & 2. Stock health and setting seasonal stocking rates was the
management practice with the greatest sum of goal scores (Table I). It was perceived
by the fanners to make the highest contribution to each of the three farming goals of:
resource management, profitability, and living standards. The management practice
with the lowest sum of goal scores was riparian protection, because although it had
the highest score for resource management it was perceived to make a negligible
contribution to farming profit.
The objectives in Table 2 have also had their scores summed.
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Again in Table 2, setting seasonal stocking rates had the highest aggregate score,
which reflected how well it was evaluated across all objectives although it did not
have the highest score for any single objective.
The lowest aggregated objective score was for animal genetic improvement. The low
score was due to it receiving slightly negative values in the matrix for soil and water
objectives. In this case, the response may be the result of these issues not being
addressed in any industry breeding programmes.
The calculated AHP weightings from the resource management goal for each
objective category are listed along the bottom of Table 2. The highest weighting was
for contented animals which is consistent with the importance of animals to livestock-
farmer decision making (Wilkinson and Parminter 1997). Efficient animals has the
next highest weighting but a negative sign. The negative sign indicates that this
criteria did not have a consistent relationship with the resource management goal.
Such an inconsistency may reflect a difficulty for farmers to reconcile their production
and resource management goals. In the AHP calculations the weighting for Animals I
(productivity) was taken to be zero to signify that it was not a consistently desired
criterion in sustainable management practices. Listed at the end of Table 2 are the
derived AHP preference scores for each management practice. Setting seasonal
stocking rates had the highest AHP preference score for achieving resource
management goals, and animal genetics the lowest score.
Table 3 describes the correlations between the objectives and the goals in the previous
tables. The correlations between the aggregated objective scores and the sum of the
goal scores was relatively low «0.6). Weighting the objectives appropriately should
have improved their ability to be used to predict the strength of the relationship
between the management practices and farmer goals. However the use of weighted
objectives in the AHP analyses produced much lower correlations for the aggregated
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CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study may indicate that in some circumstances it can be difficult for
farmer decision makers to optimise both the environmental and production
consequences of their decision making. Suitable multiple objective decision making
tools may be very important for the successful resolution of these types of issues.
Some management practices strongly associated with improving resource
management e.g. riparian management practices, may not be considered by farmers to
be very important to other farming goals. As a consequence it is likely that their use
will be restricted to only certain groups in the farming community.
tOther management practices such as setting seasonal stocking rates may be
considered by environmental policy agencies to have only a minor contribution to
resource management and yet be more widely practised by farmers. If community
resolution of resource management issues is important, then it is the more widely
practised management practices that will be most effective.
Although matrix scoring and AHP analyses have been widely used to assist decision
makers in a diverse range of circumsl.>nces (Chambers 1997) the results of this study
did not find them useful for analysing :armer resource management practices. It is
possible that the tasks (completing the matrices) being asked of respondents were too
complex, and required too much abstract analysis. It is also possible that there was
too much variation between the results of individuals for them to be analysed as group
means. Further research is being carried out by the authors to improve the quality of
the data being collected in future studies of these issues.
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ADOPTION OF ENVIRONMENTALLY BENEFICIAL LAND MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES •• EVIDENCE FROM NEW ZEALAND PASTORAL FARMS
G P Rauniyar and W J Parker
College of Sciences, Massey University, Palmerston North
ABSTRACT
Land management practices adopted by New Zealand pastoral farmers, based on a 1996
national mail survey, were examined. Retirement from grazing, tree planting, fertiliser use,
organic manure application, soil erosion control and weed control were analysed for dairy;
sheep, beef cattle and deer; and hobby farms for the period 1991 to 1996 and plans to 2000
were discussed. Nearly 27% of the respondents (n=313) had retired some land from grazing.
A further 10% of the farmers indicated lhat they were likely to retire land hy 2000. More than
two-fifths of farmers had planted an area (mean 1.9 ha) in trees since 1991. They intended to
continue planting trees through to 2000 (mean 1.7 ha). Improved aesthetic appearance, shade
and shelter for livestock and erosion control were the leading reasons for tree planting. Half of
the farmers had Increased fertiliser use on lheir farms since 1991. Judgement and experience,
followed by soil test results, guided decisions concerning fertiliser use. Greater use of organic
manures was reported by 50% of the farmers using this technology. Planting trees. land
retirement and riparian planting or physical barriers were common method~ of soil erosion
control. Pugging damage, especially on dairy farms, was primarily minimised through
rotational and on-off grazing. Chemical sprays were preferred and most effective method of
weed control. The farmers thought that they were managing their land resources effectively.
Keywords: land management, sustainahility, pastoral farming, management practices.
INTRODUCTION
Sustainable land management is an integral part of New Zealand's environmental policy and
is renected in the Environment 2010 goals and the Resource Management Act (Boshier,
1997). Pastoral agriculture, largely dominated by sheep, beef callIe, dairy and deer farms,
accounts for 73% of lhe total land area (NZMPB, 1993). New Zealand farmers are expected
to comply with environmental legislation in a deregulated market environment under which
net farm returns are typically low compared to non-agricultural sectors. From a farmer's
perspective financial and economic viahility plays an important role in lhe decisions to adopt
"environmentally friendly" practices (Rauniyar & Parker, 1997). Under the prevailing
economic conditions, most farmers consider they are farming sustainably. In addition,
sustainability is increasingly being viewed through a more holistic framework, lhat is,
consideration is given to economic/financial and community/social factors, as well as
environmental factors when evaluating the long-term viability of agricultural practices
(Gibbs, 1994). In this paper, data from a 1996 national survey is used to identify
environmentally beneficial land management practices in use on pastoral farms.
SURVEY METHOD
A national mail survey was conducted in 1996 to collect information on the adoption of
sust:unable technologies and management practices. Environmentally friendly land
management practices were identified through key informant interviews. These included
seven practices: (a) land retirement from grazing; (b) planting trees on pastoral land; (c)
reduced application of chemical fertiliser; (d) application of organic manure; (e) soil erosion
control; (0 pugging damage control; and (0 weed control. 11Je survey instrument
incorporated questions on these practices. 11Je questionnaire was pre-tested with IS farmers
and. afler some adjustments mailed to farmers representing all types of pastoral livestock
farms.
An unhiased list of farmers was sought for the national mail survey. Despite problems with
lhe validity of rural addresses, and constraints imposed by the Privacy Act, the rural delivery
mailing list of New Zealand Post was deemed to be the most appropriate source of farmer
names and adrtresses. Given the prohlems of accurately identifying farm households, a target
of about 400 completed questionnaires from a list containing 2,000 random rural adrtresses
(20% return) was set. The numher of effective returns, afler a reminder had been sent to each
non-respondent after 14 days, and taking into account non-respondents and invalid returns,
was 23% (n=316). All except three of these had complete data entries. 11Je responses were
from all New Zealand agricultural regions, and included commercial dairy, sheep and beef
callie. and deer farmers, as well as small and hobhy farmers. 11Je good geographical
representation of the farming areas and variation across farming sectors (hy type and size of
operation) provided an appropriate basis for a nationally representative study.
Data were analysed using the SAS package. Each dairy cow, breeding cow, other cattle,
hreeding ewe, other Sheep and deer was assigned as 8.0, 6.0, 4.0, 1.0, 0.8 and 1.5 stock units
(su), respectively. In order to make meaningful comparisons, non-dairy farms were classified
on the hasis of total stock units so that comparisons could be made amongst dairy, large non-
dairy. small non-dairy and hobby farms. Farms were classified into four categories: (a) dairy
farms (with more than 60 cows); (b) larger sheep, beef and/or deer farms with more than 500
stock units; (c) smaller sheep, beef and/or deer farms with total stock units between 50 and
SUO; and (d) hobhy farms (total stock units less than 50). 11Je survey sample contained 23%
dairy, 23% larger units (sheep, beef and/or deer), 27% smaller units (sheep, beef and/or deer)




Twenty-seven percent of the farmers had retired land from grazing between 1991 and 1996
(Tahle I). Larger sheep, beef cattle and/or deer units had retired more land from grazing than
any other farm class (on average 94 ha compared to 36 ha in dairy, 15 ha on smaller units and
8 ha on hobhy farms). However, the coefficient of variation in all four farm class was very
high (more than 200%), indicating a larger disparity in this practice across farms. 11Je median
farm area retired from grazing was much smaller Oess than 3 ha on dairy and hobby farms,
3.3 ha on larger units and 6.0 ha on smaller units). Land retirement practices were consistent
wilh the land's farming potential and opportunity to increase long-term earnings through
forestry (Table 2).
Ten percent of all farmers (including 40% of the farmers who had retired land during 1991
and 1996) planned to retire additional land from grazing during 1997-2000. Respondents on
larger sheep, beef cattle and/or deer units were planning to retire an average of 16 ha land
from grazing, compared to less than 2 ha on dairy farms, 6.2 ha on smaller units and 3.1 ha on
hobby farms. Smaller farm size, relatively easy land contour, fertile soils and comparatively
higher returns for dairying were all likely to have contributed to a smaller area being set aside
from grazing by dairy farmers. Half of the farmers who retired land from grazing during
1991-96 had ohserved no change in their farm income, while 20% had experienced a decline.
One in eight farmers had realised an inerease in farm income over the same period despite
retiring land from grazing.
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Nearly 23% of the farmers had retired land because they wanted to change their farming
system (reallocate their farm area to different land use enterprises), and 47% of the farmers
wanted to establish forestry (Table 2). Enhancement of the environment, improvement of soil
structure, shelter for livestock, preservation of native bush and lower labour requirements
were also cited as important factors in the decision to retire land. These reasons were not
statistically different aI-TOSS the farm classes. Less than 30% of the farmers mentioned the
unprofitability of farming, soil erosion control or increasing production as the motivation for
retiring land.
Awlication of chemical fertilisers
Almost all of the dairy and larger unit sheep, beef cattle and/or deer farmers had applied
chemical fertilisers during 1991-96 (Table 3). Interestingly, the majority of respondents on
smaller units and hobby farms also had applied chemical fertiliser in the past five years. Half
of the farmers reported that chemical fertiliser use on their farms had increased in the past live
years and about 39% had maintained the application rate. Only 10% of the farmers had
decreased chemical fertiliser use. An overwhelming majority of dairy farmers (77%)
reported that they had increased, and only less than 2% had reduced, the use of chemical
fertiliser in the past five years. Compared to 1995, slightly more than one-fourth of the
farmers had increased the application of chemical fertiliser on their farms.
Farmers rated their reliance on four specified parameters for gUiding chemical fertiliser use on
their farms. The parameters were: soil test results, an independent consultant's advice, advice
from a chemical fertiliser company representative, and their own judgement and experience.
The frequency of reliance was recorded as never, occasionally, regularly and always (Table
4). Slightly more than one-sixth of the farmers always used soil test results, 4% of the
farmers always relied on an independent consultant's advice, 6% of the farmers always relied
on a chemical fertiliser company representative and 34% of the farmers always used their own
judgement and experience. More than two-fifths of the dairy and larger unit sheep, beef callie
and/or deer unit farmers, and about 28% of other farmers, regularly depended on soil test
results. Slightly more than one-fifth of the farmers regularly relied on chemical fertiliser
company representative's advice and 32% of the farmers on larger units regularly relied on an
independent consultant's advice. Thus, the majority of the farmers used mixed criteria to
decide how much chemical fertiliser to apply. Relatively more inexperienced farmers, as well
as those on large farms, were more likely than the other categories of farmers, to rely on an
independent consultant or a chemical fertiliser company representative for advice.
Application of organic manure
One-fourth of the farmers had applied organic manure to their farms in the past five years
(Table 5). Of the farmers who had applied organic manure to their farms, 42% reported that
their use of organic manure had inereased during 1991-96. There was no major distinction
across the farm classes, except dairy farms, where 24% of the farmers who had applied
organic manure reported that the use of organic manure on their farm had decreased in the
same period. This may have been to achieve compliance with the RMA.
More than three-fifths of the farmers (62%) perceived that the application of organic manure
on their farm was "most important" for Increasing the organic matter in soil, and more than
half of the farmers thought that it was "most important" for Inereasing pasture productivity.
Twenty-eight percent of the farmers thought that organic manure applications were "most
important" for reducing the use of chemical fertilisers, although dairy farmers were not
convinced that the use of organic manure would achieve this aim. This result is not perhaps
surprising, given that dairy farmers tend to apply much higher rates of chemical fertiliser than
those with other classes of livestock. None of the dairy farmers thought that the application
of organic manure was "most important" because it enabled disposal of dairy shed effluent.
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However, an overwhelming majority (81 %) of dairy farmers thought that organic manure
application was "somewhat important" in helping with the disposal of dairy shed effluent.
1l1is concept is promoted by the Regional Councils as a means of in-land disposal to protect
catchment water quality.
Tree planting
More than three-fourths of the farmers (18%) had planted trees on their farms at some stage
and this behaviour was fairly uniform across the four farm classes (Table 6). In 1991-96,
slightly I~s than half of the farmers (all classes) had planted trees on their farm. 11Ie average
area in tree plantation varied across farm classes (13.5 ha for larger units, 9.4 ha for smaller
units, 2.1 ha for dairy farms and 1.9 ha for hobby farms). If the 1996 market conditions
prevailed, 43% of the farmers planned to plant further woodlots by 2000 (on average 9.4 ha
for larger units, 18.5 ha for smaller units, 4.5 ha for dairy farms and 1.7 ha for hobby farms).
Farmers also suggested that their planting regimen would change under different market
conditions for farm and forestry produce.
Farmers were asked to indicate the importance of eight reasons for planting trees in the
context of their own farm. An overwhelming majority of the farmers considered shade and
shelter for livestock, and the Improvement of farm appearance, as an "important" or "very
important" reason for tree planting (Table 6). Nearly two-thirds of the farmers considered
tree planting to be "important" or "very important" for erosion control, and nearly three-fifths
of the farmers viewed tree planting as an investment crop. Only two-fifths of the farmers
expressed the importance of tree planting in terms of providing timber for the farm use and
slightly more than one-third considered tree planting to be "important" for providing a
riparian strip to protect waterways. Proportionately more of the farmers on large units
attached importance to planting of trees for erosion control, timber for farm use, riparian strip
protection of waterways and shelter for livestock, compared to the other farmers.
Soil erosion control
Farmers were asked to indicate the intensity on their properties of landslip, run-off of top soil
and stream bank erosion as no problem, or a minor, moderate or severe problem (Table 7).
More than one-fifth of the farmers indicated all three types of soil erosion were a minor
problem. One in eight farmers reported that landslip were a "moderate to severe" problem,
and one in eleven farmers reported run-off of top soil as being a "moderate to severe"
problem, while one in five farmers had experienced "moderate to severe" problems with
stream bank erosion. The severity of erosion problems was more pronounced on the larger
sheep, beef cattle and/or deer farms.
A number of steps had been undertaken by farmers to control soil erosion. These included
withdrawal of land (temporarily or permanently) from grazing, planting of trees, planting
ground-cover vegetation, the use of minimum tillage, riparian planting, and establishing
physical barriers (Table 8). Tree planting was the most popular practice; 45% of the farmers
had planted trees to control soil erosion. One-fourth of the farmers had withdrawn land from
grazing, while 15% had adopted riparian planting or constructed physical barriers. Thirteen
percent of the farmers (dominated by the dairy and hobby farmers) had used minimum tillage
technology. Six percent of the farmers had taken other steps, such as oversowing by air,
control of water run-off with drainage, controlled grazing and lower stocking rates, improved
fencing, and Installing an improved flood and race Irrigation system.
Soil dralnage
On average, 71 % of the area of the surveyed farms had free draining soils (median 80%)




On average 11 % of the farm area was in tile or mole drain, and 5.4% of the area had been
contOllr drained, No specific drainage system was in place on 68% of the area of the
'average' survey farm. On average, 47% of the land on dairy farms had had some form of
drainage Installed.
Sixty percent of the farmers reported "no" or "minor" pugging damage to pasture, while 30%
had a "moderate" problem and 10% reported pugging to be a "serious" problem. Prohahly
due to the flatter contour, the greater preponderance of heavy soil and higher stocking rates
thrOllgh intensive rotational grazing, pugging damage was relatively more pronounced on
dairy farms than the other farm classes. Nearly two-thirds of the dairy farmers reported
"moderate to severe" pugging damage to pastures.
Rotational grazing with regular shifts of livestock was the most popular (69%) means of
reducing pugging damage. Less than half of the farmers had never fenced off the wettest
areas from grazing, while 43% of the farmers had never used on-off grazing. More than 70%
of the farmers never held animals in a sacrifice paddock/river accretion, on a feed pad or on a
race-way to mitigate pugging damage to pasture. The use of these techniques was largely
dominated by dairy farmers. For example, on-off grazing had heen adopted hy 37% of the
dairy farmers.
Weed control
On average, farmers spent 22 days per year controlling weeds on their farms. Dairy farmers
spent at least 50% more time than other types of farmers on weed control (Tahle 10), despile
dairy farms being much smaller in terms of area than the larger units. The time allocated to
weed control Indicates that weeds are serious a problem for most farmers.
More than 80% of the dairy, larger units and smaller unit farmers, and more than half of
hobhy farmers considered chemical sprays to be "important" or "very important" for weed
control (Table 10). Cutting or grubbing plants out, or removal of flowering heads, was the
second most popular method of weed control (more than 70% of the farmers attached
Importance to this method). Livestock grazing pressure was also widely adopted for weed
control, particularly by non-dairy farmers, 65% of whom considered this method to be
"important" or "very important". More than three-fourths of farmers (all classes) responded
that they either did not use or considered biological methods of weed control to be not
Important. Only 14% of the dairy and hobby farmers, and 24% and seven of those on larger
units and smaller units, respectively, considered biological method of weed control was
"Important"; none of the farmers thought that this method to be "very important". Other
methods of weed control adopted by farmerS included: burning, peppering, regrassing,
cropping, slashing, mulching, mechanical cultivation, shading by tree planting and mowing.
DISCUSSION
The retirement of land from grazing since 1991, especially for the pUl]JOSe of establishing
farm forestry, was accelerated by high log prices between 1992 and 1994 (Burtt, 1995).
Survey farmers reasons for planting trees compare favourably with those reported for
Wairarapa hill cOllntry sheep and beef cattle farmers who also identified that cash and labour
constrained the rate of tree planting (parker el al., 1998). The present study confirms
substantial change in attitude toward tree planting since the 1988/89 when the New Zealand
Meat and Wool Board's Economic Service reported only 23 % of hill country farmers had
estal1lished productive trees (cited by Knowles, 1994). Trees are beneficial to land
management, particularly with respect to controlling soil erosion. However, the impact of
1998 Asian economic crisis would suggest otherwise in the 1996 market conditions. If the
situation is to preVail for longer period, tree planting would not be a viable investment option
for pastoral farmers.
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The survey farmers reported increased use of chemical fertiliser, which is consistent with the
upward trend in national fertiliser sales during the 19908 (NZMWBES, 1997). The survey
farmers' response, combined with the information on farm finances (Rauniyar & Parker,
1997), indicates that dairy farmers as well as sheep, beef andlor deer farmers are under
pressure to increase the use of chemical fertiliser to maintain soil fertility and thus pasture
productivity. Greater use of fertiliser can be linked to generally improved product returns in
the early 1990s compared to the previous five years, and a change in farmer attitude toward
the treatment of fertiliser as a primary target for reduced discretionary expenditure when
product prices falter (NZMWBES, 1996). This reflects the carryover economic impact of
withholding fertiliser (Clark el aI., 1991). Dairy farmers, in particular, have increased their
use of nitrogenous (N) fertilisers in response to extension programmes focussed on growing
more pasture. Nevertheless, the rates of application generally do not exceed 80-100 kg N/ha
and thus are unlikely to increase grOllnd water contamination (Ledgard el al., 1996).
The proportion of farmers who reported that they used organic manuring (25%) is
surprisingly high, but it corresponds to the strong media focus on organic, low input farming
over the past decade. The practice was slightly more prevalent on dairy farms where the
flatter topography facilitates the application of animal effluent. The proportion of farmers
who used organic manure exclusively was not established.
Soil erosion was a 'moderate to severe' problem on almost twice of the percentage of sheep
and heef cattle farms than the other types of pastoral farms. The former class of farms are
predominantly located on hill cOllntry, especially in the North Island. Slope, soil type and
rainfall contribute to slips. Farmers had adopted standard techniques, such as tree and grOllnd
cover planting and installed physical barriers to control soil erosion and protect stream banks.
Waikato farmers ranked streambank protection and waterways the highest goal for
resource management (Parminter et aI., 1996). It wOllld have been useful to have established
whether farmers thought soil erosion had decreased over the past two decades, althOllgh
extreme weather events (eg. Cyclone Bola) can override the benefits of good land
management practice. Townsley el al. (1997) suggested that while land quality factors, such
as erosion control, are important to rural valuers and farmerS they are not necessarily
reflected in market values. Thus, farmer investment in erosion control and other remedial land
management practices Is 'captured' thrOllgh productivity advantages rather than higher land
values per se.
Wet, poorly drained soils were a seriOlls problem mainly on dairy farms, where a combination
of limited slope for water run-off, heavy stocking rates and Intensive grazing can contribute to
pugging damage. Smith el al. (1997) established differences between dairy farmers "affected
and unaffected" by wet winters. On-off grazing was more commonly used on "unaffeeted"
farms (56%), while the reverse was true of feed pads (67% of "affected" farms). Drainage
was more common on the "unaffected" farms than on "affected" farms (67 vs 33%). These
practices and technologies were also reported by the survey farmers and implies that soil
damage can be mitigated thrOllgh good management practice. Hili cOllntry farmers are also
changing their winter management of beef cattle in order to reduce soil pugging (Morriss,
1998). This is facilitated by GIS technology to map the farms' soils by their proneness to
pugging damage. These new technologies will assist farmers achieve sustainable land
management and minimise disruption to farm productiVity.
Weeds are an on-going and sometimes difficult problem to most of the New Zealand farms
and the survey of farmers confirmed this (Collins, 1997. When farm profitability is low,
discretionary expenditure on weed control is reduced, especially where large scale and
expensive programmes are required on hill country (eg. for gorse and Matagari). Biological
control methods, while used to some extent on all classes of pastoral farms, are not as




eradication/containment. TIJis remains an important constraint to the wider adoption of
organic farming and necessitates sufficient farm income to purchase chemicals to control
weeds.
CONCLUSION
Sustainable land management on pastoral farms in New Zealand is contingent upon farm
viability. Tree planting. appropriate fertiliser input. drainage to minimise soil pugging and
chemicals to control weeds can all assist land managelnent but are also discretionary items of
farm expenditure. When product returns are low. farmers will reduce or eliminate
expenditure on these items. perhaps with the exception of fertiliser. in order to meet fixed
costs such as debt servicing and family liVing expenses and thereby ensure farm business
survival. Improved product prices and better long-term market information are therefore
eritical factors in achieving sustainable pastoral farming. Nevertheless, this study has shown
that farmers are taking steps to protect the land resource upon which their livelihood depends.
but the variation in practice between farms suggest some land owners could be doing more to
protect the environment.
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Table I. Land retirement from pastoral grazing between 1991 and 1996 by survey respondents.
(Percent farmers responding)
Farm type n % farmers retiring Mean Std. Median
land (ha) dev. (ha)
A. Dairy farms 18 25 36.4 141.9 2.8
B. Sheep, beef, deer farms
a. larger units: > 500 su 23 32 93.5 256.7 3.3
b. smaller units: 50-500 su 24 29 14.8 38.0 6.0
C. Hobby farms: < 50 su 19 22 7.6 18.0 2.8
Overallffota1 84 27
--
Table 2: Reasons for retiring land from pastoral grazing in New Zealand (1996).
(Percent farmers responding)
Table 3: Changes in chemical fertiliser use on survey farms for the five year period from 1991.
,- -------- --- ---- --- . ,
Indicator Farm type
Sheep, beef, Sheep, beef, Chi-
Dairy deer deer Hobby Overall square'larger units smaller units < 50su
>500 su 50-500 su
Fertiliser used in the past n=71 n=74 n=85 n=86 n=316
five years 54.2
Yes 97.2 98.7 85.9 62.8 85.1 dJ.=3
No 2.8 1.3 14.1 37.2 14.9 •••
Trend in the fertiliser use n=68 n=71 n=72 n=50 n=261
during /99/-961
Increased 76.5 45.1 44.4 34.0 51.0 34.5
Remained the same 22.0 35.2 48.6 52.0 38.7 dJ.=6
Decreased 1.5 19.7 7.0 14.0 10.3 •••
Fertiliser lise in /996 n=68 n=73 n=72 n=48 n=261
compared 10 /995
More 30.9 27.4 25.0 18.8 26.1 9.9
About the same 64.7 52.1 59.7 62.5 59.4 dJ.=6
Less 4.4 20.5 15.3 18.7 14.5 NS
~(0
Perception of the farmers
Reason n More important Neutral Less important
A. Production from the 76 26 12 62
land was unprofitable
B. To reduce soil erosion 72 28 12 60
C. To establish production 76 20 5 75
D. Forestry 62 47 13 40
E. Planned to change 75 23 5 72
farming system
F. Other I 15 80 7 13
I Including enviroomental enhancement, livestock sheller, preservation of native fauna.
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I Significance of differences in fertiliser use between farm types:
NS = Not Significant, ••• = P < 0.001," P < 0.05 and • = P < 0.1.
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Frequency of reliance on the criteria (n=269)
Criteria for fertiliser use Never Occasionally RegUlarly Always
All Farms
A. Soil test results 17.1 29.0 36.8 17.1
B. Independent consultant's 46.5 27.5 21.6 4.4
advise
C. Fertiliser Company 38.3 33.1 23.0 5.6
Representative
D. Own judgement and experience 17.1 10.0 38.7 34.2
Dairy Farms
A. Soil test results 2.9 20.3 46.4 30.4
B. Independent consultant's 33.3 26.1 31.9 8.7
advise
C. Fertiliser company 26.1 43.4 24.6 5.8
representative
D. Own judgement and experience 13.0 10.1 37.7 39.1
Sheep, beef, deer fanns
larger IInils (>500 Sill
A. Soil test results 6.8 34.3 42.5 16.4
B. Independent consultant's 38.4 35.6 29.3 2.7
advise
C. Fertiliser company 34.2 31.5 28.8 5.5
representative
D. Own judgement and experience 11.0 11.0 37.0 41.0
Sheep, beef, deer farms
smaller IInilS (50-500 Sill
A. Soil test results 27.4 34.3 27.8 9.6
B. Independent consultant's 57.5 27.4 12.3 2.7
advise
C. Fertiliser company 41.1 30.1 20.6 8.2
representative
D. Own judgment and experience 23.3 5.5 38.4 32.9
Hobbyfarmers
A. Soil test results 34.2 25.9 27.8 11.1
B. Independent consultant's 59.3 18.5 18.5 3.7
advise
C. Fertiliser company 55.6 25.9 16.7 1.8
representative
D. Own judgement and experience 22.2 14.8 42.6 20.4
Indicator Farm type
Sheep, beef, deer Sheep, beef, deer HobbyDairy larger units smaller units
<50 su Overall(n=71) > 500 su 50-500 su (n=86) (n=316)(n=74) (n=85)
Used organic manllre
Yes 29.6 23.0 23.5 24.4 25.0
No 70.4 77.0 76.5 75.6 75.0
Trend in organic manllre n=21 n=16 n=19 n=21 n=77
lise in the las/five years
Increased 42.9 43.8 47.4 33.3 41.6
Remained the same 33.3 12.5 36.8 38.1 32.1
Decreased 23.8 31.2 5.3 4.7 15.6
Unsure 0.0 12.5 10.5 23.8 11.7
c.n
o
Table 4: Basis for decisions on fertiliser use by survey farmers (996).
II
Table 5: Application of organic manure on survey farms.
(Percent farmers responding)
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Table 6: Tree planting by New Zealand pastoral farmers.
(Percent farmers responding)




Tree planting and reasons for Farm type OverallIree planting
Sheep, beef, deer Sheep, beef, deer HobbyDairy larger units smaller units
su > 500 su 50-500 su < 50
Trees planted
Yes 76.1 77.0 72.9 83.7 77.5
No 23.9 23.0 27.1 16.3 22.5
Area planted in the last 5 n=34 n=33 n=30 n=39
years (ha)
Mean 2.1 13.5 9.4 1.9
Std. dev. 2.5 37.7 41.2 5.2
Median 1.0 4.0 0.5 0.5
Additional area planned to n=34 n=33 n=30 n=39
plant in trees (wood lot! in the
next three years.
Mean 4.5 9.3 18.5 I.7
Std. dev. 1I.1 20.4 93.6 2.2
Median 1.0 3.0 0.8 0.8
Reason.rfor tree planJing to N=53 n=56 n=61 n=69 n=239
be impOrlanJlvery imporlanJ
A. Shade for livestock 75.5 85.7 73.8 76.8 77.8
B. Sheller for livestock 81.0 85.6 90.2 82.6 84.8
C Timber for farm use 28.3 58.9 43.3 36.2 41.6
D. Riparian strip to protect 32.0 45.4 31.6 6.8 36.4
water-ways
E. Livestock fodder 7.6 14.3 26.7 26.1 19.3
F. As an inveSlment crop 52.8 76.8 53.3 55.4 59.2
G. F.sosion conlrol 63.5 75.0 55.0 59.4 62.8
II. Improve farm appearance 88.5 91.0 95.0 89.9 9I.1
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F.sosion problem Farm type Overall
Sheep, beef. Sheep. beef.
Dairy deer deer Hobby 0=314larger units smaller units su <50
n=70 su > 500 su 50-500 0=86
0=74 n=84
Land slips
No problem 74.3 43.2 69.0 74.4 65.6
Minor problem 11.4 39.2 21.4 61.3 22.0
Moderate to severe problem 14.3 17.6 9.6 9.3 12.4
Chi-square 25.4 (6 d.f.) •••
Run-Offoftopsoil
No problem 71.0 46.0 76.2 69.8 66.2
Minor problem 24.6 40.5 15.5 19.8 24.6
Moderate to severe problem 4.4 13.5 8.3 10.4 9.2
Chi-square 21.0 (6 dJ.) ••
Stream-bank erosion
No problem 58.0 31.5 54.8 61.6 51.9
Minor problem 27.5 39.7 32.1 19.8 29.5
Moderate to severe problem 14.5 28.8 13.1 18.6 18.6
Chi-square 19.7 (6 d.f.)··
14
Other steps to control soil erosion included: over sowing by air, control water run-ofr with
drainage, controlled grazing, lower stocking rates, clearing drains, imprOVed boundary fencing
along river, moved fence lines away from drains. electric fencing put along drain banks, conlTcte
barriers, stmes, improved flood and race irrigation system, and fenced off steep banks.
Farm type Overall Chi-
square
Steps Iaken by farmers Sheep. beef, Sheep, beef,
Dairy deer deer Hobbylarger units smaller units su < 50 n=316n=71
su > 500 su 50-500 n=86
n=74 n=85
A. Withdrawal of land 19.7 18.9 10.6 14.0 15.5 NS
permanenUy from
grazing
B. Withdrawal orland 7.0 10.8 12.9 14.0 11.4 NS
temporarily from
grazing
C. Planted trees 39.4 5\.4 44.7 45.4 45.2 NS
D. Planled ground cover 11.3 5.4 5.9 12.8 8.9 NS
vegetation
E. Uscd minimum 25.4 2 \.6 4.7 4.6 13.3 •••
tillage techniques
F. Riparian planting or 18.3 16.2 14.1 14.0 15.5 NS
physical barriers
G. Other steps' 8.5 2.7 4.7 8.1 6.0 NS




Table 8: Sleps taken by farmers 10 control soil erosion.
(Percent farmers responding)
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Table 9: Soil drainage and pugging damage by livestock on survey farms.
Indicatcn I Fumlype Ovenlll
au-!quue
ShUI', heof, Sheep, beef,
deer de...
Dairy larger unils smalleruni1.! I Lir"'tyle
m>SOO '" 50-500
Soil drainage .=69 .=69 .=83 .=85 0=306
Mean: Free draining soil (%) 63 71 74 75 71
Poor draining soil (%) 37 29 26 25 29
Median: Free draining soil (%) 70 80 80 90 80
Poor draining soil (%) 30 20 20 10 20
Mean farm area (ha) with
Iile and mole drains 13.6 10.9 10.3 8.2 10.6
open drains 29.1 8.1 17.2 11.8 16.3
contour drainJ!l 4.7 4.9 4.4 7.3 5.4
natural drainage 52.7 75.3 68.1 72.7 67.7
Pugging damage to soil 0=70 0=70 .=85 0=82 .=307
No problem 8.6 10.0 10.6 25.6 4.0
Minor problem 32.9 57.1 49.4 43.9 45.9
Moderate problem 35.7 30.0 31.8 21.9 29.6
Serious problem 22.9 2.9 8.2 8.5 10.4
Chi-square
Steps laken 10 reduce pugging damage I 0=63 I 0=61 I 0=71 I 0=57 I .=252
A. Tem(Xlrarily fence off
well est areas from grazing
Never I 39.7 I 59.0 I 53.5 I 9.8 I 46.0Sometimes 46.0 37.7 35.2 45.6 40.9Always 14.3 3.3 11.3 24.6 13.1
Chi-square













Sometimes 14.3 22.9 18.1 26.3 20.2
Always 79.4 68.9 68.0 59.7 69.1
Chi-square NS
C. on-orr grazing
Ne...a I 17.5 I 49.2 I 51.4 I 51.8 I 42.5Sometimes 46.0 41.0 38.9 28.6 38.9Always 36.5 9.8 9.7 19.6 18.6
Cbj-square
D. Hold animals in a sacrifice
paddocklriver accretion
I I I I I 73.9Never 69.8 73.8 72.2 86.7 18.6Sometimes 19.1 19.7 22.2 12.3 7.5Always 11.1 6.6 5.6 7.0 NSChi-square
E. Hold animals on feed pad
Never
I
68.3 I 96.7 I 83.J I 84.2 I 83.0Sometimes 22.2 3.3 15.J 7.0 12.3Always 9.5 1.4 8.8 4.7Chi-square
F. Hold animals on a race-way
Never
I 38.1 I 88.5 I 87.5 I 80.7 I 73.9Sometimes 47.6 11.0 12.5 12.3 21.0Always 14.3 7.0 5.1Chi-square
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Table 10: Weed control measures adopted by survey farmers.
01
CJ,)
Weed control measures Farm type Overall
Sheep, beef, Sheep, beef,
Dairy deer deer Hobby
larger units smaller units su < 50
su > 500 su 50-500
Number of days spent on n=67 n=63 n=76 n=67 n=273
weed control
Mean (days) 34 23 19 14 22
Std. dev. 35 20 31 17
Median (days) 30 20 8 7
Method of weed control
A. Chemical sprays n=70 n=71 n=82 n=78 n=301
-
Not used 1.4 7.0 6.1 25.6
-
Not imp<I"tant 4.3 5.6 11.0 20.5
-
Important 31.4 50.7 59.8 39.7
- Very important 62.9 36.6 23.2 14.1
Chi-square 74.3 (d.f.=9)***
B. CUlting/grubbing plants n=70 n=72 n=82 n=78 n=302
out or removal of
Oowering head
Not used 15.7 20.8 6.1 11.5
Not imp<I"tant 8.6 9.7 4.9 5.1
-
Important 45.7 43.1 63.4 48.7
-
Very important 30.0 26.4 25.6 34.6 13.9 (d.f.=9)NS
Chi-square
C. Livestock grazing n=70 n=72 n=82 n=78 n=302
pressure
-
Notuscd 34.3 20.8 18.3 28.2
-
Not imp<I"tant 22.9 9.7 14.6 6.4
-
Important 31.4 47.2 47.6 51.3
Very important 11.4 22.2 19.5 14.1
Chi-square 20.0 (d.f.=9)**
D. Biological control n=70 n=72 n=82 n=8 n=302
-
Not used 58.6 95.0 79.3 73.1
NOI imp<I"tant 47.5 16.7 3.7 7.7
-
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Extension is a non-regulatory approach which has the potential to facilitate attainment
of sustainable land management in New Zealand. A historic overview of extension as
a profession, which once was mainly concerned with technology transfer, is presented.
This is followed by a discussion of the relationship hetween extension and extension
science. Examples of the contribution made by seven social science disciplines
(sociology, communication studies, social-psychology, education, marketing, systems
theory and management theory) to the development of extension science are outlined.
of the role extension can have in achieving sustainable land management in New
Zealand.
First, an outline of the current RMA policy context is given. This is followed
by a historic overview of the development of extension as a professional activity. The
basis for the development of extension as a field of study has been both the experiences
of practitioners and a range of disciplinary areas. These areas are described briefly.
SUSTAINABLE LAND MANAGEMENT POLICY
The purpose of the RMA is to promote the sustainable management of natural and
physical resources (RMA, 1991). The Act is concerned with managing the effects of
activities associated with, and impacting on, New Zealand's natural and physical
resources. Implementation of the RMA is the responsibility of regional and district
councils.
Any intervention by a council, with respect to activities effecting resources, has
to be justified. The RMA requires that objectives, policies and methods, included in
plans under the RMA, focus on the effects of activities and include clear effects-based
environmental performance standards, wherever possible. Further, activities should
only be controlled where it is difficult, impossible or impractical to monitor their
effecL~, or where the effects would be very costly to remedy or mitigate once they had
been enacted (Morriss et aI., 1995). "Before adopting any objective, policy, rule or
other method" (RMA, 1991: Section 32) councils are duty bound to consider both the
appropriateness of the proposed intervention approach and the extent to which any
ohjective, policy, rule or method is necessary. Councils can remain silent on an activity
or they may classify the activity as permitted or control the activity and require a
consent to be applied for.
There is a range of policy instruments that councils can use to achieve their
RMA objectives. These instruments include:
Implementation of the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) in New Zealand is well
underway. A number of regional councils have proposed land, water and air plans, and
district councils are now drafting District Plans. To implement these plans individual
councils have adopted different approaches, that range from highly regulatory to non-
regulatory (Morriss and Workman, 1998). However, councils are increasingly reluctant
to place a high level of reliance on regulatory approaches alone. There is a growing
interest in adapting and developing non-regulatory approaches to facilitate effective
sustainable land management in New Zealand.
A number of approaches exist that have the potential to assist practitioners and
policy makers to develop and implement the RMA with the wider community in a non-
regulatory manner. Extension is one such approach. Both as a profession and a field of
study, extension is well recognized. It is the purpose of this paper to provide an
overview of extension practice and theory to promote a broader awareness and dehate
Keywords: Extension, extension science, sustainable land management policy.
INTRODUCTION
(a) economic instruments - mechanisms such as charges, subsidies, deposit refund
schemes, transferable rights, performance bonds and non-compliance fees and
offsets;
(b) regulatory instruments - rules, standards, regulations and compliance conditions
that define contracts and limits for what is acceptable or not - the command and
control approach;
(c) participatory non-regulatory instruments - processes that enable information
sharing and learning, and the shared communication between stakeholders.
A recent study undertaken to compare regional council and unitary authority policy
approaches to land disturbance and vegetation removal activities showed that the mix
of these instruments varies (Morriss and Workman, 1998). But the variation has
resulted not simply from Section 32 analyses, but rather the influence of historical (pre-
RMA) policy approaches, local political factors, staff philosophy, financial factors, and
differing biophysical environmental conditions. Variations were identified in relation
to each of the following:
• policy approach - in terms of the balance between regulatory and non-
regulatory policy instruments being used;
• timing and nature of policy decisions - in terms of whether or not to develop a
soon Followed by other universities. By the 1880s the work was being referred to as the
extension movement (Van den Ban and Hawkins, 1996).
Prior to Stuart introducing the term extension, there had been attempts to
change agricultural practices through nonformal education. For example, after the 1847
potato famine in Ireland Lord Clarendon established, what can be called, the first
European agricultural extension service. His argument was "that [the farmers']
impoverished conditions could be partially overcome if they could be taught, advised
and persuaded to improve their husbandry practices and to grow food crops other than
potatoes" (Jones, 1982, p.13). In the Netherlands, theology students received agronomy
lectures with the assumption that later, as pastors, they would act as "disseminators of
new ideas and knowledge" (Brugmans, 1969, p.157). In reality, this proved to be a
misconception as many of them lacked an interest in agriculture.
Agricultural extension, as an intervention instrument and a professional activity,
finally became of age in the late 19th and early 20th century. Governments recognized
the potential for productive agriculture based on the latest scientific and technological
breakthroughs (such as chemical fertilizers and mechanisation). However, this new
technology was often very slowly adopted and diffused in rural areas. In response to
this, ba~ed on the assumption that slow adoption related to a poor level of knowledge
and understanding of the farmers, many western governments established extension
divisions within their ministries of agriculture, with specialised staff that had the task
of transferring technology to the wider farming communities. Extension staff developed
a wide range of extension methods in order to inform and educate farmers, with the
main purpose being "to increase the rate of adoption of farm innovations" (Rogers et
aI., 1976, p.15).
In the US, the government chose a slightly different strategy. In the second half
of the 19th century, the US congress established land-grant institutions, most of which
were state colleges. These institutions were granted land in return for providing higher
education. In 1887, these land-grant institutions were expanded to include agricultural
research stations, and in 1914 they acquired a third function when Cooperative
Extension Services were set up with the purpose of "extending instruction in agriculture
and home economics to the public" (Boone, 1989, pAl. Although this system operates
until today, it faces serious challenges to its relevancy and existence (Hall and Kuiper,
1998).
The model that represents the predominant perspective adopted by extension
practitioners over this period, is the transfer of technology (TOT) model (Figure I).
The reasoning that defines the TOT model is that: scientific research generates
scientific knowledge; this knowledge is used to develop new technology; this
technology is transferred to potential users by extension staff; some of these potential
users adopt the technology offered; successful adoption is followed by diffusion of the
technology amongst the group of potential users; widespread adoption of new




land plan or equivalent, when those decisions were made, and why;
.. stage of development - of planning and planning documentation, both in terms
of timing and the type of plan or planning document being developed;
.. regulatory policy - in terms of the regulatory classification of activities, the
thresholds between activity classification levels, and rule targeting policy;
.. non-regulatory policy - in terms of the range of instruments used, the relative
emphasis placed on each, and the resources provided to support them.
The spectrum of approaches, in part, also reflects the stage each council has reached
in its policy development process. Most councils are either reviewing their existing
plans or planning documents through the RMA consultation process, or still preparing
plans. Therefore, over time some councils will shift to be more or less regulatory in
their approach. However, the study clearly identified an increasing desire by councils,
where feasible, to use non-regulatory policy approaches to land management issues
(Morriss and Workman, 1998).
This study supports previous work that suggests that the traditional reliance on
regulatory methods has not proven satisFactory as means to halt pollution problems
(Meister and Sharp, 1993), or wider natural resource degradation (Bradson, 1990).
While economic instruments may have appeal, they too are unlikely to deliver
sustainable resource management outcomes on their own (Walker and Morriss, 1996).
Rules will protect the environmental bottom-line, but the challenge is to implement the
RMA using increasingly non-regulatory approaches. This will mean that practitioners
and policy makers will need to have an understanding of, and ability to apply, the
theoretical and practical concepl~ underpinning effective participatory approaches such
as extension.
EXTENSION
Someone following the sustainability debate will quickly notice that although difFerent
parties might use the same terminology, confusion about the meaning of words used
often prevails (an optimist could conclude that the parties involved are at least on
speaking terms). A major task in addressing sustainability issues is clariFying the
language used and progressing towards concepts with shared connotations.
With the term 'extension' the same problems are experienced. People tend to
use it freely, but attach quite different meanings and associations to it. In an attempt to
bring some consistency of understanding of the term extension, the section below
outlines a history of extension, followed by definitions of the term drawn from the
literature.
A short hjstory of exlensjon
The use of the term extension dates back to the second half of the 19th century, when
James Stuart, a Cambridge professor, promoted the idea of 'extending the university'
by bringing its science to those who could benefit from it, but who were not able to
attend university (Van Gent, 1983). The basic premise was that universities had
developed a va~t pool of scientific knowledge with practical implications, that was not
widely used. One of the first attempts to apply this new extension philosophy was
Stuart's 1867-68 series of lectures to women's associations and working men's clubs.




The Transfer of Technology (TOT) model.






Western agriculture, including New Zealand, developed rapidly after the second
world war, with spectacular increases in per hectare and per lahour unit production.
Extension activities were seen to playa vital role in this development (McMeekan,
1963). Extension has been used by government as a instrument to hring about desired
change: "..... the ba~ic ta~k of the agricultural extension officer is to deal with the wide
technical and farm managerial field of raising agricultural productivity, including
lahour productivity, and thus increasing output per acre and per man ... ." (Penders,
1956, p.16). Looking back, many would prohahly say that the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s
were the 'golden years' of extension. Governments were willing to invest heavily in
agriculture, research and extension. It was a period with many scientific hreakthroughs
that fuelled technology development, and the focus of extension was clear and simple:
to disseminate knowledge and technology to farmers so they could make significant
gains in production and productivity.
In an attempt to achieve the same results, the TOT approach was adopted in
many third world countries, with national agricultural research and extension systems
heing established. Agricultural research centres were helieved to hold the key to
hoosting productivity, with so-called change agents delivering recommendations to
farmers. Extension was often integrated with other services, such as input supply (eg.
high-yielding varieties, fertili7.cr and pesticides), credit and product marketing (Purcell
and Anderson, 1997). This approach refiected the view that lack of adoption was not
just a lack of knowledge or motivation, but also a function of farmers' lack of inputs
which constrained their ability to put the technology in place. The integrated approach
wa~ particularly successful in some areas and for some crops (eg. wetland rice), and led
to what is now called the green revolution.
Extension worldwide has, since the 1970s, seen a shift away from sole reliance
on the top-down TOT model. Three developments that characterise this shift are:
(I) despite their success in some arca~ and for some crops, TOT approaches often failed
to deliver appropriate technologies to a large proportion of farmers. This ohservation
has promoted increased interest in hottom up, participatory approaches; (2) the shift
towards sustainahle agriculture with less chemical input often requires farmers to
develop a new perspective on their farm and the way they make decisions (RiHing,
1993). This led to increased interest in the facilitation of farmer experimentation and
learning; (3) a desire to cut back on government expenditure has led to the
commercialisation of agricultural extension services in several countries, for example
New Zealand. These three trends, although often inter-related, will be discussed
separately in the next paragraphs.
The TOT approach and rapid gains in agricultural production often coincided
in rather unique circumstances where there was hreakthrough technology such as high
yielding varieties (HYV), combined with integrated government measures to promote
agricultural development. For example, the Asian green revolution in rice was only
successful in those areas where there was consistent access to water (eg. irrigation) and
secured and timely services providing cheap credit, seeds, pesticides and fertilizer. And
although in these instances, agricultural production often increased dramatically, in
many cases the social prohlems, such as poverty and malnutrition, were not alleviated.
In Ethiopia, for example, the green revolution forced many small farmers off their land
as they couldn't compete with bigger-land owners (see Michael Lipton and Richard
Longhurst'S 1989 hook "New seeds and poor people" for a balanced discussion on the
effects of the green revolution). In many third world countries, non-government
organisations (NGOs) and some governments looked for new approaches that would
help tackle poverty and bring about social change. Many NGOs perceived and used
extension to empower rural communities, working at grass roots level. New approaches
were developed, such as participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and participatory
technology development (PTD). Although many of these approaches were developed
in third world countries, they are proving to be just as relevant in western countries,
including Australia and New Zealand (Reid, 1996).
The world-wide shift towards sustainable farming, aiming at a reduction of
chemical input and wa~tage, often requires a new approach to decision making and the
perception of risk. For example, spray applications under these systems are not aimed
at total eradication, following spray schedules, but based on careful monitoring of the
farm and its environment. This development also requires a different approach to
extension. It is not so much a case of transferring technology to farmers, as helping
farmers to develop a better understanding of the farming systems they are part of and
are trying to manage (Roling, 1993). Sustainable farming involves careful decision
making that weights options and perceived risks, and takes local information into
account. In such circumstances, the focus of extension is much more on helping
farmers to improve their decision making, than on timely delivery of messages.
The third important development of the last 15 years is the separation that many
governments (are starting to) make between extension work for the public good or
extension work for the private good. The golden days, when it was assumed that
government investment in agricultural extension was a wise thing as it paid dividends
for hoth the farmer (private good) and the country through ego increased exports (public
good), are over. Accountability and evaluation of extension programmes are major
issues for extension workers, that have come to the fore in the last two decades. But
privatisation goes much further. In New Zealand, a government funded agricultural
extension service no longer exists (Kuiper and Hall, 1997). In the Netherlands, the
government ha~ separated extension on production issues (for which farmers are partly
expected to pay) from extension on environmental policy issues (for which the
government still fully pays) (see Tacken, 1998, for an account of the Dutch extension
privatisation process ).
So what js extensjon?
As this overview shows; extension has taken on different roles in different times and
in different circumstances. The main focus of extension has shifted between nonformal
education, technology transfer, persuasion, empowerment, and information delivery.
Therefore, it is no surprise that there are many definitions of the term extension, all
dependent on the aspects of the concept that one decides to highlight. Some stress the
adult learning side of extension, such as Boone (1989, p.l) who defines extension as
"a system of nonformal education". Others seem to perceive extension foremost as
information exchange, such as Van den Ban and Hawkins (1996, p.9) who state that
"extension involves the conscious use of communication of information to help people
form sound opinions and make good decisions". Roling (1989) emphasizes the fact that
organisations use extension to induce behaviour change, and defines extension as "a
professional communication intervention deployed by an institution to induce change
in voluntary behaviours with a presumed public or collective utility" (Roling, 1989,
p.49).
Depending on its objectives, extension can be informative (providing farmers
with an opportunity to access information and use it as they wish, such as publishing
market data), educational (providing farmers with opportunities to develop better
understanding and new skills, such as through running feed budgeting workshops), or
persuasive (aimed at changing specific attitudes, ego by creating awareness of the
importance to fence off erosion prone areas along river beds). Often extension
programmes will use a mixture of all three approaches (Kuiper, 1996).
EXTENSION SCIENCE
With the development of agricultural extension. and its growing importance after the
second world war, a new field of study emerged: extension science. The purpose of this
section is to explore the relationship hetween extension practice and extension science,
to identify the social science disciplines that have fuelled the further development of
extension science, and to highlight some of the valuahle ideas that came out of these
disciplines.
What js extension science?
Extension science has borrowed heavily from these social sciences for its
development, while maintaining a strong link with extension practice. Many
agricultural universities and faculties now have separate departments for extension
research and teaching; there are special in-service training courses (such as the
International Course on Rural Extension of the International Agricultural Centre.
Wageningen, the Netherlands), and there are scientific journals that cover the field and
cater for both scientists and practitioners, such as the Journal of Extension (which can
he accessed through the Internet), the Journal of Extension Systems. the Journal of
Farming Systems Research - Extension, the Journal of International Agricultural and
Extension Education, and the European Journal of Agricultural Education and
Extension. In 1993. extension practitioners and scientists founded the Australasia-
Pacific Extension Network (APEN) in order to facilitate the exchange of ideas and
experiences. APEN now ha~ around 600 members.
The contributjon of socjal science disciplines to extension science
The purpose of this section is to warrant that extension science is a dynamic and
applied field in which ideas from different social science disciplines converge. Some
of the ideas that originated from these disciplines will be mentioned. Table I lists seven
social disciplines that feed into extension science. and provides examples of ideas that
have influenced its development.
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Every area of human activity produces its reflective practitioners, hut as time goes on
such an area is often recogni7.cd a~ a separate field of scientific study. This was the case
with extension and extension science.
The main aim of extension science is to help extension practitioners, those
people who are involved in extension planning, to make rational decisions ahout the
goals, methods and organisation of extension (Van den Ban and Hawkins, 1996). In
order to achieve this. extension scientists have turned towards other social sciences for
uscfultheories and ideas to improve extension practice. Therefore, extension science
is an applied science: comhining insight from extension practice with ideas developed
in other social disciplines, such as social psychology, sociology, marketing,
communication studies. socio-cybernetics and systems theory.
Tahle I:
Discipline
Social Science Disciplines, and Examples of Ideas Generated by these
Disciplines and Integrated into Extension Science.
EKsmples




• adoption and diffusion of innovations
• participatory technology development


















• elaboration likelihood model
• readi ng ease indeK
• experienlial or action learning
• targeting
• farming systems research
• agricultural knowledge and information systems
• management by objcctives
• extension programme planning
c.n(X)
Sociology
Extension science has its roots in rural sociology. Rural sociologists and
anthropologists are interested in how rural communities deal with change, such as
commercialisation of agriculture, urbanisation or industrialisation. One of their main
questions has always been why there is "a marked difference within a cultural group
or between groups placed in similar circumstances in the response to economic
opportunities" (Long, 1977, p.5). Many of the theories developed in the 1940s, 1950s
and 1960s, viewed farmers as resistant to change, and used cultural factors to explain
this perceived resistance, such as fatalism, external locus of control, a suh-culture of
poverty (Roling, 1985), or the notion that economic opportunity is a limited good
where one person's gains are at the expense of others and may lead to connict within
the community (Foster, 1962). Later theories often focused on limiting circumstances
instead of beliefs, and saw fatalism not as the cause of poverty, hut as a psychological
adaptation that could vanish rapidly as soon as conditions changed (Rliling, 1985;
Niehoff, 1966).
Interest in differential responses to change ha~ (first and foremost in the US) led
to a rapidly growing body of literature on the adoption and diffusion of innovations.
The 'godfather' of adoption and diffusion research is Everett M. Rogers. The fourth
edition of his much acclaimed book "The diffusion of innovations" was released in
1995, 33 years after the first edition. Rogers descrihes innovation adoption as a
decision making process with five clearly distinct stages, starting with awareness of an
innovation's existence to confirmation of its use (Rogers, 1995). For analysing
diffusion of an innovation, Rogers suggest to use five adopter categories, according to
the moment in time that someone adopts an innovation: (I) innovators; (2) early
adopters; (3) early majority; (4) late majority; (5) laggards. Diffusion is secn as a
naturally occurring process (known as the trickle down process) with more and more
people becoming aware of the benefil~ of an innovation and starting to adopt it. Special
attention is given to so-called opinion leaders who could speed up or halter dirfusion.
and the role or the media in the specific stages or the adoption process.
In the I960s and 1970s, recommendations from adoption and difrusion rcsearch
shaped extension practice, mainly hecause they fitted with the prevailing TOT model
of those days. One of the ideas eagerly adopted by extension stafr was to rocus their
efforts on the innovators, or the progressive farmers as they were often called, and then
rely on difrusion to attain widespread adoption. Furthermore, extension was expected
to speed up the diffusion process by, ror example, running field days on the farms of
these progressive farmers to create awareness of specific innovations. If widespread
adoption did not occur, it was often believed to be related to a certain 'resistance to
change' in rural communities.
Over the la~t 25 years, rural sociologists and extension scientists have expressed
severe criticism on these idea~ and recommendations (Wapenaar et aI., 1989). It is now
realized that non-adoption of promoted innovations is often the result of a rational,
well-informed decision where the innovation is deemed inappropriate by a farmer. As
a consequence, there is growing interest in bottom-up approaches that start with
assessing the needs of target groups, followed by the development of appropriate
technology. Some of these approaches assume shared responsihility for researchers,
extension starr and farmers in on-rarm technology development, such as participatO!y
technolol:Y development (PTD). The emerging literature on these approaches is often
written by rural sociologists who report on their personal experiences (e.g Van
Veldhuizen et a\., 1997).
Communication studies
Extension is essentially a form of purposeful communication. Accordingly, the
discipline that has evolved around the study of human communication is a rich source
of ideas for extension science. Extension staff tend to favour certain communication
methods and channels over others, often based on perceived success and established
habits. Much attention in extension seience, certainly in the decades after the second
world war, went towards developing guidelines for the use of extension methods, such
as discussion groups, farm visits, or articles in the popular press. These guidelines were
developed by combining results from research in the human communication diseipline
with insight gained in extension practice.
As a result, many extension science publications in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s
dealt extensively with the 'how to' questions, such as: 'how to run a discussion group'
or 'how to write a leaflet'. For example, around 60% of a 1956 textbook on rural
extension was dedicated to extension methods, with chapter titles such as "visual aids
in agricultural advisory work" (Penders, 1956). In New Zealand, the Advisory Division
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) published a series of booklets for
its extension staff, with titles such as "running diseussion groups" or "presenting a
seminar". Ideas on how to use extension methods remains an important aspect of
extension science, although it certainly doesn't attract the attention it used to get. For
example, in a recent textbook on extension science (Van Woerkum and Kuiper, 1995),
only one of the 10 chapters deals explicitly with extension methods.
Social psychology
As time progressed, with the successes and failures that they experienced, extension
staff's interests progressed beyond understanding the technology to be disseminated
and the extension methods to be used, to developing a better understanding of the
farmers they dealt with. Aspects such as human perceptions, attitudes, needs,
motivation and behaviour, became more and more important. Social psychology, as the
discipline that studies "how people think about, influence, and relate to one another"
(Myers, 1993, p.3) has been, and remains to be, an important source of ideas for
extension theory development.
To mention four of the many socio-psychological theories that have made an
impact on extension seience: (1) Maslow's (1954) famous needs hierarchy. Maslow
recognises a wide range of human motivations, and distinguished between basic needs,
psychological needs, and self-fulfilment needs. He suggests that lower order needs
(such as the basic needs thirst, hunger and security) have to be met first, before higher
order needs become important; (2) Festinger's (1957) cOl:nitive dissonance theory.
According to Festinger, a cognition is "any belief, opinion, attitude, or piece of
knowledge hout anything - about other persons, objects, issues, oneself, and so on"
(O'Keefe, 1990, p.62). People try to keep their cognitions in harmony. When two
cognitions are in connict (e.g. 'I smoke' and 'smoking causes cancer'), cognitive
dissonance results. Cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable mental state that people
wil1 try to avoid, for example, by blocking out information that might cause dissonance,
or by putting additional weight on information that supports existing cognitions (eg.
'My uncle is 92, smokes a package a day, and hasn't been sick for a day in his life');
(3) The theory of reasoned action of Fishbein and Ajzen (1980), The theory of reasoned
action looks at what determines volitional behaviour. The main premise is that people
behave in a certain way because they have assessed the expected outcomes from that
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behaviour. Both a person's own beliefs about the behaviour and its consequences, as
well as the expectations that important others place on that person, playa role; (4) The
elaboration likelihood model of Petty and Cacioppo (1986). Petty and Cacioppo's
model describes how people change their attitudes when faced with information
presented by others (which also might change their behaviours). For some issues,
people engage in 'elaboration' to form an attitude: they carefully scrutinize the
arguments presented and compare these with their existing knowledge. For other issues,
they merely look for cues in the message and often use a simple decision rule to form
an attitude.
Education
Many see extension primarily as nonformal education. Therefore, extension scientists
and practitioners have looked towards the education discipline for guidance and ideas.
For many years, the education discipline has gone through a phase when its research
approach wa~ very quantitative in nature, and didn't generate much exciting ideas that
were relevant for extension science. For example, one of the few formula used in
extension science stems from the education discipline. The so-called readinl: ease index
(RE) of Flesch (1948) measures the readability of a text: RE = 206,84 - 0.77 x average
word length - 0.93 x average sentence length. A low RE score (e.g. 30-50) indicates
that the text is difficult to understand, a high RE score (e.g. 100) indicates that the text
is ea~y to read. Unfortunately, the score doesn't give any indication for how to improve
a text.
A fruitful contribution to the development of extension science was made when
the education discipline started to use more qualitative research methodologies.
Theories on adult learning, and especially experiential or action learninl:' have had a
large impact on extension science and practise over the last ten years. For example,
many extension activities and programmes these days are based on Kolb's (1984)
action learning cycle, with the four different stages: act, renect, generalise and plan.
The aim is often to provide farmers with an opportunity to complete the whole cycle,
and to develop understanding based on their own experiences and renections. As
sustainable agriculture requires a good understanding of the farming system being
managed, extension has used experiential learning extensively to promote sustainable
management. For example, in the Australian Land Care movement (see e.g. Hamilton,
1995), and for the promotion of integrated pest management (lPM) in Indonesia (Van
der Fliert, 1993).
Marketing
Many extension scientists and practitioners used to perceive marketing as something
rather suspect. It was seen as 'selling'; trying to persuade someone to purchase goods
or services they did not necessarily need. However, increasingly extension is drawing
on marketing to improve its relevance. In the literature there is a clear difference
between the 'hard selI' approach, and marketing. Marketing is about assessing the
needs of clients, and developing goods and services that satisfy these needs. Kotler
(1976, p.5) defines marketing as "human activity directed at satisfying needs and wants
through exchange processes".
An important concept in marketing that is used extensively now in extension
and extension science is~. Whereas in the past it was assumed that an
innovation would be of benefit to all (and therefore would be adopted by most),
nowadays extension staff often aim at specific homogeneous target groups. Sometimes
this is a very participatory process (such as PTD), sometimes this is more extractive
process where extension staff collect and analyse information, and decide on follow-up
actions.
Systems
The la~t 25 years has seen a growing acceptance of the usefulness of systems thinking
to a wide range of contexts and areas of application, including extension. The concept
of 'a system' is defined by a number of fundamental properties that relate to the
process, structure and behaviour of an entity (CheckJand, 1981), such as a farm
business or rural community. A system is made up of organised and interrelated
components. The behaviour and properties of the system as a whole emerge from the
properties of il~ components and the relationships that organise the components into a
system (CheckJand, 1981). A significant advantage of systems thinking is that emphasis
is placed on the wholeness of the entity studied (such as a farm or orchard) and the
relationships between the constituent parts (Roling and Engel, 1991).
Farminl: systems research (FSR) was developed in third world countries by
practitioners dissatisfied with the more traditional TOT model. Accepting that farms
are complex systems, the focus of research and extension shifted within FSR to
describing and understanding existing farming systems. Importantly, also, the farmer
and farm family are accepted as being significant elements of the farming system. From
this understanding, technology was able to be developed that better matched the
circumstances and needs of farmers. Systems applications in agriculture also provided
the basis for many of the participatory approaches that are emerging, such as
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) (Chambers, 1992) and PTD (Van Veldhuizen et
aI., 1997).
A different application of systems thinking in extension science is the use of an
al:ricullural knowledl:e and information system (AKIS) perspective. Roling and Engel
define an AKIS as "the persons, networks and institutions, and the interfaces and
linkages between them, which engage in, or manage, the generation, transformation,
transmission, storage, retrieval, integration, diffusion and utilization of knowledge and
information, and which potentially work synergically to improve the goodness of fit
between knowledge and the environment, and the technology used, in a specific domain
of human activity" (Roling and Engel, 1991, p.10). A somewhat lengthy definition, but
the approach has proven to be useful when looking at how all the different agricultural
stakeholders, such as researchers, extension staff, policy makers, farmers, and industry,
interact and cooperate. According to Kaimowitz (1991) AKIS institutions must receive
strong and focused external pressure to function synergetically over sustained periods:
"without such pressure, institutions [such as research institutes] and personnel act to
fulfill their own social and political needs more than those of their clients, and their
effectiveness is inevitably reduced" (Kaimowitz, 1991, pAS).
Management theory
Management theory is a discipline that has developed rapidly this century, and focuses
on business and organisational behaviour. It is, as extension science, an applied science;
one that aims to develop insight for "guiding management professionals in the
performance of management tasks" (Boone and Bowen, 1987, p.iii). Some of the key
people in the development of the discipline have been Max Weber (who focussed on
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authority and bureaucracy), Frederick Taylor (who stated principles of scientific
management), Frederick Herzberg (who studied, amongst other things, employee
motivation), and Douglas McGregor (who developed Theory X and Theory Y).
One of the business management areas that has captured much attention over
the last three decades is that of goal setting (and consequently time management to
achieve these goals). Some of the ideas on goal setting have found their way into
extension science and practice, such as the concept of mana2ement by objectives
(MBO). For example, MBO has played an important role in the 1970s and 1980s in
MAr's Advisory Services Division (Hercus, 1991).
Recently, much attention in extension science has gone to management topics
such as process planning, monitoring and evaluation, and the development of integrated
extension programmes. This reflects a shift in thinking about the mana2ement of
extension llro2rammeS, which has evolved from being mainly concerned with the
planning of separate extension activities (such as field days), to the development of
integrated extension programmes (combining e.g. mass media and interpersonal
methods), to the integration of extension in policy plans (together with other policy
instruments, such as legislation and subsidies).
CONCLUSION
Extension and extension science are two tightly intertwined fields that have changed and
expanded over time. This paper has provided a brief introduction to extension and
extension science. This paper may provide basis for future thinking and research into the
application of extension as an approach to assist the development towards sustainable
land management.
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~A dynamic microeconomic analysis of
bovine Tb movement control policy




Abstract: Capital theory has been used in a wide range of economic applications to
provide valuable insights into intertemporal trade-offs. This research uses an optimal
control framework to model a livestock disease control problem in which there are
movements of livestock into and out of a herd. Movement control regulations are
important in reducing the transmission of bovine tuberculosis (Tb) between cattle
herds and farming areas in New Zealand. The analysis focuses on a representative
breeding-store beef cattle production system in a Tb vector risk area under
mandatory and voluntary movement control testing policy regimes. The hypothetical
producer has the objective of maximising net revenue from the cattle enterprise
while being faced with control decisions concerning marketing cattle to store sale or
slaughter, purchasing replacement cattle, and harvesting a wildlife Tb vector
population. Non-linear programming is used to find the steady state values for the
control variables. Numerical results disclose that economic incentives may exist for
risk neutral producers to purchase cattle from infected herds. A major policy
implication is that some form of regulatory response may be required to assist the
market in transforming the price discount for cattle from infected herds from an
incentive into a disincentive.
KEYWORDS
Dynamic optimisation, bioeconomics, animal health economics, disease control.
INTRODUCTION
The principle focus ofcurrent bovine Tb control, as expressed in the National Pest
Management Strategy for bovine tuberculosis (NPMS), is the management and
elimination of disease risk. The NPMS uses disease and vector control tactics and
methods to reduce and prevent the spread ofTb infection within and between herds
and to restrict the transmission ofinfection from wild vectors, respectively. A major
change to disease control tactics from previous control programmes, and a key
feature of the NPMS, is the tightening of movement control requirements (Animal
Health Board, 1995; Livingstone, 1996). Tighter movement control restrictions have
been justified along two distinct lines. Firstly, they move towards addressing
farmers' concerns regarding previous policy deficiencies in protecting herds clear of
Tb infection in clear areas, and secondly, they are consistent with the Animal Health
Board's philosophy of using market signals and economic incentives to elicit
appropriate behavioural responses from individuals (Livingstone, 1995).
Animal health statistics show that Tb levels are the highest in beef cattle herds
(MAF, 1996). Recent research into Tb breakdowns in non-endemic areas highlights
the movement ofcattle from endemic to non-endemic areas as a result of purchasing
or grazing decisions as a significant factor in the spread of infection (Ryan et af.,
1995; 1996). To encourage cattle management practices which reduce the spread of
Tb infection the NPMS creates incentives for producers to take the risks ofTb
seriously. New Tb classification systems and tighter movement control regulations
are intended to provide producers who have infected herds with greater costs arising
from lower market valuations of cattle and increased Tb control compliance costs.
This reflects the strategy's philosophy that better disease control can be achieved if
producers are confronted with the economic consequences of their decisions.
Although movement control policies continue to playa prominent role in reducing
the spread ofTb infection between herds very little is known about the likely effects
of movement control regulations on individual producer behaviour. This paper
provides an economic analysis of movement control regulations at the producer
level. Because of the inherent dynamics of the economic and epidemiological
systems dynamic microeconomic theory is applied to a representative beef cattle
producer faced with decisions regarding the purchase and sale of cattle in a Tb
vector risk area. The analysis identifies the important economic tradeoffs associated
with movement control confronting cattle producers.
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
The epidemiological and economic implications of bovine Tb and its control in New
Zealand suggest that the analysis of movement control should focus on store beef
cattle production in a Tb vector risk area (Animal Health Board, 1995; Dunham,
1995; Livingstone, 1995). The ClarenceIWaiau Tb vector risk area ofNorth
Canterbury was selected as the area for the hypothetical representative production
system. Bovine Tb has been a long term problem for many farmers in the area and it
contains several different beef cattle production systems which are common
elsewhere in New Zealand.
A review of the relevant economic literature suggested that a producer level dynamic
optimisation model would permit insight into the behavioural responses between the
hypothetical producer and Tb control policy. Furthermore the literature indicated that
a complex model o'fthe underlying economic and epidemiological systems was not
necessary to enhance understanding of producer responses, providing the model
captured the key characteristics of interest.
The store cattle production model is illustrated in Figure 1.1 The hypothetical beef
production system in a Tb vector risk area was formulated as an optimal control
problem. The optimal control model specified the relevant relationships associated
with beef cattle production in an environment where Tb infection is endemic in a
possum population. To achieve the required objective the producer chooses the
optimal activity level for four control variables which impact on three state
variables.
Relevant parameter values for the analysis were obtained from secondary data
relating to beef cattle production in North Canterbury. The NZMWBES annual farm
survey data for "South Island Hill Country" farms was most representative of cattle
production in the study area. Supplementary data was obtained from Lincoln
University's Financial Budget Manual (FBM) which collates commodity price and
input cost information relating to most types of primary production in New Zealand.
Variations in production data due to commodity prices and climatic conditions were
smoothed using five year averages of from 1990/91 to 1994/95. Where necessary
production characteristics not available from the NZMWBES and FBM data were
obtained from Dunham's (1995) study of bovine tuberCUlosis control on six types of
cattle farm in North Canterbury which relied on farmer interviews. All financial data
was expressed in 1995 dollars using either Statistics New Zealand's producers price
index for agricultural output or the consumers price index.
Beef Cattle Production and Tb Control Activities
State Variables in Bold
Control Variables in Italics
Movement control regulations require cattle to have a pre-movement Tb test prior to
being sent to sale as stores. Testing in accordance with movement control
regulations enters the model as a control variable but can reflect enforced testing by
setting MC, equal to one. Any cattle which have been in contact with a group of sale
animals testing positive at a pre-movement test must also be submitted to an "in-
contact" test. The potential in contact cattle are those not involved in the pre-
movement test and not removed as reactors at the whole herd test. The proportion of
cattle in the breeding and marketing herds requiring "in-contact" testing was
assumed to be dependent on the proportion of the marketing herd being selected for
sale as stores.
Whole herd testing was assumed to occur annually prior to all marketing activities
and cattle purchases. The model assumes that ancillary testing is not undertaken on
reactors detected at any testing event. If cattle return a positive reaction at testing
then compensation, as a percentage of fair market value, is paid to producers. It was
assumed that fair market value corresponds to the relevant sale price for cattle ofa
particular class.
Net Proceeds from Tb Testing Events:
The Objective Function
The producer was assumed to be risk neutral, and have the objective of maximising
discounted net revenue from the cattle enterprise over time. Revenue each period
arises from the sale proceeds ofcattle marketed as stores or to slaughter, and the net
proceeds obtained from Tb whole-herd testing and movement control testing when
total reactor compensation payments exceed total testing costs. Costs are comprised
of weaner cattle purchases, the variable costs of maintaining the herd, and possum
control costs. To achieve the optimal net revenue the producer has control over
decisions regarding the percentage of marketing herd cattle selected for sale as stores
each period (F,), the price paid for cattle purchased (APP,), whether movement
control testing is undertaken (MC,), and the number of possums harvested (HI)' The
model assumes that the proportion and implied composition ofbreeding and
marketing cattle in the herd remain constant over time through biological



































1 A mathematical representation of the model is available from the authors.
~The net proceeds from post-movement testing is comprised of compensation
received from test positive cattle. Under movement control regulations a post-
movement test must be administered to cattle arriving on the property if the cattle are
from a herd with an "infected" herd Tb status or from a herd in a Tb vector risk area.
The model assumes that all cattle purchased are from herds in Tb vector risk areas
thereby avoiding the need to include a relationship for discounting due to area status.
The proportion ofeach group ofcattle purchased that is susceptible and/or infected
was assumed to be a function of the purchase price.
Revenue from Marketing Events:
Cattle can only be marketed for sale as stores providing the risk ofTb infection is
acceptable to animal health authorities. The percentage of marketable cattle selected
for sale (Ft) each period is reduced by the percentage of true positive and false
positive cattle reacting to the pre-movement test. Consequently sale revenue is
dependent on how much the average sale price is discounted due to the risk ofTb
infection and the number of cattle actually sent to sale.
The producer also has the option of marketing cattle directly to slaughter. Because
the cattle production system was assumed to have a comparative advantage in
breeding and the production of store cattle, it was assumed that marketable cattle
will only reach the minimum carcass weight category necessary for slaughter. Cattle
slaughtered each period comprise a fixed percentage of the breeding herd which are
culled and marketing herd cattle which have not been removed as positive reactors at
prior tuberculosis testing events and/or not sold to other producers as stores. The
price ofall adult cattle sent directly to slaughter is reduced by a slaughter levy which
funds the cattle industry's share of costs associated with running the tuberculosis
control programme. It was further assumed that Tb infection can only be detected in
cattle as a result ofTb testing or surveillance at slaughter facilities and that all
infected cattle sent to slaughter were identified. The revenue received by producers
for an infected animal identified at slaughter depends on the extent to which the
carcass can be salvaged for further processing. Consequently, the price received for
infected cattle slaughtered was represented in the model as a proportion of the price
for susceptible cattle.
Purchase Cost ofReplacement Cattle:
The cost of cattle purchased is expressed as a product of the average price paid by
the producer for weaner cattle (APPt) and the number purchased. In each time period
the producer was assumed to purchase the number ofcattle that would ensure the
herd was maintained at its profit maximising stocking rate. Surplus stocking rate was
formulated as the difference between the profit maximising stocking rate less the net
flow ofcattle out of the herd during the period. The relevant flows include marketing
cattle sold and breeding cattle culled, positive reactors at Tb testing events, and new
calves entering from the breeding herd.
Cattle Purchase and Sale Prices:
The average prices for store cattle purchased and sold are either chosen by the
producer (APPt) or determined by the market discount regime, respectively.
Producers currently obtain information relating to a herd's Tb status and history
from MAF Quality Management. The model assumes producers use the whole herd
testing information to determine the apparent Tb prevalence for herds from which
they purchase cattle. Apparent Tb prevalence is defined as the percentage ofcattle
identified as being infected at whole herd testing.
The epidemiology literature suggests that when the sensitivity and specificity of the
test are known apparent prevalence may be converted into apparent true prevalence,
which in tum will provide an estimate of the actual prevalence ofdisease in the herd
of origin (Martin, Meek and Willeberg, 1987). Apparent true prevalence was used in
the model as a proxy for disease risk. This approach assumes that producers use all
available information to estimate the herd infection level. Direct comparisons are
therefore permitted between a producer marketing cattle to sale as stores and
slaughter without assuming an information bias associated with either marketing
option.
The NPMS makes it increasingly difficult for cattle from herds with a high Tb
incidence to move other than to slaughter. High risk herds are initially classified as
those with an annual Tb incidence of 5% or greater. It was assumed that cattle from
a herd with an apparent infection level ofgreater than 4.99% would only be
permitted to be marketed to slaughter. At this level ofherd infection the sale price
would equal the maximum discounted average price available for the relevant class
of cattle from infected herds. To reflect the price-infection risk response in the store
cattle market the model includes an equation for the average price ofcattle sold as
stores.
The Producer's Sale and Purchase Decisions:
With respect to marketable cattle the producer's marketing decision was presented as
choosing the percentage ofmarketing cattle to be sold as stores, for which the
average price received for all cattle sold is negatively correlated to the apparent
infection status of the herd. Once the producer had chosen the proportion of
marketable cattle to be sold as stores the remaining proportion, less cattle removed
as reactors at in-contact testing, are sold to slaughter. When cattle are sold to
slaughter the producer receives only a salvage value for stock identified as infected.
Cattle that are sold or removed from the herd as reactors within a period must be
replaced. The producer decides on the average purchase price paid for cattle (APPt)
and, because ofan assumed relationship between price and infection, trades offa
lower price with an increase in the apparent risk of infection.
Variable Cost ofCattle Management: Figure 2 Sequencing of Production and Tb Testing Events
Reactors at Reactors at Pre- Reactors at Post-
Whole-Herd Movement & In- Movement
Testing contact Testing Testing
I I
1 1 1
' Herdt+tElPossum control is undertaken to reduce the opportunity for transmission ofTb intothe herd from the local possum population. Possum harvest cost was assumed to be afunction of the size of the possum population on the farm (Pt) and the number of
possums harvested each period (Ht).
The variable cost of holding cattle was comprised of the average direct expenditure
incurred in managing a cattle beast for a period and the cost of fattening a cattle
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The objective function is constrained by equations of motion for the three state
variables for the cattle and possum populations S" It and PI, respectively. The
equations describe the evolution of the state variables over time.
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Susceptible and Infected Cattle Populations:
Periodic changes to the state of the cattle herd are illustrated in Figure 2. The
transmission of Tb from infectious cattle to susceptible cattle and infectious possums
to susceptible cattle increases the population of infected cattle and reduces the
population of susceptible cattle. The model reflects implicit assumptions concerning
the movement ofcattle into each population. Replacement cattle for the breeding
component were assumed to come from annual calving and, when required, weaners
purchased. It was further assumed that cattle entering the marketable component
comprised surplus weaners from the breeding component and weaner cattle
purchased.
The relationship between herd infection levels and cattle price was used to determine
the proportion of cattle purchased that were susceptible and infected. If cattle
purchased have been subjected to a pre-movement test then the proportion of
diseased animals, as indicated by the apparent true prevalence, will be reduced by
the percentage of true positive reactors. It was assumed that apparent true infection
corresponds to actual infection levels for cattle purchased. Therefore while the actual
true prevalence adjusted for pre-movement testing gives the proportion of infected
cattle purchased the remaining proportion relates to susceptible cattle entering the
herd. Modeling cattle purchases in this manner provided a direct relationship
between the purchase price chosen by the producer and the proportions of infected
and susceptible cattle entering the herd. The producer's decision to purchase
discounted cattle was therefore presented as the decision to "buy-in" infection.
The risk of interuterine transmission is considered to be very low (Morris et aI.,
1994). However, it was assumed that infected cows will transmit Tb to their
offspring sometime prior to weaning because calves normally remain with their
mothers for between seven and nine months. The annual increase in each population
from calves is dependent on the number of breeding cows remaining after the whole
herd Tb test because testing was assumed to occur prior to calving.
Possum Population:
Mycobacterium bovis can infect a wide range ofNew Zealand wildlife species.
Epidemiological research, however, suggests that the brushtail possum (Trichosurus
vulpecula) plays a major role in wildlife vector transmission ofTb to cattle (Morris
and Pfeiffer, 1995). To allow for Tb infection due to wildlife vectors the model
includes an equation of motion for a Tb infected possum population. The state of the
possum population was assumed to be dependent on its natural biological growth
and the number of possums killed through vector control operations (HI)' A logistic
growth function was used to represent the density dependent population dynamics.
in the producer responding to higher price discount regimes by lowering herd Tb
prevalence if cattle are marketed as stores.
SOLUTION TECHNIQUE
The empirical problem was specified in a non-linear programming format whereby
control and state variables were represented as activities and non-linear equations of
motion were represented as constraints linking activities in subsequent periods. The
empirical model was solved numerically over a 70 year period (T=70) using
GAMSIMINOS (Brooke, Kendrik and Meeraus, 1988 and 1996) software on an
IBM-PC clone.
Figure 3 Steady State Net Revenue and Herd Tb Prevalence: Mandatory
Movement Control Testing
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Preliminary results from the model demonstrated that the physical dynamics of the
herd were within the ranges of the NZMWBES survey data. Marketing and purchase
decisions were consistent with hypothesised relationships and followed a "bang-
bang" control approach with all marketable cattle being sold as stores and weaners
purchased at their maximum discounted price. As a consequence ofdecisions
concerning the sale and purchase ofcattle and possum control the apparent true Tb
prevalence for the total herd declined from an initial level of2% to a steady state
level of 1.18%.
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(J) The preliminary results indicated that when the maximum market discount on store
cattle from infected herds was 10% the producer sends all marketed cattle to sale as
stores, thereby incurring some discount on the price, and avoiding the additional
grazing costs that would be incurred if the cattle were fattened for sale to slaughter.
Given that the price ofcattle from infected herds has been discounted to varying
extents on occasions, the assumption ofa 10% discount was relaxed and simulations
were run for maximum discounts to the store cattle price of 5%, 15%, 20%, 25% and
30%.
Mandatory Movement Control Testing:
To gain insight into the producer's response to Tb control under mandatory
movement control testing the control variable for movement control testing (MC,)
was set equal to one. Figure 3 illustrates the resulting impact on steady state herd Tb
prevalence and net revenue arising from production decisions under each discount
regime. Results from the model demonstrated that the cattle producer's response to
current movement control policy is heavily influenced by the cost of controlling Tb
infection levels in the herd and the prevailing level ofprice discount in the store
cattle market. The producer affects the level ofTb prevalence in the herd through the
amount of possum control undertaken and the infection risk ofcattle purchased. As
the price discount in the store cattle market increases a marginal change in apparent
herd prevalence has a larger adverse affect on the average price received for store
cattle. The inverse relationship between the average store cattle price and apparent
herd prevalence, and the greater marginal impact ofa higher discount regime, results
When cattle are marketed as stores, under the 5% to 20% discount regimes, actual
herd prevalence is lowered successively through increased possum control as the
discount increases. No attempt is made to reduce the amount of infection brought
into the herd through cattle purchases and therefore all cattle are purchased at the
maximum discount. As the price discount becomes larger the marginal cost of
preventing a decline in the average store cattle price by reducing Tb prevalence in
the herd is high. The producer responds by fattening cattle to a condition suitable for
sale directly to slaughter. Undertaking this strategy permits a trade-off between the
additional grazing costs incurred and reductions in both possum harvest costs and
the opportunity cost of false positive reactors identified at pre-movement and in-
contact testing. As a consequence of the producer's change in behaviour, and
because cattle are still purchased at the maximum discount, there is only a small
reduction in herd Tb prevalence from its initial level of 2%. Results highlight that if
the marginal change in the store cattle price with respect to a change in Tb risk is too
large then the discount can switch from an incentive to a disincentive for the
producer to lower herd Tb prevalence. The change in marketing preferences is
facilitated by the producer being able to sell cattle directly to slaughter. In this
situation the discount does not act as a penalty on sales ofcattle from Tb risk herds
but does provide the producer with an opportunity to reduce cattle purchase costs.
Exploratory analysis suggests that if the producer can not sell cattle to slaughter then
increases in the price discount reduce levels of herd prevalence through higher
possum harvest but do not result in the eradication of the disease from the herd
because of the greater incentive to purchase infected cattle. An issue arising from
this behaviour, but unable to be clarified by the model, is whether the opportunity
Voluntary Movement Control Testing:
cost of producing cattle relative to other land uses would become too large to make
cattle production sustainable.
The methodology used in the study permitted exploratory analysis to be undertaken
on the likely producer responses to an environment where movement control testing
is unregulated. The Animal Health Board has endeavoured to provide cattle
producers with improved information on herd Tb infection. Their objective in doing
so is to generate a market in which there is an incentive for cattle producers to more
actively control disease.
Movement control testing (MCI) was treated as a decision variable in the model by
specifYing upper and lower bounds, and letting the model choose the optimal level.
As illustrated in Figure 4 when movement control testing is voluntary the association
between Tb prevalence and the price discount regime remains unchanged to that
under mandatory testing. At levels ofdiscount that permit cattle to be sold as stores
(5% to 20%) increases in the price discount reduce herd Tb prevalence. When the
discount results in cattle being marketed to slaughter increasing the discount raises
the level ofTb prevalence in the herd. Tb prevalence and net revenue are, however,
relatively higher than under mandatory testing for all discount regimes. This is
because when movement control testing is voluntary none is undertaken and
therefore fewer infected cattle and false positive reactors are removed from the herd
at testing events annually.
With respect to the incentives to post-movement test, the purchaser benefits from
fewer diseased cattle entering the herd and therefore a lower probability of spread of
infection. The economic benefits of fewer infected cattle entering the herd include
the avoidance of reduced revenue from; a lower average store cattle price due to
higher herd prevalence, the need for increased possum control to reduce herd
prevalence, and a higher number of reactors removed at testing events if herd
prevalence is not reduced. The incentive for the seller to pre-movement test depends
on whether the market continues to accept cattle from infected herds if they have not
been pre-movement tested which in tum depends on whether the purchaser is
prepared to post-movement test.
The Impact ofPre and Post Movement Testing:
The analysis indicated an interesting behavioural change when cattle purchased had
not been pre-movement tested. The producer was motivated to purchase cattle from
clear herds when the optimal marketing strategy was selling cattle as stores. The
model also provided some insights into whether cattle are likely to be pre-movement
tested by the seller and the likely response of the purchaser if they are not. The
incentives and disincentives that exist for the seller to pre-movement test and the
purchaser to post-movement test are presented in Table I. Both the seller and the
purchaser are faced with the same disincentives in the form of direct and indirect Tb
testing costs.
The formulation of the model it did not permit firm conclusions to be drawn on how
the producer would respond under a voluntary testing regime ifcattle purchased had
not been subjected to a pre-movement test. However, the influence of pre-movement
testing on post-movement testing behaviour by the purchaser was explored by setting
the pre-movement test parameter for cattle purchased at one and zero to simulate all
purchased cattle being pre-movement tested or none, respectively.
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Table I Voluntary Testing Incentives & Disincentives
Purchased Cattle Pre-movement Purchased Cattle Not Pre-
Tested movement Tested
Cattle Sold as Cattle Sold to Cattle Sold as Cattle Sold to
Stores Slaul!hter Stores Slaughter
Infection Status of Highest Risk Highest Risk Clear Herd Highest Risk
Cattle Purchased Permissible Permissible Permissible
Movement Control None None None Post-movement
Testlnl!
Table 2 discloses how the purchasing and movement control testing strategies
adopted by the producer depend on whether cattle are pre-movement tested and
where they are eventually marketed. It is important to note that when pre-movement
testing is not undertaken by the seller there is an incentive to purchase untested cattle
from high risk herds and post-movement test if cattle are sold to slaughter. A
possible reason why cattle are not purchased from infected herds if the producer
markets animals as stores is that under this scenario if movement control testing is
chosen then the model forces the producer to undertake all movement control tests.
In other words, if the producer chooses to post-movement test cattle purchased then
it is assumed that the producer will also choose to pre-movement test cattle sold and
in-contact test the remainder of the herd. The costs of a complete movement control




Table 2 Producer's Behavioural Responses Under Voluntary Movement
Control Testing
switch marketing strategies and avoid the adverse impact on sales revenue when the
discount becomes large. With respect to cattle purchases the discount provides an
economic incentive for cattle to be purchased from herds with the highest
permissible levels of infection. The significant benefit obtained from the lower
purchase cost provided by the discount results in the producer managing herd
prevalence levels through possum control rather than buying cattle from less infected
herds. These observations imply that the producers most affected by movement
control and price discounting are those who due to constraints on their production
system can not fatten cattle for direct sale to slaughter.
Based on the assumptions ofthis analysis, numerical results indicate that the
provision of accurate information concerning herd infection status is not likely to be
a sufficient requirement to prevent the inter-herd transmission ofTb infection. This
conclusion questions the probable success ofa policy relying on market prices and
indicates that a regulatory response may be required to assist the market in achieving
Tb control policy outcomes. The economic impact for the producer of having
infected cattle is the lower values of; false positive reactors slaughtered, cattle sold
to store that are discounted and infected cattle slaughtered that only return a salvage
value. The price discount on cattle purchased reduces the economic impact ofthese
costs on the producer. Under the voluntary movement control testing scenarios
considered the producer does not have to bear any of the external costs relating to
threats to New Zealand's meat trade and the adverse implications for public health
which arise as Tb prevalence levels increase. Some regulatory intervention may
therefore be required in order to reduce herd Tb prevalence.
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Strategic Alliances for Competitive Viability in Lamb Production Systems -
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& Drahenstoll, 1995; Royer, 1995), This change is reflected in New Zealand chilled lamb products
felching premiums over olher protein sources compared with the previous carcass dominated trade
(Taylor, 1997). Taylor (1997) suggested that the challenge facing New Zealand farmers (i.e. food
producers) is to cater for a growing number of consumers with rising incomes who demand higher
quality food products.
Figure I: New Zealand sheep slaughter seasonality for 1979/80 versus the average for 1990 - 97.
Sources: New Zealand Meat Wool Board Economic Service.
SUMMARY
A hreeder and a finisher have formed a co-operative (alliance) farming venture in an allempt to
improve the quality and timeliness of lamh supply. These alliance participants wcrc studicd to
dcicrtnine thc effect of the alliance on farmer risk-return proliles and other aspects of their farm
husinesses. The alliance reduced husiness risk for the finisher by ahout 90% and generated variahle
changes in profit hy season (-60% to +11%). The alliance had lillie impact upon Ihe hreeder's risk-
return prolile in spring, but reduced the profit hy 20% and lowered the risk hy 13% in summer. It was
concluded that a win:win situation with respect to risk and profit was not created by the alliance.
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RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS & CO-OPERATION
Much of the change in slaughter pallern from 1979/80 when it had an obvious trough to the flaller
pallern of the I990s can be allributed to a change in carcass weight. In 1979/80 the average carcass
weight was 13.5 kg, while in 1997 the average carcass weight was 15.5 kg meaning the lambs are now
older al the time of slaughter.
This paper highlights resource constraints existing within the industry and the changes in consumer
requirements, while reviewing potential management responses. A computer spreadsheet model was
developcd to estimate the impact of a strategic alliance hetween a lamb breeder and a finisher on
each farmer's risk-return prolile. Benefits 10 olher supply chain participants are discussed.
.......
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Shecp meat and beef production provided about 18 % of New Zealand's F.O.B. exports hy value in
1997 (NZMPB, 1998). Lamb production is one of the main enterprises on these farms and typically
providcs about 35 - 50 % of the gross income of southern North Island sheep and beef catlle farmers.
The profitability of individual farms varies considerahly hetween years. For example, the
NZMWBES 'All Classes Average' for the East Coast region has shown farm profits before lax of
between $30.600 and $55,598 in the last five years (1992/93 - 1996/97). This variahility is derived
from two major sources: market prices and volume of produclion. The former results from commodity
price cycles, exchange rate movements, consumer perceptions (welfare and health issues such as
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE», glohal realignments of these industries (such as trade
agreements and changes in food demand) and local c1imalic events. Price variation for both lamb and
beef was about 35 % either side of the mean for the period 1990 - 1997 (NZMWBES, 1997). Wool is
suhject to variation as well - 30 % either side of the mean for the same period (NZMWBES, 1997h).
Farm expenditure levels have steadily increased with the 'All Classes Average' total expenditure
incrcasing 4 % per annum since 1992/93 (NZMWBES, 1997h) and this is exacerhating net income
variability hy squeezing profits in low-income years.
.1979/80 .1990 • 97 Averege
Production variability is derived from the farm's reliance on seasonal pasture production for stock
feed and hetween year variation in pasture growth being driven predominantly by climate. soil fertility
and pasture species (Korte. et al.. 1987), Seasonal livestock production is particularly marked in hill
country where most livestock hreeding occurs. A concenlrated lamhing in spring to coincide with
improved pasture growth rates and heller wealher for lamh survival means that mosl animals are of a
similar agc and weight when ready for sale. The seasonality of supply inlroduces inefficiencies into
the meat-processing sector (Figure I). Specialist finishers cannot ohtain lambs throughout the year;
the finishers cannot therefore supply processors year round and as a consequence processing plants
arc under-utilised for portions of the year (Sheppard, 1982). In the past when lamh was solely an
undifferentiated commodity product, New Zealand's seasonality of production complimented
Northern hemisphere supply, alheil at a low price, and there was no ohvious negative effect on any
market participants.
Food demand is changing from a mass commodity market into a widening array of niche markets.
.Consumers are demanding healthy. nutritional and convenient food producls (Barkema &
Drahenstott, 1995; Royer, 1995). They expect to be ahle to purchase fresh product throughout Ihe
year, and arc no longer satisfied with the producer imposed seasonal distrihution of food supply.
Customers throughout the food supply chain are demanding 'hest products' - products with their
preferred attributes offering benefits throughout the year over other undifferentiated goods (Barkema
The comhination of resources and variability determines whether the firm can produce 'best products'
or nol. Conslraints in the resource base or the variability could cause possible failure to achieve 'best
products'. The goal of many farm businesses is to grow equity in order to improve it's viability
andlor 10 prepare for it's transition to the next generation (Shadbolt, 1997). In order to achieve this
goal, farm husinesses require access to all necessary inputs for it's successful operation and
production of 'hest products'. and profitable outlets for those 'best products'. Three alternatives for
achieving this have heen described: the market solution, the integrated solution and the co-operation
solulion (Richardson. 1972; Geryhadze, 1995). These methods of co-ordination can be defined with
respect to the extent of integration. The market method is non-integration and co-operation can be
considered as quasi-integration (Gerybadze, 1995; Williamson, 1991).
Physical resource constraints to pastoral livestock production in New Zealand include the availability
and quality of land, location (distance to markets, likelihood of adverse weather effects at key times
such as lamhing etc.', livestock genetics and prevalence of animal health problems and diseases.
These resource constraints and the underlying pattern of pasture growth means that many hill country
farms have insufficient or unsatisfactory feed to finish lambs for slaughter. Instead they sell lambs
slore on a volatile 'spot' market, or at less profitable lighter weights, In conlrast, finishing farms on
hettcr qualily land are ahle to grow lambs to heavier weights before slaughter. Finishing farm feed
supply patterns are likely to be less seasonal due to the ability to use forage crops to supplement
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pasture growth. Finishing farmers however, are not always ahle to ohtain a suitahle numher or quality
of store lamhs. and Ihis influences their ahilily to supply lamhs to processor specificalions on time and
in full. Thus. there is eomplimentarity hetween the two farm Iypes and this offers potential henefits for
farmers on hoth classes of land.
Hill country farmers can overcome Iheir produclion constraint hy either purchasing a farm with heller
qualilY resources for lamh finishing (i.e. verlically integrale) or hy co-operation with finishing
farmers. Upsizing 10 a larger unil, may not always he possihle as land is a 'lumpy' investment.
Current high land prices in New Zealand are exacerhating Ihis siluation, leaving some such
investmenls unprofilahle. The large amounts of funding required are often more Ihan the firm can
source from equity or can horrow making the investment infeasihle. Vertical integration could
introduce human resource eonslraints - the farmer may not have Ihe skills necessary to finish lamhs
even with satisfactory resources or 10 manage grazing systems wilh marked hetwecn year variation in
Ihe underlying pallern of pasture supply. Vertical inlegration in lamh finishing could also introduce
logistical difficulties associated with managing lahour and livestock on properties geographically
remote from each other.
The alternative is to co-operatively co-ordinale acllvilies and to secure continued access to all
necessary inputs and outlels for its operation via alliances with 'neighhouring' participants in the
supply chain. Co-operalion could allow farmers to add value 10 currenl oulpul and/or to reduce Ihe
variahilily of product prices.
A numher of the conditions favourahle towards a co-operative co-ordination stralegy apply to many
farm types in New Zealand, in particular hill counlry and finishing farms, suggesting Ihat strategic
alliances may he a useful co-ordination slrategy for the sheep and heef callie industry. Many farmers
want In access more resources in order to improve Iheir cost structure or to overcome some resource
conslraint (strategic weakness) that may he reducing their ahility to output 'hest producls·.
Recently there has heen a paradigm shift in parIs of New Zealand's lamb and heef sectors with
increased integration hetween farmers and processors Ihrough supply contraclS. As a result.
proccssing companies involved in supply contracts have expanded their capacity (Goodger pel's.
COIIIIII., 1997), despite the downward trend in sheep numhers. Progressive MealS Limited (PML>. is
an example of a processing company that has undertaken to produce to order rather than to the
diclales of seasonal supply. Their aim is 10 "deliver produel in full, on lime. to specification. at the
agreed price with a margin for all participants in the supply ehain". PML is encouraging their
suppliers and exporters to use a similar approach to ensure the long term satisfaction of customer
needs and allow continuous improvement in producl qualily (Goodger pel's. COIll1ll., 1997).
Participants in supply chains are aiming 10 surround themselves with preferred customers to form a
network, he they inlernal or external. or either suppliers or huyers (Tice. 1997; CSBS, 1997).
One charaelerislic of New Zealand sheep and heel' farmers Ihat may reduce the suitahilily of co-
operative co-ordination is the lack of a co-operative culture required for the successful
implemenlation of alliances. Farmers are typically individualists and fiercely independent, and in the
sheep and heef cattle industry are competing directly againsl each other in Ihe markelplace. Most
trading of livestock and livestock produce in New Zealand's sheep and heef caltle sector is on Ihe
SPOI market. The many years spent hy Ihe induslry operating in an 'open adversaria!' commodily
market has meant a strong dislrust hetween suppliers (hreeders and finishers) and customers
(processors) has developed (Goodger pel's. £'011I111•• 1997). The same situation has developed in the
UK (Palmer. 1996) and the USA (Ashkenas el a/.. 1995 cited in CSBS, 1997).
Given the characteristics of sheep and heef farms in New Zealand, and conditions of the environment
wilhin which Ihey operate. it appears that al leasl some participants would have something 10 hoth
gain and offer olher industry participants.
METHODS
A coastal Wairarapa hill country farmer and a Hawkes Bay finishing farmer who currently participale
in a co-operative livestock farming venture were identified for the study. Financial. physical,
management and social data. as well as details of Ihe structure and components of the stralegie
alliance they are involved in were collected. The case sludy farmers were interviewed to determine:
Ihe purpose of the alliance and their common objective; Iheir mutual need; sources of risk to their
lamh enterprises; Ihe impael the farmers see the alliance as having on their risks and returns; and other
henefits Ihe alliance hrings 10 their farm business (Lewis, 1990).
A compuler spreadsheel model was developed to integrate the production and financial aspects of
lamh enterprises on each farm and in the alliance. The model runs in Microsoft Excel'".
Model Descriplion
The model simulales the financial results of implemenling either of two co-ordination strategies on Ihe
case farms. There are two models for each farm - one for Ihe co-operation strategy and a second for
Ihe market stralegy. which enahled the benefils of the co-operation strategy to be estimated. Each
model incorporates key stochastic variahles for price and productivilY thaI influence farm income and
protilahility.
The variation of these key variahles was determined by asking each of the farmers for maximum.
minimum and most likely values for these variables. Distributions for each of Ihese variables were
estimated using Bela and Normal distributions based upon the data provided by the farmers and
NZMWBES historical price data (Appendix I).
Analysis of the hreeding system calculated a net operating profit after lax (NOPAT) per ewe on hand
alopening. The analysis of the finishing system calculated a NOPAT per lamb finished. The models
are illustrated schematically (Appendix 2). The NOPATs for the trading finisher scenarios include a
$2.00Ilamh honus payment for supplying the lambs as per Ihe PML supply agreement on time and in
full. Similarly, the hreeder selling finished lambs via the strategic alliance has Ihis honus included in
his NOPAT. This assumes thatlhe supply agreement is hetween PML and the owner of the lamb at
Ihe lime of supply 10 PML.
Finishing !ilTm working expenses Ihat are non-enterprise specific such as fertiliser and repairs and
maintenance are included as cost of feed (eentslkg DM). The cost of feed is determined by dividing
the costs of producing feed in each of the four seasons by the feed yield in that same season (spring;
Seplcmhcr - Novemher. summer: December - February. autumn: March - May, winter: June - August.
The lolal cost of feeding is determined by Ihe Iiveweight gain which allows the lenglh of time the
lamh is on the farm 10 he calculated. and therefore the amount of feed each lamb eats while on the
property. Variahle costs (animal health. shearing and labour associated directly with handling each
lamh) arc deducted per head.
The Iinishing farm's feed supply profile was estimated using a reverse feed hudgeting technique,
LiveSlock numhers and performance is used to estimate the feed demand profile. The feed demand
prolile was determined and adjusted with respect to climate data records and discussion wilh the
lilTmer to estimate the feed supply profile.
The reed requirement of each lamb is determined by calculating Ihe average lamh liveweight during
it's time on the farm. the lotal liveweight gained while on the farm, and therefore the energy
requirement for mainlenance and growth using the relationships provided by Geenty and Rallray
(1987).
The lotal feed demand for the hreeding property was similarly determined. The cost of producing this
reed is assumed 10 he constant throughout the year as there is no significant feed supplied by forage
crops. In practice the actual value of feed may not always be constant throughout the year particularly
when feed shortages occur. The cost of feed is again determined by dividing the tOlal amount of feed
ealen on the farm hy the total non-enterprise specific costs.
The amount of feed required to provide a lamb to a finisher in either spring or summer (Ihe only
physically feasihle seasons for the breeder) is estimated using the relationships reported by Geenty
and Rallray (1987). It is assumed that lambs supplied in summer are carried on the property an
average of 12 weeks longer than those lambs supplied in spring.
Lambs arc sourced from a number of breeders, predominanlly in the lower North Island. Forty
percent of lambs finished by Ihe case finisher are oblained via numerous alliances. The remainder of
the lambs is sourced via purchasing contracts or from the store market.
Mean-Variance Comparison of the Co-ordination Strategies by Season
The expected NOPAT and the variance of thaI NOPATare plolled on an E-V profile for Ihe finisher (
) and Ihe hreeder (Figure 3). These E-V profiles allow a visual assessmenl of the risk-relurn trade-off
heing made by each partner for their involvement in the alliance.
The farmcrs Slated Ihe purpose of their strategic alliance as "10 oplimise profitability and reduce risk
by increasing conlrol of Ihe supply chain". The breeder and the finisher are removed from the
flucluations of the slore market. The breeder's production risk is potenlially reduced because of a
guaranteed and limely outlel for lambs is available. At the same lime, the alliance generates a more
slable and forecastable pallern of lamb supply for Ihe finisher than a system based entirely upon the
slore market. This forecaslable supply pattern assists them to guarantee supply to processors.
In spring, the lamb finisher expects a $O.87flamb lower NOPAT (II % reduction) by being involved
in Ihe alliance compared to trading lambs. The variance, a measure of Ibe business risk. is reduced by
95 % ($5.78/lamb lower variance) by participating in the slrategie alliance. In line with tbis, the
hreeder is expected to receive a slightly higher NOPAT per ewe under the alliance agreement
compared to selling lambs store (a $O.II/ewe increase in NOPAT - I %). The business risk for the
hreeder is expected to increase. The variance increased by $O.19/ewe (4 %). The breeder's risk








Hill Counlry Farm Finishing Farm
The alliance is a grazing agreement belween Ihe bill country lamb breeder and the lamb finisher.
LUI"bs arc usually supplied at a pre-determined weight - a tolerance is allowed for climatic
uncertainly. The finisher grazes the breeder's lambs for a fee of $Ilkg of liveweight gained per lamb.
The hreeder retains ownership of the lambs througb to slaughter. Losses are therefore the
responsibililY of Ihe breeder (unless greater than two percent). The finisher pays animal health costs.
Any shearing compleled on Ihe finishing property is charged to the breeder at $2Jhead to cover labour
and shed costs. The lambs are grown to meet mUlually targeted markets specified in the agreement.
Performance largels are sel so thaI lamb progress can be monilored and tactical decisions made.
Area: 5722 ha Area:
Ewe nos: 11500 Lambs finished:
Olher sheep nos: 6000 No of lambs carried:
Callie nos: 1765 Callie finished:
Lamhing % 102 % Forage crop area:
Lambs sold: 8500 Arable area:
Gross farm income: $824,000 Gross farm income:
Whole Year Risk Efficiency Analysis oflhe Co-ordinalion Stralegies for Ihe Finisher
The finishing farmer docs not operate within seasons, Ihus the impacI of Ihe IWo strategies must be
determined over Ihe whole year. The expected whole year NOPAT and variance of NOPAT were
determined for each of the pure strategies (100 % alliance throughout Ihe year or 100 % market for
Ihe whole year). The whole year NOPAT was calculaled per lamb unit. A linear programme was
used to delermine the expected whole year NOPAT and variance of NOPAT for combinalions of the
two co-ordination strategies. The objeclive of the linear programme was to minimise business risk (as
measured by the variance) for a given level of expecled whole year NOPAT. The linear programme
generated a risk efficiency fronlier curve. The expecled NOPATs and variances for the pure
strategies were plolled againsl this curve 10 compare Ihe risk efficiency of Ihe respective stralegics.
CDFs were also calculated for the pure market versus the most profitable comhincd stralegy, and for
Ihe pure alliance versUs the least risky combined strategy to determine the slOchastic dominance.
Stochaslie Dominance Comparison of Ihe Co-ordination Strategies
The two distribulions of NOPAT for each farm under the two co-ordinalion slralegies can be pi oiled
on a cumulative distribution function (CDF) to determine Ihe slochastic dominance of one slrategy
over the other. First degree stochastic dominance is visually obvious - Ihe CDFs do not cross each
other. The determination of second degree dominance requires the area under the two CDFs 10 be
calculated (integration). The CDF with the smaller area under the graph is said to dominate Ihe olher
in the second degree. This technique assumes Ihe respective farms prefer more profil than less (Levy
& Sarnat, 1994; Savvides, 1994; Dillon & Hardaker, 1993). Profilabilily provides a means by which
farmers can obtain many farmers' most common objective - 10 grow equity in their business.
Mean-Variance Comparison of Ihe Co-ordinalion Slrategies
The alternative co-ordination strategies were compared in lerms of their position on a mean - variance
(E-V) prolile firsl pioneered by Markowitz (Levy & Sarnat, 1994). Two allernatives 10 the variance
could have been used. the standard deviation (Weimar & Hallam, 1990) and the coefficienl of
varialion (Nartea & Barry, 1994), for this profile. The variance rather than the coefficient of variation
was used in this sludy. because Ihe absolule varialion in NOPAT was deemed to he of greater
practical usc Ihan the relative variation. It was also preferred 10 the <landaI'd deviation as it is Ihe
more typically used lechnique. Gerybadze (1995) used Ihis technique of analysing and comparing co-
ordination slrategies in his research into Ihe development of economic Iheory of strategic alliances
and networks. The mean is the expected NOPAT for the sheep enterprises for the respective farmers
and Ihe variance is Ihe estimaled distribution parameIer of those NOPATs generated by the <lochastic
model for each farm.
The slochaslie models for each farm under Ihe Iwo co-ordination slralegies were run through 500
ilerations using the randomly generaled variables for price and productivily 10 provide a dislrihulion
of NOPAT for each farm under Ihose co-ordinal ion slrategies. The models were constructed so thaI
the same SCI of random prices. pasture and crop yields and lamb growlh rales were used for each of
the IWO scenarios for bOlh farms. Each dislribution can be described hy calculating Ihe mean or
expeeled NOPAT.lhe variance, maximum, minimum and median or mosllikely outcome (NOPAT).
;:j
Sensitivity Analysis of Breeder NOPAT
Sensilivily analysis of breeder NOPAT provides a practical technique to delermine the most
prolitable slrategy to employ based upon future price expeclations. and to eslimate the breakeven
Iiveweight gain fee. Median (most likcly) values of non-sensitised variables are used in the analysis.
Figure 2: Comparative posilions on a mean - variance profile for the finishing farm for the two co-
ordination strategies for each season (4).
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
The two farms in the alliance studied are briefly described in Table I. Bolh farmers had similar
husiness goals: improved profitability; business growth; and financial sustainahility. The hreeder also
.aimed f(1I' environmental sU<lainabilily. BOIh farmers saw improved performance as Ihe key 10
oblaining these goals; Ihe finisher also recognised the need for continuous improvement in the service
being provided to suppliers and meat processors.

































Ihe variance of the same lamb finished (15.5 kg carcass weigbt) in spring is $7.20/lamb. Therefore
the markel price risk for Ihe breeder has been increased. At the same time, market price risk has been
removed from the finishing enterprise as the finisher is no longer participating in either the store
market or the finished market.
In spring, the slrategic alliance offers the finisher an enterprise with more preferable risk
characteristics than the trading market. The finisher's return foregone for a reduction in risk is low
while Ihe breeders increase in risk for increased return is relatively high.
In summcr.the finisher is expected to earn a slightly higher NOPAT ($O.IO/lamb. an I I % increase)
by entering the slrategic alliance wilh the breeder. The finisher's variance of NOPAT under the
alliance is 88 % ($5. IS/Iamb) less than for a market situation. The risk return trade off is II :-88, thus
there is no trade off, the return is improving with a deerease in risk. Meanwhile, the breeder is
accepling an expected $2.43/ewe lower NOPAT (20 % reduction), and the variance (business risk) is
cxpecled 10 decline 13 % ($0.74/ewe). The risk return trade off for the hreeder is 20:13. Therefore
Ihe hreedcr is accepling a lower reward in return for a reduction in the level of business risk. and the
finisher is receiving a slightly higher reward and is suhstantially reducing his business risk.
The variance of the price of a 26 kg liveweight store lamb in summer is $6.76/1amb, while the
variance of Ihe same lamb finished to 15.5 kg carcass weight in summer is $4.80/lamb. The breeder's
market risk is therefore decreased hy involvement in the alliance compared to selling store lambs.
Figure 3: Comparative positions on a mean - variance profile for the hreeding farm for the two co-
ordination strategies for each season (2).
There is no return trade off for lower risk for the finisher in summer as expected profitability
increases under the alliance and the hreeder's risk reduces relatively proportionally to the reduction in
return.
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In autumn, the finisher would expect to earn a $4.70/lamh lower NOPAT when finishing lambs via
Ihe alliance compared to finishing traded lamhs (51 % decrease in profitability). The business risk as
measured hy the variance is reduced hy 96 % ($S.99/1amb lower variance). The expected risk return
trade off is SI :96. The finisher's return foregone for lower risk is relatively lower than the risk
reduction.
Based upon the variance of the store and finished lamb prices ($6.27/1amb and $S.40/lamb
respectively), it is expected that the business risk for the breeder would be reduced in autumn by
bcing involved in the strategic alliance. It was not possible to deduct whether the case study breeder
would expect an increase or decrease in NOPAT for autumn sold lambs, but the 51 % fall in finisher
profilability may suggest that the breeder would be more profitable selling lambs through the alliance
ralher than on the store market in autumn.
In winler. the lamh finisher expects to earn a NOPAT of $1O.88/1amb by trading lambs. but in the
alliance the expected NOPAT is $6.49/1amb less at $4.39/lamh, a 60 % reduction in expected return.
The business risk as measured by variance in NOPAT is expected to decrease by 96 % ($6.92/1amb).
The risk rcturn trade off is 60:96. The return trade off for lower risk is slightly higher than in autumn.
hUI the return foregone is slill relatively less than the risk reduction.
The hreeder's production risk on his own farm associated with producing lambs to store condition
remains the same under either co-ordination strategy. Involvement in the strategic alliance introduces
a cost of production risk on the finishing properly (the amount of liveweight to he gained to altain the
target finished carcass weight of IS.S kg). Under the market strategy. the finisher would carry this
risk: therefore the cost of production risk is slightly reduced hy involvement in the strategic alliance
as some risk is transferred to the hreeder. The other risk transferred within the alliance is lamh deaths
- this risk is carried hy the breeder in the alliance ratber than the finisher as for the market strategy.
The other production risks (such as lamb liveweight gain rates) remain the same for tbe finisher for
both co-ordination strategies.
For the hreeder involved in the strategic alliance. store market price risk is replaced hy finished
market price risk. In spring, the variance of the price of a 24 kg Iiveweight lamh is $S.76/1amh while
Based upon the variance of the store and finished lamb prices ($6.27/lamb and $8.0S/lamb
respectively), it is expected that the business risk for the breeder would be increased in winter by
bcing involved in the strategic alliance. It was not possible to deduct whether the case study breeder
would expect an increase or decrease in NOPAT for lambs sold via the alliance in winter compared to
the store market. However, the 60 % fall in finisher profitability may suggest that the breeder would
he more prolitable selling lambs through the alliance rather than in the store market.
Whole Year Profit & Risk Implications of Strategic Alliances for the Finisher
The mean-variance (E-V) curve is a risk efficiency frontier curve (Figure 4). Neither the alliance nor
market strategies implemented individually by the finisher are as risk efficient as a combination of
hoth co-ordination strategies because they fall below the line of the curve. This means that for the
given levcl of risk, more profit can be achieved or the given level of profit can be achieved using a
less risky enterprise mix.
Figure 4: Mean-variance (E-V) risk efficiency fronlier curve for the whole year NOPAT/lamh unil for
Ihe finisher.
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Figure 5; Proporlion of lamhs finished via Ihe alliance strategy by season in order 10 optimise risk for
Ihe given whole year NOPATl1amb unil.
Figure 5 shows the proportions of lambs finished via Ihe slralegic alliance by season in order to
0plimise thc risk for given expecled whole year NOPATs per lamh unil. The mOsl profilable scenario
(NOPAT = $49.22/Iamb unit) finishes lambs using Ihe alliance only in summer (100 % of lambs
Iinished via Ihe alliance) and uses the spot market for Ihe remainder of Ihe seasons. Generally, as the
expecled NOPAT increases (along wilh Ihe business risk), Ihe proporlion of lambs finished via Ihe
alliancc diminishes as alliance finishing in Ihese seasons has been shown to be less profilable than the
markel. Summer is the exceplion 10 Ihis trend, because alliance finished lambs are expected to be
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The risk efliciency frontier curve (Figure 4) shows thaI the pure markel and the pure alliance
stratcgies arc visually insignificanlly different from two respeclive comhinalions of the two slrategies.
hut arilhmetically Ihe comhined stralegy slighlly dominales hOlh the pure market and the pure alliance
slratcgy.~
Tahlc 2; SensilivilY analysis of NOPAT ($/ewe) for the breeder in spring for Ihe Iwo co-ordination
strategies.
The aClual strategy mix employed will he delermined by the individual finisher's risk preference and
ulililY funclion.
It can he concluded Ihal for Ihe finisher, involvemenl in a slrategic alliance in combinalion wilh
lrading on Ihe spot market is more risk efficient than eilher pure co-operalion or pure markel co-
ordination strategies.
Sensilivity Analysis of Breeder NOPAT
The sensilivilY analysis of hreeder NOPAT/ewe under the two co-ordinalion stralegies in spring
(Tahlc 2) was delermined using median values (most likely values) for those non-sensilised variables.
The hreakeven Iiveweight gain fee can he determined by comparing the Market Slralegy NOPAT on
the right hand side wilh the Alliance Slralegy NOPATon the left hand side (e.g. for an expecled store
price of $1.30/kg LWT and expected finished price of $2.70/kg CWT compare the market
NOPAT of $14.75/ewe wilh the alliance NOPAT of $14.72/ewe, Iherefore the hreakeven liveweight

















Thc E-V risk efliciency frontier curve (Figure 4) shows that neilher Ihe alliance or markel strategies
implemenled individually hy Ihe finisher are as risk efficient as a comhination of holh co-ordination
slratcgics. Assuming Ihe finisher dcsires the highest possible NOPAT in order to huild equily as
rapidly as possihlc (in line wilh most farmer's goals) disregarding risk. the mosl preferahle solulion is
Ihe comhinalion of Ihe co-ordination stralegies corresponding to Ihe point al which the mean is
$49.22/Iamh unil and the variance is $59.39/Iamh unil. This poinl is al Ihe extrcme righl of Ihe risk
eflicicncy frontier curve. This siluation provides a very slighl improvement in NOPAT over the
market solution (0.2 % increase) and a significant reduction in risk of 10.2 %. However. Ihe mosl risk
loving lamh finisher acting ralionally would prefer Ihe comhined stralegy rather Ihan Ihe pure market
hecause Ihe expccled profilahilily is higher for the camhi ned stratcgy. This most profitahle
comhinalion of Ihe stralegies returns a suhstantial 1314 % increase in NOPAT compared 10 a pure
alliance strategy hUI at 102 % more risk as measured hy the variance. The leasl risky situalion using a
comhinalion of alliance and markel slrategies (al Ihe extreme left of the risk efficiency fronlier curve)
is less risky and more protilahle than the pure alliance slralegy. Thus the most risk averse lamh
finisher acting rationally would prefer the camhined stralegy rather than the pure alliance situation as
the potential returns for the same level of risk are greater.
The musl important consideration for the finisher in determining which co-ordination slratcgy 10
undertake is what arc the returns and the associated risks over thc whole year. Lamh finishers have
hislorically heen lraders. Ihus the trading margin (lhe difference hetween the sale pricc and Ihe
replacement cost) is more importanl Ihan Ihe difference helween the sale price and Ihc purchase cosl
of thaI lamh. The analysis was completed on a seasonal hasis using the sale price and Ihe purchase
coslli" the lamhs. Ihus this analysis must he aggregated to he of value 10 the year round lamh finisher
in his dccision making. The mixcd arahle farmer finishing lamhs is likely 10 he finishing lamhs for
short pcriods of lime only, perhaps summer and autumn, Ihus Ihe Irading margin may hecome less
important Ihan Ihe margin hetween sale price and purchase price. Therefore Ihe seasonal profil and
risk discussion would he more relevanllo this Iype of lamh finisher.
The lamb breeder's decision 10 supply lambs via Ihe alliance rather than selling them in the store
market is hased upon his expeclalions of future finished lamb prices and the current slore lamb price.
For cxample, if Ihe currenl slore price was $1.25/kg LWT, the most likely NOPAT is $14.14. The
breeder would not rationally (disregarding risk) consider becoming involved in an alliancc, at $I/kg
LWT gain, if be expected the finished price to be $2.70/kg CWT at tbe time those lamhs would he
finished. However, if the finished price was expected to increase to $3.00/kg CWT, Ihere is
potentially a $2.00/ewe increase in NOPAT for the breeder, and the breeder would ralionally consider
involvement in Ihe alliance. For the breeder to rationally consider involvemenl in the alliance given
thc expected finished price of $2.70/kg CWT, the liveweighl gain fee charged by the finisher would





























input variahle assumptions used in the analysis. A small change in these inputs, especially the price
dislrihulions. could markedly change the outcome. The situation being created by the alliance does
not appear to be a win:win situation because the breeder is giving more than he is receiving and the
finisher is receiving more than he is giving for the spring/summer period. However, this is perhaps
not the case in autumn and winter given the lower expected finisher's profit for those seasons. Both
parlners stated Ihat a win:win situation was being created and was essential to the long term
continuance of the alliance. This is contradicted by the risk-return profile results of this study.
Therefore, the alliance slructure may need to be changed in order to ensure long term continuance.
The most appropriale changes could be a reduction in the liveweight gain fee charged to the breeder
in spring and summer even though feed costs are highest in summer, or a return sharing structure. A
relurn sharing structure would result in risk also being shared rather than transferred from the finisher
to the breedcr as under the current structure.
For a clearer identification of a win:win situation, gains other than those quantified in this analysis
need to be oblained such as improved physical performance brought about by potential synergies
belween the two parlners.
......
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The alliance agreement is usually drawn up before the expected date of sale or delivery, Ihus the
decision is hased upon the expected store price at that date of sale/delivery and the expected fUlure
finished lamb price al Ihe expected lime of finishing. These expected prices are hased upon expected
lamb supply and demand. If the NOPAT expecled to be achieved Ihrough involvement in the alliance
is less than that expected to be achieved hy selling on the spol market, Ihe breeder can either Opl to
sell the lamhs on the store market, or can attempt to lower Ihe price paid to the finisher for finishing
the lambs. Conlinuing to supply the lambs in less profitable years (i.e. those years when the store
markel would provide greater profit) is more likely to guaranlee access to Ihe finisher's services in the
future when the situation may be reversed. This will ensure Ihe lrust and goodwill built belween the
two parlners remains strong. Continuity of supply on behalf the breeder also ensures Ihal Ihe finisher
can continue receiving timely access 10 PML markets. many of which arc niche markets. and
premiums for bOlh the finisher and breeder. I! is Iherefore likely that continuing Ihe alliance in less
prolitable years will be beneficial 10 the breeder (and finisher) in the long term, hUI this decision is up
to the individual breeder and based upon their unique utility function and preferences.
I! appears Ihal for the spring/summer seasons it is expected to be more profilable for the hreeder to be
involved in the alliance when it is expecled 10 be less prolitable for the finisher to be iovolved in the
alliance and vice-versa. This suggcsls thai perhaps the henefits as analysed are not being shared
equally by the parlners, and therefore a win:win situation may not in fact be being crealed.
CONCLUSION:
The key mOlive for co-operation between firms is to achieve a more appropriate risk-relurn profile for
their aClivilies (Gerybadzc, 1995: Lynch, 1989), butlhe change in the firm's risk-relurn profile may
not he Ihe only henelil. Based upon the analysis of the case alliance, involvemenl in the alliance has
improved Ihe finisher's risk-return profile compared to that achieved in the independent Iransaclion-
based market for cerlain seasons wilhin the year. Wilhout exceplion, Ihe stralegic alliance
substantially reduces Ihe business risk (as measured by the variance in NOPAT) throughoulthe year
for the finisher. The alliance is expected to provide mixed returns in comparison to Irading on a
seas<mal basis. This conelusion is reinforced by farmer commenl. Over Ihe whole year. a
combinalion of finishing lambs via the strategic alliance and store market is more risk efficient Ihan
either a pure market stralegy or a pure co-operation slrategy for Ihe finisher. The advanlage of the co-
operative venture for the linisher is that Ihey have the opportunity to be involved in a less risky
enterprise, albeit potentially less profilable than Ihe pure market stralegy. For a mixed arahle farmer
finishing lambs in parlicular seasons, Ihe alliance slralegy would be favoured in summer regardless of
risk preference. In the other seasons, the decision would be determined by the farmer's individual
utility funclion and risk preference.
The strategic alliance caused a small increase in profit and business risk for the breeder in spring, but
significantly reduces both profit and risk in summer. The benefils of Ihe stralegic alliance in terms of
prolit and risk appear to strongly favour the finisher under the current venture slruclure, given the
The alliance is allowing consumer driven quality assurance programme requirements to be met more
readily as lambs supplied via the alliance are more easily traced and monitored than lambs obtained
from the S10re markel. This also assists breeders to improve their own livestock performance as
preferred liveslock can be idenlified at slaughter, and suitable livestock selected. The guaranteed and
limely oullel for lambs can also benefit the breeder's performance by allocating feed more
appropriately to capital livestock at critical times such as mating. The guaranteed and timely supply
of lambs to the finisher means that the farm can be planned to maximise productivity, and processor
supply requiremenls can be met profilably with relalive ease.
Compatible physical resources are necessary before an alliance is formed otherwise there is no benefit
10 be gained from Ihe venture. Partners must have a long term oUllook, and be continuously aiming to
improve Iheir performance wilh respect to their common objeclive. Trust, integrity and
communication are essential 10 ensuring long term continuance of the strategic alliance. Knowledge
of the olhcr partner's business and values enables the venture to remain flexible and difficulties
hroughl about by externalilies to be overcome.
Olher heoefits include the forging of stronger links between participants in the lamb supply chain as
working relationships are buil! between those participants. The stronger links will bring an element of
surely 10 the suppler-cuslomer relalionship which may help lessen the distrust which stems from years
of operaling wilbin an 'open adversarial' commodity market (Goodger pers. camm., 1997; Palmer,
1996 and Ashkenas etal., 1995).
Slralegic alliances between hill country lamb breeders and lamb finishers when combined with the
slore market provide a mechanism for farmers to expand their resource base and enables them to meet
markel requirements improving the finishing farmer's risk efficiency compared to pure market
lransactions. The breeding farmer is expanding his resource base and meeting market requirements,
hut his position on the risk-return profile is not being improved, rather it is deteriorating. The
stronger working relalionship between supply chain parlicipants is leading to consumers receiving
best lamh producls on lime, in full and to specification as envisaged by the breeder, the finisher and
the processor, ensuring consumer satisfaction.
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APPENDIX I: STOCHASTIC VARIABLES INCORPORATED IN THE FINISHER AND
BREEDER MODELS.
APPENDIX 2· SCHEMATIC DIAGRAMS OF COMPUTER MODEL INPUTS AND
RELATIONSHIPS:
Finisher Model Appendix 2.1 • Inputs 10 Trading Finisher Model
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Appendix 2.2 • Inputs to Alliance Finisher Model Appendix 2.3 • Inputs to Trading Breeder Model
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THE APPLICAnON OF STRATEGIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN A
MAORI INCORPORATION: A CASE SYUDY
METHODS
Figure I Interview c1assilication hierarchy
I I I
The study examined Ihe use of strategic planning and management using a descriptive case study
approach. An eXlensive literature review was performed to develop an understanding of strategic
planning, management and Maori incorporations. The literature review was used to establish a
questioning framework (Figure I). Interviews were then conducted with three key informants
including: Gary Alexander. Mangatu Chief Executive Officer (CEO). John Ruru, Management
Commillee Member and former Chairman, and Alan Haronga, Chairmen of the Management
Commillee. The Comminee of Management is elected by the shareholders of the Incorporation and are
responsible for the governance of the [neorporation in accordance witb its eonslitution and the Te Ture
Whenua Maori ACI 1993.
G.S. Alley, N. M. Shadbolt, T.T. Kingi
College of Sciences. Massey University,
Private Bag 11 222. Palmerston North
SUMMARY
Maori incorporations arc faced with unique legislative constraints and connicting economic and social
responsihilities. The use of strategic managemenltechniques by a Maori incorporation in an anempt 10
overcome these limitations was explored. The strategic planning lechniques used by Ihis busincss are
Ihe same as those used in the mainstream corporate community. The [ncorporation's business focus has
improved and a proactive approach to addressing Ihe requiremenls of slakeholders has been adopted.
The empbasis on relent ion of Maori land places a conslraint on the realisalion of its 'market' value.
This would suggest that performance measurements that include land value. such as return on
investment. arc not as relevant as techniques that concentrate on the relationship hetween sustainahle
opcrating prolit and the lirms cost of capital.
Strategic Planning Slrategy Implementalion Performance Measurement
(X)
o
Keywords: Maori Incorporation, strategic planning, management, key performance indicalors.
Icgislation
INTRODUCTION
Approximalely 207,156 ha of Maori Land are managed under an incorpnration structure. Maori
Agricultural ineorpnrations are tradilionally managed in a conservative manner. This is largely due to
Ihe multiple objectives faced by Ihe managemenl appointees of Maori incorporations: prolitabilily is
just one objective which must be balanced with a range of others. These may include developing
employmenl opporlunities for its owners, providing grants for educalion and supporling local Marae
(Kingi, 1997). The development of Maori land is complicated by the restriction that the land musl be
retained in thc Maori ownership. One of the main problems. is the difficulty eneounlered by Maori
organisations in accessing capital because of the reluclance by both tinancial inslitutions to acccpt
Maori land as sccurity and the owners to risk Maori land.
Thc lack of an cffcctive framcwork to address these multiple objectives oflen leads 10 common
conscnsus dccision making, where no objectives are given priority and the organisation tinds it diflicult
to make progress. Evidence suggesls Ihal the use of stralegic managemenl may help Maori
incorporations to address their multiple objectives in a more constructive manner and improve
organisational performance from both a tinancial and social perspective. Strategic planning and
managcment are commonly used by non-Maori entities to enhance business performance. Agriculture is
lradilionally a low-margin and high tixed cost business, and producers are usually price lakers. As a
result. the most reliable way to make a protit is cost control. the most effective way of controlling costs
is with a strategic business plan (Hogan and Utierrez. 1997).
Mangatu Blocks Incorporation (Gisborne) has utilised strategic planing and management in an attempt
to cffcctively address its multiple Objectives and achieve sustainable social and commercial outcomes.
The number of shareholders in the Incorporation comprises a total of approximately 3.500. The land
that the Incorporation manages and governs belongs to one iwi. Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki. It is this iwi
which the Incorporation seeks to benetit and advance. The Incorporalion's farming operation includes
15 sheep and beef farms covering 36,000 hectares (23,500 effective) and carrying 172.000 slock units,
2,500 hectares of radiata pines and a 58-hectare vineyard. There are 64 full time staff employed by
Mangatu including management ofticers. service slaff. contract supervisors. oftice staff. farm managers,
a vineyard manager. and 34 farm stafr.
A secondary calegory (incorporations) covering broader issues relating to the management of
incorporations and the Maori agribusiness environmenl was also included.
The interviews f(,cused on developing an understanding of 'how' and 'why' Mangatu Blocks have used
strategic planning and management. All interviews were laped to gain accurale and complete
transcriptions for analysis. The lranscripts were summarised and used to creale a database of evidence.
according 10 Ihe c1assilicalion hierarchy. This database was then used as Ihe basis of the results and
discussion. The inlerview data was supporled by secondary data collected from documents including
annual rep0rls. conference proceedings and Ihe common press.
RESULTS
Stratcgic Planning
Economic conditions and returns from farming. a commercially orientaled management commillee. the
prospcct of liquidation and a desire to achieve sustainable commercial and social outcomes has been the
catalyst for the use of strategic planning by Mangatu Blocks. The planning techniques employed by the
Incorporation are they same as those developed and utilised by non-Maori and non-farming businesses.
The Incorporations stakeholders include shareholders, the management commillee, employees.
suppliers. customers and the Crown. Obligations to the tirm's shareholders are sometimes referred to as
its tiscal responsibility, while obligations to its stakeholders are referred to as its social responsihility
(Miller and Dess. 1996). In the case of a Maori incorporation the shareholders have both a fiscal and
social stake in the business.
Initial strategy sessions involved industry analysis and an internal analysis of the organisalion,
developing a mission stalement and vision, identifying and formulating strategies. establishing
implcmentation procedures and performance measurement methods.
"So Ihat's what we did, we put a strategy in place. we had a number of corporate meetings where we
worked oUI our mission, our vision, our strategy. our objeclives all those sorts of things. What do we
want to do, where do we want 10 go, how are we going to do it, what do we want to produce. why do we
want to produce iI, and where are we going to sell ;1." (John Ruru)
Figure 2: Mangatu Blocks Slrategic Planning Overview. Source: (Haronga. 1993). I'igure 3: Vertically integrmed agribusiness stralegy. Source: (Alexander, 1997).
I. restrucluring the farm production enterprise to achieve greater efficiencies with a continual
Ircnd of lowcr cosl production measured by $ per kg liveweight
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Thc Incorpomlion developed the following mission slalement: Adding value 10 Ihe land for Ihe benefil
ofour people. The following long-Ierm objeclives were eSlablished.
Control of off-farm processcs, processing, marketing and branding is intended to develop stable,
sustainable priccs to be returned 10 farm production. This concept is referred to as specification
pricing. Thc spccificalion price will, in Ihe course of lime. sometimes be higher and sometimes lower
Ihan the spot price.
I. ".oducHo produce qualily to meelthe demands of the market place.
2. People-to encourage commilmcnl, initialive and satisfaction.
3. Client-to provide quality service.
4. Return on Capital-Io achieve a maintainable satisfactory return on capital.
The key faclor thaI Mangmu identified out of ils strmegic planning exercises was the importance of
managemenl to Ihe future of the business and the implementalion of ils strategic intentions. The
Incorporation was heading down Ihe path of corporate entity and had 10 be managed in corpomle
manner.
The commillce of management has taken extensive measures to inform shareholders about the changes
laking place within the business and tbe reasons why these changes are being made.
The Incorporalion has instituled an inlerim general meeting to inform shareholders about progress
andlor changes 10 the Mangatu Business Plan. Shareholders are also sent an update every two monlhs
(Nga Manu Tukutuku) whieh details issues relating to the plan i.e. why is capital fertiliser being
applied.
The Incorporalion is now focusing on developing a vertically inlegraled agribusiness: reposilioning
Mangatu from that of a primary producer to Ihat of manufacturer of compelilively priced, branded meat
products.
Strategy Implementation
The implemcnlalion slage of Mangatu's stralegic initiatives has seen the employment of a CEO, a new
business SlrUClure and signilicanl changes made to the physical management of the farming operation.




" ... Ihe key elemenl oul of a S1ralegie plan is 10 eonverl Ihe big pielure into implementable achievable
bils across Ihe board. And if you don'l have Ihal link then your slrategic planning is a waste of time."
(Alan Haronga)
Management Changes
The CEO was hired in 1994 and is responsible for the management of Mangatu Blocks and its assets
under a performance based contract. The CEO plays a major role in formulating corporate objectives
and implemenling the organisation business plan. The lOp manager's role and commitment to slrategic
planning is crilical (Daniel, 1992). Attributes that the management committee looked for in the CEO
were good rapport, corporate farming experience. academic qualifications and leadership skills. The
Incorporation created a Resource Operations Officer posilion 10 co-ordinate activities between station
managers.
The employment of a CEO has scen Ihe Committee of Management movc away from a "hands on"
approach to the management of tbe business. The Committee is involved in delcrmining Ihe strategic
direction of the business, represenling Ihe sharebolders and ensuring thaI tbe social aspirations of Ihe
Incorporation arc catcred for. However the committees' primary function is governance as opposed to
the management of the business.
Restructuring
As part of the development of the business the Incorporation was restructured inlo seven divisions with
associaled managemenl staff and busincss objectives. The reslrucluring also saw the establishment of
specialisl positions including a linancial controller, an office Clerk and a Resource Operalions Oflicer.
The Primary Production Division represents the Incorporalion's core husiness and aims to produce
Mangalu liveslock year round 10 customer specificalion at continually lower cost. The Farm Supply
Division consists of a farm merchandise and fertiliser lrading store and was established 10 reduce supply
COSIS and provide services 10 Ihe group's stations. The Food Division is responsible for Ihe marketing
of Ihe Incorporalion's meat prodUCIS. A subsidiary of the Mangatu group is involved in trial meat
shipmenls and brand development. This company has developed experlise in the Chinese market place
and is involved in the Incorporations initiatives in the USA were il is aiming to develop niche markels
in the heavy carcass weight lamb trade.
Resource Allocation & Physical Produclion
As a core busincss Ihe farming entcrprise is no longer targeting dual-purpose production. the focus is on
low cosl meal production. The Incorporalion plans to raise livestock production from the current level
of 4 million kg of liveweight sold a year to 8.2 million kg by the year 2002. In order 10 achieve this Ihe
managemenlleam has devised an aClion plan that involves integrating the farm base of 23,500 ha into a
single production unit. The concept of integraled land management is referred to as Transhumanee; the
seasonal migration of livestock to suitable grazing grounds. The 15 sheep and beef farms Mangatu
operales are designated as either breeding, growing or finishing property. Each fann has a specialist
role depending on its topography, climate and seasonal variation in grass growth.
Thc second phase of the physical implementation involves capital investment in the land and livestock
base; breeds. fertility. fencing, water supply, plant and Oeet. The Incorporation has implemented new
sheep and cattle breeding strategies that are designed to develop a ewe and cow focusing on malernal
traits including fertilily, milk production and fecundily for greater kg of progeny to be weaned per head.
New brceds and crosses are being used to provide maternal traits yet maintain and enhance carcass
chamclerislics. The programme is designed 10 maximise the numbers mated to lerminal sires using
thrcc:way crossbreeding programmes. The programme places an emphasis on sheep production
because the Incorporation believes they have a competitive advanlage in this area.
Performance Measurement
Performance measurement is a critical stage in the strategic management process, without perfonnance
measurement a business has no control. Developing a set of measures, or key perfonnance indicators
(KPIs), that arc easily collected, analysed and well-correlated with the strategic intent of the business is
therefore an essential output from strategic planning (Parker, 1997).
The Incorporation's performance measurement system is based on a five-year business plan developed
by Ihe CEO. The most imporlant performance indicator is $ per kg live weight. Targets are for
livestock prices to increase from the present level of95 cents to 100 cenls by 2003 with a reduction in
costs of production from 79 cents 10 50 cents. If tbese targels are achieved the margin over cosl of
production will increase from 10 cents 10 58 cents per kilogram of liveweight. Improving the efficiency
of production is a major component of the agribusiness slrategy.
"We have 10 get the cost of production under control. Improving the cost of production is a way of
measuring el"ficiency of farming. The more efficient farmer makes more money." (Gary Alexander)
The Kilogram of Iiveweighl cost and return measuring system initialed by Mangatu is linked directly to
its stralegy and it is a performance measure thaI operalional slaff can associate with in tbe day to day
running of the business. The physical performance indicators tbat underlie tbis system, such as ewe live
weighls al mating, arc easily collecled and represent factors Ihat are critical 10 tbe plan's success. The
use of a performance indicator ($/kg Iiveweight) tbat recognises Ihe imporlance of both physical and
linancial achievement is well suited to a farming based business.
Value Based Performance Measurement
Mangalu Blocks has developed a mission stalemenl that emphasises adding value to the business for the
bencfil of shareholders. The Value Based Management perfonnance measurement syslem developed
by Van Zyl and Perkins (1994) was used as a means to assess if the Incorporalion has been achieving its
mission. If thc oUlpul. Net Operating Profit after Tax (NOPAT) is greater than the cost of input,
Weighted Avcrage Cosl of Capital (WACC), real economic profit has been made and value created for
Ihe business (AVCl.
Thc business only adds value when the Economic Relurn on Capilal Employed (EcROCE) exceeds the
cosl of capilal. The cost of capital (WACC) is the composite rate of return required by providers of
various types of capilal (debt, equity and other). It should be noted that in the case of Mangatu a
proporlion of the capital employed is unclaimed dividends.
Table I Annual Value Created
1993 1994 1995 1996
NOPAT $855,400 $2,890,300 $2,322,600 $2.529.100
EeROCE 6.87% 21.88% 13.73% 14.10%
WACC 5.78% 9.48% 12.78% 5.04%
AVC $135,476 $1.638,411 $160.721 $1.625.357
The results indicatc that the business has been creating value over the analysed period. The Annual
Value Crealed demonstrates the ability of the Incorporation to create value for Ihe business for
reinvestment.
DISCUSSION
The use of strategic planning and managemenl has had a significant impacl on the Incorporation. The
study indicates thaI Ihe strategic planning techniques and processes used by Mangatu are similar to
those developed and used in mainstream business. The planning models developed in mainslream
agribusiness are increasingly being applied to the commercial questions facing Maori organisations.
co
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Clearly there arc different constraints imposed on the Maori land-based business, such as the legal
stalUs of the land. Howevcr, working past these issues in a planning process can still be done
conventionally (in terms of process and technique) and this tends to occur in practice.
Profitahility is an essential factor in the sustainability of any commercial organisation. Profit
maximisation is not necessarily always the primary goal of farm husinesses, though many of the most
successful farms achieve their non-profit goals by being profitahle (Shadholt, 1997). Mangatu Blocks
has a multitude of stakeholders with aspirations ranging from a financial return on their investment to
social and cultural issues. In order to meet these objectives the Incorporation is focusing on being
profitahle. By concentrating on generating a sustainahle financial return, the distrihution of profit can
then he decided by the owners through the committee memhers.
In Maori organisations It IS not uncommon to find owner representatives on the commiuee of
management providing advice to farm managers or carrying out other management duties. This creates
difTicullics in terms of maintaining clear lines of communication and accountability. The Incorporation
has clearly defined the role of the management staff and the Commillee of Management. The
management of Mangatu is the responsibility of the CEO and his staff, the commillee is charged with
the responsibility of governance. This relationship defines the focus of the husiness and helps to reduce
the intrusion of land ownership and related social issues.
The perli"'nanee measurement system adopted strongly affects the behaviour of people both within and
outside the organisation. Performance measures should he derived from the firm's slrategies and these
measures should be drivers of future performance. The Incorporation's mission statement would
indicate that the value based managemenl measurement system developed hy Van Zyl and Perkins
might he well suited to Mangalu. This performance measure is well correlated with the husiness
mission and focuses management on increasing the value of the investment made hy shareholders. The
value hased performance indicator provides meaningful information to the management staff and gives
shareholders a true indication of how the Incorporation has performed in a given year with regard 10 it's
stralegie intent.
Return On Investment (RO!) and shareholder dividend, arc common measures of business performance
and has traditionally been the cornerstone of performance measurement. The relevance and importance
of these measures to Mangatu Blocks is questionahle. Return on investment is a performance indicator
that can be altered in the short term through cost CUlling and mining of a firm's asset hase. This short-
tenn focus can Icad to a neglect of critical factors that determine long-term husiness success. ROI
provides minimal insight inlo how or why a particular result is achieved.
The usc of an indictor such as ROI is further complicated by the valuation of Maori land assets.
MangalU Blocks is faced with a unique situation due to the fact that its land assets (corpus land) can
never he sold. This means that the true market value of these assets can never he realised. A large
proportion of the average rate of return achieved hy farming husinesses and also much of the volatility
in farmland rates of return is due to the capilal gain component. A performance measurement technique
that is based on and includes revalued land is not as rclevant as one that excludes revaluation's and
concenl",tes instead on operating profit and the cost of capital and the ahility of the Incorporation to
add value to the business.
CONCLUSIONS
Thc performance of Maori agricultural Incorporations is often poor relative to non-Maori pastoral
hascd organisations. This indictment is often allributed to a lack of commercial orientation, the legal
status of Maori land and conmcting social and economic ohjectives.
There is no single strategic planning process model appropriate for all businesses. Strategic planning
processes reflect the nature of the organisation, and they range from very complex to very simple. The
results of the study suggest that the formal strategic planning tools and techniques used by Mangatu
Blocks arc the same as those used by other corporate bodies.
The employment of a CEO and the restructuring of the Incorporation into husiness units have facilitated
the strategy implementation process. The management of the operation by the CEO is clearly separated
from the social and cultural issues involved that are dealt with by the Commiltee of management. The
Incorporations production base of 15 farms has been combined and is run as a single unit to exploit the
economics of scale and the geographical difference of these properties. Mangatu has focused on getting
the fundamentals of the business right and has adjusted its management practices accordingly.
Processing and marketing capabilities are heing developed to fully integrate the business and achieve a
degree of price control.
Mangatu Blocks needs to develop a track record that demonstrates strategic planning bas been
successful in improving the performance of the Incorporation, where success is represented hy the
achievement of both economic and social goals. Before this track record is established no significant
conclusions can he drawn about the success of using formalised planning.
What separates successful from less successful strategic planning is a determination on the part of
management, particularly top management, to have a process that fosters creativity and improves the
financial performance of Ihe husiness.
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An Exchange Forum was conducted to obtain an industry-wide perspective on technology
adoption by New Zealand dairy farmers. Using a workshop format, participants developed
definitions for terms commonly used in relation to technology transfer, and identified factors
likely to influence the future technology needs of dairy farmers. Technologies that have or
have not been adopted by NZ dairy farmers were identified and reasons why this occurred
were suggested. Participants also proposed strategies to enhance technology adoption by dairy
farmers in the future. The implications for technology transfer in the New Zealand dairy
industry are discussed.
Keywords: technology, technology transfer, extension, adoption, dairy farms
INTRODUCTION
Learning new management practices and about new technologies is an important element in building
competitive advantage in the dairy industry. The failure of farmers to use apparently well-proven and
profitable technologies lends some, but not conclusive, evidence that their learning does not always
equip them with adequate new knowledge, understanding or skill to significantly improve their
management capabilities. This paper presents key findings from an Exchange Forum designed to
obtain a cross-sectional view of technology transfer to New Zealand dairy farmers, and in particular,
why they do or do not adopt a technology. The proposition that there is confusion in the use of
terminology associated with the subject of technology transfer was investigated. The research is part




The Exchange Forum was held on 25 and 26 June 1997. It was conducted over an evening and a full
day, and was modelled on the framework and processes used by Rauniyar and Parker (1997). The
maximum number of participants was set at 30. A list of people involved in the New Zealand dairy
sector was drawn up using the following criteria:
• the final sample had to provide cross-sector representation (ie. farm inputs, owners of large
and small properties, sharemilkers, farm managers, farmer partners, dairy company
processing, the New Zealand Dairy Board, research scientists and policy makers);
• the individuals had to have several years experience In the industry and be familiar with
industry issues;
• one third of the participants had to be farmers and their partners.
Letters were sent to selected individuals inviting their participation in the Forum. Where attendance
was not possible, the position was filled from a reserve list. Groups were formed during the
workshop sessions either to represent broad areas of similar interest (eg farmers, researchers and
academics) or to provide a cross-section of interests.
Exchange Forum Design
The specific objectives of the Forum were to collect the perceptions of a group of industry
stakeholders about:
(a) the meaning of: 'a technology'; 'technology transfer'; 'extension'; and 'adoption';
(b) factors that are likely to influence the future competitiveness of NZ dairy farms;
(c) 'technologies' that have, and those that have not been, adopted by NZ dairy farmers;
(d) reasons why these technologies have or have not, been adopted by NZ dairy farmers;
(e) strategies required to ensure the successful adoption of technologies by NZ dairy
farmers in the future.
A draft plan for the Exchange Forum identified a number of processes for obtaining data consistent
with the projects overall objectives (Stantiall & Parker, 1998). This plan was discussed and refined
by the research team members, before being pre-tested with a group (11= 19) of postgraduate students
studying farm management and extension. Teclmiques such as creating rich pictures and concept
building (Collins 1997) were adapted to the dairy industry context in order to systematically capture
information and to build concepts. The pre-test highlighted some areas for improvement, especially
in relation to involving individuals in group activities. To avoid internal bias during the Forum, and
to ensure it ran smoothly, an experienced external facilitator was hired. The team members, with the
facilitator, finalised the programme for the Forum. To help improve data capture, a workbook was
prepared with spaces for participants to write in their responses to the questions raised, and to record
their thoughts as the Forum progressed. Forum members were divided into groups for the various
tasks ego to define the terms technology, technology tranSfer, extension and adoption. Group 1
included farmers, Group 2 members from the wider industry and Group 3 the researchers and
academics. The workbook information, along with wall chart summaries of the groups' reporting
back, became the data set for the analysis of the Exchange Forum. This paper reports the results for
(a), (c) and (d) only. The full set ofresuIts are presented in Stantiall & Parker (1998).
Data analysis
The written comments from the workbook entries and text from the wall chart diagrams were typed
into a Word File. Words and phrases with similar meanings were grouped and categorised into a
Word Table. The categories were reviewed with the research team to ensure they represented the
workshop discussion. The number of mentions by participants for each category and break-out
group was recorded. Common themes from the session were identified and conceptual models were
developed to describe processes of technology adoption by dairy farmers as seen by the forum
participants. All Forum participants reviewed the draft report for accuracy and completeness.





Reaching a consensus on terminology
A Technology
The simplest definition provided for "technology" was an idea or concept. The largest number of
responses (22) indicated that "technology" could be applied to a system to bring about improvement
or change, or to achieve a goal or purpose. Many of the other comments elaborated in some way on
"an idea" (eg. a method of getting the job done/process/technique; can be physical or non-physical).
"Technology" was also seen as information. knowledge. skills and a tool (to be used to achieve a
goal). There was a high level of agreement on the definition of "technology" amongst those
representing various sectors of the industry.
Technology Transfer
"Technology transfer" was most commonly identified as "the transfer of information!
Ideas/technology from one person or group to another". According to the participants, the purpose of
"technology transfer" ranged from "creating awareness" to "building understanding/capacity" to
"accepting and applying an idea". Words substituted for "transfer" included: getting across; making
available; passing; moving; disseminating; conveying; communicating; exchanging; enabling a flow;
selling of; teaching of; creating awareness; and enabling. The farmer group (Group 1) defined
technology transfer as "the passing-on of ideas (information) in order to raise the level of awareness
and understanding so that individuals could choose whether or not to successfully use the ideas to
realise perceived benefits". Members of Groups 2 ('industry' group) and 3 (researchers &
academics) defined technology transfer as "the passing of technology from X to Y".
Extension
of a technology or practice"; whereas Group 2 ('Industry' group) defined it as "the taking up and
application of a technology with the expectation of achieving a desired result". The researchers &
academics (Group 3) did not produce a written definition.
Technologies "widely adojlted" by dairy farmers
In order to understand why particular technologies were or were not adopted by dairy farmers,
participants were first asked to identify, from their experience, technologies (based on the Session I
definitions) that fell into these two categories. The extensive list provided a basis for subsequently
selecting example technologies for more in-depth analysis of why they hadlhad not been adopted.
The technologies mentioned most frequently as being widely adopted by dairy farmers were:
machinery (e.g. four wheel fann bikes). modern milking plant, AI, animal health remedies, grazing
management (especially rotational grazing), CIDRS, supplementary feeding, fertiliser inputs, new
pasture species, soil testing and herd testing. Generally, the Items with the greatest number of
mentions were observable, discrete technologies such as farm machinery and fertiliser. Management
technologies for planning and monitoring (eg. financial budgeting, business planning, total quality
management (TQM» were mentioned, but not as frequently, apart from soil testing and herd testing.
The greatest variety of adopted technologies was generated by the group of fanners with large dairy
units. Items mentioned more often by the farmers with larger herds than the other groups were
CIDRS, supplementary feeding and herd testing.
Technologies "not widely adopted" by dairy farmers
Technologies most frequently mentioned as NOT being widely adopted by dairy farmers were:
embryo transplants, new pasture species, business planning techniques, computer use/skills and
monitoring systems. Some items (eg. new pasture species) appeared on both lists, hence different
perceptions are held within the industry about the level of adoption of some technologies.
Classification of technologies
Technologies that hadlhad not been widely adopted were classified into the following categories:
independent, sequential and simultaneous (Table I).
Table 1. Selected technologies categorised by complexity relative to a dairy farm system that
havelhave not been adopted by farmers. (* Indicates technologies studied in relation to Table 2)
A greater range of concepts was identified with the term "extension" than "technology transfer".
"Extension" included the concept of "technology transfer" as well as: human resource
development/building knowledgelhelping others learn; the trialing of ideas. especially in the farmer's
own environment; encouraging adoption or inducing voluntary change; and raising awareness levels.
Some of the definitions of extension also incorporated solVing problems/improving one's situation.
Only one participant commented on the role of extension in helping to solve community problems
(eg. local issues such as catchment, pest, access, or similar concerns); all others focused on the
individual farmer. Group I memhers (mainly farmers) defined "extension" as "the passing on of an
idea"; whereas Group 2 ('industry' group) defined it as "the process for creating awareness about
the benefits of the technology for the user"; and Group 3 (mainly researchers & academics) defined it
as "a process for developing a client's understanding about a practice or technology".
Adoption
The most common definition provided for the term "adoption" was to lise a technology or an idea.
Alternative expressions included: incorporate/integrate; uptake/pick-up; implement; apply; action;
acceptance; and 'buying' the idea/technology. In most instances, the words were used in the context
of something being used for the first time. A numher of qualifications or elaborations were used in
relation to the term "adoption": Integrating technology or ideas into existing systems; implementing
and modifying (a practice/technology/system) to achieve a result; a process of deciding, using and
tilen integrating; using technology successfully for self-improvement; using technology If it is
beneficial; beginning to use a technology rather than the on-going use of technology; using
technology effectively in part or full; using technology in a practical sense; and, if the technology
works, "keep on doing it". Group I members (mainly farmers) defined "adoption" as "continued use
Cate~orv I Adopted:
'Independent' Technologies Mineral supplements,
e.g. magnesium. zinc















Catel!orv 1 AdoDted: NOT adopted:
'SeqllentiaI' Technologies Electric fencing * Live weight monitoring*
Artificial insemination (AI) Environmental monitoring
Tail painting Feed analysis *
Herd testing Ration balancing




'SimultaneOlls' Basic feed management Business management techniques *
Technologies
Rotational grazing * Use of computer modeling
Feed budgeting Farm monitoring *





1 The categories proVide a broad measure of the degree of difficulty in introducing the technology
to the farming system. Independent technologies can essentially be introduced without prClieding or
associated steps; sequential technologies require particular preceding technologies to be adopted;
simultaneous technologies require the adoption of a bundle (or package) of technologies all at once.
Factors influencing the adoDtion/non adoption of technology
Participants .in each of the three groups identified factors influencing the adoption/non-adoption of a
subset of the technologies listed in Table I (marked *). Clear benefits arising from the use of a
technology were highly and consistently rated as the main causal factor in its adoption (Table 2).
Benefits could arise from the saving of time and increased satisfaction and convenience, as well as
increased financial returns (or decreased costs). On the other hand, non-adopted technologies were
secn as providing no economic benefit. They were also perceived to increase "hassles", to lack
reliability and to be intimidating. Marketing was seen as a factor that could "sell" a technology, even
if the benefits were not clear, ego 4-wheel farm bikes.
Table 2. Reasons for the adoption/non-adoption of a technology by dairy farmers.
AdoDtion of a technolol!Y NON-adoption of a technolol!v
I. Clearly identifiable benefits I. No immediate, direct, perceived benefits; perceived
disadvantages; no value; no needlnot important
2. Cheap/affordable/perceived cost 2. Costs money
savings
3. Saves time/convenient 3. Requires too much time or hassle
4. Simple/easy to adopt/use 4. Complex Icomplicated/difficult to fit into system need
facilities not understood;
5. It works/practicaVfit for purpose 5. Does not solve problem, not reliable/system not fully
developed
6. Peer pressure/aeceptable 6. May create perception of poor management
/leisure/pleasure (pride)
7. Multi-purpose/flexible 7. Alternatives available (substitute technologies or
Dractices)
Adovtion of a technolol!y NON-adoption of a technolol!Y
8. ControVrisk management safety 8. Not natural
9. Well marketed 9. Poorly marketed, hasn't been promoted as a single
package, wrong target; lack of right product!
relevance
10. Generates satisfaction 10. Intimidating/challenges or erodes confidence
II. Builds asset value II. Lack of training, esoteric; can't visualise; learning
ethos; requires bookwork; time (excuse)
12. Industry benefit/requirements (eg. 12. Timing relative to needlavailability;
milk quality) venue/environment; delivery by wrong people; not on
their ground; not personally invited to training
ovportunities.
From discussion, a list of questions was developed that need to be answered from a farmer's
perspective when considering a 'new' technology for their system:
• Will the technology improve profit (or save a non-cash cost like farmer's time)?
• What is the risk that the technology will not work, and how would this impact business
Viability?
• How will the technology affect job satisfaction, motivation, pride, peer judgement
and reaction?
• Is there a cash/capital cost, and how affordable is the technology (ie. benefits relative to
costs)?
• Will the technology contribute positively to health and safety?
• Is the technology required to meet a legislative requirement?
• Can the technology improve confidence?
• Is information about the technology clear and consistent?
Strategies to improve the adoution of technology
Some strategies to improve the adoption of technology were identified by the Forum. These included:
cost effectiveness, simplicity of use, matching the technology to a clearly identified farmer needs and,
effective promotion and marketing. These were seen to be key elements in successful adoption of
technology by farmers. Farmers who are viewed by their peers to be in the "top 10%" were identified
as important facilitators of technology adoption. "Top" farmers were regarded to be leaders,




Our efforts to clarify some of the key words used in relation to technology transfer highlighted a
diversity of views on their meaning amongst stakeholders in the dairy industry. ThIs confirms the
researchers' views that industry personnel often ascribe different meanings to the same word Not
surprisingly, this gives rise to confusion, especially in regard to the evaluation of the success of
extension in relation to technology adoption. For the purpose of this Forum, the term 'technology'
was defined as: "An idea thaI can be applied to a syslem 10 achieve a defined purpose. ..
en
-...J
A definition for 'a technology' in the context of pastoral agriculture does not appear to have been
reported in the literature, despite its widespread use in science-related publications. The terms 'new
technology' or 'innovation' are often used interchangeably and it is not possible to distinguish
whether they refer to some physical item or to any (new) idea. In CARR (1993, p. I) technology is
used synonymously with knowledge, and is defined as "a commodity to be transferred from research
institutions to graziers ...".
The Exchange Forum participants defined technology transfer as: "The (process of) passing ideas
from those who have them to those who are interested so they become aware of. or beller
understand them, and as a consequence are in a beller position to decide whether or not adoption
is appropriate or if further investigation is required." This is in contrast to the Iilerature which
often does not distinguish between technology transfer and extension (eg. some MORST
publications, World Bank literature ego Purcell & Anderson 1997). The Exchange Forum
participants, however, saw technology transfer as a relatively simple concept coneerned with the
transfer of information. In contrast, extension has a "richer" meaning as summarised in Figure I.









Extension is a process (or several processes) that includes
technology transfer PLUS elements of: developing an awareness and understanding;
trial; and encouraging adoption/change to bring about improvement.
There is no agreed definition of extension in the literature, although those developed between the
early 19608 and the late I980s have similar elements (helping farmers aehieve their goals; education;
improving levels of produetion and standards of living). At the 1962 Australian Agricultural
Extension Conference, agricultural extension was defined as "a service or syslem which assists the
rural people, through educational procedures, in improving farming methods and techniques,
increasing production efficiency and income, bettering their levels of living, and lifting the social and
educational standards of rural life." (Penders et al. 1963: p. 359). Roling (1988) analysed the role of
extension in depth and identified two contradictory aspects of extension: "\. It is an instrument of
pre-meditated, deliberate intervention to achieve the intervener's goals, 2. Which can only be
effective by inducing voluntary change and hence satisfying client goals" (p. 39). He went on to
develop the following definition: "A professional eommunication intervention deployed by an
institution to induce voluntary behaviours with a presumed public or collective utility" (p. 49).
Vanclay and Lawrence (1995) saw extension as having three major theoretieal bases: transfer 01
technology, poliey instrument and agricultural knowledge and information systems approaehes. Thel
built on Roling's definition in terms of its use as a poliey instrument, and censured others fOi
omitting this aspect from their definitions. More recent definitions of extension have tended to fOCUl
at the community level. For example the Australian Rural Industries and Development CorporatiOl
(RIRDC) defined extension as "The use of communication processes to identify and assist change II
primary industries" (RIRDC 1997: p. I); and Allen et al. (1998) defined the role of extension in till
context of solving community problems as "to provide the understanding, forums, processes alX
learning opportunities to help address the - often apparently conilicting - goals of management (01
communities, policy makers and other Interest groups)".
The concepts provided by the Exchange Forum participants included the positive aspects 01
extension as awareness, education, trial and adoption of technologies. They did not identify aspectl
of institutional or scientific agendas "forcing" change upon farmers (e.g. as suggested by McRae e,
al. 1993), nor its use as a policy instrument, nor was a commUnity-level role identified (apart fron
one comment).
Adoption was defined by the Forum members as "The taking up. and application of. a technolog]
(idea) with the expectation of achieving a desired result". (This does not necessarily imply that till
idea or technology will continue to be used unaltered). This differs from the view of Rogers &
Shoemaker (1971) who defined adoption as being the decision to make full use of a new idea as till
best course of action whereas rejection is a decision not to adopt an innovation. They also defille(
discontinuance as being the adoption of an innovation followed by rejection. With respect to till
latter, initial adoption of a technology by farmers may be very high, but its on-going use may be verJ
low (ie. the technology failed to meet expectations, or becomes redundant because of nev
developmenls or because "better" substitute products become aVailable). Thus, initial uptake of l
new technology may not necessarily indicate Its economie value to the farming community. This ii
well illustrated in the sheep industry by cover comb shearing technology: protection of sheep fron
inclement weather after fleece removal, while highly valuable (the internal rate of return on researcl
investment exceeds 1000%), is likely to be less important than the use of the technology tl
manipulate lamb birth weight and hence survival (Dooley et al. 1997, Hussain et al. 1997).
Factors iniluencing adoption/non ado,ption of technologies by dairy farmerS
No single factor was identified as being the "reason" for adopting a technology. Rather, till
perceived overall benefits (financial and other issues such as initial cost, time requirements, degree 0
simplicity, peer pressure, flexibility, risk management and control, and personal satisfaction) al
contributed to technology adoption. These elements also provide a checldist for those considering till
promotion of a technology, and the need to look at appropriate pre-requisites and methods to achievl
its widespread adoption. Frank (1995) established that peer pressure was an important precipitant 0
technology adoption by North Queensland cattle farmers. It was also frequently mentioned by till
farmer members of the forum.
In a different context Dobbin (1994) investigated factors affecting the adoption of ISO 9000. Ht
categorised the reasons for adoption into: "have to" (eg. customers want it); "need to" (eg. the~
for market credibility); and "want to" (eg. the general desire to improve). Reasons for not adoptinl
ISO 9000 included "did not know enough about it"; "the costs of implementation outweighed till
perceived benefits"; and "standards are already high". The essence of these reasons are reflected il
the eomments of the Exchange Forum participants in relation to the adoption of technologies b~
dairy farmers. "Culture" was identified as a major factor iniluencing the adoption of ISO 9000. Pee
pressure is a proxy for culture in dairying, and indieates the importance of social context whel
considering ehanges to a farming system.
(X)
(X)
Strategies to improve the adoption of technology
1be Forum farmers emphasised the vital importance of correctly targeting and packaging a new
technology, and of obtaining the support of Widely respected and leading farmers at an early stage of
the programme. Other researchers have identified the important influence of 'leading, respected'
farmers in technology adoption (Brazendale et al. 1994). The structure and co-operative ownership
of the New Zealand. dairy industry appears to encourage the willing sharing of innovations and
experience between farmers, presumably because farmers supplying the same milk company receive
the same average price for their milk. irrespective of the level of production. Helping a neighbour to
increase production therefore does not compromise the 'sharer's' income. lllis is not the case for
other livestock industries where pecuniary advantage can be eroded through the over-supply of a
market opportunity.
In developing technology transfer strategies. it is important to appreciate that farmer goals and
farming systems can be quite different, hence across-the-board, industry-wide adoption of a new
technology is often unrealistic. Instead, establishing selected target groups that allow focused
technology development is a well accepted strategy in agricultural R&D and extension (eg. Roling
1988). Technology adoption should be measured relative to this target group, and their goals. Even
with relatively homogeneous farmer groups, adoption will not happen simultaneously. To accelerate
the adoption process it might be useful to work closely during the design stages with farmers who
have an expressed interest in the development of a technology. Because social acceptance of new
technology appears to play an important role in dairy farming communities, it might pay to get
"opinion leaders" involved in the diffusion of new ideas to the wider farming community.
SUMMARY
A one-and-a-half day Exchange Forum involving stakeholders representative of the New Zealand
dairy production sector was held in June 1997. The Forum showed that the actors in the dairy
industry subscribe different meanings to shared terms like "technology" and "adoption" and that they
use terms such as "technology transfer" and "adoption" interchangeably. lllis appears to cause
confusion amongst the funders, providers and users of technology and, probably contributes to
misconceptions about the level of technology adoption relative to the population of dairy farmers
rather than specific target groups. To rectify this situation use of consistent definitions of technology
such as those presented in this report is recommended.
Emphasising the economic benefit of a technology. whether it be through direct changes in net
income, labour saving, or the reduction of stress, was identified as a primary factor in obtaining a
high level of technology adoption. "Proper" markeling of the technology and the endorsement and
involvement of leading farmers in technology transfer aclivilies were other factors associated with
successful technology adoption. Conversely, technologies that are perceived to be complex, Iime-
consuming, require extra bookwork or whose release is poorly limed relative to their on-farm
applicalion, are likely not to be adopted. 1be assumption has been made that "good" outcomes will
be achieved when farmers adopt technology quickly and efficiently. Although data from the Forum
give us some ideas which technologies are/are not widely adopted, and some factors or reasons why;
we still have very little understanding of the process of how technology adoption 'happens'. Further
work is required to study the facilitation, technology transfer and learning processes and how these
impact on technology adoption.
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ABSTRACT
A rapid diagnostic socioeconomic survey of 200 sheep farmers in Nepal was conducted in
1996. All four ecological regions of Nepal (Trans-Himalya, Mountains, Hills and Terai), each
with a distinct local sheep breed, were represented. The survey was designed to: (a) quantify
farm and household characteristics of sheep farmers, (b) evaluate farmer access to, and the
effectiveness of livestock services in sheep farming areas, and (c) examine regional constraints
to improving sheep productivity and profitability. Six major constraints were identified: (a)
poor performance of local sheep breeds, (b) a serious seasonal deficit of pasture and other
feed, (c) the lack of an organised market for wool and meat, (d) poor access to agricultural
credit, (e) primitive shearing equipment, and (I) an inadequate supply of drinking water for
sheep. Strategies to assist farmers develop their sheep management skilIs, as welI as to proVide
improved technology adapted to local conditions to address constraints are now required.
Keywords: sheep farming, production, breeding, household characteristics.
INTRODUCTON
Sheep and wool production plays an important role in the Nepalese economy. Sheep are
integral to the subsistence life of rural people; they provide a primary source of clothing and
cash earnings, meat as a source of protein and manure for maintaining soil fertility. Official
statistics indicates that Nepal has 0.6 to 0.9 million sheep, largely concentrated in the Mid-
Western and Far-Western Development Regions (CBS, 1996). These sheep farming regions
have relatively poor infrastructure (including roads) and are mostly isolated from major market
centres. Sheep flock size ranges from I to 400 head and their management varies from
migratory to sedentary. Most sheep are reported to be of one of the native breeds: Bhyanglung
in the Trans-Himalaya, Baruwal in the Mountains, Kage in the Hills and Lampuchhre in the
Terai region. By international standards, productiVity per sheep is very low, both in terms of
body weight and wool production.
The Nepalese govermnent and policy makers are seeking ways to revitalise sheep farming.
Nepal produces some of the finest quality hand-knotted woollen carpets in the world. The
Industry has grown with the influx of refugees escaping the Chinese occupation of Tibet. It has
expanded rapIdly since the 1960s and is now the single largest export earner, contributing more
than 50% of total exports. At present the industry relies heavily on imported New zealand and
Tibetan wool, approximately 80% and 20%, respectively, to meet export demand for woollen
products. Very lillie domesticalIy produced wool is used by carpet manufacturers because it
does not meet blend requirements. The Tibetan supply of wool has been quite erratic over the
past five years and is dependent on a subsidised quota from the Chinese govermnent. The
Nepalese industry would encounter a major setback if this wool is not available on time.
Nep~lese farmers are therefore being encouraged to improve the management of local sheep so
that they produce wool of suitable volume and quality for carpet manufacturing.
Apre-requisite to the preparation of a Govermnent strategy to improve sheep and wool
production is to obtain reliable data on: current farm and household characteristics of sheep
farmers, the effectiveness of livestock services In sheep farming areas, and regional constraints
to sheep farm development. Such information has not been documented except some anecdotal
observations. This paper presents the results of a 1996 survey to assess the status of sheep
farming in the major sheep producing regions of Nepal. The findings from this survey is
expected to provide a more focussed programme planning by the goverrunent in developing
sheep and wool industry in Nepal.
SURVEY METHOD
First, available statistics on sheep farming in Nepal were colIected and reviewed (ADB 1993,
CBS 1996). 'Brain-storming' sessions were then held with scientists from the Nepal
Agricultural Research Centre (NARC) and the Department of Livestock Services (DLS) to
identify major gaps in the data set. A personal interview survey instrument, based on a
participatory framework, was designed to collect these missing data from sheep farmers. This
was pre-tested with five farmers and revised before farmer interviews were conducted The
field survey team consisted of three local experts: an animal scientist, a pasture scientist
(NARC) and a district level livestock extension officer (DLS).
Each district headquarter for the DLS was visited and, in consultation with the district
Livestock Services Officer (LSO) and field staff, a list was prepared of Village Development
Comrnillees (VDCs) where sheep are a major agricultural activity. The VDCs were ranked
according to their estimated number of sheep and those with the greatest populations were
selected for further study. The survey covered one VDC each in the Mustang and Kaski
districts, two VDCs in Jumla, and three VDCs in Banke. In each district, a sample was
selected randomly from a list of sheep farmers held by the LSOs. Unfavourable weather, along
with time and resource constraints, limited the sample size to 200 sheep farmers. They were
interviewed between mid-January and mid-March 1996.
Interviews were conducted with farmers at a time and location that was convenient for them.
Farmers were interviewd at their homestead, at the DLS district or area level offices or at local
markets. Most interviews were conducted during the 'lean' period of the day (evenings or
during lunch hours). Farmers actively participated in the survey and provided their best
approximation of their circumstances. Since farmers do not keep official farm records,
responses were based on their recolIection of events. The farmers' responses reflect a single
cross-sectional view of their status at the time of interview.
Completed questionnaires were reviewed each evening by the interviewers and where possible.
discrepancies were resolved and answers checked for accuracy. Edited questionnaires were
brought to Massey University for data analysis, based primarily on descriptive statistics, using
the SAS package.
FARM HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Sheep farming was the primary occupation of alI respondents, but their secondary occupation
was location specific being largely dominated by smalI business (Mustang), herb colIection
(Jumla) and other farm work (Kaski and Banke). The overalI literacy rate (20%) for the
survey sample was substantialIy below the national level (35%). On average, children (under
15 year of age) accounted for 44% of the household members and slightly more than two-fifths
of them were in school (Table 1). Proportionately more boys attended school (26%) than girls
(16%), especialIy in Jumla and Mustang. An average farmer was 45 years old (Table I). The
youngest farmers were from Mustang were the harsh winter climate requires relatively young
household members to take care of sheep. The variation in farmer age was smaller in sheep
farming areas (CV=27%) than in the other farming districts in Nepal.
'Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
FARM CHARACTERISTICS
An average sheep farm household size was 1.5 times larger than the average national farm
household (8.6 vs. 5.6 members, Table I). The Mustang district had the smallest household
si7-c (5.8 members), while households in Banke were the largest (10.1 members). Overall,
economically active household members (15-59 years old) accounted for slightly more than half
of the household. This reflected the fact that each member of the household was required to
support an additional member of the household. Nearly 94% of the adult members in a
household were economically active. The dependency ratio (defined as the total household
members divided by the household members in the IS-59 year age range) was greatest in
Mustang and least in Banke.
More than 90% of the sheep farm households had at least one member engaged in full-time
sheep farming and 43% of the households had at least one further member engaged in part-time
sheep farming (Table I). Part-time employment in sheep farming was most prevalent in Banke
and lumia, due to their proximity to commercial centres and the aVailability of transport, and
least prevalent in Mustang and Kaski. On average, 1.2 household members were employed
full-time and 0.8 members were employed part-time in sheep farming.
Three-fourths of the sheep farmers had made no change to their farming practices since 1991.
One in seven farmers had fewer sheep in 1996 compared to 1991. However, sheep were a
relatively new livestock entity on many farms in lumIa. All farmers produced some quantity of
cereal; this was largely driven by the subsistence nature of agricultural production. In this
respect, cereal production helped to ensure a household's food supply. lumIa and Mustang
sheep farmers did not plant rice (Table 2).
The average land holding area varied across the four districts (Table 2). An average farm was
smaller in the Trans-Himalayan region (0.35 ha in Mustang) and larger in the Terai (1.65 ha in
the Banke district). Nearly 95% of the farm area was cultivated, but only 13% of the farmers
had access to irrigation. Paddy was the dominant crop in Banke (90% of the land area).
Three per cent (or less) farmers were landless in Mustang and Banke. Half of the respondents
had a farm area of 0.5 ha or less, 22% of them had a farm area of hetween 0.5 and 1.0 ha and
only 27% had farms larger than 1.0 ha. The last group was most prevalent in Banke. Most
(87% and 74% ,respectively) farms in the Trans-Himalayan range (Mustang) and The
Mountain region (JumIa) were 0.5 ha or smaller (Table 3).
District Overall
Characteristic Mustang Jumla Kaski Banke n=200
n=36 n=72 n=36 n=56
Mean age of respondent 38 45 51 46 45.4 (\2.4)'
Family members (No.)
·
Total male 2.9 4.9 3.7 5.3 4.4 (1.9)
-
Total female 2.9 4.9 3.1 4.8 4.2 (1.8)
-
Male (15·59) 1.2 2.6 1.9 3.2 2.4 (1.4)
-
Female (15-59) 1.2 2.7 1.4 2.9 2.2 (1.4)
Family members eating from
the same kitchen (No.)
·
Adult 3.8 5.5 3.1 6.1 4.9 (2.6)
- Children 2.1 4.4 3.6 4.1 3.8 (2.0)
Households with at least one
member engaged in sheep
farming (%)
-
Full-time 94 96 97 85 92
Part-time 13 54 6 69 43
Household members engaged
In sheep farming (No.)
-
FUll-time 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.2 (0.7)
- Part-time 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.8 (0.5)
Children in school (No.)
- Male 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.0(0.8)
·
Female 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.6 (0.7)
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
2. Paddy is also planted under rainfed conditions in many cases.
Livestock ownership was not limited to sheep: a variety of other animals specWs were farmed
depending upon the agro-ecological environment. Rams were also used as pack animals in the
Trans-Himalayan and Mountain ranges, but only for breeding purposes in the lower altitude
areas (the Hills and Terai). The average flock size was larger in Mustang, Banke and lumIa
(31, 37 and 48 sheep, respectively), than in Kaski (18). The live lamb to ewe ratio was
between 60 and 65%, with a small variation in this performance parameter across districts.
Most lambs were from single births. The ratio of ewes to a ram varied significantly across the
four districts (0.38 in Mustang, 6.8 in lumia, 11.4 in Kaski and 15.9 in Banke). The 1996
situation reflected more or less a normal year for the farmers. except for a better lambing
season.
Land area (ha) District Overall
Mustang Jnmla Kaski Banke 0=200n=36 n=72 n=36 n=56
A. Total land owned 0.35 0.44 0.74 1.65 0.82 (0.76)1
B. Total land cultivated 0.32 0.40 0.71 1.61 0.78 (0.76)
C. Total irrigated area 0.11 0.06 0.21 0.18 0.11 (0.20)
D. Area under paddy
- - 0.20 1.49 0.46 (0.79)
E. Upland area 0.16 0.28 0.45 1.13 0.53 (0.66)
F. Uncultivated shrubland 0.01 0.02 0.05
-
0.02 (0.05)
Land ownership and land use activities of sheep farmers (1996).Table 2:




Farming area class District Overall
Mustang Jumla Kaski Banke
n=178
n=31 n=65 n=30 n=52
A. Landless 3 - - 2 I
B. Up to 0.5 ha 84 74 40 6 50
C. 0.5 to 1.0 ha 13 23 37 17 22
D. More than 1.0 ha 3 23 75 27
Farms with shrubland 11 32 47 - 22
Table 3: Distribution of farming households by area cultivated (1996).
SHEEP FARM MANAGEMENT
Sources of breeding rams and ewes in Nepal
Three major sources of breeding ewes and rams were identified: own, government farms and
neighbours or friends. Most farmers in Mustang and Jumia and all of the farmers in Banke
used their own ewes. All but one farmer in Kaski sourced breeding ewes from the Government
farm in Pokhara. Sheep farming in Kaski, especially following the introduction of cross-bred
sheep from the Goverrunent farm by livestock extension staff, was popular. Almost all farmers
(97%) primarily used their own rams, with the exception of Jumia farmers. Only 3-4% of the
farmers in Mustang and Jumia sourced rams from their neighbours and friends. However, one-
third of the Jumia farmers and one Kaski farmer purchased rams occasionally from the
Goverrunent farms.
The results for ram and ewe selection, in conjunction with the small flock size, indicate that in-
breeding is likely to prevail in many of the sheep flocks. Externally sourced rams and ewes
were either inaccessible or the livestock extension service in sheep management was
inadequate, to inform farmers how they could expand and utilise the local sheep genotypes
effectively. Although farmers were using physical characteristics to select ewes and rams, the
productivity of sheep remains very low due to the low genetic potential of local breeds,
inbreeding and inadequate nutrition.
co
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Sheep selection criteria used by farmers
The sheep selection criteria adopted by farmers varied Widely across the four survey districts.
This was largely determined by tradition and local market demand. Sixteen traits influenced
ram selection for breeding. Farmers in Mustang (Bhyanglung breed) preferred heavier wool
production (92%), a large body size (47%), strong legs/feet (31 %) and a white fleece colour
(19%). These traits were consistent with the premium paid for the Bhyanglung wooi produced
in Mustang, which is identical to the Tibetan wool used in carpet manufacturing in Nepal. The
Jumia farmers (Baruwal breed), on the other hand, preferred rams with a large body size
(85%), black colour (65%) and big horns (42%). The preference of these farmers was guided
by the utilisation of Baruwal wool in local rugs (radi, pakhi) and other woollen items. All of
the Kaski farmers (Kage breed) used big horns, white colour and a clean face as criteria for
selecting rams. Farmers in the Banke district indicated that their selection decisions were
guided by more wool (100%), large body size (68%), good health (36%) and white fleece
colour (25%). Eleven of the 16 traits associated with ram selection were statistically
significant (P<0.05) across the four districts, which suggests that the criteria were location
(district) specific.
Eleven traits were specified by the farmers from the four districts for selecting ewes; these
traits varied considerably across the districts. The Mustang farmers used four traits: good
'milker' (36%), white colour (22%), strong body (6%) and good wool production (3%). The
Jumia farmers preferred good wool production (49%) and good milking ability (36%). White
colour (100%) and high milk yields (97%) were the preferred criteria for farmers in Kaski.
The Banke farmers adopted a combination of traits: good milk yields (48%), large body size
(45%), good wool production (25%), good health (16%) and white colour (13%). Other traits
mentioned by farmers included: a 'strong' body (constitution or structure: Banke), black
colour, white colour, fast growth, large headlbig horns and frequent lambing (JumIa). Five of
the eleven traits (good wool production, good milker, white colour, large body and good health)
wer~ statistically significant (P<O.OI), indicating a strong association between selection traits
and geographical location (district).
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Sheep breed structure and flock characteristics
All sheep farming households in Mustang and Banke utilised only local breeds: Bhyanglung
and Lampuchhre, respectively. All Kaski and 46% of the Jumia farmers had one or more
cross-bred sheep (25% or less) on their farms. Due to some degree of cross-breeding all
farmers in Kaski identified themselves as having mostly improved breeds. Improved breeds
comprised 8% and 95% of flock in Jumia and Kaski, respectively.
The age of ewes at first mating was nearly 20 months on average and there was relatively lillie
variation across farms in this flock performance parameter (CV=20%). The lambing
percentage was somewhat higher for the improved breeds in the Jumia and Kaski districts, but
the difference was not statistically significant. This presumably reflects the very low level of
cross-breeding, as well as a lack of knowledge on the part of farmers concerning sheep
breeding policies, and inadequate sheep nutrition.
The survival rate after lambing was claimed to be 93-96%: this was statistically similar for
both locai and improved breeds. However, in the first four months after lambing the survival
rate was higher in local than improved breeds (78% vs. 71%). The high mortality oflambs in
the first four months was a major concern for most of the sheep farmers. The reasons for high
post-natal mortality, however, are multi-foid and include exposure to poisonous plants, lack of
adequate feed and fodder, and inadequate allention to sheep health.
Forty-two percent of the farmers in Jumia had Polwarth x Baruwal cross, while only 4% had
Merino x Baruwal halfbreeds. All farmers in Kaski had Border LeicesterlPolwarth x Kage
crosses. The introduction of exotic breeds to Nepal, to date, has been very much on an ad hoc
basis. Live sheep have been introduced from Australia, UK and New Zealand. The status of
individual cross-breds at the farm level and their genetic composition is largely unknown
because of the level of inbreeding even in cross-bred flocks.
Shecp nutrition
Sheep grazing in the Trans-Himalayan range (Mustang) and the Mountain (JumIa) is based on
a migratory system, while in the Hills (Kaski) it is largely centred on a sedentary system. In
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the Terai region (Banke), sheep are raised by specific ethnic groups and are grazed along the
roadside and on fallow crop fields. For the purpose of this study, sheep grazing in Terai was
defined as a 'migratory' system, because sheep are grazed as and where grass is available.
most prevalent diseases in the Trans-Himalayan range (Mustang). Diarrhoea (69%),
pneumonia (58%), foot abscesses (56%), sheep pox (35%), foot and mouth disease (FMD)
(13%) and foot rot (13%) were reported by the respondents
Table 4: Months of severe feed shortage and pasture/supplement aVailability for sheep.
Charact~ristks
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Access to public grazing land has either remained unchanged or deteriorated since 1991. The
deterioration in the availability of public grazing was most pronounced in Mustang where 97%
of the farmers reported reduced access to rangeland. About one-third of farmers in the three
other districts also shared similar views. Access to public forests was increasingly difficult
because of the implementation of community forestry and other land management programmes.
Sheep farmers had no say in any land management decisions. Over-stocking and dry monsoon
seasons were cited as the main reasons for deterioration in access to public rangeland in
Mustang, while cultivation pressure on marginal lands and over-stocking of callie and small
ruminants were primary problems associated with access to common graZing land in JumIa,
Kaski and Banke (Table 4).
In Mustang sheep graze on rangeland and have some access to fallow crop fields. In JumIa,
depending on the seasonal availability of pasture rangeland, forests and crop fields comprised
the major source of feed tor sheep nutrition. Kaski and Banke farmers, on the other hand,
relied exclusively on access to public forests/grazing land and fallow crop fields. A handful of
farmers in JumIa also depended to some extent on a small area of forage crops that had becn
established on private farms for sheep feed. No recent tangible efforts to develop pasture and
rangeland in the survey districts was evident.
co
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Farmers faced a serious feed shortage during March to May in Mustang; March to May in
JumIa; April and May in Kaski; and January to March in Banke (Table 4). Harsh winter
weather and associated poor pasture growth, in conjunction with problems with rangeland and
pasture management. were responsible for feed shortages in Mustang and JumIa, while
unavailability of fallow land and restrictions on grazing in forests contributed to the feed
shortages in the Kaski and Banke districts.
c. Dry monsooo.
O. Bush removal for fuel wood
Typn or pasture and fodder lIftS _nilahle
A. Pangeha. Ramcha, Gyatunga
D, Populus









Use of feed SUPPlements E. Q. .semi-ctupofolia, Sali x sp. Kude
Almost all of the sheep farmers in JumIa and Kaski and one-third of the sheep farmers in
Mustang used feed supplements for their flock (Table 4). Feed supplements were primarily
used at the peak of the winter feed deficit experienced in the respective regions. Farmers
obtained hay from communal grazing land, bond/terrace rises and privately owned or cultivated
land. Use of private land for this purpose was relatively more common in Mustang than in
JumIa.
A combination of grazing in forests, collection of leaves and twigs from fodder trees (JumIa,
Kaski and Banke) and hay feeding (JumIa and Mustang) was commonly adopted by most
farmers to meet sheep feed requirements in all but the JumIa district. Lack of pasture
management skills and poor coordination of feed demand and supply were the primary reasons
for SUb-standard feed management on most of the sheep farms.
F. Chhatro. Dhazbi. San. Muse kuar


































Diseases and parasites on sheep farms
sotU"Ceorhar I n=31
A. Conunlmalland 23




The prevalence of sheep diseases and parasites in Nepal varied with the geographical location
of farms and the surrounding agro-ecological conditions. Nearly two-thirds of the farmers
reported pneumonia and more than half of the farmers indicated the occurrence of diarrhoea in
their sheep. Pneumonia (56%), diarrhoea (33%) and food rot (22%) were reported to be the
c. Private land/own. cultivated land/own pasture I 39
'Note: a. denotes a value of less than 0.5.
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~in the Mountain region (Jurnla). Almost all of the farmers in the Hills (Kaski) experienced
problems with pneumonia and foot rot. Similarly, diarrhoea (80%), pneumonia (59%), foot rot
(23%) and mouth rot (21 %)were considered to be the major sheep diseases in the Terai
(Banke). Other less problematic diseases mentioned by some of the farmers were dysentery in
Mustang; hayfever and unidentified 6 month disease in Jumla; and brisket rot, rumnang, warts
and eczema in Banke.
Liver /luke was the major parasite problem of sheep in all districts: Jumla (99%), Banke (98%)
and Mustang (78%). The presence of mange mites was cited by two-thirds of the farmers in all
but the Kaski districts. Round worm, lice and tick were endemic in Mustang. The prevalence
of lice and tick was associated with the once the yearly shearing policy adopted by farmers in
the Trans-Himalayan region. Other sheep parasites encountered by the respondents were tape
worm in Jumla and Banke, round worm in the other districts. and lice and ticks in Banke.
Most of the farmers in the more accessihle regions (for example. Kaski and Banke) and only
half of the farmers in the Mountain region (Jumla) had treated their sheep with veterinary
medicines (Table 5). Only one of the 36 farmers from the Trans-Himalayan region used
veterinary medicine. Interestingly, 31 % of the farmers in the Mountain region (Jumla) used
cannabis sativa to treat sheep diseases. This practice is an ancient local tradition of farmers,
although the medicinal value of the plant is not known. Some farmers in Mustang and Jumla
applied Neblon, other local herbs or Himax to treat various sheep ailments.
Farmers were often unable to describe the specific treatment method they had adopted to treat
parasites. Their responses were therefore grouped into four methods: veterinary medicine
(type of medicine unknown). Cyothin, TetzanlNilzam and local herbs. Due to the remoteness
from outlets for veterinary medicine, local herbs (names not known) were used by 31 % of the
farmers in the Trans-Himalayan region (Mustang). All Kaski farmers reported having used
veterinary medicines for parasite treatment. Cyothin was used by half of the farmers in Jumla
and Banke, while slightly more than two-thirds of the farmers in Banke also used Tetzan or
Nilzam. Most of the treatments were adopted as a curative rather than a preventive measure.
Causes of sheep death in Nepal
Sheep feeding on poisonous plants (names unknown) was the leading cause of sheep death in
all hut the Mustang district. Nearly half of the farmers in Mustang and Jumla (high altitude
regions) experienced ewe losses through malnutrition and this also contributed to low milk
production hy ewes. One in nine farmers in Mustang also experienced difficulties with
predators (wild animals) and some farmers in Mustang and Jumla had encountered a poaching
problem.
Veterinary services for livestock
Livestock Service Centres in Nepal have the dual function of proViding livestock extension and
veterinary services to farmers. In most locations. the centres are staffed by a veterinarian and a
livestock extension worker. Nearly two-thirds of the farmers interviewed knew that a
veterinary service for livestock was availahle in their area. However, wide variation in the
availahility of such services was ohserved across the four districts (24% in Mustang, 56% in
Jumla, 100% in Kaski and 77% in Banke). This result was consistent with the inverse
relationship between the availability of services and the degree of remoteness of the farming
location. Sheep are apparently often given a low priority by livestock extension staff and
veterinarians.
The sheep farmers indicated that on average the service centre was located about 3.5 km from
their homestead, or the equivalent of about one hour of travelling time (Table 5). Mustang
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farmers had to travel an average of 100 minutes (6 km distance) to reach a livestock service
centre. The distance to veterinary services should be interpreted with caution, as it is a relative
measure based on farmer perception rather than physical measurement. Almost all of the
farmers had walk to the veterinary centre. However, some of the farmers in Banke (Terai)
were able to use a bus service for this purpose.
Almost all farmers in the more accessible areas (Kaski and Banke) had to pay for most of the
veterinary services they acquired (Table 5). Veterinary staff generally. charged directly for
veterinary medicine or prescribed its purchase from private shops. The user fee for services
varied across the four districts (Rs 25 in Mustang and Jumla. Rs 50 in Banke and Rs 81 in
Kaski per sheep). Farmers ineurred an additional cost for prescribed medicines.
Table 5: Availability of extension and veterinary services for livestock in sheep farming areas
Indicator District Overall
Mustang Jumla Koski Banke
A. Availability of extension and vet. n=J4 n=72 n=36 n=56 0=200
Services
Yes(%) 24 56 100 77 64
B. Distance to vet. Service n=26 n=J4 n=35 n=53 n=150
Mean (Ian) 6.0 1.8 4.9 2.5 3.5
Std. dev. (2.0) (0.9) (2.6) (0.9) (2.3)
Mean (hrs) 1.7 0.9 0.5 1.0 1.0
Std. dev. (0.6) (0.7) (0.1) (0.5) (0.5)
C. Payment required for vet. Service n=27 0=51 0=36 n=53 0=167
Yes (%) 22 41 100 96 71
D. Amount required for payment 0=4 n=6 n=36 n=51 0=97
Mean (Rs) 25 25 81 50 59
Std. dev. (-) (0) (3) (8) (I9.4)
E. No. of visits in past 12 months n=27 n=51 n=36 n=54 n=168
Mean 0.11 1.18 0.97 0.73 0.80
Std. dev. (0.32) (0.7 I} (O.l7) (O.69) (0.7)
F. No. of paid visits
Mean 0.11 0.61 0.97 0.63 0.60
Std. dev. (0.32) (O.72) (OJ7) (O.59) (0.6O)
Most of the livestock service centres are inadequately staffed and serviced. This contributes to
their low utilisation by sheep farmers. The service centres are mostly run by the government
and hence "free service" is the usual expectation of farmers. However, farmers who visit a
centre qUickly find out that services are not always free and accessing the necessary technical
advice and veterinary service is frequently not easy. The survey indicated that on average
sheep farmers had made 0.8 visits to a centre in the past 12 months and that they had to pay for





1lle number of shearings per sheep each year varied with the agro-ecological conditions. In the
Trans-Himalayan range (Mustang). where there are harsh winter and dry monsoon seasons.
sheep are shorn only once in a year. The majority of the farmers (58%) in this region shore in
Seplember. prior to the onset of winter. and slightly more than one-third of the farmers shore in
lune. In the Mountain and Hill regions (Jumla and Kaski) farmers had adopted a twice-yearly
shearing policy. Almost all shearing was accomplished in March (Kaski) April (Jumla) and
September (both districts). 1lle Terai (Banke) farmers. due to hot weather. shore their sheep
three times each year (April, June and September). Four major reasons were given for a
multiple shearing policy: to prevent shedding (Jumla). to harvest more wool (Jumla), to keep
sheep comfortable (Jumla and Kaski) and to follow tradition (Banke). The Banke farmers'
policy related to hot weather conditions, especially during the summer months.
Farmers used very traditional tools to remove wool from sheep. The tools included sickles
(Mustang. lumla and Banke). scissors (Jumla), and khukuri (Jumla and Banke). The most
popular tools were the local knife (Mustang, Kaski and Banke) and scissors (Jumla). Often
shearing involved at least two people at once and each shearing took 2-4 hours per sheep.
An average sheep in Mustang provided the highest wool yield (1.4 kg/sheep) compared to 0.8
kg in Jumla, 0.3 kg in Kaski and 1.0 kg in Banke. The average wool yield per sheep for the
four districts was 1.1 kg. Wool staple length was longest in Mustang (13.0 cm) compared to
other districts where annual shearing was practised (10.8 in lumia, 8.0 in Kaski and 10.2 in
Banke). Second shorn wool staple length in lumla was 10.5 cm while it was somewhat longer
in Kaski (9.0). 1lle wool in Banke was similar to second shorn wool (8.3 cm vs 8.4 cm). The
longer staple length of wool from Mustang was associated with the once-yearly shearing policy
adopted by farmers in the district.
Wool marketing
An average household produced wool ahout 19 kg of wool pei- annum. Total wool production
related to flock size, and consequently the variation across districts was significant (26 kg in
Mustang, 24 kg in lumla. 4 kg in Kaski and 20 kg in Banke). Variation in wool production per
household was larger in Jumla (CV=IOO%) and Mustang (CV=74%), compared to the other
two districts (CV=59% in both Kaski and Banke).
"11Je utilisation of wool at home for knitting warm garments and local rugs was greater in the
Trans-Himalayan and Mountain districts (51 % in Mustang and 65% in lumla), than in the
other two districts. As a result, only half of the wool produced in Mustang and about 35% of
the wool produced in lumla was sold for cash. Some of the home-made woollen goods were
also sold in local markets. On the other hand, all wool produced in Kaski and 85 of the wool
produced in Banke was sold for cash.
All farmers in Mustang and Kaski sold first shorn wool to local residents in their communities
who hand-knitted their own woollen apparels. Similarly, 88% of the respondents in Jumla and
79% in Banke sold first shorn wool to local residents. Only 12% and 5% of the respondents in
Jumla and Banke, respectively, sold first shorn wool to middlemen. respectively. One-fifth of
the respondents in Jumla and Banke sold their first shorn wool to middlemen and the remainder
to local middlemen. All farmers in Kaski and four-fifths of the respondents in Banke sold
second shorn wool to local residents. The third shorn wool in Banke was sold to local residents
(59%) and middlemen (41 %).
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Little variation in the price received for wool sold in local markets was observed within each of
the four districts. 1lle relatively high price of wool from Bhyanglung sheep in Mustang
reflected its quality (both durability and staple length). 1lle fll"st and second shorn wool in
lumla fetched the same price (Rs 51/kg). while second shorn wool in Kaski received Rs 5/kg
more than the first shorn wool. However. the second and third shorn wool in Banke was valued
Rs 5/kg less than the first shorn wool. 1lle market price of wool was positively correlated with
staple length.
Live sheep sales
Farmers were asked to specify the number of sheep they had sold from each flock class (ewes.
rams and lambs) in 1995. On average. 8 rams, 3 ewes and 3 lambs had been sold by the
sample respondents. Both rams and ewes were sold at 5 years of age. while lambs were
typically sold at six months of age. Substantial variation was found across districts for the age
at sale. particularly for lambs. For example. Banke farmers kept lambs until 9 months of age
before sale. whereas the Kaski respondents sold lambs at less than 4 months of age because of
the local market for lambs of this type for religious functions. 1lle market price for live rams
was reasonably similar in all four districts. while ewes fetched a 35% higher priee in Banke
than in lumla and Mustang. Lambs on the other hand were three times more expensive in
Kaski than in the other districts. 1lle average meat price in Mustang was twiee that of Kaski
and 26% higher than in Banke and lumla.
1lle estimated live weight of sheep of the different flock classes at sale suggests that all classes
of animals sold were heavier in lumla and Banke (35-38 kg for rams and ewes, and II kg for
lambs) compared to those from Mustang and Kaski (27 kg for rams rams. 22-23 kg for ewes
and 5-10 kg for lambs). Because of their young age and market demand. Iambs were
estimated to be only marginally heavier than 5 kg at the time of sale in Kaski.
CONSTRAINTS ENCOUNTERED BY SHEEP FARMERS
Poor performance of local sheep breeds
Almost all farmers in Kaski and nearly three-fourths of the farmers in Mustang and Banke
expressed concern about the low productivity of the local sheep breed (Table 6). 1lleir concern
specifically reflected the very small quantity of wool produced per sheep. The major concern
of farmers was to increase income and they were keen to explore ways to boost wool and meat
production from sheep. Kaski farmers had experienced some success in raising cross-bred





Table 6: Problems faced and solutions suggested by sheep farmers in Nepal (1996).
District Overall
Mustsn!! Jumla Kaskl Banke
Problem; faced
A. Lack of market 25 61 97 46 57***1
B. Access to agricultural credit 17 65 100 25 52***
C. Undeveloped pasture land II 22 - 21 16**
D. Poor performance of local breeds 72 15 97 77 58***
E. Over cultivation - 14 7 7**
F. Shearing equipment 31 I 3 4 8***




A. Create an organised market for 3 46 39 28***
Wool
B. Provide credit from Agricultural 8 42 - 23 16**
Development BanklNepal
C. Develop pasture land 44 14 77 35***"
D. Improved breeding service - II - 4 5**
E. Reduce over cultivation - 3 - 2 2 (NS)
F. Provide reliable veterinary services 25 7 4 8**
G. Provide subsidised transport for 3 7 - - 3*
Wool
II. Provide access to good pasture
-
Land - I 13 4***




J. Provide access to drinking water 8 - - 2***
for sheep
K. Organise seasonal grazing permit 17 - -for pasture in Chinou 3***
NS = Not significant. *P<.I. **P<O.05. ***P<O.OI.
Under-development of pasture land and cultivation of marginal lands were expressed as the
primary concern of farmers in terms of sheep feeding (Table 6). Farmers were concerned
about the increased time involved. particularly for women. to collect fodder during the peak
feed deficit periods. Discussion with farmers indicated that the pasture available for sheep was
both of poor nutritional value and low dry matter productivity. Furthermore. community
forestry programmes were largely dominated by farmers with large ruminants and hence sheep
farmers had problems in accessing grasses and other fodder from these forests.
Lack of market
As sheep and wool production is largely concentrated in remote areas the lack of markets for
both live sheep and wool was one the major problems mentioned by farmers (Table 6).
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Prohibitive transport costs, lack of knowledge about buyers, poor or no market signals for
price and demand, exploitation by middlemen and the small quantity of wool produced per farm
collectively, all contributed to farmers experiencing problems In marketing their sheep
products.
Access to agricultural credit
Farmers had insufficient capital to upgrade their sheep flock by purchasing superior ewes and
rams (Table 6). They also could not borrow from a commercial or the Agricultural
Development Bank because they had been practicing a migratory sheep grazing system was
practiced. Lack of collateral was one of the major issues in obtaining access to credit. In
addition. farmers also were located too far (several hours walk) from the banks.
Shearing equipment
Nearly one-third of the farmers in Mustang reported that the lack of proper shearing equipment
meant wool harvesting was very time consuming (Table 6). In addition. they had to leave a fair
amount of wool on sheep to protect them from serious skin cuts.
Drinking water for sheep
One in seven Mustang farmers faced an acute problem with the supply of drinking water for
sheep. The problem was most pronounced during the dry months (August-October).
SOLlfflONS PROPOSED BY FARMERS
Farmers specified a number of ideas to alleviate most of the problems they faced in sheep
farming (Table 6). Development of pasture land, controlled grazing under a sedentary flock
environment. Government initiatives at a senior level to organise seasonal grazing permits for
pasture in Tibet and the provision of reliable services to support sheep farming were actions
proposed by the farmers in Mustang. Creating an organised market for wool. providing
agricultural credit for sheep farming and developing pasture land were areas in which the
Jumla and Banke farmers wanted to see improvements. Farmers in Kaski did not provide any
suggestions on resolving problems. It should be recognised. however. that farmers in remote
areas are not used to thinking about solutions because they struggle simply to meet their daily
requirements. Some may not have responded to the question on solutions simply because of
this factor. Further time with farmers in their local areas is required to identify solutions that
are realistic and acceptable for the local sheep farming conditions and farmers.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A rapid diagnostic socioeconomic survey of 200 sheep farmers in Nepal was conducted during
January to March 1996. All four ecological regions of Nepal (Trans-Himalya, Mountains,
Hills and Terai), each with a distinct local sheep breed, were represented in the survey. The
literacy rate was very low in Kaski (3%) and Jumla (13%), but greater in Mustang (37%) and
Banke (32%). Farming was reported by all respondents to be their primary occupation,
although some were engaged in off-farm income generation through activities like small
businesses, herb collection. carpentry and farm work. The opportunity for off-farm activities
was greater in" areas closer to the major market centres which were served by all weather roads
(Banke) or which had a strong influence of tourism (Mustang).
The average age of sheep farmers in the survey sample was 45 years. Employment in sheep




respondents had adopted an integrated farming systems with livestock and food crop
components. Farming largely served a subsistence role. Half of the farms were 0.5 ha or
smaller. The trend in sheep flock size and performance since 1991 was either stagnant or
declining in most of the survey VOCs. Average flock size was relatively larger in Jumla (48),
than in Banke (37), Mustang (31) or Kaski (18).
Ewe and ram selection was largely based on the physical attributes of the sheep and to some
extent on their productivity (wool and meat production). Most breeding rams and ewes were
sourced from the farmer's own flock and to a limited extent from the Government farms. The
introduction of exotic sheep breeds to Nepal. to date. has been very much on an ad hoc basis
and the status of individual cross-hreds at the farm level and their genetic composition is
largely unknown because of the level of inbreeding. even in cross-hred flocks. The genetic
potential of the local breeds farmed under high standards of selection and nutrition arc not
known.
The lambing rate was reported to be 74-88%, and survival four months after lambing was
reported to be 70-85%. However, an analysis of sheep numbers in flocks at the time of survey,
indicated a live lamh to ewe ratio of 60-65% and that most of the lambs born resulted from
single hirths. It was also noted that the 1996 season was relatively better in terms of lambing
performance compared to other recent years.
Sheep grazing was mostly based on a migratory system in all but the Kaski VOCs and included
feeding on pasture rangeland, forest trees and fallow crop fields. Access to public pasture land
was restricted for sheep farmcrs who had had little say in public land management decisions.
The respondents reported no tangible efforts to develop local pasture and rangeland for sheep
grazing. Farmers all experienced periods of serious feed deficits for their sheep and were
attempting to cope with these by feeding hay. and when available fodder tree leaves, tWigs, and
grazing in forests.
Pneumonia and diarrhoea were cited as the leading sheep diseases and liver fluke as the major
parasite. Farmers treated animal health problems through a combination of chemical and
herbal treatments. However, in many cases access to treatment facilities was limited either
because of distance or cost. The livestock extension and veterinary service facilities were also
not well utilised by sheep farmers either because of the unavailability of proper medicines or
suitably trained staff. Problems in identifying poisonous plants in sheep grazing areas led to
sheep deaths in many flocks.
Traditional equipment such as sickles, scissors and local knives. were used to remove wool
from sheep and this meant shearing was a time consuming operation. Average wool yield per
year was greatest for the Mustang sheep (1.4 kg), followed by those in Banke (1.0 kg), Jumla
(0.8 kg) and Kaski (0.3 kg). The respondents sold wool to the local residents or middlemen in
their communities and reported receiving prices far below those prevailing in larger markets.
No organised market for local wool in Nepal was reported.
The six major constraints to sheep farming in Nepal were identified as: (a) poor performance of
local sheep breeds, (b) a serious seasonal deficit of pasture and other feed. (c) the lack of an
organised market for wool and meat. (d) poor access to agricultural credit, (e) primitive
shearing equipment, and (f) an inadequate supply of drinking water for sheep. These
constraints are generally consistent with the anecdotal evidence available prior to the rapid
diagnostic survey. On one hand, management practices and technologies must be developed and
or introduced to mitigate or remove these constraints in order to profitably increase sheep
production. On the other hand, farmer non-formal education programmes must be
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implemented to raise their awareness of the teclmologies and to help them develop and
implement solutions which will best meet their local needs and circumstances.
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Agricultural extension in New Zealand has now moved from almost complete
public provision to almost complete privatisation. Initially it was felt that
extension (and research) were public goods, given the importance of agriculture
to the national economy. However, in 1985 the Government decided that the
results of extension were wholly appropriable and hence the Government
extension service should be privatised. This paper looks at the history of public
extension services, the benefit to the nation, compares the New Zealand system
to the US system, and discusses the future under a predominantly private
system.
stock, and improved management practices. These products were easily reproducible and did not
lend themselves to private market development and appropriation.
In New Zealand, the Department of Agriculture was established in 1892 and developed into a
large inspection, science, extension and policy organisation in subsequent years. In 1984, there
were 5000 employees functioning in 9 subject matter divisions and located in over 70 locations
throughout the country. From 1984, this hierarchical structure was under attack from the
Treasury reformists in the name of fiscal conservatism. The principal arguments were: emerging
exceptions to the public goods coverage of the state's activities, and the [graduall emergence of
appropriable products within the system. Principal among these latter products or services were




Agricultural research and extension has now moved from almost completely public provision to
almost complete privatisation. The former national departments of agriculture and science have
been re-structured into subject matter research institutes and the extension services sold to
private enterprise. Research institutes are subject to private sector disciplines and financial
controls. Public funding of research has been restricted and made contestable between science
providers under stricter criteria. The share of public funding has been falling since 1986 and so
far the contribution of the private sector has not kept up with national income.
Though the reform of agricultural science and extension delivery has been driven by the search
for fiscal savings, the principle behind the privatisation of these services (and the reason for their
reform) lies in the characteristic nature of such services as public goods. In the past, it was
assumed that they would be under-provided without government intervention, and the state
assumed responsibility for funding and delivery from early settlement days. Characteristically,
and different from most other countries, both the universities and the private sector were
excluded from these developments. The result was the emergence of monolithic, inclusive, and
hierarchical organisations, with multiple layers of management and widely dispersed
responsibilities both in subject matter and in location. In effect, the public provision of service
became a goal i" itself such that needed reform was prevented from emerging.
This development may be contrasted with the same process at the same time in the USA. The
land grant system of agricultural education, experimentation and extension was introduced in the
years before the first world war. Federal funds were provided for every state in the union to
establish combined and integrated agricultural universities with science skills, experimental
facilities, and extension services. Out of this bold initiative emerged extremely strong progress in
agricultural science, methodologies, and the emergence of the separate profession of agricultural
economists. Just and Rausser (1993) call the land-grant university system one of the most
successful innovations in the history of education. This success is attributed to the two-way
.interaction whereby research scientists are well-informed of field problems and relevant solutions
are communicated to the field. Phenomenal gains in productivity was due to dispensing and
commercialising these technologies widely in a dominant sector in the economy. The system
supplied products with public characteristics such as new crop varieties, improved breeding
In 1914, two new organisations were set up by the government: the Council of Agriculture, which
was to encourage research and its practical application to farming; and the Board of Agriculture,
which was to examine the government's overall role with respect to farming. In 1922, the Board
produced a crucial report, noting that the experimental farms were of little value unless they
could demonstrate their usefulness to the local farming community, and that farmers needed more
specialist assistance from expert advisors. The result was the closure of a number of the
experimental farms, and the setting up of an advisory service within the Field Division, with
extension responsibilities for soils, pastures and crops. The advisory service proved much more
successful than the experimental farms, and lead to enormous gains in productivity (Nightingale
1992). By the start of the second world war the service had expanded to cover the whole country.
Post-war expansion: World War II saw a run-down in the Department, so that by 1945 there was
a total of 1,129 staff, with only 148 in the Field Division. By 1950, the total had risen to 1769,
with the greatest increase in the Field Division (which became the Extension Division in 1948)
and the Animal Research Division (established in 1939). The goal of the Department, as stated
in 1946, was to "increase production to earn overseas funds". In the immediate post-war period,
the Field Division greatly expanded its research facilities, and in particular boosted its research
and advisory effort to hill country, following the advent of aerial top dressing (Nightingale
1992).
Experimental/arms: The experimental farms were run as mixed farms to cover as wide a range
of practices as possible. This was criticised at the time by dairy farmers who wanted a specialist
experimental dairy farm, and by South Island farmers as there was no experimental farm in the
South Island. The farms themselves were expensive to run, consuming one-third of the
Department's budget, and largely unsatisfactory for extension work, due to their isolation and
mixed farming objectives.
The Department of Agriculture was formed on 31 March 1892. The main functions were a
combination of animal health inspection/quarantine, and researchltesting and farmer advice
(Nightingale 1992). The first national conference of Agricultural and Pastoral Associations in
1892 called for assistance in providing farmers with scientific information. This was initially
done by experimental farms - two were set up in 1883, and by 1910, the Fields and Experimental
Farms Division of the Department of Agriculture (formed in 1907) had established nine farms
throughout the North Island. Other activities such as poultry advice and soil analysis were also
set up within the Field Division in 1895 and 1900 respectively. The main requirements of
farmers at the time was information to improve the quality of their produce (mainly via hygiene
and grading standards at processing factories) and to increase levels of production.
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In the latter half of the 1950s, the responsibilities of Extension Division advisors were redefined
to include a clear directive to provide advice to farmers on livestock husbandry and management
- a recognition of the state of affairs that already existed in most districts.
Farm business management: A further change of emphasis, pushed in the late I950s and early
I960s, was attention to farm business management. An English expert, O.Williams, was
brought out to oversee the process. The main message was that the management of the farm as a
business was of over-lJding importance in comparison with the soil, plant and animal
husbandries. Throughout this whole period, advisors had a two-fold function (Gunning pers
com):
(I) advice to farmers; and
(2) the continuation of basic on-farm research into such aspects as soil fertility and fertiliser
needs, regional testing of new crop and pasture varieties, control of insect and weed
problems, and animal responses to trace elements and anthelmentics.
Field trials: In 1964, all the Department's research activities, including the research stations
under the Farm Advisory Division (re-named from the Extension Division in the early 1960s),
were grouped together into a single Research Division. At the formation of the Research
Division, all advisors were given the choice of remaining in the Farm Advisory Division, as
advisors, or transferring to the new Research Division. Following this, advisors remaining with
the Farm Advisory Division would be just that - i.e, advisors. The only trials to be conducted by
advisors were to be demonstration trials, to demonstrate known results to farmers, not research
trials.
The Export Drive: In 1964, the Agricultural Development Conference identified growth targets
for agriculture over the next decade to stimulate export earnings, together with the policy actions
considered necessary to achieve these targets. One of the requirements identified by the
Conference was a strengthening of the government's agricultural extension service, both
numerically and also by widening its role to include a monitoring of the situations, attitudes and
expectations of farmers and growers, and to playa stronger part in advising on, and helping to
implement the government's responses to the new policy mandate including responses to adverse
climatic events and natural disasters affecting agriculture (Squire & Hercus 1995). An
Agricultural Production Council was established with a permanent secretariat. This served to
coordinate agricultural planning throughout the sector and drew heavily on the resources of the
Advisory Division of the Department.
In 1966, as a result of these initiatives, the Farm Advisory Division identified its role as being
"to provide a sound technical and farm management advisory service to help farmers to achieve
their farming objectives". By the early I970s, the organisation had adopted Management by
Objectives as its working style. By the late 1970s-early 1980s, this involved a formal system
whereby the directorate produced an annual statement of the environment in which the
agricultural sector was operating, the impacts of any changes on the sector, and the responses
that the Advisory Services Division were seeking in the forthcoming year. Regional and district
extension plans were then developed to enhance the achievements of these outcomes.
Role of horticulture: In 1972, as part of a general restructuring of government departments, the
Fisheries Management and Fisheries Research divisions of the Marine Department combined
with the Department of Agriculture to form a Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF). At
'the same time, the Farm Advisory Division was amalgamated with the Horticultural Division, to
form Advisory Services Division. The Horticultural Division had existed in parallel with the
Farm Advisory Division, with broadly similar objectives but with more emphasis on regulatory
functions, such as disease containment, and export certification.
Advisory Services Division reached its maximum size in 1986, when it consisted of some 670
staff, half of them graduates in agricultural or horticultural science, and with an annual budget of
NZ$22 million. Staff were spread throughout the country in 56 locations, with the primary
function of providing a free extension service to all farmers and growers. Extension methods
covered a wide range of opportunities - regular discussion groups, field days, seminars, articles in
newspapers and journals, radio talks, as well as direct one-tn-one interactions (see Table 1).
Advisors also continued to run local demonstration (and research) trials. In addition to its
extension effort, Advisory Services Division also ran the F1ockhouse (North Island) and Telford
(South Island) training institutes for farm cadets, as well as the diagnostic laboratories in
Auckland, Levin and Christchurch.
3.0 Government Reform and Extension Services
General: The election of a new government in 1984 saw a change in policy towards liberalising
and opening up the economy; policies which have been continued by subsequent governments.
Reforms and deregulation have been carried out that affect all sectors of the economy. For the
agricultural sector, the reforms included a removal of all subsidies, a removal of concessional
finance to producer boards and to farmers, the restructuring of agricultural research and
development and the commercialisation of agricultural extension. After these reforms, New
Zealand has the lowest level of subsidisation of its agricultural sector within the OECD, with a
producer subsidy equivalent equal to 2% (MAF 1996).
Commercialisation ofExtension: Up until the mid 1980's the Advisory Services Division of
MAF was a provider of extension and advice to the rural sector on a non-chargeable basis. In
1985, the new government directed Advisory Services Division to become fully user pays within
five years. This required a major change in culture for the organisation, as commercial success
would demand significantly more business focus and discipline.
In 1987, the Advisory Services Division amalgamated with the Agricultural Research Division to
form MAF Technology. This amalgamation was undertaken to better link the science and
extension activities, and to gain a better commercial return from research developments. While
there were some synergies gained from this amalgamation, there were major cultural differences
between the two organisations. The consultancy business was placed under considerable
pressure, and many advisors/consultants resigned.
In 1990, the renamed Management Consultancy Service was reformed as a separate national
business, still within MAF, but with the intention of corporatising and then privatising the
organisation over the following two to three years. Full privatisation occurred on I February
1995 when the business, now known as Agriculture New Zealand, was purchased by Wrightson
Limited, New Zealand's largest stock and station firm. At the time of the purchase, only 80
consultants remained. Their number has since increased to 100, making Agriculture New
Zealand Limited the country's largest national agricultural consultancy business. It now operates
as a fully commercial but separate limited liability company, fully owned by Wrightson Limited
(Ritchie 1995).
Agriculture New Zealand Limited: The core business is on-farm/orchard consultancy to
individual farmers and growers, which makes up approximately 50% of their total business
compared with 25% previously. Other important business areas are (Ritchie 1995):
(i) technology transfer, whereby the consultant works with a group of farmers or growers or
organisation to enhance and develop existing services or practices using advanced or
new technology. An example here is the New Zealand Meat Research and Development
Council monitor farms, whereby Agriculture New Zealand Ltd is contracted to facilitate
(iv) consultation to agribusiness, where Agriculture New Zealand Ltd is contracted to an
agribusiness organisation to help them further understand the business and develop
strategies in the agriculturalfhorticultural sector, or, in other cases deliver advisory
services to their clients; this is a new service fonnerly discouraged.
AgResearch - research into pastoral agriculture;
HortResearch - research into pennanent horticultural crops;
Crop & Food Research - research into annual crops (arable, vegetable and flower);
Landcare Research - research into the environmental management of land resources; and
NIWA (National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research) - research into marine
and fresh water systems. and climate. .
Restructuring ofResearch and Development: In 1992, the Research Division of MAF, the
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), the Forestry Research Institute (FRI),
and the research section of the Meteorological Service were split up into ten Crown Research
Institutes (CRIs). Government funding for research was centralised in the Public Good Science
Fund (PGSF) administered by the Foundation for Research Science and Technology (FRST), to
which the CRIs "bid" for research funding. Policy advice to the government on research was to
be provided by the Ministry for Research Science and Technology (MoRST). The CRIs were to
act on a commercial basis, and seek funds from FRST and/or from private industry. In the






selected "monitor" fanns throughout the country where research and new ideas are
applied, trials are analysed, and the results are shared with other farmers in the local
area; this is an expanding service;
rural intelligence gathering and facilitation, which is paid for at arms length by the Policy
division of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAF);
training courses for agriculture and horticulture, which are part of the national
qualifications network; this is a new service; and
4.0 Comparisons with the US Land Grant System
Within the United States, the Land Grant University System is the centrepiece of the agricultural
science establishment. This very successful system is based on the coordination of research
scientists, extension personnel, and universities in centres of excellence (the State universities)
(Just and Rausser, 1993). This integrated system was considered in New Zealand in 1925, but
was turned down, mainly due to departmental/ university rivalries (Nightingdale 1992), and the
commitment to public provision.
In the US, a decreasing share of public funds for research is going into agriculture in the US,
though this has been more than offset by private funding. A result of this has been private
companies "leveraging" off public funds - scientists' time has tended to concentrate more on
specific private needs, despite public funds supporting some of that time, and some general
overhead costs. This has tended to crowd out public good research, such as social science and
safety and environmental research. In New Zealand, the response from the private sector has been
slower, and public money still funds the majority of social science and environmental research
(MoRST (996).
The research focus of the land grant universities has broadened considerably to include agri
business, consumers, and environmental groups as well as producers. Many of the newer
research tools developed by the universities had little synergy with existing extension efforts,
which concentrate on the fann sector, and often were of no direct use to farmers. This has
resulted in an ongoing decline of the land grant model of integrated teaching-research-extension
(Just and Rausser, 1993). Most of the benefit of publicly funded research was being captured by
a minority of private farmers (the larger fanns). In New Zealand, this decline in the research-
extension nexus has been achieved by administrative fiat: state-funded extension has largely
ceased to exist and production research scaled down. The concentration of benefits from
agricultural research is not so evident in New Zealand possibly due to the dominance of livestock
farming compared to crop farming in the US.
5.0 The Effectiveness of Extension
Government expenditure under the Public Good Science Fund (PGSF) for 1997/98 was
$282 million, of which $145.6 million was allocated to the agriculture and horticulture output
classes. In addition, FRST also administers the Technology for Business Growth (TBG) scheme,
which has the goals of:
increasing the level and quality of research and development in industry;
encouraging business growth and improved competitiveness through the use of science
and technology; and
encouraging closer cooperation between CRIs and industry.
Technology for Business Growth projects affecting agriculture nonnally involve a partnership
between the business (which may be a group of fanners or growers) and a CRI to carry out the
technological development or technology transfer (TBG 1994). Total funding of TBG in
1997/98 was $15.7 million.
While the CRI Act states that CRIs have a responsibility for "the transfer ofknowledge", their
overall thrust is as a commercial entity. Any intellectual property developed from PGSF funding
i~ the property of the CRI. The expectation is that this intellectual property will be
commercialised and marketed by the CRI in some manner - directly, in joint ventures, sold on a
royalty basis, or marketed privately.
Agriculture has been the mainstay of the New Zealand economy for most of the 20th century. In
the I960s and I970s, it was accounting for 80% of mercantile export earnings. While still of
major importance, its relative position has recently declined to around 56% of mercantile export
earnings. Prior to restructuring, it was generally felt by policy makers that agricultural research
and extension were public goods which the government should provide. In this context, the
definition of 'public good' was possibly wider in scope than that given below; the material
benefit to the nation from agricultural exports was such that government continued to allocate
state funds to support agriculture via research, extension and farm credit. Considerable private
benefit accrued to the farmers, but it was still felt that state funding could be justified. While an
extension service provides a mixture of both public and private goods, and the boundary between
the two is difficult to define, government decided in 1985 that the results of extension were
wholly appropriable (given the background of government policy for deregulation and reform)
and decided to set in train the privatisation of the Advisory Services Division.
A public good is one for which consumption by one individual does not prevent consumption by
another. Knowledge, information and improved management practices are public goods because
they can be transmitted from one individual to another without diminishing benefits to either. In
pure form, a public good is non-excludable in the sense that no practical rationing mechanism
exists by which consumption is controlled by price. Non-paying individuals are not able to be
excluded from the benefits derived from the good. A private firm is discouraged from developing
a market for a product that can be easily shared. In this situation, the benefits of such a product
6.0 The Total Extension Sector
The table shows an overall decline in the number of extension workers, although there has been a
major increase in the number of private consultants following the demise of the government-
funded service. Prior to restructuring, approximately half of all services were provided free by
Government.
Noles: Most of the privale funding would he Agri-husiness finns funding trials and subsequent field-days and
demonstrations. Few private consultants worked outside of the one 10 one edvice, field days, and discussion group
arenas.• Most of the aClivities shown would have both puhlic and private good attrihutes. The ticks indicate where
the activity could he classified. Both columns ticked indicate that the activity is intennediate on the public/private good
continuum.
While the government-funded AdVisory Services Division of MAF was by far the single largest
extension service prior to restructuring, there were a number of other extension workers,
including private consultants and extension workers employed by non-governmental bodies. The
estimated number of extension workers in 1973 and 1995 is shown in Table 2.
~~~Cost Benefit Analysis
Evaluations: No formal evaluation has been carried out as to the effectiveness of the overall
programme of Advisory Services Division. There have been a number of evaluations of
particular advisory efforts, which gave internal rates of return of anything from 16% to well over
100% (Squire and Hughes, 1973; Dawson and Smith, 1979; Smith et ai, 1979; Mace and
Peterson, 1979; Armstrong, 1980). A study in 1986 (Scobie and Eveleens, 1987) showed a rate
of return of 30% to the nation from publicly funded agricultural research in New Zealand from
1926 to 1984. Recent United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) work (Fuglie et ai,
1996) has shown a similar figure of 35% for US research work. Further work was undertaken in
1991 in New Zealand (Scrimgeour et ai, 1991) to try and determine the rate of return to the
nation from the publicly funded AdVisory Services Division. This work could not differentiate
between the rate of return from research and that from extension, and concluded that the 30%
figure derived by Scobie and Eveleens was inclusive of both research and extension. United
States work on the rate of return to extension has shown wide variability, from 20-110% (Fuglie
et ai, 1996).
cannot be appropriated and therefore, profit incentives do not induce private development, even
though social benefits may be high (Just and Rausser 1993). There is a continuum between
public and private goods, with few pure public goods; many of the results of publicly funded
research would lie somewhere in the middle of this continuum.
Estimate ofthe Number ofFull Time AgrkulluraVHorticullural Extension




In terms of the scope of public good provision in the agricultural sector, Scrimgeour et al (1991)
concluded that the government requires some form of extension service to achieve its goals in
rural communities, to obtain the information it needs from the agricultural sector, and to facilitate
the implementation of government policy. However, these authors saw no reason for government
to be involved in providing agricultural consultancy services. There is a wide range of services
provided by a government extension agency which do meet the definition of public goods (Table
I). But it is also characteristic that some services are a mixture of appropriable and non-
appropriable components that are difficult to separate. Withdrawal of government support leads
to a loss of some of the original service as a result. In general the privatisation of extension
services in New Zealand has resulted in a decline in the total quantum of services provided
except where contractual arrangements could be established.
Table I : The Funding and Nature ofHistorkal Extension Activities
Table 2:
Organisation
Government Departments: - Agriculture
- Other
Boards: - Producer and Catchment
- Regional Councils (FfEs)
Private
Commercial CompanieslUniversilies, CRIs
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Producer Boards: The New Zealand Dairy Board employs a tolal of 34 consulting officers. and 21 Fannwise
consultants (Howse. pers com. 1996). These operate as pan of the Livestock Improvement Corporation (a fully
owned subsidiary of the Dairy Board). The Dairy Board consulting officer service was set up in 1940. and has
been the main exlension ann of Ihe dairy induslry (Stichbury. 1994). The focus of the consulting officer service
has been on a "mass extension" approach via discussion groups and field days. Consulting officers have some
individual conlact with dairy farmers. but not on a regular/repeat basis. The main aim of the service is to maximise
its contact with dairy farmers, and cunently achieves contact with 60-65% of all dairy fanners. They also achieve
a large degree of conlact via two main extension media for dairy farmers - the "Dairy Exporter" (a monthly
joumal), and "Farming with Pictures" (3 quarterly video on fanning, sent to dairy fanners). Surveys have indicated
a 90% readership/viewing of these media. The Fannwise consultants operate on a commercial basis, similar to
private consultants (Howse, pers com).
Wools of New Zealand (previously the Wool Board) has staff involved in training and extension activities for New
Zealand's wool fanners: eight Production Officers, five Senior Shearing Trainers, and five Valuers.
Regional/Local Government: The Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991 gave local government Ihe
responsibility for resource management including land, water, air, and weeds and pests. While regional and district
councils do not operate extension services as such, they are involved in the provision of information and advice to
land owners on environmental matters.
Private/Commercial: This includes Agriculture New Zealand Ltd as acommercial entity. In addition, there were
many former MAP advisors who have set up either individual or group practices. In the financial sector, the major
trading banks have "relationship managers", some of whom have the primary function of servicing the needs of
farmers as a means of betli servicing existing clients and maintaining, if not improving the bank's market share.
Dairy companies employ "production officers" to provide company, and regional, specific services to complement
the Dairy Board consulting officer service. Commercial agribusiness finns, such as fertiliser, chemical and food
processing companies. encourage their sales representatives to become "client managers", providing a more
broadly based advisory function, but always with a view to promoting a particular product andlor to securing farm
produce.
7.0 The Future
The structural balance of agricultural extension in New Zealand has changed markedly, with the
market place now largely determining what extension is provided, by whom and how. For the
government, extension is mainly about facilitating the operation of the market place in line with
government policy objectives; and for the private sector, it is a matter of commercial benefit to
the organisation.
As noted by Walker (1995), this has had a number of outcomes and implications for agricultural
extension in New Zealand:
(i) for fanners and growers seeking infonnation and advice, their ability to do so is now
largely determined by their ability to pay;
(ii) the mix of clients for consultants has widened from fanners and growers to include local
government, producer organisations, agribusiness, marketing organisations and
financiers;
(iii) there is less I: I contact between advisors and farmers/growers and such I: I contact as
still occurs tends to be with larger fanners/clients - larger farms/clients tend to be more
profitable, while smaller/individual fanns are less attractive due to the relatively higher
transaction costs;
(iv) there are differences between sectors, dependent on their profitability and hence ability
to pay. This can be counterproductive in an economic dOWllturn as farmers may need
increased advice, but cannot afford to pay. The dairy sector, however, continues to be
well serviced by its own extension service, regardless of the profitability of dairy
farming;
(v) collaboration between agencies, particularly research agencies, has reduced, resulting in
less cross-discipline research and inconsistencies in databases and information
distribution systems. Fanners and growers often have to access research information
through several CRIs;
(vi) on the other hand, there have been some increases in collaboration and partnerships
between agencies involved in extension activities such as the TBG programme, the
monitor fann programme between the Meat Research Development Council, the ANZ
trading bank. and Agriculture New Zealand Ltd and other private consultants; and other
private consultants and the sustainable agriculture focus fanns involving MAF Policy,
local government, CRIs, agribusiness and local fanners and growers.
The main inconsistency in the current research-extension mix is the question of the
communication of publicly funded research. Research is still largely viewed as a public good,
and the bulk of CRI funding comes from the State. If the bulk of spending on research and
development is seen as a "public good", should the transfer of the infonnation gained also be
seen as a public good, i.e, should the state fund the transfer of the infonnation? While much of
the application on-farm of research and development has a private benefit, it can be argued that
there is also considerable public benefit, especially with respect to research and development on
environmental, social and sustainability issues relating to agriculture. This question highlights
the difficulty in determining the boundary between public and private goods in many of these
cases.
While the CRIs are involved in some technology transfer activities, such as field days, seminars,
workshops, etc, much infonnation is written up as scientific papers and not taken further. One
difficulty for the CRIs, given their commercial focus, is to capture a commercial return on
technology transfer, especially with respect to "whole fann" research and development/extension,
and research and development on management systems. It is much easier to sell a discrete
product or service than a management concept.
In many respects, the CRIs are still in a state of flux, with many still dOWll-sizing and
restructuring internally. Their focus therefore, tends to be more on core research competencies
and opportunities. They have been moving their focus towards marketing of infonnation, which
could increase in coming years. However, this marketing will emphasise a commercial return,
and it is unlikely that they wiIl engage in public infonnation transfer to the extent that some
consider desirable on public interest grounds.
In some areas, the private sector is moving to fill the gap left by the removal of the government
extension service. Where a government agency, such as MAF Policy, requires an extension
effort to facilitate government policy, the model of contracting private sector consultants is well
established. The question of an optimum transfer of research infonnation to fanners, its funding
and its execution, is unresolved by present structures. The importance of the application of
research to agriculture and the wider economy requires that it be addressed urgently.
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REGIONAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTIONS: THE RMA AND FARM DAIRY EFFLUENT CONTROL
publicising the fertiliser benefits of the applied effluent. Previous research (O'Neill and
Scrimgeour, 1991; Parminter, 1995) indicated that these benefits were insufficient to




1.1 Legislative Background for the Control of Farm Dairy Emuent
~
~
Note: The views expressed in this paper are those ofthe author. and do not necessarily
reflect the official view ofthe Ministry ofAgriculture and Forestry.
Abstract
In 1994, the Waikato Regional Council introduced new rules governing farm dairy
effluent treatment, with the intention of encouraging farmers to install land-based
treatment, primarily as an instrument to improve surface water quality in the region.
Previous studies have suggested that investment by farmers in land based treatment is
not profitable at the farm level (O'Neill and Scrimgeour, 1991; Parminter, 1995). In this
paper, the effect on methods of treatment are explored, and the regional costs and
benefits examined. The rules have been remarkably effective in changing farmer
behaviour - the percentage of farmers using land based treatment has increased from
39% in 1993/94 to 63% in 1996/97. While initial capital costs associated with the
changed rules have been high, there have also been significant benefits to farmers,
particularly in terms of saved fertiliser costs and increased production on the treated
area, and saved consent fees and charges. Other potential benefits such as trade, cultural
and water quality benefits are examined in the paper. The water quality results are
ambiguous. The results are contrary to those expected; ie, the rules have arguably had
a positive (or at least non-negative) effect on the dairy industry, whereas regional water
quality benefits have yet to emerge.
Keywords: farm dairy effluent, policy, water quality
1.0 Introduction
Discharges to land or water are currently subject to the requirements of the Resource
Management Act, 1991. Under the Act, discharges to water are not permitted unless
they are allowed by a rule in a regional plan, or by a consent issued by the relevant
regional council. Discharges to land are allowed provided they are not disallowed by
a rule in a regional plan, and do not result in contaminant entering water.
The passing ofthe Resource Management Act provided a stimulus for change in the rule
structure governing farm dairy effluent treatment in the Waikato. The former system
was inconsistent between areas, and was not considered adequate to meet the water
quality objectives of the Region. The WRC proposed a change to the sections in the
Transitional Regional Plan dealing with farm dairy effluent in 1993. The changed rules
became effective in October, 1994.
The changed Plan makes the application of farm dairy effluent to land a permitted
activity (ie, no consent is needed, and no annual fees are payable) under the Resource
Management Act, provided certain conditions are met. Other discharges to land, and
discharges to water from treatment ponds, barrier ditches and other systems meeting
specified discharge standards are discretionary activities requiring a resource consent,
for which annual charges are payable. Untreated discharges remain prohibited.
In 1994, the WRC anticipated that the policy would increase the proportion of farmers
applying effluent directly to the land, and that this would result in a progressively
reducing environmental effect from farm dairy effluent.
2.0 Trends in treatment methods
Since 1994, when the change in the Regional Council's rules governing the treatment
of farm dairy effluent was made, there has been a dramatic increase in the proportion of
farmers using land-based treatment. The changes are summarised in Table I.
Surface water in the dairying areas of the Waikato has been documented as having
generally low water quality, associated with effluent discharges and runofffrom farms,
and in some cases with discharges from non-agricultural sources as well (Smith et aI,
1993). Poor water quality compromises many uses of some lakes, rivers and streams in
the region, including contact recreation, fishing, water supply, aesthetic appreciation and
even stock water in some cases.
Table 1: Percentage of farmers disposing of farm dairy emuent by various
methods in the Waikato Region
In 1994, the Waikato Regional Council (WRC, or Environment Waikato) changed and
standardised the rules governing the disposal of farm dairy effluent, in order to improve
surface water quality, protect ground water quality, and consider Maori cultural concerns
'(Waikato Regional Council, 1994). The Council's aim was to increase the proportion
of farmers treating effluent using land based methods. The incentives offered to farmers
by the Council to make the investment in land based treatment facilities include waiving
consent requirements (and fees) for systems that meet certain requirements, and
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97
Landbased 31 30 39 48 58 63
Pond/ditch/other 60 61 58 51 41 37
1N0 system 9 9 3 I 1 <I




Table I highlights the success of the Regional Council's policies, in changing the
treatment methods used by dairy farmers in the region. The changes should be seen in
the context of the long-term educational and regulatory programme by the Regional
Council (and before the establishment of the Regional Council, by the Waikato
Catchment Board), to improve the treatment of farm dairy effluent.
3.0 The Costs and Benefits of Effluent Treatment to the Individual Farmer
In order to evaluate the costs and benefits to a typical Waikato dairy farmer of the new
rules, the MAF Farm Monitoring model farm is used, under different effluent treatment
scenarios. The MAF Farm Monitoring Waikato/South Auckland model dairy farm has
an effective area of 70 ha and milks 196 cows (MAF, 1997). The model has recently
been adjusted to more closely reflect the mean size of dairy farms in the Waikato
Region.
3.1 Construction and Operating Costs of Treatment Systems
Farm dairy effluent in the Waikato is predominantly treated in pond or barrier ditch
systems that discharge to surface water, or by land based treatment. The advantages of
a pond system are low capital costs ($4500 for a 200 cow herd) and management inputs
(the ponds require desludging every five years or so at a cost of approximately $1500).
By contrast, a travelling irrigator land based treatment system for the model farm costs
$18,000 to install, and requires regular management during the milking season.
Operating costs per year, including labour costs are of the order of $800. However,
there are fertiliser benefits from the effluent, and the farmer also does not face the armual
consent fee, if the system meets permitted activity requirements. Some farmers have
installed less expensive systems, eg using existing effluent ponds as holding ponds and
installing a travelling irrigator system to pump from the ponds, or utilising contractors
to empty the ponds periodically. Such systems store the effluent for a period ofvariable
length before application. During storage, some of the nitrogen content is lost to the
atmospherel.
Two factors must be taken into account in evaluating the fertiliser value of the nutrients
applied as effluent. Firstly, the application of effluent has the potential to reduce
fertiliser application rates and therefore costs, and secondly, the applied effluent applies
more of some nutrients than the standard fertiliser programme, and therefore may have
an additional grass production effect which translates into increased outputs and gross
returns. In this respect, this paper takes a different approach to earlier papers on this
subject, which either value all the nutrients applied at the equivalent fertiliser price
(O'Neill and Scrimgeour, 1991), or assume that nutrients added over the standard
fertiliser level have no value (Parminter, 1995). The approach in this paper more
accurately reflects the value of the applied nutrients.
Table 2: Nutrient Application Rates (kglba/season)
N P K S
Fertiliser 81 70 87 68
Fresh effluent 150 30 200 25
Stored effluent 75 30 200 25
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture, 1997; O'Connor and Longhurst, 1997
3.2.1 Saving in Fertiliser Costs
If it is assumed that the farmer alters the fertiliser regime on the treated block to
compensate exactly for the nutrients applied in the emuent, the saved fertiliser costs are
a measure of the dollar value to the farmer of the benefits of the treatment system3.
However, some farmers do not adjust their fertiliser programme sufficiently (if at all)
on the treated blocks, so there is a reduced saving in fertiliser costs. The savings under
a range ofassumptions are summarised in Table 3. The three approaches assumed are
as follows:
3.2 Fertiliser Benefits
The application of farm dairy effluent to land supplies a range of elements for plant
growth. The quantity of nutrients applied under a standard fertiliser regime, and under
two land based effluent treatment regimes is described in Table 2. Sludge from pond




Total applied nutrient approach: the farmer tailors the fertiliser on the treated
block to apply exactly the same nutrients in total as on the rest of the farm.
Adjusted standard fertiliser regime approach: the farmer adjusts the fertilisers
applied on the treated block, while minimising the complication to fertiliser
management of the farm.
Standard fertiliser approach: the farmer applies the standard fertiliser programme
lIn Table 2 it is assumed that halfof the nitrogen content is lost in storage. The amount
lost depends on length of storage (which varies from a few days to a year) and a range of
environmental factors.
2The fertiliser value ofsludge is estimated at approximately $500 - 1000 (per desludging)
for an average size herd, realised over a longer period than a year, as the organic forms of the
nutrients mineralise (Selvarajah, 1994).
31deally, soil tests of the treated block would be used to establish the fertility status, and
a unique fertiliser programme applied to it. The saving in fertiliser costs over past years or over




across the whole fann. including the treated blocks.
3.2.2 Returns from Increased Production
The impact of any extra applied nutrients (above the amounts that would have been
added as fertiliser) on grass production and output varies widely depending on the
nutrient concemed. the fertility of the soil. the pasture species, and the management of
the farm. It seems likely that the application of phosphorus, potassium and sulphur at
higher than maintenance quantities will have an insignificant impact on dry matter
production on a developed Waikato fann4• Similarly. the application of marginally less
phosphorus in strategy (ii) is unlikely to have a significant impact on dry matter
production (Table 3). However. the application of more nitrogen will have an impact
on production.
A recent meta-analysis ofexperimental results developed a model which estimates the
increases in milk solids production given the level of nitrogen application (Clark. 1997).
However. these results may not be reproducible in the fann situation under examination.
for three reasons. Firstly. the model is derived from results from research farmlets. in
which all the extra dry matter grown is utilised. In a fann situation. the fanner may not
alter stocking rate or pasture management. and much of the extra dry matter production
will not be captured. Secondly. the experimental results were obtained with chemical
fertiliser applications rather than organic sources of nitrogen. It is not known whether
this has any impact on the pasture response. Finally. the extra grass produced may be
conserved as silage. hay etc. The harvesting of the grass has costs associated with it,
which must be taken into account. Given these limitations of the nitrogen model. the
production benefits generated should be seen as maxima.
The fertiliser and production benefits for the different strategies are summarised in Table
3, with the production benefits shown as a range from 25% to 75% of the theoretical
levels achievable.
Table 3: Fertiliser and Production Benefits of Applied Emuent ($)
(i) total applied (ii) adjusted (iii) standard
nutrient approach standard fertiliser
fertiliser
Fresh effluent
Saved fert costs 1390 1390 0
Prod. benefits 313-938 313-938 606-1817
Total annual 1703 - 2328 1703 - 2328 606 - 1817
benefit
Stored effluent Saved fert costs 1200 960 0
Prod. benefits 82-247 275-826 337-1011
Total annual 1282 - 1447 1235-1786 337-1011
benefit
3.3 Saved Consent Application Costs and Annual Charges
Farmers with pond and ditch systems (and those with land based systems that do not
meet the permitted activity requirements) pay an application fee to obtain a current
consent (usually every 10 years), and an annual charge. Land based treatment systems
that meet the permitted activity requirements pay neither of these charges as a consent
is not required.
3.4.1 Irrigation Benefits
The saved fertiliser costs and production benefits tend to work in opposite directions to
each other.
3.4 Unquantified Benefits and Costs of Land Based Treatment
Assuming approximately one-third of fanners follow each strategy. and assuming that
the "average" fanner gains half the maximum potential gains from the production
effects. the total annual benefits of utilising fresh and stored effluent are approximately
$1800 and $1200 per farm respectively. With good management, a farmer should be
able to achieve annual benefits ofapproximately $2300 and $1800 from fresh and stored
effluent respectively.
~Although there is a degree of scientific argument about the impact of "luxury" amounts
ofphosphate on developed fanns (eg, Thomsen et al 1993. cfMorton and Davis, 1998). and there
will be a sulphur benefit on a small percentage of Waikato fanns.
The effluent applied to pastures is very dilute. and may have some irrigation value
during a dry season. However, the irrigation benefits from effluent application are likely
to be slight given the small part of the fann treated on anyone occasion, and the long
period between treatments. The total depth ofwater applied is also small- the maximum
nitrogen application allowed in the regional rules is achieved with annual applications
totalling less than 40 mm, spread over at least two applications (Waikato Regional
Council. 1997). Evapotranspiration rates in the Waikato during Summer are of the
order of 100 - 140 mm/month (McAneney et aI, 1982).
3.4.2 Soil Quality
There may also be soil quality benefits from careful application of effluent, that avoids
ponding and caking. The addition of organic matter and water as fann dairy emuent
alters soil microbial populations, with an increase in some species and a decrease in
others. Overall, it is likely that microbial biomass will increase, a factor that is
associated with improved decomposition of plant and animal materials, nutrient cycling
and the formation ofsoil particle macro-aggregates for improved soil water retention and
air flow (Ghani et aI, 1996). However, if ponding and/or caking occur when effluent is
applied, anaerobic soil conditions are likely, resulting in growth of undesirable micro-
organism populations, and a reduction in plant growth.
3.4.3 Non-monetary Benefits
Parminter (1995) comments on the non-monetary benefits to farmers of land based
disposal, including satisfaction at "environmental correctness", and the reduction in the
necessity to deal with the Regional Council once the permitted activity is recognised.
While these benefits are difficult to quantify, they are significant. Environment
Waikato's education programme is important in establishing and maintaining these
benefits, by building the image of land-based disposal as the "best practice" in
environmental terms (Selvarajah, 1998).
3.4.4 Trade benefits
others) is concemed about the competition effects ofdivergent environmental standards
between member states and competitors, viewing lower environmental standards in
countries exporting to the EU as unfair competition The issue of environmental
standards is certain to be raised in future trade negotiations in the WTO Committee on
Trade and the Environment.
In summary, it is currently difficult to identify and/or isolate any trade benefits from
improved treatment of farm dairy effluent, but it is an issue which may become more
significant in the future.
3.4.5 Farm Management Costs
The management of a land based disposal system is more complex than ofa pond or
ditch based system that discharges to water. Not only is vigilance required ofa farmer
in positioning and maintaining the system, grazing management is also complicated.
Stock should be rotationally grazed ahead of the application of effluent, and a 7 day
withholding period should be observed after application, to minimise the risk ofdisease
transfer, and to increase pasture palatability (Dairying and the Environment Committee,
1995). These require a reasonably sophisticated farm management regime.
The monetary costs of the new rules depend on the individual farmer's response to them.
Farms may be grouped into four categories, based on whether they were in existence
when the new rules came into effect in 1994 (categorised as existing), or not
(categorised as new); whether they used land based treatment in 1994 or not; and if they
were not using land based treatment in 1994, whether they have since installed land
based systems:
Note that there are other possibilities, eg, land based treatment systems may have been
converted to oxidation pond systems discharging to water, or a new farm may have been
established that discharges treated effiuent to water; but the number of such farms is
insignificant.· Many farms have installed variants of the land-based systems specified
in 3(a) to (c) above, but the three system types considered are sufficient to cover the
range.
1. Existing farm, was land-based, remains land-based
2. Existing farm, was non-land-based, remains non-land-based
3. Existing farm, was non-land-based, land-based system installed between 1993/4
and 1996/7
4. (a) Fresh effluent, travelling irrigator system
(b) Stored effluent, contractor-application system
(c) Stored effluent, travelling irrigator system





Trade benefits from improved treatment of farm dairy effluent could arise from two
sources, consumer preferences and market access.
3.4.4.1 Consumer preferences - "Green Consumerism":
Current research indicates that consumers are most influenced by price, quality and
safety when deciding who and where to source food products from. Where
environmental issues are a concern, the important ones are traceability, pesticide use,
residue levels, genetically modified products and animal welfare (Fact Finders, 1997).
However, gatekeepers in the market chain (such as supermarket chains), limit the ability
of consumers to determine what food products are available. Gatekeepers are
intermediaries in the market chain, who determine whether a country's product will be
purchased or not. Thus the end consumer does not have a direct input into the choice
oforigins of food products available to them. Gatekeepers are able to check claims, and
wield considerable market power in some (particularly affluent) markets. Although
gatekeeper pressures for environmental performance standards are not currently strong
in the dairy industry, other products (such as timber and paper products) increasingly
require certification for on-farm/forest practices. If (or some would argue, when)
gatekeeper requirements of the dairy industry extend to environmental management,
simply demonstrating that most farmers use land based treatment is unlikely to be
sufficient - demonstration of the benign environmental effects of treatment is also likely
to be required.
3.4.4.2 Market access
Agreements under the World Trade Organisation GAIT prevent importing countries
from requiring compliance with environmental standards that do not impact on particular
characteristics of the traded product. Any standards stricter than international standards
must be scientifically justifiable (MAF, 1994, 1995). Trade barriers on the basis of
effluent treatment practices violate these requirements. However, the EU (amongst
3.5 Net Monetary Costs to Model Farmer: Is a Land Based System a Good
Investment?
Table 6: Net Effect
Assumptions underlying Tables 4 to 6.
Average farm size: 70 ha, 196 cows.
If the rules had not been instituted, Environment Waikato would charge ail farmers $200 for effluent
disposal annually, existing non-land based treatment systems in 1994 would have remained in operation,
and all new farmers would have installed pond-based treatment systems.
All new farms since 1994 have installed land based treatment systems
The average size of new farms since 1994 is in the 150 - 250 cow range (NZDG data indicates that the
average size of new farms was 207 and 311 cows in 1994/5 and 1996/7 respectively)
With or without the rules, a new farmer would have to pay a consent application fee to dispose to water.
Of those existing farmers who have changed to land-based disposal since 1994, 500 have installed
travelling irrigator systems applying fresh effluent, 200 utilise contractors to empty ponds and apply the
effluent to the land, and the balance have installed travelling irrigator systems using effluent stored in
ponds. The numbers of farmers are estimated fron data in Environment Waikato files.
In the Tables, the annual operating costs for pond based systems have annualised desludging costs ie, the
$1000 net cost (after allowing for fertiliser benefits) which is incurred every 5 years, has been annualised
to $200 p.a.
Table 5: Consent, Capital and Operating Costs and Benefits Without the Rules
FarmerGp I 2 3a 3b 3c 4
Consent app. 0 250 0 0 0 0
fee
Annual 0 200 0 0 0 0
consent fee
Capital costs 0 0 18,000 0 15,500 18,000
Annualop'g 800 200 800 2400 530 800
costs
Annual nu!'t 1800 0 1800 1200 1200 1800
benefits
Net annual 1000 -400 1000 -1200 670 1000
benefit
Farmer Group I 2&3 4
Consent application fee 0 0 250
Annual consent fee 200 200 200
Capital costs 0 0 4,500
Annual operating costs 800 200 200
Annual nu!'t benefits 1800 0 0
Net annual benefit 800 -400 -400
Farmer Gp I 2 3a 3b 3c 4
Capital costs 0 250 18,000 0 15,500 13,500
Net annual 200 0 1400 -800 1070 1400
benefit
No of farms 2200 -2300 -500 (est) -200 (est) -240 (est) -320
Table 4: Consent, Capital and Operating Costs and Benefits With the Rules
It is interesting that the value ofland based treatment as an investment is as substantial
as it is, given the results of previous studies (O'Neill and Scrimgeour, 1991, Parminter,
1995). The major differences lie in the assessment of fertiliser value (lower in both
earlier studies) and operating costs (higher in both previous studiesS). For large new
farms, the relative costs and benefits of two pond and land based treatment systems are
such that the farmer has sufficient incentive to install land based treatment without the
rules (given that slhe is compelled to install some form of treatment). However, the rate
of return on installation of land based treatment on existing average sized farms is not
high enough to provide sufficient incentive to prompt installation without the rules6
(given average returns). If further benefits to farmers from land based treatment can be
captured (eg, by improved fertiliser and pasture management on treated paddocks) or
demonstrated (eg, trade benefits that are reflected in improved farmer returns),
installation of land based treatment becomes a more attractive investment.
3.5,1 Commentary
A cost-benefit analysis of the three alternative methods presented for converting an
existing pond based system to land-based treatment on the model farm (over 20 years),
indicates that at low discount rates (3-4%), conversion from a two-pond system to a
travelling irrigator system for fresh or stored effluent has a positive net present value.
Farmers who can achieve greater returns from land based treatment (by increasing the
level of fertiliser and production benefits captured to the levels noted in section 3)
generate higher net present values - positive NPVs are achieved at eight to nine percent
discount rates. Farmers who can convert to land-based treatment systems more cheaply
are also able to generate better financial outcomes.
The costs and benefits of the new rules for these four categories are summarised in
Tables 4,5 and 6. As illustrated in the Tables, farmers in categories 3(a), 3(c) and 4 (ie,
existing and new farmers who have installed travelling irrigator systems for fresh and
stored effluent) have incurred significant capital costs, but are also receiving a net annual
return from the fertiliser and production benefits of the systems, which exceed the
operating costs. Farmers who have always used land based treatment systems are better
off since the introduction of the new rules, since the annual consent charge has been
removed.
SThe costs in the current study are derived from interviews with farmers.
60r with the rules for that matter. As noted in Parminter (1995) additional incentives to







4.0 Region-wide Farm-Gate Costs and Benefits of the Rules
There is a wide variation in the costs associated with conversion to land based treatment,
due to the variety of systems that farmers have installed, and the cost savings they have
been able to attain. The calculation of the regional costs and benefits of the rules is
therefore difficult ~ithout a survey of farmers who have installed land-based treatment
systems. However, using the estimates of costs and benefits, and numbers of farmers
summarised in Table 6, an estimate of the farm gate region-wide costs and benefits may
be calculated.
Capital costs of the new rules have been approximately $17.5 million over three years,
with net operating on-farm benefits of nearly $1.7 million per year. Positive Net Present
Values are obtained at discount rates over 7%. At 5% and 10% discount rates, the Net
Present Values are $2.7 million and -$3.1 million respectively. Considerable
improvement to these results are achieved if it is assumed that farmers are able to
capture more of the fertiliser and production benefits.
5.0 Additional Costs and Benefits in the Wider Region
5.1 Cultural Benefits
Under the RMA, regional councils are required to consult with the tangata whenua of
the area affected when preparing policy statements and plans. Environment Waikato,
when consulting Maori in the region regarding the (then) proposed change to the farm
dairy effluent rules, received a reasonably consistent message that direct discharge of
farm effluent to waterways is unacceptable and offensive to Maori interests and values
(Waikato Regional Council, 1994). It is culturally more acceptable to Maori to treat
effluent using land-based treatment systems, than to discharge treated effluent to water.
This is because land based treatment is considered to purifY or spiritually cleanse the
effluent (Huakina Development Trust, 1993). The increase in land based treatment as
a result of the new rules is likely to be a benefit to langala whenua. The level ofbenefit
is difficult to quantify, although there has been some recent research in this area
(Awatere and Scrimgeour, 1998).
5.2 Regional Council Costs
Administration of the new rules has involved communication, consent processing,
monitoring and policing activities, which all have costs associated with them. Some of
these costs would have been incurred with or without the new rules, given that a consent
and monitoring programme was in place before the new rules came into force.
However, the Council has lost income from the annual charges associated with permitted
land based systems, while still incurring the cost of annual inspection of these properties
(at some $25 per visit). The cost in lost income over the past three years has been
estimated at $600,000 (Selvarajah, 1998). The farmers concerned have gained by the
same amount.
The Council has also faced considerable costs associated with promoting the benefits
ofland based disposal, and in funding research into effluent disposal. In addition, the
Council has taken a number of prosecutions against farmers for breaches of the rules,
in most cases successfully. It is not known how much ofthis expenditure would have
been incurred without the new rules, although promotion, research, and prosecutions
were all carried out before 1994, as well as afterwards.
5.3 Surface Water Quality
The changes to Environment Waikato's Transitional Regional Plan in 1994 were
expected to generate significant water quality benefits. The objective ofthe rule change
was a management regime for dairy shed effluent discharges which (inter alia) "results
in a measurable reduction in adverse effects on surface water quality and instream
values, and protects ground water quality" (Waikato Regional Council, 1994, p.8). A
reduction in point source effluent discharges to the streams and rivers of the region of
the magnitude described in Table I, could reasonably be expected to result in a
measurable improvement in water quality. However, initial analyses by Environment
Waikato staff have yielded results with no overall pattem (pers comm., Tony Fenton and
Bill Vant, Environment Waikato, June 1998). The indicators focussed on to date have
been the levels of nitrogen and phosphorus in the region's waterways. The results,
corrected for variations in flow, are very "noisy" ie, the levels fluctuate over a very wide
range.
Changes in the levels of nitrogen, phosphorus and chlorophyll a' in the Waikato River
since 1987 (or 1990 in the case of nitrogen) are summarised in Table 7.
Table 7: Changes in the nutrient and chlorophyll a levels in the Waikato River
Indicator Time period Average annual % change
Total nitrogen 1990 - 1997 - 3.8%
Total phosphorus 1987 - 1997 +2.2%
Chlorophyll a 1987 - 1997 +5.4%
Source: Waikato Regional Council, 1998.
The levels of the two nutrients have moved in opposite directions, with chlorophyll a
increasing, possibly in response to the increased phosphate levels (Waikato Regional
Council, 1998).
The Waikato River integrates water quality changes across the region, so is a useful
'Chlorophyll a levels indicate the level of algae in the water. Recent blooms of blue-
green algae in one of the river's hydro lakes (and less commonly in the river itself) have
concerned the Regional Council. High phosphorus levels are conducive to outbreaks of blue-





indicator of changes in the overall state of the region's waterways. However, a large
number of factors influence water quality in the river, most of them unrelated to the
discharge of farm dairy effluent, and many ofwhich have changed in various ways since
the introduction of the new rules. In order to overcome some of the problem of
variability in nutrient in-flows from non-dairying sources, investigation of the sub-
catchments where dairying is the major source of point discharges, was also carried out
by Environment Waikato staff (pers comm., Tony Fenton and Bill Vant, Environment
Waikato, June 1998). However, trends in the sub-catchments (and in the individual
waterways) are equally as ambiguous as those in the Waikato River. In some sub-
catchments, nitrogen levels have increased and phosphorus levels have fallen; in other
sub-catchments the reverse trends were observed. Overall, the number of sites that have
shown an improvement in nutrient levels is similar to the number of sites that have
shown a deterioration.
A number of factors may have contributed to this unexpected result:
Increasing intensification of dairy farm management, and increasing
numbers of cows in the region as a whole, have increased the total
amount of effluent generated in the region. Stock numbers per hectare
on the MAF Farm Monitoring model Waikato dairy farm have increased
steadily over the period between 1993/4 and 1997/98. Similarly, the
number of cows in the Livestock Improvement's South Auckland,
Central Plateau and Western Uplands statistical areas8 has increased
from 1,081,395 in 1993/94 to 1,145,910 in 1996/97 (Livestock
Improvement, 1997), an increase of some 6%.
It is likely that application rates of nitrogenous and phosphate fertilisers
have also increased over the period. The fertiliser company BOP
Fertiliser, which supplies most of the fertiliser for the Waikato and Bay
of Plenty, has increased sales of fertiliser nutrients over the period from
1993/4 to 199617, from 32,511 to 44,098 tonnes of nitrogen, and from
32,511 to 49,371 tonnes of phosphorus. The company estimates that
application of nitrogen per dairy farm increased from 53 kglha to 58
kglha between 1995/6 and 199617, while phosphate applications
remained steady (BOP Fertiliser, 1996, 1997). The increased quantities
of fertiliser nutrients applied in the region increase the likelihood of
nutrients finding their way into waterways (whether through direct run-
off, leaching into groundwater that seeps into waterways, or more
indirect routes).
The relative importance of farm dairy effluent and other sources of
nutrients on water quality may be such that any impact from the change
in rules is overwhelmed. Recent estimates by Environment Waikato
suggest that point sources of nutrients (such as farm dairy effluent
8These statistical regions cover almost the same local government districts as the
Regional Council except that part of Franklin District is included in the local government region
(but excluded by Livestock Improvement) and Ruapehu District is excluded from the local
government region but included by Livestock Improvement).
discharges from ponds) make up only 30% of the nutrient load of the
Waikato River (Waikato Regional Council, 1998). In addition, there are
significant point sources9 other than farm dairy effluent discharges,
which further attenuate the impact ofa reduction in effluent discharges.
In-stream processes may be more complex than initially thought. If
nutrient levels discharged into stream and rivers are dropping (and this
is debatable given the factors listed above), nutrient levels in streams
may be maintained by the release of stored nutrients.
Groundwater seepage from shallow aquifers into surface streams and
rivers is a significant source of flow in some parts of the catchment,
especially during low flow periods. Changes in the nutrient loading in
shallow aquifers may therefore impact on surface water quality.
Increased fertiliser applications, stocking intensity and land-based
application of effluent itself'° may all have increased the level of
nutrients in shallow aquifers. However, water quality trends in shallow
aquifers in the catchment are not available in order to test this
hypothesis.
In summary, it is not possible to clearly demonstrate any water quality improvement as
a result of the change in farm dairy effluent rules. However, this is not to imply that
there have been no water quality benefits. The available data on changes in stock
numbers and fertiliser rates in the region suggest that without the rules, surface water
quality may well have deteriorated more than it has, or not improved by as much as it
has (depending on the catchment). It may be necessary to use modelling techniques,
such as those being used in the Toenepi catchment (Waikato Regional Council, 1995),
to isolate the impact of the rules. Nonetheless, the lack ofa demonstrable increase in
water quality (as measured by nutrient levels) indicates that water quality improvements
in the future are likely to be achieved by addressing issues other than farm dairy effluent
treatment. The link with ground water quality is worthy of further investigation.
'1'wenty percent ofthe "growing season" mass flow oftotal N in the Waikato River (from
all sources, point and non-point) at Mercer is derived from three major point sources - the
Kinleith pulp and paper mill, the Hamilton Water Pollution Control Plant, and the AFFCO
Horotiu meat processing plant. The growing season is the period from January to May during
which algae grow in the river. At five-year low flows (Q5), the three point sources contribute
45% of the N mass flow at Mercer (Vant and Bellingham, 1997). This is consistent with the
observation that during dry periods (when Q5 flows may occur), many farm dairy effluent ponds
do not discharge (Selvarajah, 1995), so the contribution from this source is lower.
10Although the maximum level of N allowed under the rules has been carefully set to
minimise leaching of nutrients into groundwater, poorly managed land based treatment is able






This paper has reported on the intervention by the Waikato Regional Council in the form
ofthe change in farm dairy effluent treatment rules. The intervention has been highly
successful in terms of changing farmer behaviour. Many farmers in the region have
incurred considerable capital costs to instaUland based systems, and are now reaping
a net annual benefit. For some farmers, who can install systems cheaply, and/or are able
to capture most of the fertiliser and production benefits, and/or who gain from
economies of scale, the investment in land based treatment is a profitable one, that they
may not have made without the information and encouragement (monetary and
otherwise) supplied by the Regional Council.
Previous studies have found that land based treatment systems run at a net operating
loss. The current study has used an improved methodology for assessing fertiliser
benefits, and a revised assessment of system operating costs based on farmer experience,
and improved technology, with the net result that land based systems are estimated to
run at a net operating surplus.
The paper has also assessed the region-wide impacts at the farm-gate. The effect of the
rules is more positive (in investment terms) at the regional than at the level of the
individual farmer who has converted to land based systems, because of the addition to
the equation offarmers who have always used land based treatment (who no longer pay
consent charges), and new farmers.
However, the rules were not designed primarily to encourage farmers to make a
management change that the Regional Council believed was in their best interests. The
rule change was an intervention aimed primarily at improving water quality. That water
quality has not shown a clear pattern of improvement across the catchment is
unfortunate, but understandable given the complexities of the land-water system in the
region, and the changes in land use intensity over the period. It may be necessary to use
modelling techniques to isolate the impact of the rules. However, the relatively low
importance of farm dairy effluent as a source of nutrient load to the region as a whole
is highlighted by these results (although for some individual - particularly small -
waterways farm dairy effluent may be a more important source). Further measurable
reductions in nutrient levels in the region's waterways are unlikely to be achieved by
further reductions in the number of pond/ditch based treatment systems.
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SUMMARY
Our work in the Meat Act area to date has covered some interesting issues about: the rigour of good
legislation, the challenge of melding minds, team work, etc. We want to reflect on a few lessons
learned. We don't have all the answers, but we hope to be able to share some concerns, some ideas
and stimulate discussion. The areas covered are:
• Need to have clear concepts
• Don't presume - seek external advice
• Gain a common understanding of issues
• Principles and consistency
• What really matters in the team
• Be aware of critical drivers
This paper shares some of our experience in the public sector policy development arena, and may
perhaps stimulate some interest in public sector policy work as a career.
Key words: policy development, team, Meat Act, principles.
INTRODUCTION
Contextk.w.ork.DILa..nCl\CMeaIAct
The policy work that is used to draw examples from for this paper is the development of a new Meat
Act to replace the current Meat Act 1981. Meat legislation establishes the legal framework relating to
the technical operation ofmeat slaughtering and processing businesses in New Zealand and covers
the domestic market and export trade.
The 1981 Act has been amended many times and is widely acknowledged by lawyers, policy
advisors, industry participants and others, to lack cohesion and require rewriting rather than
amendment. Two key factors contributing to the push to rewrite the 1981 Act now, are:
(a) The 1981 Act does not reflect the current knowledge and thinking on food risk management
such as Hazard Analysis at Critical Control Point principles. The result is that New Zealand's
industry is currently constrained by historic methods. If New Zealand is to enhance its
protection ofpublic health and enable its industries to compete with countries that are able to
apply more efficient modem risk management systems, then the fundamental precepts of the
meat regulatory regime must be rewritten.
(b) Cabinet has recently agreed to a regulatory model that sets out the functional sbucture that is
being, and will continue to be applied across New Zealand's food industries. The integration
of this functional sbucture into law is critical to its implementation across industries. Key
functions are:
(i) Regulatory Function (standard setting, audit, official assurances, enforcement,
approvals) - tasks performed by the regulatory agency.
(ii) Verification Function - tasks performed by non-public sector "persons" accredited by
Government who are employed by "agencies" recognised by Government.
(iii) Industries - that establish risk management programmes and provide front-line
inspection.
(c) In accordance with this regulatory model, Cabinet has also recently agreed to the resbucture
ofMAF Quality Management. This reform will enable the devolution of front-line meat
inspection tasks from MAF to the meat companies themselves. The new Meat Act needs to
reflect this state of devolution.
NEED TO HAVE CLEAR CONCEPTS
At the outset, it is worth stating that it is absolutely critical for the smooth development ofpolicy that
clear concept "stakes" are established early in the process. These need to be tested so that advisors
can be certain that they are workable and sufficient to provide enduring direction to the ongoing
policy development process.
ClellLConcepts
Clear concepts were set out for the new Meat Act by doing two things.
First a statement ofpurpose was developed. This was done after an early draft of an overview paper
for the new Meat Act had been written. The overview paper discussed matters such as why we
needed a Meat Act in New Zealand, drivers for reform, coverage of the new Act etc. Thus the project
team members held a reasonably common understanding of what the new Meat Act was about.
The writing of the purpose statement was basically a team effort using a whiteboard. This meant it
was a very open process and afforded the opportunity to discuss ideas, phrases and words. The
purpose statement that we developed for the new Meat Act is a three fold statement being:
Establish a statutoryframework under which responsibilities are created and discharged in a
way that wi//:
(i) Provide for the management ofrisks to human and animal health from the
consumption or use ofanimal material by requiring that only animal products that
are ''fit for purpose" are traded and used;
(ii) Facilitate entry ofanimal products to overseas markets by providing the controls
and/or mechanisms needed to give official assurances in accordance with the
requirements offoreign Governments; and
(iii) Safeguard the integrity ofNew Zealand's risk management systems and official
assurances in regard to animal products
Second, a series ofprinciples was developed - also a collective team effort. These principles are not
intended to be part of the new Meat Act. Rather they have been used to guide the development of the
policy. The principles were put to Government in a lead paper on the policy development. They
have since become a touch-stone for ourselves.
The principles are:
one: that animal product that is traded must be ''fit for purpose". Being ''fit for purpose"
means the animal product meets the appropriate New Zealand standardfor that animal
product given a particular use;
two: compliance with an approved risk management programmers) is to be evidence that the
appropriate New Zealand standard has been met;




four: that there be mutual recognition ofrisk management programmes under the Meat Act
andfood safety programmes under the Food Act /98/;
five: Government's activities in relation to the risk management system and official
assurances in regard to animal products sfrall be resourced in accordance with cost
recovery principles taking into account Government-wide developments in this area;
six: the new Meat Act is to be enabling and not prescriptive with flexibility and responsiveness
to change being provided by the use ofrisk management programmes and allowing the
necessary detail to be promulgated as required in subordinate legislation; and
seven: the substantive provisions related to powers, duties, enforcement and cost recovery will be
contained in the Act.
Workable and.sufficient
The process of establishing clear concepts also needs to include some testing to ensure that what the
policy analysts come up with are in fact workable and sufficient. In our case this was done through
consultation.
Government departments were consulted in a two stage process. One, a presentation was given where
the general concepts were explained to officials, and matters of concern were raised and discussed.
Two, the usual process ofcirculating the draft Cabinet papers that contained the purpose statement
and policy principles for formal comment. This two stage process meant that when the Cabinet
papers were circulated, they and their content, were expected and understood by officials in other
departments.
However, the real test of the concepts came from discussing them with various industry and consumer
groups through a series ofpublic consultation meetings. Those invited to the consultation meetings
included representatives from 29 different industry organizations, 12 Maori groups and 17 consumer
organizations. In addition, the general public was invited to two of the consultation meetings through
public notices placed nationally.
In general, the feedback from all the meetings endorsed the concepts embodied in the purpose
statement and the policy principles. Specific concerns were raised by consumers and union
representatives, and these were taken into consideration. The meetings also highlighted the
industries' desire to see the new Meat Act implemented as soon as possible.
Discussionpoints andllenefits:
The benefits ofestablishing clear concept "stakes "early in the process include:
- all team members clearly understand what the work is about and can hold a common vision ofthe
outcome;
- there is confidence that the policy detail can be developed as a "cascade"from the concept
stakes, in fact concept "stakes "have been continually referred to throughout the policy drafting
process.
Note that we wrote some ofthe principles in a very general way and others in a more specific way.
This was to avoid the need to alter them, and so far we haven't; however a measure offlexibility must
be allowedfor.
DON'T PRESUME· SEEK EXTERNAL ADVICE
Role.ofNon,public-serY.&nts
When the policy to provide for contestability of the verification function was agreed by Cabinet in
1996, the extension ofcompliance powers to non-public servants was seen as a necessary step for
implementation. It was envisaged that the non-public servant verifier would, through the process of
being authorised, be empowered directly by law to exercise the powers that MAF officers currently
have. The constitutional ramifications were not discussed with external legal advisors.
As policy for the new Meat Act developed, the notion of giving non-public sector persons powers
was questioned. MAF sought guidance from the Legislative Advisory Committee (LAC). In short,
LAC's preliminary and indicative view was that legislated powers would be best exercised by state
sector persons only. LAC noted that the Food Act 1981 arrangement which relies mainly on
monitoring and reporting non-compliance to the regulator while constitutionally acceptable, might
not deliver satisfactory risk management outcomes in the animal product industries. The consensus
view was that verifiers under the new Meat Act regime, need some "plank of authority" to adequately
perform their duties.
The policy development objective therefore became to establish law for a verification system where:
a) non-public servants can perform the verification activities with sufficient authority and with
the necessary immediacy ofaction to ensure that risks are adequately managed and therefore,
the public health ofthe consumer is not compromised;
Some animal material and animal products pose a high risk to public health. The scale and
speed of animal material processing operations is such that significant economic losses are
associated with any suspension ofa process. Therefore, it is important that non-compliance
events are able to be handled firmly and immediately to ensure the prompt re-establishment of
compliance.
b) non-public servants can perform the verification activity effectively; and
This part of the objective simply recognises that while a key driver for contestability is
economic efficiency, from the perspective of the regulator it is imperative that third party
service providers efIecti\'cly deliver the verification function.
c) there is no unacceptable departure from constitutional norms.
The system must be legal and meet accepted societal norms in relation to the business and
regulatory environment. It is unacceptable for the new Meat Act to create a "private police
force".
The solution to this policy dilemma could be to provide third party verifiers with the authority to
exercise some limited form of coercion is the risk management programme itself.
It has always been recognised that a part of the risk management programme would involve reference
to verification. This concept was expanded so that a pre-condition of approval of the risk
management programme will be a requirement to:
identify the verification agency;
outline the verifiers rights and the actions that could be undertaken; and
incorporate reference to performance based verification specifications.
Thus, the risk management programme is a means ofunderpinning the contractual relationship
between the operator and the verifier whereby the operator effectively authorises the verifier to
exercise certain "rights". Those "rights" would detail exactly what the verifier can do: what actions
they can take, or direct, and what is the trigger and means of involving the regulator. If the operator
prevents the verifier from exercising those rights, by say refusing entry, then they would be in breach




What signals that a previously accepted policy concept may no longer be acceptable?
Can we learn from equivalent third party verification systems. or from the experience ofother
countries?
Ifin doubt - test it out!
GAIN A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF ISSUES
This area is one that continually surprised. Having worked on a particular policy issue in the team
over a period of time, one team member would make a statement that would profoundly shift the
thinking of the entire team - the point is that such "profound" statements were simply related to
getting a common understanding of issues. Getting a common starting place based on fact is critical.
The team had little problem with the concepts, but there were misunderstandings relating to the law
(or administrative position) in regard to specific issues.
The following example highlights how such divergent views can develop. The example relates to the
review of the policy for the treatment of "home kill" meat under the new Meat Act.
''Home kill'Jssue:
The detail of the policy relating to the "home-kill" of animal product, and the control of illegal meat
needed review in light of the new Meat Act's risk management system and also because the current
sub-system of control over illegal meat is complex, and has proven to be of limited effectiveness.
The basic policy position reflected in the Meat Act 1981 is that the sale of uninspected meat is
prohibited. The Meat Act 1981 also expressly states that:
any person who owns stock can slaughter it, or have it slaughtered, on their own premises
provided that the meat is not sold or intended for sale;
farmers are permitted to sell their meat to any person employed in connection with the farming
business on any farm owned or occupied by the farmer;
farmers can have stock slaughtered and dressed in licensed custom killing premises, again on the
condition that the meat is not sold; and
in regard to game, the sale of game as 'meat' that has not been derived from a licensed game
packing house (or licensed deer slaughter premises) is prohibited, with the exception that a host
may sell a cooked game meal to a guest when the game was personally bagged by that guest or the
host.
In addition to the Meat Act 1981, the Food Hygiene Regulations 1974 permit the use offood
premises (such as butcher shops) for the processing of meat not intended for sale provided stringent
conditions of separation, labelling, and inventory control are observed and a warning notice is
conspicuously displayed. Farmers, in particular, use the facilities offered by butchers to have stock
slaughtered and processed into meat packs to take home.
From the above it should be clear that to start the process of reviewing the "home kill" policy for the
new Meat Act the project team members needed to be clear on the current policy position.
Having discussed "home kill", sometimes to the point of quite definite disagreement about the
acceptance of various policy positions, perhaps on three or four occasions, the penny dropped! While
the Meat Act 1981 expressly states that any person who owns stock can slaughter it, or have it
slaughtered, on their own premises provided that the meat is not sold or intended for sale, about half
the project team understood that this right related to only farmers.
DisCllssion:
Why the misunderstanding:
On reflection, there were three contributing/actors: the genuine complexity 0/the law, the existence
ofan Amendment Bill, and team dynamics.
(a) Complexity ofthe issue: the current law is complex. To piece together the "home lcill" policy
one needs to refer to several sections in the Meat Act/98/ (including the definitions) and the
Food Hygiene Regulations made under the Food Act. Further, the current "legal" situation is
underscored by case history relating to MAF's enforcement activity in this area.
(b) The existence ofan Amendment Bill: because the current law is not working effectively, a
complex redraft was prepared in 1995 under what was the Meat Amendment Bill /995. This
amendment will not proceed as it has been replaced by the drafting ofa new Meat Act.
However. the earlier work on the Meat Amendment Bill was a key contributor to the
misunderstanding because to some team members the policy position that was to have been
implemented through the amendment was the starting point.
(c) Team dynamics: the most vocal influence the views ofthe teams and in this instance some team
members fonned their views based on the discussion rather than checking the law.
What can minimise misunderstandings:
Exercise discipline -
don't presume that there is a common understanding ofissues
be prepared to ask the "silly" questions
be alert to a discussion that tends to go "round and round"
check the facts for yourself-do the research, check earlier policy material such as Cabinet
minutes, relevant legislation etc. test assertions to see whether they can be substantiated by
empirical data - basically scrutinise all issues.
PRINCIPLES AND CONSISTENCY
Provisions in legislation can be structured in such a way that they enable those operating under those
provisions to work in accordance with a ''process''. The law sets out how you can do a certain thing.
Sometimes the process deliberately allows for a measure of flexibility, other times it may be very
prescriptive.
It is our view that where provisions establish a "process", and there is a measure of flexibility, then
the empowering provisions should contain principles to establish a useful framework to guide the use
of the "process". The benefit is greater accountability and transparency, and consistency in the
application ofsuch provisions.






The current Meat Act 1981 cost recovery regime and process provides for the most comprehensive
recovery from any industry. It enables:
the recovery of direct and indirect costs of MAF's meat services, in respect of every season,
allowing for adjustments between seasons of any shortfall or surplus in cost recovery from the
previous season;
amounts to be recovered from a category ofprocessors in related to the service received by
that category ofprocessors;
a generic contract to be created for each category of processors, and then in tum for that
generic contract to be made specific to each individual processor;
consultation to occur with recognised representative organisations in regard to the activities to
be cost recovered.
Having regard to the current cost recovery regimes under other legislation and their application, it is
obvious that the funding processes are not consistent across Government.
In general, cost recovery empowering provisions are often brief in stating that the costs of services or
activities can be recovered from private beneficiaries, and then a levy and/or fee making Regulation
is empowered. Thus, generally, cost recovery provisions provide for the means of cost recovery (eg
contracts, fees, levies) but lack meaningful guidance as to what costs should be funded under cost
recovery, and what should be considered in selecting the preferred recovery mechanism when several
are provided for.
Such treatment ofcost recovery results in very little regard being given to the economic principles
underpinning cost recovery, rather it advances the practise that cost recovery be dealt with only as an
accounting exercise. The result is to create divergence and conflict in the cost recovery regimes
established by different government agencies.
To address this concern for the new Meat Act, it is proposed to insert guiding principles into the cost
recovery provision to assist in the application of the provision.
Cost recovery principles need to address: whether costs should be recovered; from whom they should
be recovered; and the mechanisms which should be used to effect cost recovery. For example, the
following principles (not a complete listing) will assist in the allocation of costs under the new Meat
Act:
Equity: Outputs of a public good nature should be funded by the Crown. Private good
services should be funded by those who receive the benefit of the service (beneficiaries) or
who cause the service to be required. Cost-sharing may apply where there is a mix ofpublic
and private interests.
Efficiency: Overall, efficiency considerations ensure that the maximum benefits are
delivered at minimum cost. Cost recovery drives efficiency in two ways. First, recovery of
costs causes users of services to consider how they can reduce the incidence ofcosts by
altering the way they do business. Second, it causes users to question and challenge the need
for, and efficiency of, the services they acquire. Further cost recovery should itselfbe
efficient in that the costs to be recovered should exceed the costs of recovery.
Transparency: Ifefficiency gains are to be made through cost recovery the service provider
must be required to supply costing information openly and transparently. Users must be
consulted on the costs to be recovered.
Discussionl'oinIs:
The benefits are:
the Ministry will be able to present a clear case to the Governmentfor appropriation ofthe
public benefit activities undertaken in accordance with the new Meat Act. This will ensure
that Government is able to make more informed decisions in regard to appropriation. and
greater transparency will result;
the choice ofservice provider. and investment decisions in the industry. will not be influenced
by cost recovery disparities across enterprises and sectors.
Are principles in the policy development process a useful tool?
Are principles in law a useful tool? Yes in terms ofguiding the administration by the department
concerned - less so in terms ofinfluencing others including politicians and other policy advisory
departments.
Really. how important is consistency? Consistency. while a driver, is not ofitselfthe key priority.
Consistency is often not about law; but the way in which the law is applied.
WHAT REALLY MATTERS IN THE TEAM
Two major divisions of MAF - Policy and the Regulatory Authority - are involved in the
development of policy for the new Meat Act. The core Project Team comprises a Team Leader from
MAF Policy; 2 MAF lawyers; 5 MAFRA technical persons; 2 MAF policy analysts; I Ministry of
Health representative; and a contracted policy advisor. The Project Team is supplemented by others
within MAF depending on the issues, including policy analysts from other work areas, and directors.
The Team met at approximately weekly intervals over a 4-month period in order to develop the 3
"lead" papers that have now been approved by Cabinet. The meetings ran for approximately 2-3
hours. Each of these papers has therefore taken about 100 person-hours of meeting lime alone to
reach "Cabinet-ready" stage.
In March of this year, in order to accelerate progress on the remaining 7-8 Cabinet papers, and to
ensure that the Bill is ready for introduction to Parliament by November, the Team began to meet
twice-weekly.
The degree of sustained effort that is necessary to develop new legislation may be a surprise to
colleagues who have not had first-hand experience of the policy development process. Group
processes can be time-consuming, but the pay-off should be policy robustness. An atmosphere of
creative tension between "regulators", who have responsibility for administering the present Act and
are fully familiar with how the existing institutions work, and ''policy makers", who have in-depth
knowledge ofcurrent Government policy settings indicates that people are thinking hard about the
issues being discussed.
There is possibly nothing unique in team management for new legislation, but the demands on the
entire process means that it is critical to get a "good" team. Some of the key ingredients are:
getting the best mix ofpeople (policy generalists, technical experts, etc);
getting people that can work together;
creating an atmosphere that encourages sharing/challenging of ideas;
internal support for resourcing the project;
authority to proceed;






The collective drafting ofthe purpose statement and principles has taken time. but there are
a number ofbenefits from an "open" effort. They include:
, all team members get to input and a collective result is always superior to that ofan
individual;
all team members get exposed to the "wisdom" ofthe discussion;
there is greater likelihood ofall team members clearly understanding what the words
mean;
there is greater likelihood that the acceptability ofthe purpose will endure and;
reduced chance oftime-consuming relitigation within the Group at a later stage.
How useful are GANTT charts as a project management tool in policy work?
BE AWARE OF CRITICAL DRIVERS
There are a number of factors that are critical drivers for the policy development process that all
public sector policy analysts should be aware of. The following discussion points do not provide a
comprehensive check list. Rather they serve to illustrate how policy analysts can work to ensure that
their effort is effective.·
Discussionl'oints:
Get the basics write (right!):
Use training material on policy development.
Follow general procedural matters and requirements ofthe Cabinet Committee process,
such as the Cabinet Office Manual.
Talk to other colleagues: eg level ofdetail ofrecommendations eg rescind earlier decisions




Net national benefit test.
Use your political antenna:
Basically, spend some time thinking outside ofthe technical policy development box.
Consider the political acceptability ofpolicy WITHOUT compromising professional
integrity.





Queuing for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Import Requests:
Can political interference and bureaucratic delays be removed?
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Abstract
International trade in the post Uruguay Round environment has an ongoing problem with
non-tariff barriers. This paper looks at the principles, issues and procedures that could be
adopted to promote a transparent and efficient system for decision making on import
applications for plants, animals and food products that is consistent with the objectives and
principles of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement while recognising the reality
of limited resources. The answer is found, as much as can be, in orthodox micro-economic
reform including increased transparency and accountability and a more market oriented
approach.
Background
New Zealand is protected from foreign pests and diseases through an integrated system of
measures described as biosecurity. The Biosecurity Act 1993 provides the legal framework
for the biosecurity system. The Ministry of Agriculture Regulatory Authority (MAF Reg) is
responsible for managing biosecurity risks to the agricultural sector. All animals, plants and
animal and plant products are prohibited entry into New Zealand, unless an Import Health
Standard (IHS) has been issued in accordance with the Biosecurity Act. For example, an IHS
can be issued if the plant is already contained on a list of plants from various countries
allowed entry into New Zealand. If the plant is not contained on the list held by MAF, a risk
analysis must be completed to decide whether or not to allow importation.
The Biosecurity Act requires that decisions about importation should take into account the
possible effects of an unwanted organism on people, the environment and the economy.
And it requires New Zealand's international obligations, such as the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) be taken into
account.
Demand for negotiating technical conditions for market access for agricultural products and
the preparation of IHS's, often exceeds the available resources of the responsible national
authority. Thus countries receiving requests to process such applications, find it necessary
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to assign priority order to them. Because imports of agricultural products are often
politically sensitive the procedures adopted for setting of these priorities can be used as non-
tariff barriers i.e. extensive delays. Our purpose in this paper therefore, is to investigate the
possibility of establishing a transparent, efficient and consistent policy framework for
allocating priorities to lessen the opportunity for such actions.
We review current practise, consider the principles that should underpin policy, discuss
issues arising from the experience of dealing with SPS measures and develop a set of
procedures that could form the foundation for an improved system for dealing with SPS
requests and issuing IHSs.
Literature review
A survey of literature was little help in addressing the queuing issue. The WTO results of
the Uruguay Round (WTO, 1994) and the legal texts on the SPS Agreement (WTO, 1995a)
offer only generalities on the time frames for dealing with applications for IHSs. The WTO
Committee on SPS measures has addressed the risk analysis issue (WTO, 1995b), the issue of
consistency (WTO, 1996), and there has been some preliminary internal work done on
general guidelines but not that of setting priorities for processing IHSs.
New Zealand's approach to the WTO SPS Agreement is set out in the MAF publication
Surveillance Vol 23, No.3 (MAF,1996). MAF also publish various articles on agricultural
security and the SPS Agreement in Sentinel (MAF, 1997b). Once IHSs are determined the
provisions are published, see for example the New Zealand Embryo Standard (MAF, 1993).
The New Zealand phytosanitary system for plants is set out in MAF (1997c), however, it
does not address the issue of how priorities are set for assessing applications. On the meat
and seafood side a priority setting mechanism has been set up for specification development
programmes (MAF, 1995), but not for SPS requests.
Because of New Zealand's high dependence on agricultural trade a very close involvement
is maintained with trade liberalisation issues and often leads the way in developments of
new policy and procedures (see for example McKenzie, 1997). New Zealand is a world
leader in the area of establishing sound technical procedures based on quantitative and
qualitative risk analysis for assessing applications for IHSs (MacDiarmid, 1991 and 1994,
McKenzie 1996 and Hathaway, 1997).
MAF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) have highlighted the trade
opportunities (MAF/MFAT, 1997) and setout the technical barriers to trade (MFAT, 1997)
arising from the SPS Agreement.
Australia recently reviewed its quarantine services (Nairn et ai, 1996) and although the
review did not address a priority setting mechanism for SPS access requests directly, it did
consider the issues of time in the area of risk analysis. The Review Committee
recommended, inter alia, that each Risk Analysis Panel (RAP) develop a specific timetable
with deadlines for each stage of consideration of an import access request, for agreement
with relevant registered stakeholders (see pages 93 -101). Submissions registered a plea for
consultation with stakeholders and an input in setting priorities. The Review Committee
considered this was consistent with the new culture advocated with its focus on national




The review considered the principles that should determine priority for access to be:
The extent to which Australia would benefit from the proposed import
The source of the import access request
The quality of the application and supporting documents
The time the application had been before the Board.
The SPS Agreement clearly places an obligation on members of WTO to deal with market
access requests in an efficient and expeditious manner. But overall there is very little
information about current administration systems and procedures for consideration of
import applications by various countries.
All signs indicate gaining consensus at the international level on consistent and accepted
procedures based on the types of principles discussed later in this paper being a
considerable challenge.
Learning from other queuing problems
The problem of prioritising the queue for SPS requests is similar to the queuing problem for
medical surgery or to obtain regulatory consents in the land development and building
industries.
In the medical area the problem is tackled by separating those who can pay from those who
can't. Those who can pay go to private consultants and pay the full cost of the operation or
they take out medical insurance which ensures they can by-pass the state system and have
an operation if required. Those who cannot pay wait in the state funded queue. Various
types of operations have quotas and people are taken in chronological order until the quota
is used up for the current financial year. Under certain circumstances it is possible to jump
the queue, for example, if the condition is life threatening or if the level of pain is greater
than normal for that condition.
In the land development and building area a similar market is developing whereby those
who are prepared to pay an additional fee can have their application fast tracked. There is
also a proposal for councils to accredit consultants to carry out regulatory functions such as
issuing permits.
Implementing a queuing system
Our review suggests the following framework for developing a queuing scheme.
Guiding prindples: The identification and definition of a set of guiding principles. These
would-be drawn from work carried out to date in various international fora, combined with
New Zealand's general approach to international obligations and way of working.
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Issues: Identification of the issues needing to be addressed in developing a workable
scheme. These include the practical realities of day-to-day matters which impinge on the
effectiveness of implementation of an import queuing regime.
Working Polices and Procedures: A set of working policies and procedures which are
derived from the principles and issues already identified. These would form the main
substance of the scheme and ideally be developed by working from the principles and
issues, combining that information with the practical knowledge already gained by MAF
personnel and therefore available from within the Ministry.
In essence the outline of the queuing scheme could be a set of principles, a list of issues and
a set of working policies and procedures. All three will contain issues relating to the process
of the system, together with issues relating to the substance of the matters at hand.
Principles
The following is a set of draft principles that has been compiled following a review of the
SPS Agreement, other relevant papers and discussions with stakeholders.
New Zealand's international responsibilities and treaty obligations will be respected.
New Zealand's plant and animal health status will be protected giving due
consideration to the economic, social and environmental risks involved.
Affects on the volume and value of trade flows will be considered before decisions
are made as part of normal risk analysis.
Wherever possible, judgements will be made on the basis of sound scientific
principles and knowledge.
Applications will be processed in a fair and transparent manner in accordance with
published policies and procedures.
Applications will be processed as fast as resources and satisfaction of the risk profile
allow.
Parties having an interest in decisions or changing conditions will be kept informed
in a reasonable time and manner.
Decisions will be made subject to review.
Issues
The following issues have been identified as likely to impact on the effectiveness of a
queuing scheme.
Increased world trade and new patterns of trade resulting in increased demand for
decisions on market access.







Increased demand and limited resources leading to unacceptable delays in decisions
being made.
Increased use of technical, non-tariff barriers as WTO agreements come into effect.
Increased global competition leading to industry pressures and/or political
interference.
Lack of sufficient scientific knowledge to make informed decisions.
Increased government focus on cost recovery as a way of funding government
services.
Differing circumstances in each country leading to the need for acceptance of
equivalent rather than absolute procedures.
The ponderous nature of international dispute settlement procedures.
The variable levels of technical expertise and scientific knowledge in exporting
countries.
Natural suspicion on behalf of interested parties on the fairness of any procedure
and the need for openness and transparency.
Policies & procedures
In this section we set out a number of options for managing the queuing problem. The
issues that arise from adopting each option and the consequences are then elaborated on.
Our approach is to address the problem in two stages. The first stage is to separate the
personal or non-strategic requests (i.e. domestic pets and one off minor requests) from
requests that have a strategic or national impact. National requests are those which have
significant trade or economic implications for either the exporting or the importing country.
It is likely the personal or non-strategic requests could account for a significant proportion of
the volume. If these can be dealt with separately in the private sector then this could free up
scarce resource in the national authority to focus on the requests of national significance.
Options to improve performance
Option 1 • Chronological order for personal imports
Description: For personal import requests priorities would be determined on the
chronological order in which they are received. The priority order list of applicants would
be publicly available along with the actual performance achieved from month to month by
the national authority in issuing or declining an IHS. The time frame for processing
individual personal requests would be determined by the resources allocated to the personal
request ~ategory. The actual level of resources devoted to personal requests in total would
be a political decision and be justified on that basis.
The national authority's available resources for personal requests could be augmented by
accrediting consultants to perform the analysis. Consultants operating in a competitive
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environment would be paid by the applicant. This would leave the national authority with
the responsibility for scrutinising the analysis and issuing the IHS. The national authority
would also be responsible for setting the standards for the consultants, accrediting them and
auditing their performance.
Issues: Transparency and fairness would be provided by the national authority issuing a
statement setting out the output performance targets for the personal category. For
example, a national authority could issue 10 personal category IHS's per month. If
consultants are able to be accredited the Government should be able to devote less resources
than otherwise and move applicants into a user pays environment.
Consequences: Using chronological order is the least complicated approach. It would be
perceived to be the fairest approach by those whose request has a relatively small impact on
trade flows, but carrying major risks. Applicants would be able to see where they are on the
list and be given an indication as to when the processing of their application would be
completed. Past performance by the national authority would give validity to the estimated
completion date. National authorities would be made accountable for performance. In a
user pays environment those people able to pay are likely to obtain a faster service than
those on the national authority list, and accrediting consultants will avoid any user-pays
conflicts within government. If all requests go on to a user pays basis those unable to pay
will be penalised.
Option 2 - Chronological order for national category requests
Description: Use chronological order for national category requests. Under the
transparency criteria national authorities should, in processing applications, make public
their best estimate of when the decision on issuing the IHS is to be made.
Issues: The major problem with the chronological approach is that when the process starts
is not a good indicator of priority for national category requests. The real test is when
consideration of the request is completed and the yes/no decision made on the IHS. In fact
it is this milestone which is the key indicator of the position in the queue. As far as
applicants are concerned they want to know when their IHS is to be issued and how this
ranks with other applicants.
Consequences: The chronological order approach does not take into account the cost of time
delays to applications having a major potential impact on trade flows or where other
sovereign issues are at stake. The latter might include Pacific Island trade issues which are
seen as being of considerable importance to New Zealand's international obligations. A
chronological approach would inevitably lead to external pressures building to an
intolerable level and the system breaking down. It is not recommended as the basis for
setting priorities for national category requests.
Option 3 - Adopt a global CBA perspective for national type requests
Description: Under this option each import request of a national significance either from the
importing or exporting country perspective would have a cost benefit analysis (CBA)
undertaken from a global perspective. The requests would then be ranked in order of
maximum net trade benefit and the request with the highest benefit analysed first. The basis




the import be approved are made explicit. This analysis would be done from a global
perspective using a standard methodology that could be adopted internationally. Projects
would be ranked on the basis of the internal rate of return (IRR) with the risks explicitly
quantified. The technical system would be based on an accepted risk analysis methodology
incorporating a rigorous analysis of costs and benefits to all stakeholders. An important
component of the analysis would be the apportionment of net benefits (gross benefits minus
costs) by stakeholder group. This would make it clear which country and which group
within a country receives benefits or faces costs and to what degree.
Issues: Ranking projects on the basis of net global benefit is aligned with SPS principles
which takes as fundamental the stance that trade is good because it adds to net welfare
internationally. Other considerations include the costs associated with the import for the
importing country. These costs include any estimated negative impacts on local flora and
fauna. They are assessed in the risk analysis. As country jurisdiction becomes more and
more blurred and multinational trading entities across boundaries become more prevalent
this idea becomes more and more appropriate. People are now becoming more aligned to
the idea of the global village and hold concerns for the welfare of all people not just within
national boundaries.
The national interest part of the equation is taken into account in assessing the costs and
benefits. However, such interests would not take precedence over the global perspective.
The problem with this approach is the difficulty of estimating the benefits and costs.
Undertaking a CBA is likely to be expensive and time consuming in many cases and subject
to high levels of uncertainty. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the estimates of future
trade flows unless the analysis is undertaken by an independent analyst the likelihood of
bias is high. If the applicant undertakes the analysis the benefits are likely to be biassed
upwards. If the importing country national authority undertakes the analysis the benefits
are likely to be biassed downwards.
Having ranked the requests there is still the problem of ensuring the resources are available
to undertake the processing of the request. A country that wished to delay processing
requests could limit the resources available for processing.
Consequences: Projects that have the highest global net benefit would have the highest
priority. As the benefit is likely to accrue to the exporter nations those countries that placed
national interests above global net benefit would not favour this approach. Compulsory
CBA is likely to result in long delays where there is a limited resource to undertake the
analysis. If the national authority undertakes the CBA this will use up even more scarce
resources and delay further the issuing of IHSs.
Unless the estimates are made in an open transparent environment with participation from
relevant stakeholders the resulting rate of return from the CBA is likely to be heavily
biassed. In order to ensure an unbiassed analysis an independent international authority
may need to be set up or at least international rules formulated. If the latter stance is
adopted there would need to be some auditing of the analysis. This approach is clumsy and
resource intensive. It still does not address the question of the time it takes to process the
request'which is a major factor in determining the time in the queue.
Option 4 - Points system
Description: The multi-faceted nature of the decision-making process suggests an initial
prioritising of applications based on a points system. In this process low risk, low resource-
demanding applications could be fast tracked while difficult, resource intensive, high impact
applications run their course. Applications would be separated at an early date into those
which should be addressed early, as opposed to other applications, which because of their
nature are likely to give low returns relative to resources consumed, or consume
considerable resource and time in proportion to benefits derived.
Issues: This approach doesn't seem to be very helpful in solving the queuing problem. As
under the CBA approach, decisions still have to be made on the resources devoted to each
category because this will determine when the assessment is completed and the IHS issued.
While it would be desirable to have a single quantitative basis for prioritising the queue,
reality suggests there are a number of significant issues impacting on decisions which have
considerable political and or national interest fallout.
Such issues include the special relationship New Zealand has with the Pacific Islands, the
current high degree of focus on environmental issues and the Treaty of Waitangi to name
the obvious. All countries face similar issues. This political dimension has to be taken into
account in setting priorities, but the line between technical/economic and political
considerations must be transparent. Moreover, the time and place in the process where one
method of decision-making shifts to the other should be completely transparent to
stakeholders. Nation states generally require decisions of national importance be resolved
by the political process. It is unlikely countries would be willing to abdicate this
responsibility to a multilateral organisation.
Consequences: The major down side to adopting a points system is that in reality it just
fudges the difficult issues. Rather than making the basis of the decision transparent, a points
system muddies the water. It will be quicker and easier to apply than cost benefit analysis,
but the quality of analysis is likely to be lower.
Option 5 - Removing the resource constraint
Description: The size of the queuing issue is largely determined by the severity of the
resource constraint on national authorities. If there was no resource constraint the queuing
issue would be minimal and the need for a ranking system including a cost benefit analysis
or points system avoided. The issue then becomes one of managing resources. The national
authority would issue a list of applications for IHSs. Accredited consultants would be
invited to tender to undertake the risk analysis to determine whether the import should be
disallowed on SPS grounds.
In order to ensure the process is fair the analyses would be made public once the IHS was
issued. This would ensure transparency and promote a harmonisation of analysis
methodology across national boundaries.
A condition of the tender would be that the estimated completion date of the analysis would
be published on the list. Should an application be turned down there would be an appeal
process to a higher authority on natural justice grounds. The appeal authority would
include representatives of the key stakeholder groups. Once a completed analysis is




decision. As with personal category applications the authority would set performance
targets for the completion of its work and publish these along with its decisions.
Issues: As under the personal category consultants could be accredited to undertake the
analysis of national requests for IH5's. This approach is already being implemented in other
areas, for example, building consents for local authorities. The analysis would be paid for
by the applicant. It should follow that the consultant tenderer would have to be acceptable
to the applicant as well as the national authority. The applicant would therefore choose
from the list of accredited consultants. Once chosen the tenderer would, however, be
responsible to the national authority only. The national authority's role then becomes one of
standard setting, accrediting, auditing, scrutinising completed applications and issuing the
regulations. The time consuming business of undertaking the analysis is carried out in the
private sector.
A negative issue with this approach relates to transparency. An application relating to the
importation of say a new breed of plant or animal is likely to be commercially sensitive.
Applicants are likely to want to keep their application secret. The system should reward the
innovator and at least allow them to keep a step or two ahead of the pack by not publishing
details until some time after the IH5 is issued. It should be noted that this free rider problem
exists no matter which system is adopted because the IH5 is a public document once issued.
Another issue relates to those who cannot afford to pay, for example, a developing country.
However, developing countries are likely to qualify for overseas development assistance to
pay for the analysis and therefore would not be penalised.
Consequences: This approach overcomes the queuing problem. In a contestable competitive
environment the market would determine the resources required to undertake the risk
analysis. H there was a high demand the number of consultants would increase to match the
demand. H demand dropped the consultants would seek to do business in other areas.
The national authority would tender out the analysis and the applications would be
undertaken without the administrative delays and resource constraints often associated with
national bureaucracies. Applicants unable or unwilling to pay for an accredited consultant
would stay in the queue. They would be no worse off under this system and probably better
off as there would be less of a resource constraint in the national authority.
A country unilaterally adopting this market model could be at a disadvantage on a net trade
basis. It would be adopting a fast track system for processing IH5s, but its exports would
still face the delays inherent in the current procedures operating internationally. In order to
be fair the process should be adopted on a multilateral basis.
Option 6 - Prioritising the queue within a resource constraint
Description: Some countries will have problems with the Option 5 approach, particularly in
command or centrally planned economies. In that case the analysis has to be undertaken by
the national authority rather than in the private sector and thus there is a real queuing issue.
Where.the analysis has to be carried out by a monopoly authority a cost benefit analysis of
each application should be undertaken (from a global perspective) and the applications
ranked on the basis of lRR. This ranking could be modified taking into account political
factors, however, this would have to be explicitly accounted for and the ranking made
public showing the ranking before and after taking into account political factors.
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Issues: There is no simple answer to the queuing problem when the national authority has
to undertake the analysis but, the national authority can at least be transparent and
consultative about the approach it takes. In this situation, much of the concerns of
stakeholders centre around the lack of consultation and a lack of inclusiveness in the
process. External stakeholders would like to see early and ongoing consultation in a
partnership type of environment (Nairn et al. 1996, p. 91).
Consequences: Unlike the private sector there cannot be payment of fees and other costs
without the possibility of corruption. The reason being that a government agency is a
monopoly and there is not the disciplines of the market to ensure the same degree of
efficiency and effectiveness. The transparency condition is unlikely to find favour with
some countries, but without this level of openness the process is no further ahead than the
present situation.
Conclusions
The overall objective of the 51'S system is to facilitate trade while protecting national
interests relating to fauna and flora - not to accord commercial competitive advantage to any
particular sector or national interest.
The approach whereby risk analyses for IH5s are taken out of the monop'oly environment of
the government sector and undertaken in a contestable competitive environment over comes
much of the 51'S queuing problem.
Where this is not possible the queuing issue comes down to one of resource constraint. The
lower the level of resources that can be devoted to risk analysis of IH5 requests the longer
the queue. Analysis tools such as CBA and points systems can be used to establish a priority
order for the queue, but this does not solve the problem of how long the risk analysis will
take. If the market is not able to operate then it becomes a political decision as to the level of
resources to devote to the risk analysis.
We favour the market approach which could be implemented in a number of phases,
starting with the non-strategic or personal requests first. This not only solves the queuing
issue it forces the national authority to set up transparent standards and apply consistent
and fair methodologies in determining whether IH5s are issued or not.
If this approach is to be adopted the next step is to develop a set of criteria, operating
policies and procedures for the tendering process.
New Zealand is in a position to apply the market model. A number of New Zealand's key
trading partners could also adopt it if there was the political will. It would be in New
Zealand's interests to promote the market model internationally and to take an active role in
developing an internationally acceptable tender process.
So, the answer to the proposition in the title is a qualified yes. It is possible to limit political
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COPY: A new technique for evaluation of biodiversity protection
programmes.





New Zealand, and many other countries, are troubled by animal pests which
attack, damage, or displace indigenous species. Considerable amount of
taxpayers funds are spent each year attempting to combat these pests and
some research has been conducted investigating the 'cost effectiveness' and
the efficiency of various pest control activities. Research into the cost
effectiveness of pest control for biodiversity protection is hindered by the
absence of satisfactory measures of output from the programmes. A new
measure, Conservation Output Protection Years (COPY) is proposed for use
in cost utility evaluation of biodiversity protection activities. This paper
outlines the cost utility approach and reports on use of COPY in evaluation
of six New Zealand biodiversity protection programmes. The paper
demonstrates that COPY provide a practical output measure, and reports on
the comparative output per dollar spent on each biodiversity protection
programme.
KEYWORDS
Biodiversity protection, cost utility, COpy
INTRODUCTION
New Zealand and many other countries are reluctant hosts to introduced
animal and plant species, which compete with, displace, or attack existing
species. The species threatened can be valued for both commercial and
conservation reasons. Invasions of these often aggressive species threaten to
homogenize ecosystems throughout much of the world (Townsend, 1991).
Many countries when faced with this threat embark upon programmes
designed to combat, control, or even eliminate these exotic species from
farms, forests and from conservation areas. New Zealand taxpayers for
example funds programmes to combat possum, goats, tahr, wasps, clematis
vitalba and other species in National Parks, Reserves, and other protected
natural areas. The importance of these measures is indicated in a recent New
Zealand publication Environment 2010 Strategy, which lists ... 'protecting
indigenous habitats and biological diversity' ... first in a listing of
environmental priorities for action (Ministry for the Environment, 1994).
Given the importance of these protection actions measurement of their
effectiveness and efficiency is essential if we are to judge their success or
failure.
In New Zealand biodiversity protection actions are conducted mostly by the
Department of Conservation who have statutory responsibility for
achievement of conservation and recreation objectives (Conservation Act,
1987). Taxpayer funded programmes can be subjected to scrutiny to judge
their effectiveness, and their efficiency of use of resources. The present paper
argues the absence of a system for comprehensive measurement of output is
a fundamental obstacle to accurate evaluation of biodiversity protection
programmes. Two major requirements are the need to include measurement
of the length, and the level of protection provided by biodiversity protection
programmes. An evaluation method is proposed to remedy these defects in
programme evaluation methodology, and a new measure of output is
proposed to aid that task.
The paper proceeds by briefly reviewing in Part 2 the array of evaluation
practices currently directed at biodiversity protection programmes. Part 3
provides a review of selected material from the field of health care
evaluation. Part 4 explains the evaluation issues to be tackled in biodiversity
protection and details the new measure developed to improve the validity of
evaluation studies. Part 5 reports on application of the technique to evaluate





ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION
PROGRAMMES
There are limited resources available for biodiversity protection activities,
and countries are concerned to achieve value for money from taxpayer
funded activities. The New Zealand Department of Conservation decides on
the allocation of biodiversity protection funds by rating potential species,
communities or areas for protection, using the ratings to rank them, and
protecting as many of the highest ranked projects as the budget allows
(Department of Conservation, 1994). These ratings use approaches developed
by Elliot and Ogle (1985) and Molloy and Davis (1994).
The basic economic evaluation questions which can be asked of biodiversity
protection programmes include:
1. Subject to meeting various safety and environmental standards, are stated
objectives being achieved in least cost ways? Cost Minimization and Cost
Effectiveness studies can check to see if pests are being killed at lowest
possible cost, and if species and communities are being protected at lowest
possible cost.
2. Are the costs of biodiversity protection programmes greater than, less than,
or equal to the benefits attained from these programmes? Economic
efficiency criteria can be employed in Cost Benefit Analysis studies to
determine if the payoff from biodiversity protection exceeds the resource
costs of the programmes.
3. What is the appropriate level of expenditure each year on these activities?
Long term programmes such as species conservation programmes require
analysis by tools which recognize the dynamic aspect of those activities.
Economic evaluation of biodiversity protection programmes is challenging
for two reasons. First, the outcomes sought from the programmes are often
only indirectly achieved. Improvement in forest condition occurs after pest
numbers have been controlled. Establishing the nature of the relationship
between protection action and outcomes, requires research to generate data,
followed by careful statistical analysis. Secondly there is no market which
provides direct information on monetary evaluations of the benefits
provided from the programmes.
There have been expenditures on vertebrate pest control activities in pursuit
of conservation objectives in New Zealand for more than twenty years, but
formal economic analysis of these activities appears to have commenced in
1991 (Warburton et al 1991). In the seven years since publication of that
report there has been improvement in the quality and amount of
information collected on costs of pest control operations. Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Environment (1994), Table A.16, lists data on costs and
outcomes for 54 pest control operations which are germane to biodiversity
protection. Montague (1997) is a recent example of a detailed study of the
comparative costs of two pest control techniques at two sites. These studies
investigate and report the costs of vertebrate pest control activities, and
primarily aim to establish the cost effectiveness of these activities.
Cost benefit analysis studies are generally much more difficult to complete
than are cost effectiveness studies. Evaluation of the economic benefits of
conservation activities requires good understanding of non market
valuation techniques, and considerable skill in designing and completing a
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) study, or a Stated Preferences (SP)
study. CVM studies have been completed in many countries on a vast range
of topics (Carson, 1997), and a few researchers have begun to apply SP
techniques to biodiversity protection topics (Adamowicz et al 1994, Morrison
et al 1998). One New Zealand research project has investigated Willingness to
Pay (WTP) for 'possum control' operations for biodiversity protection (Kerr
and Cullen, 1995). There are considerable difficulties in applying these non
market valuation techniques to biodiversity protection actions, particularly
the need to clearly define and communicate to survey audiences the nature
and the scale of output from conservation projects.
The difficulty in completing reliable economic benefit studies means that
physical measures such as biological status scores, or changes in probability of
survival of the population or species have to be used to indicate the benefits
achieved by biodiversity protection programmes. Conservation managers,
and the taxpayers who ultimately pay for these activities, have little basis for
judging whether the benefits from biodiversity protection are greater than
their costs. Equally, they have little basis for judging whether an expenditure
on biodiversity protection, would provide more or less benefit if the
resources were instead applied to a different conservation project.
Rudimentary examination of the discounted costs over thirty years of
various possum control strategies are contained in Warburton et al (1992).
Optimal control theory has been applied to possums and TB control
programmes (Lambie 1998), and could be applied to possums and species
conservation programmes. Application of this technique to biodiversity
protection actions, also encounters the difficult issue of estimating value of
outputs from the programmes.
The paragraphs above indicate a range of tools can potentially be employed to
provide answers to economic questions about biodiversity protection
programmes. However the studies completed to date evaluating biodiversity
protection progammes almost invariably report they have used Cost
Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). New Zealand researchers have focussed on the
relative merits of selected conservation strategies, primarily what is the least
cost pest population knockdown strategy? Direct comparison of aerial lOBO
poisoning of possums, to groundhunting for control of possums, is possible




possum numbers on selected conservation areas. This enables researchers to
judge which technique is the cost minimizing way to control possum
numbers, or protect species or communities at a conservation site. Many
studies described as CEA have in practice been Cost Minimization Analysis
(CMA) studies. CMA requires no measurement or valuation of the
outcomes, because the outcomes are assumed to be identical. Activities
which result in dissimilar outcomes cannot validly be assessed by CMA.
Biodiversity protection activities can produce widely varying outcomes
hence a more powerful evaluation technique is required.
A key feature of the biodiversity protection evaluations completed in New
Zealand is their choice of unit in the measurement of output. The unit
chosen appears to be 'hectares where predator populations are controlled' or
'hectares of conservation region protected'. If outcomes are identical, then
these are appropriate units for CMA, but reliance on that unit stifles
possibilities for other forms of evaluation. In practice biodiversity protection
activities produce variable outcomes and there is a need to recognize the
following factors :
• attention needs to be directed away from reduction in pest numbers and
toward the desired output - species or community protection.
• measurement of output needs to include a quality component, indicating
the level of species or community protection provided.
• measurement of output needs to include a temporal component,
indicating how long the species or community protection endures.
These three factors significantly limit the usefulness of cost minimization
studies for the evaluation of biodiversity protection activities and provide a
rationale for the development of a more versatile evaluation methodology.
An alternative approach is proposed and explained in section 4, after a
selective review is completed of evaluation practice in health care.
INSIGHT FROM HEALTH EVALUATION LITERATURE
Economic evaluation of health programmes also encounters difficult issues,
and scrutiny of these studies can provide some valuable insights. Health care
evaluation literature indicates at least four techniques are employed in that
field: Cost Minimization Analysis, Cost Effectiveness Analysis, Cost Benefit
Analysis, and Cost Utility Analysis (Drummond, et aI, 1987). Three of those
evaluation techniques are currently used in biodiversity protection
evaluation, but the final technique on the list, Cost Utility Analysis (CUA)
has been developed specifically for use in health services evaluation
(Bethwaite and Bethwaite 1991).
The fundamental idea of CUA is to measure output by way of utility, where
utility refers to the worth of a particular health status, or improvement in
health status. Utility can be measured by the preferences of individuals or
society for specific health states or outcomes. Utility analysis is particularly
useful in health evaluation because it provides a means to evaluate
situations where a 'treatment' can result in differing quality outcomes. The
worth of these differing quality outcomes can assessed by use of a unit called
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY). The number of QALY produced by a
'treatment' are assessed by rating the resulting changes in health status
(utility value) on a scale from 0 to 1, and noting the duration of those net
gains in health status achieved because of the 'treatment' (Drummond et aI,
1987). An example is provided to illustrate how QALY calculations are
completed.
Prevention of a case of hepatitis will ensure that a person remains at quality
of life level 1.0. Hepatitis infection would result in quality of life 0.64 for
three months. A hepatitis vaccination which prevented the infection
occurring would result in a gain of (1 - 0.64) x 0.25 =0.09 QALYs.
The costs of achieving the number of QALYare measured in monetary units,
and a standard practice is to calculate the cost per QALY for a chosen
treatment or medical action.
The attractions of CUA include its use of a standard unit (QALY) for
measuring outcomes from health programmes, and standard units ($) for
measurement of the costs of those actions. Use of these standard units allows
for ready comparison of many medical actions including: a procedure which
can result in differing quality outcomes, and comparison of differing
procedures which can result in many different outcomes. CUA is also
attractive because it avoids the difficult task of evaluating the consequences
of health care actions in monetary terms, as is required by Cost Benefit
Analysis.
A crucial requirement of CUA is the availability of outcome data to allow
calculation of QALY achieved. Intermediate output data cannot be converted
into QALY gained and hence comparison of actions is not possible. In those
situations Cost Effectiveness Analysis can be employed and that technique
can be used to calculate for example, cost per case treated, or cost per
vaccination, where natural units of output are the measure of output.
A key component of CUA is the generation of quality of life data. Three
methods for data generation have been proposed by health programme
evaluators: judgment by experts, values from literature, and values from
measurement on a sample of subjects. Judgments are typically provided by
relevant and knowledgeable health professionals who make assessments by
reference to such objective criteria as physical functioning, role functioning,




In some circumstances it can be important to ask whose utility values are
appropriate to use in CUA? Because most CUA studies are completed from a
social perspective it is often appropriate to obtain utility assessments from
informed members of the general public or from community
representatives. This approach meets the problem of accurately describing
the relevant health condition and avoiding framing or information bias
problems. The alternative is to use patients as the source of information on
utilities. This approach encounters issues of patient exaggeration of disutility
of health states, and is likely to require different groups of patients to provide
assessments of the disutility of different health problems. Sensitivity analysis
is a crucial requirement whichever approach is taken to data generation.
Studies which have compared the outcomes from different data sources
have often found no differences between the assessments provided, and
none have found large differences (Drummond et aI, 1987, p.1l7)
Measurements of cardinal disutility of health states are typically completed
via one of three methods: rating scale, standard gamble, and time tradeoffs.
Rating scales are very often used for measurement and the QALY calculation
examples above illustrate the popular 0 - 1 rating scale used in many CUA
studies.
Because health states, and the outcomes of medical actions, can extend over
more than one year, discounting of QALY is completed in some CUA
studies. Johannesson (1994) provides a recent analysis of the practice of
discounting QALY.
The features of CUA which make it attractive to health care evaluators are of
relevance to evaluators of biodiversity protection programmes. Biodiversity
protection actions are directed at goals which are achieved to varying degrees,
the outcomes are not readily evaluated in monetary units, and the outcomes
can persist (and decay) over several years. Emulation of the health care
evaluation approach may provide a useful tool for evaluation of biodiversity
protection programmes.
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF OUTPUT
Solow et al (1993) argue that protecting a population is valuable because it
contributes to species survival. Montgomery et al (1994), argue that as species
survival is uncertain under any conservation programme, the benefits from
species protection programmes are the gains made in enhancing the
probability of species survival. New Zealand biodiversity protection
programmes are directed ultimately at species protection, and their direct
output is the contribution they make to the probability of species survival.
Secondary benefits of these programmes include the enhanced aesthetic and
recreation opportunities available in the biodiversity protection areas.
Montgomery et al (1994), employ a population simulation model to calculate
the increase in probability of survival of the Northern Spotted Owl following
increases in area of habitat provided for that species. This methodology is
dependent on the use of a chosen biological relationship between habitat
capacity and the probability of owl survival. The authors note this is the most
controversial portion of their analysis. Calculation of the increases in
probabilities of survival of species which result from biodiversity protection
programmes are a difficult challenge. In New Zealand where there are very
many endangered species, populations and communities requiring
protection, population simulation models are lacking for most endangered
species. Alternatives to 'change in probability of species survival', seem
essential at present to provide useful measurements of output from New
Zealand biodiversity protection programmes.
The focus of many New Zealand biodiversity protection programmes is on
recovery of communities rather than species survival. The direct outputs
from these programmes are: their contributions to maintaining or increasing
the community population level, the health of the individuals in the
community, and the overall health of the communities in the region
protected. Secondary outputs, as argued above are the enhanced aesthetic and
recreation benefits in the regions protected. These outputs are more
analogous to those sought from medical interventions than they are to
species survival as studied by Montgomery et al. An output measure which
captures the duration, and (diminishing) quality of biodiversity protection,
seems appropriate in these circumstances.
Damage caused by possums and other vertebrate pest species occurs
continually, and the level of damage in a region is primarily determined by
the numbers of pests present. Biodiversity protection programmes can be
directed at elimination of pests from a region, continued suppression of their
numbers by sustained harvest, or by episodic reductions of the population.
The latter approach will result in a sawtooth pattern of pest population
numbers and is useful for illustrating the need for a new measure of output
for evaluation studies. The level of population knockdown and the growth
rate of the pest population, are major determinants of the time lapse before a
further population knockdown is required to keep the pest population below
some chosen level.
The pest population growth rate will be determined by several factors
including: the biological potential for population growth, the level of
nutrition available to the pest, the presence of diseases amongst the pest, and
the rate of emigration of pest into the region. Following population
knockdowns of 80 percent or more, possums in New Zealand have exhibited
population growth rates of up to 33 percent per annum (Seitzer 1992),
although 20 percent is a more representative rate. This latter growth rate
means that following an 80 percent population reduction, a further
Conservation Output Protection Years or COPY, they can be described as
below:
All species and communities are not of equal importance or merit. The
current system used in New Zealand to rank resources for biodiversity
protection asserts some resources are more equal than others. That system
estimates priority scores for each resource or area (Molloy and Davis 1994).
These priority scores could be used together with COpy estimates to calculate
a weighted measure of output from biodiversity protection actions.
A biodiversity protection activity for a community can be evaluated by
dividing the number of COPYs it delivers, by the cost of the biodiversity
protection action. This calculated cost per COpy can be compared to similarly
calculated, costs per COPY for biodiversity protection actions for other
conservation areas or resources. If all species or communities are regarded as
being of equal importance or merit then decisions on which areas to protect
from predators can be determined by estimating 'costs per COPY'. In the spirit
of Cost Utility Analysis, 'least cost per COPY' activities are likely to be




population knockdown will be required within seven years to prevent pest
numbers from regaining or exceeding their initial level. The benefits from
biodiversity protection programmes are short lived and diminish rapidly as
pest populations grow following the initial population knockdown.
It is proposed that Conservation Asset Security ratings (CAS) be estimated for
the status of the species or community, with a range from 0 - the species or
community is extinct, to 6 - the species or community is secure, has a high
survival probability and there is no need for active management. Table 1
lists the features of each CAS level.
Table 1: The Conservation Asset Security (CAS) rating system
6 The asset is secure, very high survival probability, no need for active
management
5 The asset is in need of occasional monitoring in case potential threats
become actual threats, some uncertainty
4 Positive prospects for asset security so long as potential threats continue to
be managed, some security concerns/questions unanswered
3 Marginal/poor asset security, in need of additional management or input
to remedy and mitigate threats to security
2 Very poor asset security, very large management effort required to secure
the asset, in need of management and or research to determine how to
improve asset security, very large concerns over future security
1 The asset cannot be protected, there is no possible management action
available given present technology
0 The asset is extinct
COpy = Li [(CASi + CASi-l)12]- CASo
Where
CASi - Conservation Asset Security in year i
CASO - Conservation Asset Security in year 0
PCOPY = p X Li [(CASi + CASi-l)/2]- CASo
Where
CASi - Conservation Asset Security in year i
CASO - Conservation Asset Security in year 0
P - priority score for the species or ecosystem
(1)
(2)
These CAS ratings can be assessed annually for each conservation resource of
interest, and can be expected to decrease each year if for example a pest
population rebounds following a biodiversity protection action. The annual
CAS ratings can be compared to the CAS ratings assessed prior to the
commencement of biodiversity protection in a region. The output from a
biodiversity protection programme is the sum of the additional CAS rating
for each year above the initial CAS rating in year zero prior to the
commencement of the biodiversity protection action. If this sum is denoted
Numbers of PCOPY achieved by a biodiversity protection action can be
divided by cost of the biodiversity protection action. Output from a
conservation budget might be maximized by selecting resources for
protection, in ascending order of cost per PCOPY.
Some conservation areas are prized as much for the recreation opportunities
they provide as for their biodiversity features. Kerr and Cullen (1995) report
that willingness to pay (WTP) for biodiversity protection at Paparoa National
Park was strongly influenced by perceived recreation opportunities in the
park. In those circumstances COpy scores might be weighted by recreation
importance ratings. If recreation opportunities are an important factor to
consider when selecting areas for protection, prospective areas can be scored
for recreation importance on a scale from 10 - national importance, to 1 - no
importance. Recreation weighted COPY scores can be calculated as below. Table 2: Characteristics of the six conservation projects
APPLICATION OF THE NEW TECHNIQUE
At present Department of Conservation policy is to complete knockdowns of
pest populations where they are required then to commence long term
harvesting to provide continual suppression of predator numbers on the
selected regions. Both the initial knockdown, and the annual harvesting
operations, can be evaluated by use of COpy, PCOPY and RCOPY calculations.
The output from annual harvesting operations is assessed by reference to the
CASi-l scores at the start of each year's conservation programme.
COpy, PCOPY and RCOPY can be used to provide ex post evaluations of
biodiversity protection actions, and can also be proposed for use in assessing
potential biodiversity protection actions if there is little uncertainty about the
success of those future protection actions. The rapid advances which have
been achieved in the technology for knockdown of possum numbers for
example suggests the outputs from some biodiversity protection actions can
be predicted with a reasonable level of confidence (Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Environment, 1994). The ability to assess which
biodiversity protection actions are expected to provide greatest output per
dollar spent is necessary to achieve cost effective use of these funds.
Six New Zealand projects are studied to test the practicality of COPY at
measuring conservation output. The projects are focused on communities of
the folIowing species: Kokako (Callaeas cinerea wilson i), Hector's Dolphin
(Cephalorlmchl/s hectori), Whitaker's Skink(Cyclodina whitakeri), Kakabeak
(Clianthus puniceus), Black Stilt (Himantopus novaezealandiae), and the
Brown Teal (Alias aucklandica). Several criteria were identified to aid
selection of the conservation projects for study including: a range of types of
conservation action; management of a range of introduced mammals
including humans; a range of indigenous biota - plants, reptiles, birds and
mammals; inclusion of both charismatic and non-charismatic megafauna;
and coverage of species in each of the priority categories used by DoC to
allocate conservation funds. Table 2 lists the characteristics of the various
conservation projects.
Conservation managers, and researchers with excellent knowledge of the
conservation projects were surveyed to obtain information on costs, and
changes in conservation status of specific communities. Respondents were
asked to provide CAS scores for a community one year prior to
commencement of the conservation project and for each subsequent year. No
respondent reported they were unable to complete the CAS scoring exercise.
They were also asked to report annual costs of the conservation project.
There are some difficulties with the data on costs of Kakabeak protection and
on Whitaker's Skink protection. In the former case specific information on
costs prior to 1992/93 were not available. In the latter case the conservation
project provided protection for a range of species but the conservation costs
are ascribed solely to the Whitaker's Skink.
Using the methodology summarized in equation 1 above, conservation
output was estimated for each project and results are shown in Table 3. As
well as COpy, the table also includes weighted COPY, after multiplying by the
relevant Molloy and Davis priority score. Present value of costs of each
project are included based upon a 7.5% discount rate. Cost data are in 1996
dollars. Raw data were deflated using the 1996 December quarter Producers
Price Index (local government) New Zealand Yearbook, (various years).
The data indicate the six conservation projects have enjoyed varying success
with a range of COPY scores from 17 to -3. A negative output resulted in the
case of the Brown Teal as the CAS score fell from a starting level of 3,
remained at 2 for a number of years before climbing to reach 4. The Black Stilt
has remained at a CAS score of 2 throughout the project. Because the range of
Molloy and Davis scores is not large, weighting by these scores has only
minor influence on the assessed relative output of the six projects.
Species Location and period Molloy and Davis score
Kakabeak East Coast, 1988-1997 52
Whitaker's Skink Mercury Island, 1985-1997 43
Hector's Dolphin Motanau-Waitaki, 1987-1997 47
North Island Kokako Mapara, 1987-1995 47
Black Stilt Mackenzie Basin, 1988-1996 57
Brown Teal Mimiwhangata, 1986-1997 36
(3)
Where
CASi - Conservation Asset Security in year i
CASO - Conservation Asset Security in year 0
R - Recreation importance score







Table 3: Outputs and costs of the conservation projects
Project COpy PCOPY Mean annual PV PV of costs per
of costs, r = 7.5% COPY, r = 7.5%
Kakabeak 4 52 95D8 177
Whitaker's Skink 15 43 8267 358
Hector's Dolphin 17 47 54865 687
N.I.Kokako 4 47 161654 6879
Black Stilt D 57 13D 3D4 -
Brown Teal -3 36 13D29 -
The cost data indicates the mean annual present value of costs for each
project has a range from $95D8 to $16D 654. The present value of costs for each
project is used to calculate present value of cost/CoPY and these are also
shown in Table 3. The calculations illustrate that for the four species which
produce positive conservation output, PV of costs per COpy have a very
large range from $177 to $6879. The cost per COPY for protection of Kokako at
Mapara is 38 times greater than the cost per COPY for Whitaker's Skink.
Sensitivity testing of the results was conducted to examine the effects of
varying discount rates from DC}';. to 2D%. No change in the ranking of projects
on costs per COpy occurs as a result of varying the discount rates.
SUMMARY
Biodiversity protection actions involve use of scarce resources and these
actions can be evaluated to assess if best use of conservation resources is
occurring. Economic evaluations to date have attempted to determine the
cost effectiveness of biodiversity protection operations but in many instances
it is CMA which have been completed. Alternative measures are required
which focus attention on biodiversity protection achieved, and recognize the
varying levels of protection provided over time following the conservation
action.
In some circumstances biodiversity protection actions will be directed
specifically at preservation of a species. In those situations increments in
probability of survival of the species is an appropriate measure of output.
Accurate calculation of increments to probability of survival requires use of
population simulation models, a requirement too demanding to allow
widespread use of that approach. Biodiversity protection actions are often
directed at targets other than increased probability of survival of a species.
Protection of populations and communities are the typical objects of New
Zealand biodiversity protection activities. A new measure of output COPY,
has been developed to aid in evaluation of conservation activities. This
measure recognizes the time-varying quality of conservation actions, and
may be used to provide ex post and ex ante estimates of the output from
biodiversity protection actions. Estimation of COpy scores require annual
inspections of areas to assess their status, but the scientific input required to
calculate COpy are not onerous.
Test of the COpy at six diverse New Zealand conservation sites reveals there
are wide variations in the output from biodiversity protection projects. At
two of the sites no net improvement in CAS was achieved by the biodiversity
protection project. Of the four projects attaining positive conservation
output, PV of costs/COPY range between $177 and $6879. These results
provide stark evidence that allocation of conservation resources can be
directed toward proven successful projects and away from non-performing
projects, to improve output per conservation dollar. Further testing should
be completed to affirm COPY usefulness in output measurement and in
allocation of biodiversity protection resources.
COPY provide a practical way to evaluate biodiversity protection projects.
The technique can be used to make comparisons between a wide range of
conservation projects. Use of COPY will not ensure that optimal levels of
conservation are provided, as they do not provide estimates of the marginal
benefits from conservation to compare with marginal cost estimates. But
their modest data requirements, and versatility, appear to make them
valuable tools in assessing the relative merits of conservation projects,
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The Economics of Endangered Species:
The Case of the African Elephant
Robert R. Alexander and David W. Shields




This paper examines the economic factors that are at work in the decline of African
Elephant populations. It considers mankind's portfolio of assets and finds that the
Elephant must pay its way as a productive asset if it is to avoid extinction resulting
from disinvestment. Further, the paper posits that if the African Elephant proposes to
continue as an asset then there needs to be some appropriation of its, as yet unrealised,
non-consumptive benefits.
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Abstract
The conservation status of the African elephant is a complex and contentious issue.
In 1989, CITES banned all trade in elephant products to end a crisis of rapidly
declining numbers due to the ivory trade. A decade later, CITES has agreed to a
limited trade in stockpiled ivory from a few southern African countries, and this has
reopened the debate on the appropriate conservation strategy for the elephant. In this
paper, a model is developed, using the African elephant as an example, to highlight
the key economic factors that are influential in determining the fate of an endangered
species. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of non-consumptive values as a key
component of the species' survival. It is demonstrated that some existence value must
be appropriated to the resource in order for extinction to be avoided.
Part 1. Introduction
Th~ modelling of endangered species has principally grown out of the literature of
fisheries economics. Clark (1973) based his model of species extinction on Gordon's
(1954) seminal fisheries model in order to examine the conditions under which
extermination of a species may appear to be the most attractive policy to a resource
owner. This work fonns the foundation of most of the modelling on species
extinction that has followed. More recently, Swanson (1994) examined ways of
adapting this model more readily to terrestrial species by generalising the model in a
similar conceptual structure. Swanson provides a theoretical framework for the
economics of extinction that considers the elimination of species as a product of
human choice into which resources they wish to retain.
He points out that mankind has a portfolio, as it were, of productive assets and that he
substitutes between those assets (less productive assets being replaced by more
productive) through a process of investment and disinvestment. Swanson's model is
applicable to any scarce natural resource. The model implies that the stock of a
particular resource, be it elephants or otherwise, will move (by investment or
disinvestment) to the level that equates its rate of return to the rates of return of other
assets in his portfolio. Extinction is seen as a complete disinvestment of a wildlife
resource, which occurs because it is perceived as not being worthy of investment.
(See also, Swanson and Barbier 1992).
We should distinguish here between the three different types of action we recognise
as being involved in the process of asset substitution - stock disinvestments, base
resource allocation, and management service reallocations. In the context of the
African elephant it is the second of these, base resource allocations, which is central
to the problem. What we mean by base resource allocation in this sense is that the
elephant must compete with other productive assets for an allocation of base resources
such as land, food and water. It is often the case that allocation of these base resources
is taken away from less productive assets such as the elephant and moved to other,
higher return, assets such as pasture or crop land. The African elephant must prove its
worth as a productive asset if it hopes to win the rights to land and life from other
assets in the human portfolio. Otherwise mankind will simply use those base
resources in the manner which yields the highest return.
The plight of the African Elephant, and ultimately its fate as a species, depends on the
economic incentives which act upon those who have the power to dictate how the
elephant is treated. If we are to understand the complex issue of extinction of the
African Elephant then we must acknowledge the role that economics, past, present
and future, plays.
The general objective of this paper is to develop a model of African elephant
management, based on the objectives of the various agents who have an interest in
elephant populations, in order to examine the impacts of their decisions on the decline
of populations. More specifically, first, to examine the causes of the elephant's
decline toward extinction in the general framework of Clark and Swanson. Second, to
reconcile the nature of the differences between the values received by the resource
owner as reflected in those models, and the total value placed on the resource by the
global society. And, third, to develop a model to examine the magnitude of the
unappropriated values which would be necessary to make long-tenn sustainable
populations of elephant's bioeconomically viable. Both the Clark and Swanson
models address consumptive use of the endangered species, but provide no means by
which non-consumptive values may act to the benefit of the species. Yet non-
consumptive values are large and may even exceed consumptive values (Swanson and




The lack of value appropriation may well be the principle reason we see the decline of
many species, such as the African elephant, that are highly regarded and valued by
people around the world.
Perhaps larger still, existence values are virtually not appropriated at all. There are
many structural reasons for this, and they are not easy to overcome. Existence values
are non-rival in consumption and non-excludable, and thus are classified
economically as public goods. As with all public goods, there is no incentive for any
given individual to pay and the good will typically be under supplied without
government intervention.
If the good in question, and those benefiting from it. were all contained within a
single government jurisdiction, this problem could be solved in the traditional way.
The government would tax all of its members, perhaps weighted by some criterion
such as the ability to pay, then the government itself would provide the good.
The problem of .species extinction, however, is complicated by its global nature.
Much of the world's biological diversity is concentrated in a small number of states
(McNeely et al. 1990). Those countries are generally poor and are in dire need of
appropriable income, while the bulk of the non-consumptive values of endangered
species arise out of the relatively wealthy developed nations. There is no mechanism
in place to transfer income from those who benefit to those who are asked to bear the
costs.3 Of the two non-consumptive values we have identified, tourism use values
and non-use existence values, clearly the latter is the more difficult to appropriate in
practice. Although a closer examination of the policy altematives is beyond the scope
of this paper, it may be instructive to examine the impacts the inclusion of these
values may have on the trend of a species toward extinction. Although we may not be
able to solve the appropriation problem immediately, we may be able to design a
framework within which it is possible to determine the appropriation necessary to
make a particular species 'pay for itself within a bioeconomic model.
Consider the specific case of the African elephant in a particular jurisdiction. The
objective of society in terms of value appropriated may be expressed with the
following objective and constraint.
(6) maxJ"e-&[(PM(h)rM +P/(h)r, +Ps(h)-C(x»)h+PuU(x)+N(x)-PRRxtJt
h 0
s.t. x=F(x)-h
P; (h) < 0 P; (h) < 0 P;(h) < 0 pt(h) < 0 C'(x) < 0 C'(x) < 0
U'(x) > 0 U'(x) < 0 N'(x) > 0 N'(x) < 0
and the usual transversality and boundary conditions.
Where PM(h) is an inverse demand function for the non-ivory products of harvest. rM
is the average yield of non-ivory products per animal, Pl.,h) is an inverse demand
function for ivory, 1'f is the average yield of ivory per animal, Ps<h) is an inverse
demand function for safari hunting, Pu is the unit price of one tourist-day, U(x) is
tourists days as a function of population, N(x) is the non-market existence value of
) Some programs exist which attempt to 'tax' wealthy nations to support wildlife and biodiversity
conservation. such as the United Nations' World Heritage Convention, but the level of support
provided is minuscule when compared to the world's conservation needs (Swanson and Barbier 1992).
elephants as a function of population, PR is the unit value of land resources used by
elephants, R ·x is quantity of land resources used by elephants as a constant proportion
of population, and all other terms are as previously defined in Part 2.
Note that, unlike Swanson, we do not characterise land resources given to elephants
as a control variable as we find it unlikely that resource managers will have sufficient
control of those resources to act on the results of these models. Rather we suggest
that, if the correct incentives are put in place in society, including the appropriations
that are the focus of this model, such transfers of land resources from alternative uses
will arise through the market.
For the purposes of this exposition, we offer some simplifications to the model to aid
the transparency of the result. We assume that PM(h)= PM (constant), that Pl.,h)= PI
(constant), that Ps(h)= Ps (constant), and that 1M = 1'f =1. This removes some terms
that are not needed for understanding the features of the model, but which would be
useful for developing a numerical solution.
With the simplifications in place, the societal objective with regard to elephants is
shown in equation (7).
(7) maxJ" e-&[(PM+p/ +Ps -C(x»)h+PuU(x)+N(x)-PRRxtJth 0
s.t. x= F(x) - h and other conditions as noted above.
Using the Pontryagin necessary conditions for maximisation of this problem, we
derive the new version of the golden rule equation, analogous to that shown in
equation (3). This condition shown in equation (8) below must be met when this
system is optimised.
8 J> F' - C'(x)F(x) - PRR + PuU'(x) + N'(x)( ) u = (x) + -....:...-.:---.:.....:....----!!...--"<---:.-=------.:.....:.
PM +p/ +Ps -C(x)
Recall that the LHS and the first term on the RHS indicate that the resource must be
maintained at a stock level such that the marginal productivity of the renewable
resource stock, F'(x), equates to the returns to capital available to the resource owner,
Ii, and that all other terms on the RHS modify that relationship.
The modifications take into account the stock-dependent terms of the original
objective function, all expressed proportionately to the unit net revenue of harvesting
the resource. The negative terms on the right side of equation (8) act to further lower
the effective marginal productivity of the stock and the positive terms act to increase
it. As in Clark's model, the first term, -C'(x)F'(x), represents the stock dependent
harvest costs. A species' growth must then accommodate a rate of growth equal to the
discount rate after this adjustment is made, placing even more pressure on the trend
toward extinction.
Similarly, the second term on the RHS shows the return for the foregone land required
to sustain the elephant. This is one of the key points offered by Swanson in his
generalisation of Clark's extinction model. That is, the elephant must compete for the
land resource that sustains it against the next best opportunity available for that land.
The returns from the harvest must also cover these costs.
~
W(J)
The two positive tenns in equation (8) reflect the non-consumptive values of the
elephant. These tenns act to increase the effective retums from the population of
elephants, but both tenns are non-consumptive in that they do not require the harvest
of an animal to be realised. The third tenn on the RHS is the marginal revenue from
tourism. This is one way in which the total value people place on elephants is
expressed in the market. These revenues act to support the existence of the elephant as
it competes against other opportunities in society.
The fourth tenn on the RHS is the marginal existence value, aside from any use value
(either harvest or tourism), that people place on knowing elephant species continues.
As used in this model, it actually represents the marginal existence value that is
appropriated by the resource owner.
Part 4. Implications for species extinction
A closer examination of the modification tenns may be instructive in understanding
the implications of this model. The ban on ivory trade has created a value of PI that is
effectively zero. The impact of that change is to increase the net impact of the
modification whether negative or positive. That is, the value of each modification is
proportionately more important. If the combined values of stock-dependent costs and
returns to land resource use outweigh those of tourism and existence value revenues-
a condition that is almost certainly the case, as will be addressed below-then the loss
of ivory revenues acts to the detriment of elephant conservation. This is a point that
economists have attempted to make throughout the debate on the CITES ban.
Increasing marginal tourism revenues, PuU'(x), acts unambiguously to the benefit of
elephant conservation. Unfortunately it is unlikely that such revenues are sufficient to
encourage additional investment in the elephant resource. Norton-Griffiths and
Southey (1995) found that non-consumptive use values in Kenya are not sufficient to
equal the opportunity costs of the land. In a similar result, Barnes (1996) found that
non-consumptive use values are not sufficient to justify further investment in the
elephant resources of Botswana. Within the context of this model, these results
suggest that tourism revenues are less than the opportunity cost of land, PuU'(x)<PRR.
Despite its prominent place in this model, marginal existence value appropriated by
the resource owners is virtually zero4• Foregoing any consideration of the stock-
dependent costs, if this is the case, then the negative tenns of the RHS of equation (8)
must outweigh the positive, and the loss of ivory revenues must be considered to be
detrimental to elephant conservation.
More important for our purpose, this highlights the critical nature of existence values
being appropriated to the resource owner on behalf of those who enjoy the public
good of the elephants' existence. This value can be characterised by manipulating
equation (8) to isolate N'(x) then solving the resulting differential equation for N(x).
• Several conservation organisations. such as the WorldWide Fund for Nature. do contribute funds to
projects in support of elephant conservation. As the sources of these funds are from voluntary
contributions from members who may never see an elephant. it may be argued that this is an
appropriation of existence values. Unfortunately. such resources are so small relative to the other
values involved that the magnitude may be considered close to zero for our purposes.
To summarise the argument, recall that the equation must balance at some positive
stock level for the elephant to avoid extinction. Now consider the variables we have to
work with.
The basic relationship is that the elephant growth rate must equal the rate of return on
capital at some positive population level. With a particularly slow growing species
like the elephant, this is unlikely. We cannot change the growth rate of the elephant
and we cannot unilaterally force the discount rate lower, especially for the long tenn
over which this problem is defined. Stock dependent costs act to the detriment of the
elephant, but are based on biology and technology and are not something we can
dramatically lower. Even if we were to bring this tenn to zero, which we could
achieve by setting harvest to zero, it wouldn't remove the competition for land
resources.
Competition for land resources acts to the detriment of elephant conservation and is
substantial in magnitude. It is estimated that human populations will more than
double in Africa over the next decade (Concar and Cole 1992), and this will only
increase the opportunity cost of the land for which the elephant must compete. Not
only can this not be changed, it poses the greatest long-tenn threat to the survival of
the elephant.Price and cost policies cannot alter the basic relationship, though they
can speed up or slow down the process of extinction. As Swanson (1994) expresses
it, this can "shift the path" of extinction but not prevent it. So we are left only with
non-consumptive values as possible tools with which to balance the equation. We
have already discussed how tourism values alone are insufficient to offset the
opportunity cost of land resources, and this leaves only one option for preserving the
African elephant: the appropriation of existence values. Extinction is inevitable if
some means for such appropriation to occur is not found. This conclusion may well
be generalised to many endangered species.
Part 5. Conclusions
This paper has attempted to highlight the key economic factors which influence the
fate of the elephant, and to provide a theoretical basis for estimating the non-
consumptive values required to be appropriated in order for the elephant to 'pay its
own way' in our asset portfolio.
All species of animals and all wilderness areas are now economic goods in the sense
that they must compete for a place in mankind's asset portfolio. It is estimated that
global human populations will double over the next century (Pennan et aI. 1996). This
will significantly increase pressures to convert wildlands into food producing areas,
and make it even harder for endangered species to compete. This continuing loss of
habitat is probably the single greatest threat facing endangered species. The African
elephant is particularly threatened by these trends as it requires a tremendous volume
of land to sustain viable populations.
Non-consumptive use values of the elephant are becoming increasingly important in
acting to slow the population decline. However, tourism alone is insufficient to
support increased investments in elephant conservation, so it is critical to the survival
of the species that a way is found to appropriate the non-consumptive, non-use
existence value held by members of the wealthy industrialised societies. The




has been identified and the theoretical foundation provided for numerically
approximating their magnitude. References
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NEW ZEALAND FARMERS' COSTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGISLATION
Roger Wilkinson', Peter Jarvis', and Tony van der Lem'
, Landcare Research, P.O. Box 69, Lincoln
, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, MAF Policy, P.O. Box 2526, Wellington
SUMMARY
From the survey responses the cost of each compliance item was calculated. The cost of compliance
was calculated by multiplying the time spent on compliance (hours per year) by $20 per hour and by
totalling the dollar amounts from the survey responses. We then conducted case study interviews with
21 farmers who had high compliance costs and who were in any of the following regions: North
Waikato, South Waikato, Bay of Plenty, King Country-Taupo, North Canterbury, South Canterbury.
Otago, Southland. The selection was limited by region because we needed to ensure that it was
geographically feasible to visit each of the selected farms within the budget for the research. These
regions contained more than half the respondents in the survey sample.
We investigated the process of compliance with legislation, its costs, and effects on farm businesses in
New Zealand. We surveyed 976 farmers in 1997-98 (in conjunction with MAF's annual outlook
survey) and conducted case studies with 21 farmers who had high compliance costs. Many farmers
faced few compliance cost items and, for most of those who did. the costs were not great. Taxation
compliance, time spent on employment paperwork, and safety compliance were the highest actual
costs. but more significant than time and money were the inconvenience, fear, and uncertainty
engendered by the process. The primary task of any allemptto mitigate the effect of compliance costs
on farmers will be to provide understandable, factual information that reduces farmers' fears and
uncertainties.
Key words: compliance costs, legislation, New Zealand, farmers.
Several farmers with very high compliance costs were unwilling to be contacted further. We responded
in two ways. First, we asked AC Nielsen to provide names of farmers with lesser compliance costs. but
who were willing to be contacted further. We also obtained the names of other farmers who had faced
significant compliance costs, from regional MAF Policy agents, Federated Farmers, selected farm
consultants, and other professionals. This enabled us to canvass a wider group of farmers than the AC
Nielsen sample alone.
Because we were not able to contact all those farmers who had high compliance costs, we were unable
to ascertain why they had high costs. We were also unable to tell whether the nature of their costs was
any different from those of the farmers who we were able to interview. Nor could we tell whether their
stated compliance costs included any capital costs associated with compliance. Therefore, we cannot




The piece of legislation or legal requirement that caused the respondents most concern about potential
adverse effects on their farm business was the ability of the ACC to maintain their income if they had
an accident (table I). Two other legal requirements provoked high levels of concern about adverse
effects: the Health and Safety in Employment Act and their regional council's administration of the
Resource Management Act.





As part of their normal farming activities, farmers are required to comply with a number of different
pieces of local and central government legislation and legal requirements. These include the Resource
Management Act (RMA) administered by regional and district councils, Health and Safety in
Employment Act (OSH), Employment Contracts Act, Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation
Insurance Act (ACC), and taxation legislalion. Examples of compliance costs are fees paid to district
or regional councils for resource consents, or fees paid to environmental consultants and planners for
services required as part of the resource consent process; payments for safety measures, such as signs
and guards, the provision of safety manuals, and courses of instruction for employees in safe work
practices; and payments for professional fees to accountants for compliance with taxation legislation.
The cost of compliance for farmers and businesses has been of concern to farmers and their
representative bodies (Federated Farmers) as well as to the government ministers. In May 1997 the
Minister of Commerce approved a review of internal government processes aimed at reducing
compliance costs. The Ministry of Agriculture commissioned our study of compliance costs on farms
to complement the Ministry of Commerce study.
Table I:
Piece of legislation or legal requirement mean level of concern




(score 4 or 5)
For most of the legal requirements, levels of concern were not related to whether or not the respondent
had incurred the particular compliance item. There were two exceptions. Those who had made a
submission on their district plan were significantly more concerned about the plan (mean 4.0) than
those who had not made a submission (mean 2.9; F test. p < 0.0001). Those who had applied for a







Ability of ACC to maintain income after
accident
Health and Safety in Employment Act
(OSH)
Regional Council's administration of the
RMA
District Plan (or proposed plan) 3.0 39
Regional Council pest management 3.0 36
strategies
Estimating provisional tax 2.7 30
Employment Contracts Act 2.4 23
GST returns 2.3 20
METHODS
Our research aimed to quantify the costs of compliance for a survey sample of New Zealand farmers,
and to investigate, by means of a number of case studies, the more detailed process of compliance on
farms and the farmers' comments on how these costs have affected their farm business.
After consultation with representatives of MAF and Federated Farmers, a survey questionnaire was
developed to quantify the proportion of farmers facing particular compliance costs and the actual costs
faced by them. The survey covered the costs farmers had incurred (both in dollars and time) for
applying or objecting to a resource consent for their farm, making a submission on their regional or
district plan, and complying with OSH, employment, and taxation requirements. The survey also asked
farmers how concerned they were about the impacts of the relevant legislation on their farm business.
The sample consisted of the farmers in MAF's annual outlook survey. The survey covers a panel of
1.000 pastoral farmers and 200 horticultural producers. Our survey of compliance costs was included
in the October 1997 pastoral outlook survey and the April 1998 horticultural outlook survey. The
surveys were conducted by the 'market research firm AC Nielsen, under contract to MAF Policy.




RMA (mean 3.9) than those who had not applied for a consent (mean 3.6; F test, p = 0.01). For those
who had incurred a particular compliance item, there was no correlation between the costs a respondent
had incurred and their level of concern. Increased concern about one's district plan was associated with
having made a submission on it, but not with having spent any more money on the submission.
Similarly, increased concern about one's regional council's administration of the RMA was associated
with haVing applied for or objected to a resource consent, but not with having spent any more money
on the application or objection.
ApplYing for or obiecfing to a resource consent
The resource consent process affected few farmers. Only 13% had applied for, or spent time or money
applying for, a resource consent as part of their normal farming activities in the past year. Even fewer,
4%, had objected to anybody else's application for a resource consent in the past year. And 10% said
the need for a resource consent had required them to change their farm management or prevented them
from changing their farm management. Those farmers who had applied for a resource consent in the
past year spent a median of 3 hours on their application and a median of $235 On costs associated with
it. Most of the direct costs were council fees. Calculating time spent at $20 per hour, the median total
cost of applying for resource consents was $330. Total costs for farmers applying for a resource
consent varied from $0 to $52 000. Most of the farmers who had applied fro resource consents
incurred total costs between $100 and $ I600.
Costs of objecting to other people's resource consents were lower. Objectors spent a median of 4 hours
and $0 direct costs, in total a median of $110. Total costs of objections varied from $0 to $5008. Half
the objectors incurred total costs between $1 and $100.
Fourteen of the 21 case study farmers had spent money on applying or objecting to a resource consent.
The amount of money spent applying or objecting ranged from $160 to $10,100. The case studies
show that any management changes required as a result of the need for resource consents were
generally minor. The most common single resource consent required by the case study farmers
interviewed was for disposal of dairy shed effluent. Six had required such a consent, with the highest
cash cost of the consents being $600. In most cases this occurred when the old consent had expired.
All the dairy farmers said the new effluent disposal system was beller than the old, and for most of
them the net benefits of the new system outweighed the costs of the change.
Two case study farmers required resource consents in the past year to draw water for irrigation, and
another required a consent to irrigate and to lay drains as part of the same scheme. One was
straightforward but the others were more complex, involving notification, objections, appeals, delays,
and negotiated agreements. Resource consent fees may be a significant burden on farmers who are
embarking on a development programme, in particular when there is a possibility of this development
having an impact on the resources used by other farmers.
The cost of resource consent fees may be compounded when more than one consent is required for
what is essentially one activity. Examples are a consent for the damming of a stream (to make it
possible to extract water), a consent to draw water, a consent to discharge water. Because farmers feel
that they must apply for a resource consent for relatively insignificant activities, many farmers are
inclined to undertake activities without applying for a consent. This is not in the best interests of sound
environmental management. Another complaint was that anyone could object to a resource consent
even if they were not directly affected by the consent. Farmers must bear the cost of refuting an
objection, even though there may be no material substance to the objection.
Making submjssjons on district or regional plans
Few farmer respondents had made submissions on their district or regional plans. Only 15% had made
submissions on their district plan, mostly in 1997. These farmers spent a median of 6 hours on their
submissions, and a median direct cost of $0. In total, their median cost was $160. Nearly three-
quarters of farmers making submissions on their district plan spent a total of less than $400. Whilst all
the submitters had spent time, few had spent money on their submissions, but some had spent large
amounts of money (in one case $17 000). Even fewer farmers, only 6%, had made submissions on
their regional plan. Again, most of these were in 1997. These farmers spent a median of 4 hours and
$0 direct costs on their submissions, a median total cost of $150. Again, nearly three-quarters of
farmers making submissions on their regional plan spent a total of less than $400. Some farmers (3%)
had made submissions on both their district and regional plans. The median total cost of submission on
district and regional plans was $200.
Five case study farmers made a submission on their district plan. For three of these farmers the cash
cost was $300 or less; one of these farmers spent 220 hours on making a submission, one farmer 30
hours and the other 10 hours. Several farmers spent time making a submission on their district plan
because it precluded a certain land use, particUlarly subdivision for housing. One example is
restrictions on land uses near airports. The same situation can occur for farmers who have a significant
natural area on their property.
Only three case study farmers spent time or money on making a submission on their regional plan.
One spent 15 hours, one 8 hours and $50, and the third 2 hours. One concern voiced by farmers was
the apparent duplication of services between regional and district councils.
Health and Safety in Employment Act compUance
Half the respondents (48%) had spent time or money complying with the requirements of the Health
and Safety in Employment Act, a median of3 hours and $120 direct costs. This gives a median total of
$220 to comply with the Act. Most of the farmers affected by aSH compliance costs had spent less
than $800.
Nine of the 21 case study farmers told us they had made a cash payment for implementing aSH in the
last year. Few of the case study farmers had real problems with aSH, none had incurred significant
costs that were not recognised as contributing to safe work practices or that were not regarded as
general capital improvements to ensure that the farm was a safe place to be. One farmer incurred
$5,000 of expenditure on aSH, spending the money on fencing off a dairy effluent pond, fitting guards
to mechanical equipment, and constructing a new bridge to replace one considered to be unsafe.
However, these costs were considered by the farmer to be necessary safety measures and therefore a
normal component of farm expenditure. An aSH inspector's visit had created greater awareness of
safety issues and prompted earlier action than otherwise would have been the case.
Several case study farmers were able to save money on aSH compliance by doing the work themselves
with materials already at hand on the farm. One farmer built a guard for the milking machine belts, a
roof over the effluent tank, and a chemical shed, and put spline drives in the shearing gear, with 36
hours' work and $500 in direct costs.
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Premiums to ACC are not strictly compliance costs: they are a cost of doing business. We include costs
of ACC payments in this report because many of the case study farmers considered the payments in
similar terms to the other compliance costs we discussed, and because of the high level of concern
farmers in the survey expressed about ACC. In the survey, concern about the ability of ACC to
maintain their income after an accident was greater than their concern about any other piece of
legislation or legal requirement (table I). In the case studies, several farmers described difficulties they
had experienced dealing with ACC.
The direct costs of ACC for the case study farmers averaged over $3,000, ranging from $710 to
$7,900. The farmers we interviewed all regarded their ACC payments as high, and the popular view is
Number of compliance items % of respondents
that they felt that they would be able to obtain cheaper cover from the private sector if they could opt
out of ACC. However, it is difficult to make a direct comparison of insurance options without
investigating in detail the cover associated with each policy. Not all the farmers had experienced
difficulties with ACC: one farmer, who made an ACC claim, experienced no problems.
The issue of the costs of ACC to farmers is mainly one of whether there are more cost-effective ways
of achieving the same service or an improved service. Recent changes by ACC may allay farmers'
concerns about the high cost of ACC.
Employment compliance
Two-thirds (67%) of the respondents said they employed staff, and those who did spent a median of 2
hours a month on paperwork associated with employment mailers. At $20 per hour, this represents an


















Once taxation is included among the compliance costs, the total costs become very much higher (table
5). Only \% faced no compliance costs at all, the median was $3750, and the maximum $59680.
Nearly three-quarters (72%) faced total compliance costs of between $\600 and $6400.
Ignoring taxation, and still valuing the farmer's time at $20 per hour, we calculated the total cost of
compliance. Nearly a quarter of the farmers faced no costs at all, the median was $430, and the
maximum was $52 480 (table 4). For almost half the respondents (48%), these costs amounted to
between $200 and $1600.
For most pieces of legislation, compliance costs were incurred by few farmers, although almost half
had spent time or money complying with OSH requirements, just over half had to spend time on
employment paperwork, and almost all had incurred laxation compliance costs (table 3). For those
incurring particular compliance cost items, by far the largest costs were for laxation compliance,
followed by employment paperwork, applying for a resource consent, and OSH. Multiplying the
median value of these costs by the percentage of farmers incurring them gives an aggregate cost
averaged across all respondents. This is an unusual calculation, but it ensures that the results are not
affected by the skewed distribution of compliance costs. Because of the large percentage of farmers
incurring taxation, employment, and OSH compliance, these items have the highest costs when
aggregated across all respondents. According to this calculation, the cost of OSH compliance was
twice that of the cost of all resource consent and plan submission issues combined, and the cost of
employment paperwork was four times the resource consent and plan submission cost. Again, laxation
compliance costs were very much greater than all others combined.
Compliance item %of median total aggregate of this
respondents cost, for those median across all
incurring incurring ($) respondents ($)
Applied for resource consent in past year 13 330 43
Objected to resource consent in past year 4 110 4
Made submission to District Plan \5 \60 24
Made submission to Regional Plan 6 \50 9
Spent time or money on OSH 48 220 \54
Spent time on employment paperwork 55 $480 $322
Taxation (time, accountant's fees) 99 $3220 $3220
Percentage of Farmers Incurring Particular Compliance Costs (n=976)Table 3:
Total cost of compljance
The cost of accounting fees for the case study farms ranged from $800 to $5,000. The farmers with
low cash costs generally kept their own cash books and spent several hours per month allending to
accounting mailers (such as GST returns). The two farmers who spent the most on accounting fees
either had family trusts or some other business structure which required more of the accountant's time;
one of these farmers had three farms, each with its own set of accounts.
Taxation compliance
It could be argued that some of the accounting fees paid by farmers represent fees for general business
advice rather than for taxation advice. However, our experience suggests that farmers tend to use
accountants mainly as taxation consultants. It is true that any taxation regime involves compliance
costs, and farmers would have to complete paperwork and employ an accountant whatever the taxation
system. However, the more complicated the taxation system, the more expensive the costs of
compliance with it are likely to be.
Neither of the two case study farmers who spent over a hundred hours per year on employment-related
mailers felt that this was excessive. There may have been some confusion about what is taxation-
related paperwork and what is employment related. It is likely that, in many cases, the two are done
together. Some case study farmers told us that they avoided employing certain categories of employee
(such as students with loans to repay and beneficiaries with benefit abatement) because of the pitfalls
associated with administering their taxation arrangements.
The costs of complying with taxation requirements were very much higher than all the other
compliance costs. Almost all farmers spent time or money on taxation mailers. Only 2% spent no time
on taxation mailers, and only 2% spent no money on accounting fees for their farm business. The
farmers spent a median of 5 hours per month on paperwork associated with taxation mailers, and a
median of $1800 on accounting fees per year. This represents a median total for the year of $3220.
Most of the farmers regarded compliance with taxation legislation as a normal business expense.
Whilst some resented the time it took to file GST returns and other related tax paperwork, none of them
felt it to be a significant burden. Some suggested that the discipline of completing GST returns helped
provide them with timely information about the financial performance of their farms. None uf the case
study farmers felt that their accounting fees were unreasonable.
Selling aside taxation mailers (which would likely be required under any legislation), we asked about
six compliance mailers: applying for a resource consent, objecting to a resource consent, farm
-management effects of needing a resource consent, submissions to the district plan, submissions to the
regional plan, spending time or money complying with the Health and Safety in Employment Act, and
doing employment paperwork. A quarter of the farmers had done none of these, and only 16% had
done three or more of them (table 2). Costs of compliance are thus not dispersed widely among the




Total Costs of Compliance, including Taxation (all respondents included, n=976)
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level of compliance costs, but the reasons why the bulk of the compliance cost burden falls on
relatively few fanners, and whether these fanners deserve this burden.
It is sometimes difficult to tell what is a compliance cost and what is a cost of doing business. We have
already commented that, strictly, ACC levies are, like lallation, a cost of doing business. But in which
category does one place the cost of tar-sealing a driveway, or the cost of a new system for dairy
effluent disposal? And how much of an accountant's fee is a cost of compliance with taxation
legislation, and how much is a cost of business? Also, there is often a difference between fanners'
perceptions of what is a compliance cost and the results of strict economic definition. Any attempt to
reform compliance costs must take account, not only of economic analysis, but also of the perceptions
of fanners. However wrong fanners' perceptions might seem to experts, those perceptions are real.
Farmers did not always understand the real requirements of some of the legislation. Some did not
grasp the reasons for the consent process, some did not understand aSH, and many felt they were not
being treated well by ACC. There is a need for education on the purpose and benefits of the pieces of
legislation for which fanners face compliance costs. This education must take account of fanners'
perceptions.
Often, the most significant compliance 'costs' faced by fanners were not strictly 'costs' at all, nor were
they time with an attributed cost. They were inconveniences which, though real, are difficult to
quantify. Examples are a need to consult widely for notified consents (and thereby risk potentially
malicious objections and escalating costs), confidential business plans becoming public knowledge,
having to deal with several different council officers (who may deal with a consent application in
different ways), fears about aSH exacerbated by safety consultants selling their services, and concerns
about the consequences of inaccurate income forecasts for taxation purposes. Any review of
compliance cost issues will need to consider these real concerns voiced by fanners.
Fanners' greatest concerns about compliance costs were often not about the items with the highest
actual costs. High levels of concern about resource consents were generally not matched with high
actual costs. Conversely, areas with the highest compliance costs, such as taxation and employment,
did not attract high levels of concern. For none of the legal requirements was there a correlation
between the amount of compliance costs a survey respondent had incurred and their level of concern.
This reinforces further the idea that compliance costs are as much about fear and uncertainty as they are
about dollars and hours. The primary task of any attempt to mitigate the effect of compliance costs on
fanners will be to provide understandable, factual infonnation that reduces fanners' fears and
uncertainties.
CONCLUSION
Many fanners faced few compliance cost items. Excluding taxation, more than half our survey fanners
faced no, or ollly one, compliance cost item. For most of those fanners who did face a particular
compliance item, the costs were not great. The only compliance cost item faced by virtually every
fanner was taxation, and this was by far their highest compliance cost, representing a mean of 77% of
the total compliance costs of the fanners in the survey. Time spent on employment paperwork, and
time or money spent on compliance with aSH, were also incurred by more than half the survey
fanners.
Taking a mean value of compliance costs faced by fanners can be misleading. Because many farmers
face few compliance cost items and many of those who do, incur little expense, mean values are




THE EL NINO WEATHER PATTERN AND PASTORAL SUPPLY
RESPONSE FORECASTING I
Rod Forbes
MAF Policy, Policy Information Group, Wellington
Abstract
MAF Policy's Pastoral Supply Response Model (PSRM) uses aggregated days of soil
moisture deficit (DSMD) as climate variables covering dairy, sheep, and beefareas of
NZ. This is historically recorded data, and for forecasting purposes, MAF Policy has
relied on the historical modal values. The measurement of EI Nino events is based on
a Southern Oscillation Index (SOl). It was found that the winter SOl data provided a
basis for forecasting the following season's SOl outcome and the DSMD. The PSRM
was used to run climate scenarios in order to illustrate the effects on pastoral sector
outcomes of changing the climate variable assumptions. There are likely to be
intertemporal impacts for the sheep and beef sectors, but not for dairy.
EI Nino, Southern Oscillation Index, days soil moisture deficit, pastoral supply response
INTRODUCTION
The possibility ofan EI Nino event was first mooted by the National Institute of Water
and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) in a press release of6 April 1997 and captivated the
media attention from early spring of 1997, especially with dire predictions comparable
to, or worse than, the 1982/83 event. EI Nino was not a well known term outside of
climatological circles - but droughts and floods certainly are! EI Nino events have
historically occurred every three to seven years and appear to be a "release" following
several years of"build up" (Basher, 1998).
As MAF Policy approached the October 1997 Current Economic Situation (CES) round,
thought was given as to how an EI Nino event could be factored into agricultural
forecasts. This paper explains the outcome ofour research. The remainder of the paper
describes firstly what an EI Nino event is and its measurement by the Southern
Oscillation Index (SOl), secondly, covers the regression relationship between SOl and
days of soil moisture deficit (DSMD), and thirdly, details three scenario simulations
with the Pastoral Supply Response Model (PSRM). Scenario I used the long term modal
values ofthe climate variables as a control, scenario II used the SOl based values of the
climate variables, and scenario III used the actual climate data for the 11 months ended
May 1998.
Views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the official view ofthe Ministry ofAgriculture and Forestry. The helpful
suggestions and comments from my colleague, Dr Ram SriRamaratnam is
acknowledged. Errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the author.
EL NINO WEATHER PATTERNS
EI Nino is Spanish for "the boy child" and is associated with the tradition ofPeruvian
anchovy fishers to describe the occurrences ofwann sea currents offthe South American
coast around Christmas time. The wann currents displace the colder up welling water
which is rich in phytoplankton, the food source of the anchovy fish. The anchovy
migrate out into colder Pacific Ocean waters with sometimes disastrous consequences
to the incomes of fishers and related industries (Australian Bureau of Meteorology).
The opposite condition is La Nino. Both conditions describe extreme events.
There is no clear cause to the onset ofan EI Nino event, as both oceanic and atmospheric
factors are involved (Brett Mullen, personal communication). There is large scale
interaction between the ocean and the atmosphere that leads to the sea surface
temperatures rising and a disruption to the Walker Circulation oflow level, east-west
trade winds in the equatorial region of the Pacific Ocean. The resulting global climate
fluctuation is referred to as the EI Nino - Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon.
Tropical and sub-tropical regions of Indonesia, Australia, the Pacific Islands, the
Americas and southern Africa are most affected resulting in droughts in mainly western
regions and floods in mainly eastern regions. New Zealand, while lying outside these
regions, has its climate affected by wind changes (Basher, 1998).
Basher (1998), in a review for the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology,
provides an excellent reference document for ENSO and the 1997/98 EI Nino event. He
points out that EI Nino wind patterns over New Zealand (stronger southerlies in winter,
stronger southwesterly in spring and autumn, and more westerlies in summer) results in
wetter conditions in western areas and drier conditions in eastern areas. However,
serious droughts can also occur in non EI Nino years, for example 1989. There are other
unexplained or random factors at work. As the 1997/98 season progressed, some
months - September, February and April - exhibited atypical EI Nino wind patterns.
An EI Nino event is measured by the Southern Oscillation Index (SOl), which indicates
the strength of the Walker Circulation by the difference in air pressure between Tahiti
and Darwin. The SOl is derived from values of mean sea level pressure and NIWA
calculates this for each month as follows:
SOl = (D-M)/S
where D = Tahiti-Darwin difference for a particular month
M = mean monthly Tahiti-Darwin differences over a 1941 to 1980 base period
S = standard deviation of monthly Tahiti-Darwin differences over the base
period
Source: NIWA
Table 1: Montbly SOl for 1997/98 compared to 1982/83 and the Long Run Average
A negative value indicates an E1 Nino while and a positive value indicates a La Nina.
For convenience, values are expressed as integers by multiplying by 10. Values since
1960 have varied between -37 (February 1983) and 33 (November 1973). The values
for the current event compared to the 1982/83 event and the long run average from





Ma Ap My Ju Jl Au Se Oc No De Ja Fe Ma Ap Ma Ju
-12 -19 -22 -27 -10 -23 -16 -19 -15 -9 -24 -21 -29 -2510
o -2 -8 -22 -19 -27 -22 -22 -34 -23 -35 -37 -34 -20 5 -4
-5 -3 0 -3 -2 -3 -I -3 -2 -3 0 -2 -5 -3 0 -3
Up until 1992, MAF Policy was provided with national DSMD series for sheep, beef
and dairy from the former NZ Meteorological Service. This was based on DSMD for
representative rainfall sites within regions weighted by distributions of sheep, beef and
dairy numbers. This old series gave values ofDSMD ofapproximately 50% ofNIWA's
revised methodology. In the absence ofa revised DSMD series, MAF Policy has used
the trends in DSMD data published by the New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards'
Economic Service (NZMWBES) in their Annual Review ofthe New Zealand Sheep and
BeefIndustry. This data is prepared by NIWA on a districts, Island, and New Zealand-
wide basis. DSMD for selected rainfall sites for each district, are weighted by sheep and
cattle stock units in those districts.
The univariate characteristics for DSMD for sheep (WS) (from June year 1961 to 1997),
beef (WB) (from June year 1972 to 1997) and dairy (WD) (from June year 1972 to
1997) are set out in Table 2.
Table 2: Univariate cbaracterlstlcs for WS, WB and WD (old metbodology)
Source: NZ Meteorological Service and MAF Policy calculations
In late December 1997, MAF Policy contracted NIWA to provide monthly DSMD data
for around 86 rainfall sites with comparisons to the previous year and the long run
average. NIWA also present this in a map format (comparing current season to previous
season and long term average) in their ClimateNow web site, password access being
available to subscribers ofNIWA's monthly Climate Now publication. (See Map for the
latest data.) Table 3 sets out the available data for selected drought related sites for




The data above shows that the SOl monthly values for 1997/98 compared to 1982/83
were initially more negative in the previous autumn (March to May) and June, less
negative from July to March, more negative in April and then more positive in May,
signalling an abrupt end ofthe EI Nino event (see also Figure 1). The average data show
that in the longer run, monthly SOl trend slightly in the negative.
DAYS OF SOIL MOISTURE DEFICIT
The climate variable, days of soil moisture deficit (DSMD), is defined as the number of
days when there is insufficient soil moisture for pasture growth. It is calculated by
NIWA from data collected on many rainfall sites around New Zealand using a single
layer water balance model (Porteous et al 1994). The model assumes constant
evapotranspiration (ET) from field capacity to wilting point, below which no ET is
assumed to take place. However, pasture growth begins to reduce after about 50% of
available water is used - this is the critical deficit point and is at about 75 mm of water
depth for a broad range of pasture sites in New Zealand. Therefore, any day of soil
moisture deficit below the critical deficit is accrued as a day ofdeficit.
The basic soil moisture mass conservation equation (Rosenberg et al 1983, cited in
Porteous et al 1994) is as follows:
"R + I + dS - D - E ± Q= 0
Where R is rainfall, I is irrigation, S is soil moisture deficit relative to field capacity, D





























Table 3: DSMD for selected drought related sites (revised methodology)
The SOl has an indirect effect on agricultural production as it influences the climate,
which in tum influences production. In the PSRM, the model used by MAF Policy to
forecast sheep, beef and dairy production, the climate variables WS, WB and WD are
used. The relationships between SOl and the climate variables were explored to see if
there was a way of predicting the June year outcomes ofthe latter, given pre and early
season SOl values. The correlation between the winter SOl and the SOl for the
following June year was found to be 75%, based on a time series from 1961 to 1997.
Figure 2 illustrates the historical relationship.











































Table 4: Regression equations
WS = 35.2503 - 0.4024 >I< WinSOI
(-2.19) adj R2=9.5%
DW= 1.81
WinSOI 1997/98 = -10,0 WS 1997/98 = 43.3
WB = 31.099 - 0.4315 >I< WinSOI
(-2.32) adj R2= 14.9%
DW = 2.30
WinSOl 1997/98 = -10.0 WS 1997/98 = 39.7
WD = 23.7415 - 0.4405 >I< WinSOI
(-2.39) adj R2 = 16.6%
DW= 1.83
WinSOI 1997/98 = -10.0 WD 1997/98 = 31.6
Figure 4, 5 and 6 show the comparisons between actual and fitted DSMD based on the
winter SOL Figures 4 to 6 show that the values forecast by the equations reasonably
track the directions of the actual, but not the more extreme deviations away from the
mode as reflected by the low adjusted R2.
APPLICATION IN THE PASTORAL SUPPLY RESPONSE MODEL
Figure 3 sets out the historical relationship between average SOl and WS for June years
1961 to 1997. The correlation is weak at -0.17. The expected relationship is evident for
1973, 1978, 1983 and 1992, but not so for 1966, 1971, 1974, 1976, 1987 and 1989. This
suggests localised rather than national WS impacts and seasonal rather than annual
average SOL The strongest seasonal SOl correlation to WS, WB and WD is for autumn,
namely -0.39, -0.43, and -0.45, respectively.
A simple regression analysis shows that the best fit to predict the following year's
DSMD is the winter SOl expressed as an average of the three months. The three
equations are set out in Table 4. Below each of the equation reported, the 1997 winter
SOl and the 1997/98 forecast DSMD are set out.
The PSRM was developed in 1989 using TSP software (SriRamaratnam and Reynolds
1990). The PSRM is an econometric model of the sheep, beef and dairy sectors based
on Statistics NZ's agricultural statistics time series as at June, along with production and
other data from various sources. The latest update ofequations is to June 1996, and will
remain at this point until there is funding to reactivate the agricultural surveys.
There are two sets ofexogenous variables required to carry out forecasts using PSRM.
Firstly, product prices, price indices, dummy variables and the climate variables, WS,
WB and WD. These are at present from year ended June 1997 to year ending 2002.
Secondly, adjustments are allowed for where other sources provide either actual or
estimates of data forecast by the model, and allowances for land use conversions not
captured by the model structure. The latter include conversions to dairy, deer and
forestry.
In the past, there has been no other choice than to assume a modal climate outlook for
the current year in the October CES round. The winter SOl provides a predictive basis
for WS, WB and WD in the current year. For the last March CES round, the climate
variables were revised, based on derivations from NIWA's monthly DSMD data.
DSMD for selected rainfall sites (consistent with the NZMWBES published data) are
weighted by sheep, beefand dairy numbers. For the March CES round, DSMD data was
Table 5: Estimates ofWS, WB and WD for 1997/98 June year (old methodology)
available from June to February. The values used in both rounds and the latest available
estimate are set out in Table 5.
The estimates for the March CES round are slightly higher than for the earlier round,
while the extended drought conditions have impacted more on the sheep sector than the
beef sector, while improved rainfall in the main dairy areas has reduced WD.
The climate variables, either current, or lagged or both, are included in all the sheep
sector equations, in five out of the 10 beef sector equations, and in three out of the II
dairy sector equations. Climate shocks will have intertemporal effects in the sheep and
beef sectors. Some examples ofthese are lambs born, sheep numbers and beef breeding
herd numbers. The main impact ofa climate shock in the dairy sector is on current milk
production per cow.
Under scenario I - the absence of EI Nino conditions 1997/98 season - total sheep
numbers are estimated to be up 0.6%, but the breeding flock would be down slightly.
This reflects higher numbers ofretained lambs for winter kill at heavier weights and the
influence ofland use conversions to forestry, deer and dairy. Scenario II resulted in a
1.2%fall in total sheep numbers and a 0.7% fall in the breeding flock at June 1998 in
relation to scenario I, reflecting an earlier kill oflambs at lighter weights and a fall in
carrying capacity ofbreeding stock. The worsening drought conditions represented by
scenario III, resulted in a 2.3% fall in total sheep numbers and a 1.4% fall in the
breeding flock at June 1998 in relation to scenario I. The model also indicates a stronger
flow on effect into 1998/99 (and beyond).
Stock Numbers
Estimates of livestock numbers as at June 1997 are based on the PSRM since the last
Statistics NZ survey was as at June 1996. Table 6 sets out the estimates of livestock
numbers for June 1997, 1998 and 1999 under the control scenario, and changes in terms
of numbers and percentages between the control (scenario I) and the other two climate
scenarios (II and III).
Table 6: Effect ofDSMD assumptions on sheep and beefcattle numbers
Scenarios I II -I III - I
Total sheep (million) (million) (%) (million) (%)
June 1997 47.595
June 1998 47.888 -0.558 -1.2 -1.116 -2.3
June 1999 47.576 -0.659 -1.4 -1.317 -2.8
Breeding flock
June 1997 33.983
June 1998 33.943 -0.237 -0.7 -0.474 -1.4
June 1999 33.751 -0.462 -1.4 -1.317 -2.7
Total beef
June 1997 4.691
June 1998 4.349 -0.02 -0.5 -0.026 -0.6
June 1999 4.433 -0.035 -0.8 -0.047 -1.0
Breeding herd
June 1997 1.439
June 1998 1.582 -0.022 -1.4 -0.029 -1.8

















Three scenarios were run to illustrate the effects of changing the climate variable
assumptions. Each scenario used the price forecasts of the recent March CES round.
Scenario I was a control with climate variables set at long term modal values (Table 2),
scenario II used the climate variables estimated from the SOl equations (Table 4), and
scenario III used climate variables based on II months DSMD data to May 1998 (Table
5). Drought conditions worsened as the year progressed and therefore the third scenario
had the largest impact on livestock numbers and production.
SriRamaratnam (1996) has explored the implications of current and lagged effects of
climate variables on the pastoral sector for data up to 1992. Correlations between lagged
DSMD and lambing% and fleece weight per head were -0.687 and -0.583, respectively.
These correlations are consistent with drier or drought conditions affecting sheep
condition and hence production in the following year. Correlations between current year
DSMD and selected variables were as follows: adult sheep slaughter 0.539, slaughter
weight of lambs -0.437, slaughter weight of adult sheep -0.505, fleece weight per head





Under scenario I, a 10% rise in the beef breeding herd was estimated, while total beef I Table 7: Effect ofDSMD assumptions on meat production
numbers would fall by 7%. This reflects the rise in future beef price expectations, the
lower numbers of beef bull (of dairy origin) available, but moderated by the influence Scenarios I II - I III - I
of land use conversions to forestry, deer and dairy. Scenario II compared to scenario I Lambs docked (million) (million) (%) (million) (%)
resulted in a 0.5% fall in total beefcattle and a 1.4% fall in the beef breeding herd. The 1997/98 38.750
worsening drought con,ditions only marginally increased the fall in cattle numbers. 1998/99 36.135 -0.66 -1.8 -1.32 -3.7
Historically, DSMD have had no significant influence on dairy cattle numbers largely Lamb kill (million) (million) (%) (million) (%)because dairying avoid drought prone areas, unless adequate irrigation schemes are in 1997/98 27.018 0.22 -0.8 0.441 -1.6place (eg South Canterbury and North Otago). When drier-than-normal conditions do 1998/99 25.739 -0.292 -1.1 -0.586 -2.3
arise, particularly in late summer and autumn, herds tend to be reduced to once-a-day
milking, or to be dried offcompletely to protect the cows for the following season. I Adult sheep kill (million) (million) (%) (million) (%)
11997/98 5.650 0.16 2.8 0.402 7.1Earlier than usual culling is also an option. A major reason for the 3 week shut down 1998/99 5.612 -0.024 -0.4 -0.049 -0.9
ofsome AFFCO meat slaughter plants in early March 1998 was the 50% cancellation
ofcull dairy cow sendings following the first substantial rainfall in several weeks (Neil Adult cattle kill (million) (million) (%) (million) (%)
Bridgeland, Regional Plant Manager ofAFFCO Food Group - personal communication). 1997/98 2.541 0.023 0.9 0.031 1.2
In the drought affected regions, there have been a few instances of herd liquidations on 1998/99 2.365 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
recent land use conversions.
Lamb exports (kt cw) (kt cw) (%) (kt cw) (%)
1997/98 379.6 -2.7 -0.7 0.7 0.2
1998/99 360.1 -12.4 -3.4 -16.9 -4.7
~ Mutton exports (kt cw) (kt cw) (%) (kt cw) (%)~ 1997/98 92.3 2.3 2.5 4.6 5.0(J)
1998/99 89.8 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7
Beefexports (kt cw) (kt cw) (%) (kt cw) (%)
1997/98 507.6 3.3 0.7 4.4 0.9
1998/99 498.6 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.1
I
Meat Production
Table 7 sets out the effects ofDSMD assumptions on sheep and beefmeat production.
Lambs docked in the coming spring will be reduced because of the lack offeed to flush
breeding ewes during the autumn tupping.
Scenario II compared to scenario I resulted in a 1.8% fall in lambs docked for the spring
of 1998. For the comparison with scenario III, the fall in lambs docked was 3.7%.
However, there will be regional differences, with larger declines expected in drought
affected regions and increases in Southland and Otago which experienced wetter-than-
average conditions in 1997/98. Overall lambing percent differences between scenario
II and scenario I and between scenario III and scenario I are -1.2 percent points and -2.5
percent points, respectively.
The lamb and adult sheep kills in scenarios II and III compared to scenario I for 1997/98
are down, reflecting lower closing total sheep numbers as a consequence of drought
conditions. These in tum impact on exports. Kill weights for lambs are estimated to be
down by 0.5 kg on the previous year and 0.3 kg compared to scenario I. In 1998/99, the
lower numbers of lambs docked in scenario II and III compared to scenario I flow on to
lower exports.
The intensification of drought conditions between scenarios II and III compared to
scenario I have less effect on beefkill and exports than is the case for sheepmeat. Beef
exports in 1997/98 are estimated to be 0.7% and 0.9% up, respectively for scenario II
and III compared to scenario I. There is also little carryover effects into 1998/99.
Mj\ksolids and Wool Productjon
i
Table 8: Effect ofDSMD on mj\ksolids production and wool production
Scenarios I II - I III - I
Milksolids/cow (kg) (kg) (%) (kg) (%)
1997/98 266 -3 -1.1 -5 -1.9
MS processed (kt) (kt) (%) (kt) (%)
1997/98 888 -16 -1.8 -19 -2.1
-'" Greasy wool/sheep (kg) (kg) (%) (kg) (%)
.J:lo.
......
1997/98 4.78 -0.03 -0.6 -0.5 -1.0
1998/99 4.77 -0.02 -0.4 -0.4 -0.8
Clean wool (kt) (kt) (%) (kt) (%)
1997/98 201.3 -0.7 -0.3 -1.5 -0.7
1998/99 200.0 -4.2 -2.1 -8.5 -4.3
Table 8 sets out the impacts ofDSMD on mj\ksolids production and wool production.
Mj\ksolids per cow in 1997/98 is estimated to be down 1.1% and 1.9%, respectively for
scenario II and III compared to scenario I. Actual milksolids processed differs from the
model outcomes because the climate variable was not able to account for the very good
1997 spring mj\k production. Similarly, mj\ksolids processed is estimated to be down
1.8% and 2.1 %. Greasy wool shorn per sheep in 1997/98 is estimated to be down 0.6%
and I% and clean wool production is estimated to be down 0.3% and 0.7%. Flow on
effects into 1998/99 result in lower wool yields and lower clean wool production. The
latter is exacerbated by a fall in sheep numbers.
SUMMARY
This paper has provided some background into the phenomena known as ENSO which
gives rise to an EI Nino event. The interaction between oceanic and atmospheric
conditions across the equatorial Pacific Ocean result in particular wind conditions which
give rise to drier or drought conditions in eastern regions and wetter conditions in some
western regions of both North and South Islands of New Zealand.
The SOl data for the previous winter provides reasonable predictive capability for the
following year's climate for the October forecasting round carried out by MAF Policy
for the Treasury. Recent contract arrangements for the provision ofDSMD data from
NIWA on a monthly basis has facilitated the estimation ofclimate data outcomes for the
current year during the March forecasting round.
Three scenarios were run to isolate the impacts ofclimate variables on NZ sheep, beef
and dairy production. Scenario I was a control, against which the other two scenarios
were assessed. Scenario II was based on the forecast ofclimate variables (DSMD) using
the regression relationship to the previous winter SOl data. Scenario III used the actual
values of the climate variables for the I I months to May 1998.
The SOI-DSMD relationships in comparison to the actual DSMD outcomes only picked
up around 50% ofthe impacts on sheep numbers and production, and around 75% ofthe
impacts on beef numbers and beef and dairy production.
The inability of the SOl - DSMD relationships to predict more closely the actual
outcome is consistent with the low R2 values in the regression equations. Nevertheless
this paper reports some useful progress made in assessing the likely magnitude ofthe
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NEW ZEALAND APPLE SUPPLY RESPONSES BY REGIONS AND
VARIETIES
OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study are:
Jagdish Prasad and Ram SriRamaratnam
MAF Policy, Wellington
(a) to analyse the changes that have occurred in the apple industry over time in terms





In this study an attempt has been made to develop an econometric model to forecast
apple production in New Zealand over the medium term. The study aims to identifY
factors that have influenced plantings and the level of apple production in New Zealand.
These include: pool payment to growers for the respective varieties, returns for apples
and competing enterprises, availability of planting materials, etc. Natural disasters such
as hailstorms and frosts along with other climatic factors that affected yields and the level
of production and the quality of the crop have also been taken into consideration.
Adoption of new varieties and the rate of new plantings by growers is also within the
scope of this model.
New Zealand produces in excess of forty different varieties/strains of apples in nine
principal regions around the country. However, for this study eight main varieties have
been selected that account for more than 80% ofthe total apple produced in six principal
regions in New Zealand. Data used for the analysis comprises area planted and apple
supplies by variety and region; export pool payments by variety; and relevant climatic
factors which influence apple yields by regions. This model is being developed by MAF
Policy with assistance from ENZA with the objective of further enhancing our
forecasting ability.
INTRODUCTION
Need for the study
An in-depth study of the New Zealand apple industry is undertaken to monitor the
developments in the rapidly evolving apple sector. The apple industry has been through
a rapid evolution not only in terms of varietal mix and areas planted in response to price
relativities and associated profitability, but also in terms of technology relating to plant
density, propagation methods etc.
Views e~'Pressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official view of the
Ministry ofAgriculture and Forestry. Errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors. Authors
wish to acknowledge ENZA staff in Wellington and in Hastings for supplying most of the data required for
this study. The assistance ofLou Bird. MAF Policy Agent in Hastings, David Cranwell of World Empire
Trade and Ross Wilson of AGFIRST are also greatly appreciated. Helpful suggestions and comments of
colleagues at MAF Policy are also acknowledged.
(b) to analyse the level and variability ofyields by variety and regions;
(c) to investigate the economic, technical, management, climate and other factors
that have contributed to the above changes and variability in plantings and yields;
(d) to develop a model ofplantings and yield responses to understand the nature and
the level of impacts of key factors responsible; and
(e) to use the developed econometric model of supply responses for short and
medium term forecasting of the level of production and export yields.
Scope of the study
The study is largely based on known historical developments in the apple industry over
the period from 1974 to 1997. The analysis focused on eight main apple varieties and
six main apple growing regions in the North and the South Island.
The apple varieties studied are: Braeburn, Cox's Orange Pippin, Fuji; Gala, Granny
Smith, Pacific Rose, Red Delicious and Royal Gala.
The regions modelled are: Hawkes Bay, Southern North Island, Upper North Island,
Nelson-Marlborough, Canterbury and Otago.
Purpose of the study
The main objective of this study is to develop a model that will assist MAF Policy to
forecast apple production and returns to growers. This information is then used in the
Current Economic Situation (CES) report. The CES report, which covers the entire
agricultural, horticultural and forestry sectors, is prepared in March and September each
year to monitor the developments in these sectors and to carry out forecasts for the
Treasury. The analysis carried out for this report is also used by MAF Policy to provide
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More recent statistics show further expansion in production and exports. New Zealand's
total apple production expanded from about 5.8 million cartons in 1974 to about 25
million cartons in 1997, more than 400% increase. Peak production was in 1995 when
total production reached some 30 million cartons. Total area in production over the
same period increased by 300% from 5,000 hectares to 15,000 hectares.
BACKGROUND
By the beginning of the twentieth century there was widespread recognition of the
potential for commercial fruit growing. Scientific developments and improvements in
marketing methods provided a further boost to the industry (ENZA Board Biography).
In 1910, New Zealand exported 5,650 cases of apples and by 191468,000 cases were
exported.
The first apple seedlings arrived in New Zealand with the early settlers in the 1840s.





Apple growing in New Zealand is concentrated in two main regions. In the North Island,
about 90"10 ofthe total apple production takes place in the Hawkes Bay region. Nelson-
Malborough, at 80%, is the largest apple producing region in the South Island. The
North Island and South Island's share ofapple submissions' to ENZA in 1997 were 54%
and 46%, respectively.
While some 48 different varieties of apples were grown for commercial production in
New Zealand in 1997, the three most common varieties were Braebum (36%), Royal
Gala (21%) and Fuji (11%). Together, these varieties accounted for about 70% of total
New Zealand apple production for the export market.
New Zealand Apple Plantings; Totals and by Varieties
Total apple plantings in New Zealand consists of the aggregate of the plantings in all the
different apple varieties. This is depicted in figure 2. Increased plantings between 1985
and 1992 are accounted for mainly by plantings in Braebum, Royal Gala and Fuji at the
expense ofGranny Smith and Red Delicious varieties. Removals ofGranny Smith and
Red Delicious varieties took place between 1981 and 1988, with the highest removal
recorded in 1987. Since 1992, Royal Gala and Pacific Rose plantings have maintained
but Braebum and Fuji plantings have declined.
The New Zealand Scene
In this section, average apple prices, total New Zealand apple plantings and plantings by
varieties is provided as an overview of developments in the apple industry. The
relationships between plantings, total trees, bearing trees and bearing percentages are also
illustrated.
Figure 2: Total Apple Plantings and by Varieties for NZ
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Figure I provides the average apple prices and total net plantings for New Zealand. It
is evident that rising average apple prices led to higher plantings over the period 1985 to
1992. Since 1992, total net2 apple plantings in New Zealand began to decline
dramatically reflecting lower apple prices. It is also evident that changes in the level of
new plantings take place with a time lag, most often 1-2 years after a favourable price




Submissions refer to apples supplied by growers to ENZA for export, the local
market and rejects are for processing are included
September Years
Net plantings consist of total plantings net of removals but including graftings.
Net Plantings, TotallBearing Trees and Bearing Percentages New Zealand Apple Yields
As referred to before and illustrated in Figures I and 2, total net plantings were highest
during the 1988 to 1993 period. This resulted in total apple trees rising from about four
million in
1988 to about 10 million in 1996.
This also led to consequential increases in total bearing tree numbers over the same
period. However, the percentage of bearing trees declined because of the upsurge of
new plantings. It is only since 1994 that percentage of bearing trees have started to
increase. Overall, the plantings and total tree data provided by ENZA suggest that only
60% of total apples trees in New Zealand are bearing. The percent of bearing trees in
New Zealand were as high as 80% in the mid 1980s before the recent boom in new
plantings.
In Figure 3, total New Zealand apple tree statistics are set out in the form of net
plantings, total and bearing trees and bearing percentages. Net plantings consist of new
trees being planted, grafting of newer varieties on root stocks of older less profitable
varieties and remo.vals of older uneconomical varieties. Bearing trees consists of total
trees eight years qld and older and new plantings from years three to seven based on their
bearing capacity, which is assumed to commence at one carton in year three, rising to




management practices and methods adopted by growers;
regional variations; and






Table I: Apple Yields by Varieties - 1977 to 1996 (cartons/tree)
Varieties Minimum Maximum Average
Braebum 3.3 5.4 4.4
Cox's Orange Pippin 4.4 8,5 6.5
Fuji 3.6 4.8 4.2
Gala 3.7 7.6 5.7
Granny Smith 4.8 8.1 6.5
Pacific Rose na na na
Red Delicious 5.0 8.2 6.6
Royal Gala 3.9 5.6 4.8
All Varieties Average 4.1 7.0 5.6
Table I provides the ranges and the means of apple yields for the important apple
varieties in New Zealand for the period from 1977 to 1996. The ranges reported in table
I cover changes in yields arising from tree maturity as well as those from climatic
impacts.
Based on information available, the older varieties, Cox's Orange Pippin, Red Delicious
and Granny Smith appear to be the higher yielding varieties, averaging 6.5 cartons per
tree. The newer varieties, Braebum, Fuji and Royal Gala produce lower per tree yields,
averaging 4.5 cartons per tree reflecting continuing maturity and higher plant density in
recent years.
While yields on a per hectare basis are a common basis. for preparing, per tree
calculations were more appropriate for this study. While the total yield data used in this
study is somewhat deficient for the 1980s and early 1990s due to problems with tree
numbers statistics, yield data can still be used as trend indicators. It should be noted that
fluctuations in yields can be quite large from year to year. The per tree yield for apple
varies with:
Apple yields in this study are derived on a per tree basis based on information on crop
submissions, net plantings, total trees data and area planted. First three data series were
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Over the years, apple planting density in all regions has increased considerably with
increasing levels of adoption of semi-dwarf type cultivars sincethe 1980s. Average
planting density for New Zealand rose from about 400 trees per hectare to nearly 700
(table 2). The rate ofincrease in planting density varies substantially among the different
apple growing regions. The dramatic increase in apple planting density in the Otago
region and reduced apple planting density in Upper North Island region suggested by the
data nevertheless requires further investigation.
Table 2: Apple Planting Density by Regions (tree/ha)
Regions 1997 1992 1987 1982
Hawkes Bay 720 696 520 520
Southern North Island 428 436 390 390
Upper North Island 299 352 173 173
Nelson-Marlborough 612 492 323 323
Canterbury 515 534 289 289
Otago 1465 1135 826 826
New Zealand 666 564 412 412
Regions Studied
The regions that have been included in this study are Hawkes Bay, Southern North Island
(Wellington and Wanganui), Upper North Island (Auckland, Gisborne and Waikato),
Nelson-Marlborough, Canterbury and Otago. Table 3 details each region's share of
export
submissions over the 1977 to 1997 period at five yearly intervals.
Table 3 Apple Submissions by Regions Over Time (% of total submissions)
Regions 1997 1992 1987 1982 1977
Hawkes Bay 48.5 47.8 50.9 49.1 37.8
Southern North Island 1.3 1.6 0.4 0.4 0.4
Upper North Island 4.2 5.6 5.2 5.4 6.0
North Island 54.0 55.0 56.5 54.9 44.2
Nelson-Marlborough 36.2 34.6 36.5 37.1 49.1
Canterbury 5.9 6.3 1.9 2.1 1.2
Otago 3.9 4.1 5.1 5.9 5.6
.~~~
South Island 46.0 45.0 43.5 45.1 55.9
..
Based on the 1997 apple submissions to ENZA, Hawkes Bay (in the North Island) and
Nelson-Marlborough (in the South Island) are the two main apple growing regions,
comprising 49% and 36% respectively, oftotal apple production in New Zealand. The
minor regions are: Canterbury (6%); Otago (4%); Upper North Island made up of
Waikato (2%), Gisborne (1%) and Auckland (0.4%); and Southern North Island made
up mainly by the Wellington region (1%).
Until the emergence of Hawkes Bay as the main apple growing region in the 1980s,
Nelson-Marlborough accounted for nearly 50"/0 ofthe apple submissions in 1977. In the
North Island, the regions to the north ofHawkes Bay have declined in importance from
6% to 4% over the 1977-97 period, while the submissions from the Southern North
Island regions have risen even though together they have accounted for less than 6%.
In the South Island, Canterbury region rose in importance while submissions from Otago
declined. This is likely to be altered somewhat with the withdrawal of Apple Fields in
Canterbury.
Major Regions (Hawkes Bay, Nelson-Marlborough)
Hawkes Bay, the largest apple growing region in New Zealand, accounted for 49% of
the export submissions in 1997. While growers in this region produced apples from some
46 different varieties, Braeburn, Royal Gala and Fuji accounted for 75% ofsubmissions
in 1997.
Nelson-Marlborough, is the second largest region and accounted for 36% of total export
submissions in 1997. Braeburn, Royal Gala and Cox's Orange Pippin are the three main
varieties grown in this region and submissions ofthese varieties made up 66% ofthe total
export crop in 1997. Cox's Orange Pippin at 15% was the third largest variety grown
in the region, ahead of Fuji.
Minor Regions (Canterbury, Otago)
Canterbury and Otago, the two minor regions in the South Island, together accounted
for about 10% ofthe total export apple submitted between 1992 and 1997. However,
Canterbury's share of export submission during the last two decades has increased
whereas Otago's share has declined. In 1977, export submissions by Canterbury and
Otago were 1.2% and 5.6% respectively. By 1997, Canterbury's share increased to
5.9% whereas Otago's share declined to 3.9%. Braeburn, Royal Gala and Fuji are the
three prominent varieties of apples grown in the Canterbury region. In Otago, Red
Delicious is the most prominent variety followed by Braeburn and Royal Gala.
Other Regions (Upper North Island, Southern North Island)
The Upper North Island region consists of Auckland, Gisboume and Waikato. Export
submissions from these regions have declined from about 6% in 1977 to about 4% in
1997. Until 1993, Granny Smith was the single largest variety of apple submitted from
these regions and in the early 1980s accounted for up to 60% of the total submissions.
By 1997, Granny Smith and Red Delicious apples were replaced by the common varieties
of the 1990s (Braeburn, Royal Gala and Fuji). Braeburn at 47% became the single
largest variety submitted from the Upper North Island regions. Nelson-Marlborough
The Southern North Island region consists ofWellington and Wanganui. Its share of the
total submission increased from 0.4% in 1977 to 1.3% in 1997. Varietal developments
in these regions are similar to those in the Upper North Island.
Regional Apple Tree Statistics
In this section, the relationship between new plantings, total trees, bearing trees and
bearing tree percentages are illustrated for the regions studied.
Hawkes Bay
In Figure 5, total Nelson-Marlborough apple tree statistics are provided in the form of
net plantings, total and bearing trees and bearing percentages. While total net plantings
remained high over the 1988 to 1996 period, plantings have declined since the peak of
1993. Consequently, total apple trees in Nelson-Malborough rose from just under a
million in 1988 to about two and a half million in 1996. This also led to a consequential
increase in total bearing tree numbers over the same period. However, the percentage
ofbearing trees declined as more new plantings took place. It is only since 1994 that the
percentage ofbearing trees has started to increase. In 1996 less than 60% oftotal apples
trees in Nelson-Marlborough were bearing, compared to the high mid-1980s levels of
more than 80%.
100
In Figure 4, Hawkes Bay apple tree statistics are provided in the form of net plantings,
total and bearing trees and bearing percentages. Total net plantings were highest during
the 1988 to 1993 period. This resulted in total apple trees rising from about two million
in 1988 to nearly five million in 1996.
Figure 5: Nelson Marlborough Apple Tree Statistics
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Figure 4: Hawkes Bay Apple Tree Statistics
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This also led to a consequential increase in total bearing tree numbers over the same
period. However, the percentage of bearing trees declined as more new plantings took
place. It is only since 1993 that the percentage of bearing trees have started to increase.
Overall, the plantings and total tree data provided by ENZA suggest that in 1996 less
than 60"10 oftotal apples trees in Hawkes Bay were bearing. The percent of bearing trees






In Figure 6, total Canterbury apple tree statistics are provided in the form of net
plantings, total and bearing trees and bearing percentages. Total net plantings rapidly
increased over the 1985 to 1989 period and then declined to about 2,000 trees by 1996.
Consequently, total apple trees in Canterbury rose from less than 100,000 in 1976 to
about 800,000 in 1996. This also led to consequential increases in total bearing tree
numbers over the same period. The percentage of bearing trees declined from its peak
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Figure 6: Canterbury Apple Tree Statistics
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Figure 8: Upper North 'sland Tree Statistics
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trees declined from its peak in 1984 of nearly 90% to just over 40% in 1992 before rising
to more than 70% in 1996.
In Figure 8, Upper North Island apple tree statistics are provided in the form of net
plantings, total and bearing trees and bearing percentages, Total net plantings increased
substantially between 1988 and 1992, Consequently, total apple tree numbers rose from
about 300,000 in 1988 to about 500,000 in 1996. This also led to a consequential












In Figure 7, total Otago apple tree statistics are provided in the form of net plantings,
total and bearing trees and bearing percentages, Total net plantings increased over the
1988 to 1993 period and then declined to about 2,000 trees by 1996, Consequently, total
apple trees in Otago rose from about 300,000 in 1976 to nearly 1,2 million by 1996. This
also led to consequential increases in total bearing tree numbers over the same period,
The percentage of bearing trees declined from its peak in 1984 of nearly 100% to just
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Figure 9: Southern North Island Tree Statistics
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Figure 7: Otago Apple Tree Statistics
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In Figure 9, Southern North Island apple tree statistics are provided in the form of net
plantings, total and bearing trees and bearing percentages. Total net plantings increased
rapidly from 1983 onwards. Consequently, total apple tree numbers rose from about
20,000 in 1976 to about 250,000 in 1996. This also led to consequential increases in
total bearing tree numbers over the same period. The percentage of bearing trees
declined from its peak in 1982 of more than 80% to just over 20% in 1985 before rising
to nearly 60% in 1996.
Varieties Studied
The varieties included in this study are Braeburn, Cox's Orange Pippin, Fuji, Gala,
Granny Smith, Pacific Rose, Red Delicious and Royal Gala. The remaining varieties are
lumped into the "Other Category". Table 4 sets out the varietal shares based on the
export submissions over the period 1977 to 1997 at five yearly intervals.
Table 4: Changes in Apple Varietal Shares Over Time (% or total submission)
Varieties 1997 1992 1987 1982 1977
Braeburn 36 20 5 0 0
Cox's Orange Pippin 8 8 8 7 7
Fuji II 5 0 0 0
Gala 2 4 4 4 I
Granny Smith 8 21 36 36 33
Pacific Rose I 0 0 0 0
Red Delicious 8 14 23 22 12
Royal Gala 21 16 5 0 0
Other 7 II 20 31 46
Braeburn, Royal Gala and Fuji comprised 68% of the total export apple submission in
1997. The increased share of Braeburn and Royal Gala in the total export mix has been
at the expense of Granny Smith and Red Delicious apple varieties. The shares of both
these varieties declined from 36% and 23% respectively in 1987 to 8% each in 1997.
Pacific Rose, a new variety, is gaining in market share and will continue to do so in the
future.
Varietal Deyelopments Oyer Time
1960s and 1970s
Cox's Orange Pippin, Granny Smith and Red Delicious, the three older varieties, have
been grown for many years and were fairly well established in the 1960s.
The most popular varieties during the early 1970s based on their respective varietal
shares were Granny Smith (24%), Sturmer Pippin (18%), Delicious (12%), Golden
Delicious (10%), Jonathan (9%) and Cox's Orange Pippin (7%).
While Cox's Orange Pippin continues to hold its 8% market share, Granny Smith and
Red Delicious have lost market shares considerably to Braeburn and Royal Gala,
especially since the early 1990's.
Braeburn and Gala were introduced in the early 1970s. The first recorded submissions
of these varieties were in 1974. Braeburn has a very successful history. Since its
introduction, its market share has increased tremendously and in 1997 accounted for 36%
ofthe total export submissions. However, Gala's market share remained unchanged at
around 4% until the mid 1990s but has dropped to around 3% over the last three years.
1980s
The most popular varieties of the early 1980s based on their respective varietal shares
were Granny Smith (36%), Red Delicious (22%), Sturmer Pippin (10%), Golden
Delicious (10"10), Cox's Orange Pippin (7%) and Delicious (5%). While Granny Smith's
market share increased substantially and Red Delicious became a more established variety
during the 1980s, Golden Delicious and Cox's Orange Pippin maintained their shares.
Submission data indicates some removals of Sturmer Pippin and Jonathan around this
time.
Royal Gala and Fuji are newer varieties that were introduced in the 1980s. Royal Gala
compares well with Braeburn in terms of its success. The market share of this variety
increased from just 1% in 1984 to 21% in 1997. Fuji, unlike Gala, has also been a
successful variety and its market share has increased from around I% in 1989 to II% in
1997.
1990s
The most popular varieties ofthe early 1990s based on their respective varietal shares in
export submissions were Granny Smith (29%), Red Delicious (20%), Braeburn (12%),
Royal Gala (11%), Cox's Orange Pippin (9%) and Sturmer Pippin (3%). The 19905
shows the emergence ofBraeburn and Royal Gala. Granny Smith started to lose its share
whereas Cox's Orange Pippin gained slightly. Sturmer Pippin and Golden Delicious were




Varieties introduced in the 1990s include Pacific Rose, Pink Lady and Southern Snap.
Of these varieties Pacific Rose has already recorded a 1% market share. Export
submissions of Pink Lady and Southern Snap remain below the I% level.
The prominent varieties in 1997 were Braeburn(36%), Royal Gala (21%), Fuji (11%),
Cox's Orange Pippin, Granny Smith and Red Delicious, each with a share of8%.
Delicious was last submitted for export in 1981 and Jonathan in 1993.
Varietal History
Braeburn
The first recording ofBraebum submission was in 1974 (Table 5). Nelson-Marlborough,
Hawkes Bay and Auckland all submitted this variety for the first time with the largest
quantity being supplied by Nelson-Marlborough. Canterbury, Wellington and Otago
submitted small quantities for the first time in 1975, 1980 and 1981 respectively. Total
Braeburn submissions in 1997 amounted to nine million cartons and represented 36% of
the total export submissions. Hawkes Bay at 47% is the largest producer of Braeburn
apples followed by Nelson-Marlborough at 35%.
Table 5: Apple Varieties and their first export submission by regions
Varieties Year of Regions Region & Region &
first where Highest % Highest %
submission Submitted (initial) (1997)
Braeburn 1974 HB,NM& NM,83% HB,47%
CA
Cox's Orange Pippin 1960s All NA NM,70%
Fuji 1987 AIl- SNI HB,68% HB,54%
Gala 1974 A11- SNI HB,76% HB,51%
Granny Smith I960s All NA HB,50%
Pacific Rose 1992 HB&NM HB,67% HB,45%
Red Delicious 1960s All NA HB,55%
Royal Gala 1983 A11- SNI HB,50% HB,57%
Royal Gala
Royal Gala is a more recent variety with submissions first recorded in 1983 in all the
regions with the exception of Southern North Island and Canterbury (Table 5). At 5.3
million cartons, Royal Gala is the second largest variety grown and represented 21% of
the total export submissions in 1997 with 57% of the country's total Royal Gala crop
supplied from Hawkes Bay.
Fuji
Fuji at 11% is now New Zealand's third largest apple variety. Export submissions of this
variety were first recorded in 1987 in all regions with the exception of Southern North
Island that joined the rest a year later. Hawkes Bay and Nelson-Marlborough accounted
for 54% and 33% respectively of the total export submissions of this variety in 1997.
Cox's Orange Pippin
Cox's Orange Pippin, one of the older varieties in New Zealand, is the most stable variety
of apple grown in New Zealand. Its current 8% market share has remained fairly
constant since the early I970s. The variety is more prominent in the Nelson-
Marlborough region which produces more than 70% of total Cox's Orange Pippin crop.
It is the second most popular variety grown in Nelson-Marlborough and represented 15%
ofthe total 1997 export submission from that region. The 1997 export submission data
suggests that the variety is now getting almost nonexistent in the Upper North Island
regions.
Granny Smith
Granny Smith at 8% in 1997 shared the same level of varietal shares as Cox's and Red
Delicious. However, it is one of the older varieties that has been rapidly replaced with
the more popular varieties such as Braeburn, Royal Gala and Fuji. In the mid I980s, this
variety commanded up to a 40% varietal share. Fifty percent of the 1997 export
submission of Granny Smith came from Nelson-Marlborough and 39% from Hawkes
Bay. Canterbury's contribution in 1997 was nil. The variety is considered to be in a
much more stable situation now.
Red Delicious
Red Delicious appears to have a lot of similarity with Granny Smith. Export submission
ofthis variety also peaked in the mid 1980s and then declined constantly reaching an 8%
market share in 1997. It is the fourth most popular variety grown in Hawkes Bay, a
region which accounted for 55% ofthe total export submissions in 1997. Since the early
I980s, Red Delicious has been the most popular variety grown in Otago until Braeburn
shared that position in 1997. This variety is becoming nonexistent in the Canterbury
region and is declining in other regions as well.
Table 7 sets out the nominal prices by variety at five year intervals form 1977 to 1997.
Table 7: Fruit Value Payments by Varieties ($/18 kg carton)
Varieties 1997 1992 1987 1982 1977
Braeburn 9.73 26.49 10.60 7.24 2.76
Cox's Orange Pippin 8.32 28.03 11.25 6.45 3.54
Fuji 11.34 20.41 10.31 na na
Gala 12.10 23.06 10.79 6.29 3.01
Granny Smith 11.92 9.50 8.94 5.67 3.14
Pacific Rose 15.95 na na na na
Red Delicious 0.46 10.54 8.04 4.94 2.83
Royal Gala 13.03 25.53 10.12 6.76 na
All Apple's Average 10.17 18.78 9.53 5.77 3.24
na: Prices for these varieties were not available for these years as they were not in
production.
Kiwifiuit is the main competitor when it comes to land use in the apple growing regions.
The price ratios between apples and Kiwifiuit have always been in favour ofKiwifiuit.
It was only in 1992, that the price relativities between these two fiuits came close and
that was due to the slump in Kiwifiuit prices. In the South Island, among other
commodities, competition for land comes from arable crops and apples' returns have
been more competitive.
Substitution between apple varieties in NZ
Net plantings ofBraeburn, Fuji and Royal Gala increased substantially between 1981 and
1992 reflecting rising levels of average payments (refer Figure 14) for these varieties
compared to mainly Granny Smith and Red Delicious. The latter two were being
removed and/replaced by newer varieties. However, the fall of apple prices from 1993
onwards resulted in reduced plantings for all varieties.
The impact ofprices on plantings can be seen in figures 16 to 21. Each figure shows the
general rising pattern of both plantings and prices over time and also the decline in
plantings as prices fell. Each figures also show the trend in net planting for the particular




Returns for Apples Vs Other Enterprises
Figure 15 shows the trend in price relativities between apple and possible competiting
land uses - kiwifruit, field peas, wine grapes, and milkfat.
Net planting of apple trees in New Zealand increased from about 20,000 in 1976 and
peaked in 1992 at just over one million trees. Increased plantings over this time
reflected:
Figure 15: Ratios of Apple Prices to Selected Commodity Prices
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introduction of newer and better varieties ofapples in New Zealand;
increased demand for New Zealand apples especially of the newer varieties;
availability of planting materials;
adoption of better and advanced technologies in all sectors of the industry; and
improving returns.







Figure 16 sets out trends in Braeburn to other variety price ratios and net plantings from
1981 to 1996. Braeburn plantings continued to increase throughout the 1980s and
peaked in 1992 when 418,500 trees were planted. Increased plantings reflected higher
returns for this variety compared to al\ others. The decline from 1992 onwards reflects
the price decline ofBraeburn itself and higher prices received largely for Royal Gala and
for Pacific Rose to some extent, even though Pacific Rose was only just becoming
available in very small quantities for export. The large differential between Braeburn and
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Figure 18 sets out the trends in Royal Gala to other variety price ratios and net plantings
form 1981 to 1996. Royal Gala plantings picked up substantially after 1982. New
plantings continued on a general upward trend with the exception of two years and
reached a peak in 1989 with total new trees planted exceeding some 212,000 trees. Like
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Fuji
Figure 17 sets out the trends in Fuji to other variety price ratios and net plantings form
1981 to 1996, Fuji was first planted in 1981. It soon carried on the same path as
Braeburn and reached its peak planting of 144,500 trees in 1989. Fuji plantings
continued but at rapidly declining rates to only about 6,000 trees in 1996, Among other








Figure 19 sets out the trends in Pacific Rose to other variety price ratios and net plantings
form 1981 to 1996, While the commercial planting of Pacific Rose was first recorded
in 1985, it was in 1991 when numbers planted increased substantially and peaked in 1993
to 135,000 trees, Plantings ofPacific Rose continued after that but in reduced numbers,No of Trees
160,000
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Figure 20: Granny Sm Ith Price Ratios & Net Plantings
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Figure 20 sets out the trends in Granny Smith to other variety price ratios and net
plantings form )98) to )996. Net plantings ofGranny Smith have been declining since
)977 with basically no new plantings taking place after) 989. Uneconomical returns for
Granny Smith compared with Braeburn, Fuji and Royal Gala led to reduced plantings and
also some removal ofGranny Smith trees and replacing them with either Braeburn, Royal
Gala or Fuji or a combination of these three varieties.
APPLE SUPPLY RESPONSE MODEL: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The following is an outline of the conceptual framework of the apple production sector
adopted in this study to model apple plantings, total and bearing tree numbers and yields
per tree for the important apple varieties grown in the six model1ing regions. The eight
varieties and the model1ing regions covered in this study were identified earlier in this
paper and the mnemonics adopted for the purpose ofdata identification and estimation
are as follows:
In this study, apple plantings and yield response relationships are investigated for six
growing regions and for New Zealand as a whole. Six modelling regions were
determined following discussions with ENZA. The objective was to identify relatively
homogenous areas into single production regions and also to keep the number of regions
modelled to a manageable size. The potential availability of important data on production
(crop submissions), tree numbers and net plantings by varieties were also additional
considerations. The diversity ofalternative enterprises to apples available in the different
parts of the country and the variability of climatic impacts on apple yields necessitated















Braeburn (BR), Cox's Orange Pippin (CO), Fuji (FU), Gala (GA), Granny Smith(GS),












Figure 2) sets out the trends in Red Delicious to other variety price ratios and net
plantings form 1981 to 1996. Red Delicious apples started to become unpopular, like
Granny Smith, since 1977. Removal of Red Delicious trees was highest in 1982 and
1984. Net plantings virtually became nil after 1991.
Regions
Hawkes Bay (HB), Nelson-Marlborough (NM), Canterbury (CA), Otago(OT), Upper
North Island (UNI), Southern North Island (SNI) and New Zealand (NZ) for purposes
of an overview of changes in apple varietal mix in plantings and total tree numbers.
September Year.
The planting equations within each region are estimated in a two-step process. For each
region, the collective decision ofgrowers to plant (either expand current operations or
embark on apple growing) apples is modelled first. For example, the total net apple
plantings in Hawkes Bay (ALLHBPL) are modelled as the first step.
This step takes into account the relative returns for apples in relation to the returns for
relevant competing enterprises in that region such as kiwifruit (eg, Hawkes Bay, Nelson-
Marlborough, Upper North Island), dairy (eg, Hawkes Bay, Canterbury, Otago), beef
(Southern North Island), lamb (eg, Canterbury, Otago), and wine grapes (eg, Hawkes
Bay, Southern North Island, Nelson-Marlborough). Other variables considered were
Government Policy that favoured the main competing enterprises such as kiwifruit,
availability (known shortages) of planting material and the cost of financing which was
not neutral. Government Policy dummy variable represents assistance to kiwifruit (1975-
1987), when certain development expenditure items were fully tax deductible in the year
that they occurred, and/or supplementary minimum prices for the pastoral sector, also in














Figure 21: Red Delicious Price Ratios & Net Plantings
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The second modelling step involved estimating the planting equations for each of the
important varieties in each region, given the level of total net new plantings estimated in
the first step. This was achieved by deriving the ratios of particular varietal prices to the
alternative apple varieties in that region and using them as the explanatory variables along
with the total net new plantings for that region.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF mE APPLE SUPPLy RESPONSE MODEL
Time periods - t (years), Regions- n (six), Varieties- m (eight)
(a) Total area - TA~lI,m
(b) Bearing Area - BA ~ II, m
(c) Net NewPlantings- PL~lI,m =(N~lI,m-R~lI,m)
I. ANNUAL ACREAGE ADJUSTMENT (CHANGE) RELATIONSHIPS
(BY REGIONS)
For the newer varieties such as Royal Gala, Fuji and in particular Pacific Rose for which
prices were available only from 1981, 1985 and 1993, respectively, a composite price
variable was derived (APNAVPR) in order to allow for degrees offreedom. This price
was then used to derive the price ratios with the respective varieties being modelled (eg.
the ratio of Braeburn prices to this composite price were referred to as RATBRNAV).
An additional management consideration in varietal choice (yet to be represented in the
model) relates to the timing ofmaturity ofparticular varieties grown. This should enable
harvesting operations to be spread evenly over the harvesting period so as to avoid
labour and other constraints. Royal Gala is the variety that matures first (mid February),
followed by Braeburn and Red Delicious (mid March) and then by the other varieties





New Plantings in variety m in region n, at the beginning ofyear
t
Removals of variety m in region n, at the beginning of year t
BA ~ II, m = BA,.,. II, m+ PL'-4. II, m
TA ~lI,m = TA'.I,lI,m + (N '.I,lI,m - R '-1. II, m)
ESTIMATED EQUATIONS (BY REGIONS & VARIETIES)
PL ~lI,m = f(PL •.I,lI,m. PR, PRA, GP, AF, APM, TO]




The crop submissions data available from ENZA annual reports, on a regional basis, were
available from 1970 to 1997. Detailed net new plantings (which includes graftings on
existing trees) data was available with ENZA for the more recent period of 1988-1996
only along with total tree statistics for 1987. Both statistics were provided by ENZA for
this study for all the main varieties and for the regions identified above.
The area data available from Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) agricultural census was
utilised to derive planting densities (trees per hectare) for the recent 10 year period. This
information provided the basis to estimate the likely total tree numbers for the previous
5-10 year period by regions based on the knowledge of rising planting densities since the
adoption of semi-dwarf trees in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Crop submissions to
ENZA by varieties for each modelling region then provided the basis for estimating the
most likely tree numbers by varieties for these regions, where the lags between plantings
and production were taken into consideration.
Endogenous Variables
The key endogenous variables modelled are net plantings and yields per tree for
individual varieties by regions. The naming convention adopted for these variables is in
the order ofvariety name, region name and variable category. For example, BRHBPL
represents Braeburn plantings in the Hawkes Bay region and BRHBYD represents
Braeburn yields in Hawkes Bay. Similarly, GSNMPL represents Granny Smith plantings
in the Nelson- Marlborough region and FUCBYD represents Fuji yields in the Canterbury
region.
Bearing tree numbers are derived from net new plantings data assuming some production
from plantings after 3-4 years and full bearing in the eighth year. Graftings which have
dominated the increases in tree numbers in the late 1980s and 1990s come on production











Total area planted in variety m in region n, during year t
Bearing area planted in variety m in region n, during year
t
New plantings in variety m in region n, during year t
Profitability ofapple enterprise in year t-i in region n (i =
I, 2 or 3 depending on the time lag between ordering and
planting)
Profitability ofalternate enterprises (eg Kiwifiuit, Dairy,




Government policies (eg investment incentives, taxation,
depreciation etc.) related to horticulture at year t.
Affordability of finance (eg interest rates) in year t.
Availability of planting material for variety m at year tin
region n. (Measured as a Dummy Variable)
RESULTS OF MODEL ESTIMATION
Estimated Planting Equations
Estimated apple planting equations are reported in the appendix for the six modelling
regions and for New Zealand. A separate table is set out for each region to report total
plantings in apples in that region first and then plantings of important varieties (currently
or in the past).
(b) Yield Relationships (Y ~ n. m ) Hawkes Bay




Average yield per tree of variety m in region n in year t
Alternate bearing pattern dummy variable for region n in
year t
Total apple plantings in Hawkes Bay (ALLHBPL) is explained by (current and lagged)
price ratios ofapples to kiwifiuit and apples to milk and the government policy variable.
This equation had a reasonable level of overall explanatory power with an adjusted R2
of 0.899 and significant F-statistics (31.3). All the explanatory variables were also
statistically significant (t-statistics significant at the 5% level ofconfidence) and were of
the correct sign (ie, positive in the case ofprice ratios and negative for government policy
initiatives which favoured alternative enterprises).
Time trend for year t.
Tree density (number of trees per hectare) in ye'lr in
region n
Climatic factors (eg, rainfall or soil moisture, frost.
average temperatures, minimum temperatures etc.) in year








+I for high yielding years
-I for low yielding years.
Individual varietal plantings for Braeburn, Fuji, Granny Smith, Royal Gala and Pacific
Rose for Hawkes Bay are also represented in this appendix table. All these equations also
represent a reasonable level of overall explanatory power with an adjusted R2 in the
range of0.723 to 0.899 and significant F-statistics, with the exception ofRoyal Gala for
which the adjusted R2 value was only 0.548.
In all these equations, the variable representing total net apple plantings in Hawkes Bay
(ie, ALLHBPL) was significant at the 5% level of confidence. The co-efficients
associated with this (common) variable in all these varietal planting equations represent
the average relative share of plantings over the estimation period of 1982-1996 (eg,
0.141 for Braeburn, 0.221 for Granny Smith, 0.146 for Royal Gaia, 0.095 for Fuji and
0.104 for Pacific Rose). An attempted share equations approach to model apple
plantings did not provide satisfactory results.
III. AGGREGATE PRODUCTION RELATIONSHIPS (TP)
RP ~ n. m = BA ~ n. m X Y ~ n. m
The ratios of respective apple prices to the composite apple price (of Royal Gala, Fuji
and Pacific Rose) is a variable used in all the varietal planting equations. Most often this










Regional production ofvariety m during year t in region
Total aggregate production of variety m during year t
Nelson-Marlborough
All plantings in Nelson-Marlborough (ALLNMPL) is explained by the price ratios of
apples to kiwifiuit and apples to lamb and the government policy variable. This equation
had a reasonable level of overall explanatory power with an adjusted R2 of 0.905 and
significant F-statistics (32.0). The policy dummy variable was statistically significant (t-
statistics significant at the 5% level of confidence) but not the lagged price ratios for
competing enterprises. They were, however, ofthe correct sign (ie, positive in the case




Individual varietal plantings of Braeburn, Cox's, Fuji, Royal Gala and Pacific Rose in
Nelson-Marlborough are also represented in this appendix table. All these equations also
represent a reasonable level of overall explanatory power with an adjusted R2 in the
range of0.727 to 0.872 and significant F-statistics, with the exception ofFuji and Pacific
Rose for which the adjusted R2 values were 0.560 and 0.619, respectively.
In all these equations, the variable representing total net apple plantings in Nelson-
Marlborough (ie, ALLNMPL) had the correct positive sign, but was significant at the 5%
level of confidence only in the case of Royal Gala and Pacific Rose. The co-efficients
associated with this (common) variable in all these varietal planting equations represent
the average relative share of plantings over the estimation period of 1982-1996 (eg,
0.148 for Braeburn, 0.124 for Cox's, 0.165 for Royal Gala, 0.052 for Fuji and 0.054 for
Pacific Rose).
The ratios of respective apple prices to the composite apple price (of Royal Gala, Fuji
and Pacific Rose) is used in all these varietal planting equations as well. Most often this
is an important variable in explaining varietal planting decisions, along with other relevant
price ratios.
Canterbury
Total apple plantings in Canterbury (ALLCBPL) is explained by the price ratios of apples
to milk and apples to lamb and the government policy variable. This equation had an
overall explanatory power with an adjusted R2 of 0.550 only. All the explanatory
variables were ofthe correct sign (ie, positive in the case of price ratios and negative for
government policy initiatives which favoured alternative enterprises) but statistically
significant (t-statistics significant at the 5% level ofconfidence) only in the case of lagged
(two periods) apple to lamb price ratios.
Individual varietal plantings for Braeburn, Fuji, Royal Gala, Gala and Pacific Rose for
Hawkes Bay are also represented in this appendix table. All these equations represent
a reasonable level ofoverall explanatory power with an adjusted R2 in the range ofO. 710
to 0.896 and significant F-statistics.
In all these equations, the variable representing total net apple plantings in Canterbury
(ie, ALLCBPL) was significant at the 5% level of confidence, with the exception of
Pacific Rose. The co-efficients associated with this (common) variable in all these varietal
planting equations represent the average relative share of plantings over the estimation
period of 1982-1996 (eg, 0.344 for Braeburn, 0.287 for Fuji, 0.251 for Royal Gala, 0.061
for Gala and 0.009 for Pacific Rose).
The ratios of respective apple prices to the composite apple price (of Royal Gala, Fuji
and Pacific Rose) is a variable used in all the varietal planting equations and had the
expected positive sign. Most often this is an important variable in explaining varietal
planting decisions, along with other relevant price ratios.
Otago
Total apple plantings in Otago (ALLOTPL) is explained by the price ratios ofapples to
milk and apples to lamb and the government policy variable. This equation had an overall
explanatory power with an adjusted R2 of0.537 only. All the explanatory variables were
of the correct sign (ie, positive in the case of price ratios and negative for government
policy initiatives which favoured alternative enterprises) but statistically significant (t-
statistics significant at the 5% level of confidence) only in the case of the government
policy variable.
Individual varietal plantings for Braeburn, Cox's, Fuji and Pacific Rose for Otago are also
represented in this appendix table. All these equations represent a reasonable level of
overall explanatory power with an adjusted R2 in the range of 0.679 to 0.720 and
significant F-statistics.
In all these equations, the variable representing total net apple plantings in Otago (ie,
ALLOTPL) had the correct positive sign but was significant at the 5% level of
confidence, only in the case of Fuji. The co-efficients associated with this (common)
variable in all these varietal planting equations represent the average relative share of
plantings over the estimation period of 1983-1996 (eg, 0.036 for Braeburn, 0.156 for
Fuji, 0.039 for Cox's, and 0.013 for Pacific Rose).
The ratios of respective apple prices to the composite apple price (of Royal Gala, Fuji
and Pacific Rose) is a variable used in all the varietal planting equations and had the
expected positive sign. Most often this is an important variable in explaining varietal
planting decisions, along with other relevant price ratios.
Upper North Island
Total apple plantings in Upper North Island (ALLUNlPL) is explained by the price ratios
ofapples to kiwifruit and apples to wine grapes and the government policy variable. This
equation had an overall explanatory power with an adjusted R2 of 0.481 only. All the
explanatory variables were ofthe correct sign (ie, positive in the case of price ratios and
negative for government policy initiatives which favoured alternative enterprises) but not
statistically significant.
Individual varietal plantings for Braeburn, Granny Smith, Royal Gala, Gala and Pacific
Rose for Upper North Island are also represented in this appendix table. All these
equations represent a reasonable level ofoverall explanatory power with an adjusted R2
in the range of0.645 to 0.841 and significant F-statistics, with the exception ofGranny
Smith planting equation which had an adjusted R2 value of0.546.
In all these equations, the variable representing total net apple plantings in Upper North
Island (ie, ALLUNIPL) was significant at least at the IOO!o level ofconfidence, with the
exception ofGranny Smith. The co-efficients associated with this (common) variable in
all these varietal planting equations represent the average relative share of plantings over
the estimation period of 1986-1996 (eg, 0.379 for Braeburn, 0.016 for Granny Smith,




The ratios of respective apple prices to the composite apple price (of Royal Gala, Fuji
and Pacific Rose) is a variable used in all the varietal planting equations and had the
expected positive sign and was significant at the 5% level of confidence for Braeburn,
Royal Gala and Gala. Most often this is an important variable in explaining varietal
planting decisions, along with other relevant price ratios.
Southern North Island
Total apple plantings in Southern North Island (ALLSNIPL) is explained by the price
ratios of apples to beef and apples to wine grapes. The government policy variable was
not found to be important for this region. This equation had an overall explanatory power
with an adjusted R2 of0.478 only. The co-efficients of explanatory variables were of the
correct sign (ie, positive in the case of price ratios) and statistically significant for apple
to beef price ratios.
Individual varietal plantings for Braeburn, Cox's, Fuji, Royal Gala, and Pacific Rose for
Southern North Island are also represented in this appendix table. All these equations
represent a reasonable level of overall explanatory power with an adjusted R2 in the
range of0.649 to 0.828 and significant F-statistics, with the exception of Cox's planting
equation which had an adjusted R2 value of0.589.
In all these equations, the variable representing total net apple plantings in Southern
North Island (ie, ALLSNIPL) was significant at least at the 5% level of confidence, with
the exception of Pacific Rose. The co-efficients associated with this (common) variable
in all these varietal planting equations represent the average relative share of plantings
over the estimation period of 1982-1996 (eg, 0.236 for Braeburn, 0.064 for Cox's, 0.203
for Royal Gala, 0.157 for Fuji and 0.057 for Pacific Rose).
The ratios of respective apple prices to the composite apple price (of Royal Gala, Fuji
and Pacific Rose) is a variable used in all the varietal planting equations and had the
expected positive sign and was significant at the 10% level of confidence for Braeburn,
Cox's and Fuji. Most often this is an important variable in explaining varietal planting
decisions, along with other relevant price ratios.
Model Validation Results
Validation of the Apple Planting Equations
Model validation results for regional planting equations by key apple varieties are
reported in table 8. Statistical measures reported in this table are the Correlation Co-
efficients (CORR), the Regression Co-efficients (REGR) ofactuals on predicted, Theil's
Inequality Co-efficient which measures the extent to which the turning points are
captured and the Error due to Bias (EOB). The CORR measures the degree of parallel
changes in actual and predicted or estimated values, while REGR measures the extent to
which the two series coincide together. In both cases, a value close to one is most
preferred and the value for REGR can be greater than one. The range for the Theil's Co-
efficient is 0-1 and a value closer to zero suggests greater capture of the turning points.
A lower EOB value also indicate better model validation.
Table 8: Validation of the Apple Model Regional Planting Equations by Varieties
Endogenous Variables Correlatio Regn Co- Theil's Error
n Co- err Act vs Co-err Due To
Efficient Pred Bias
I. Hawkes Bay
a) All Plantings 0.951 1.030 0.155 0.003
b) Braeburn Plantings 0.908 0.990 0.227 0.002
c) Fuji Plantings 0.706 0.966 0.361 0.001
d) Granny Smith Plantings 0.700 1.108 0.694 0.024
e) Royal Gala Plantings 0.644 1.010 0.394 0.035
f) Pacific Rose Plantings 0.937 1.016 0.274 0.002
II. Nelson-Marlborough
a) All Plantings 0.929 0.961 0.105 0.002
b) Braeburn Plantings 0.943 1.010 0.109 0.015
c) Cox's Plantings 0.937 1.020 0.223 0.003
d) Fuji Plantings 0.751 1.216 0.290 0.0001
e) Royal Gala Plantings 0.792 1.053 0.176 0.0001
f) Pacific Rose Plantings 0.715 1.147 0.494 0.003
III. Canterbury
a) All Plantings 0.633 0.834 0.552 0.021
b) Braeburn Plantings 0.933 1.007 0.226 0.0002
c) Fuji Plantings 0.843 1.001 0.420 0.033
d) Royal Gala Plantings 0.962 1.012 0.201 0.002
e) Gala Plantings 0.930 1.002 0.326 0.003




Endogenous Variables CORR REGR THEIL EDB
IV. Otago
a) All Plantings 0.736 0.878 0.408 0.027
b) Braeburn Plantings 0.826 1.010 0.393 0.013
c) Cox's Plantings 0.824 1.002 0.513 0.022
d) Fuji Plantings 0.841 1.035 0.395 0.015
e) Pacific Rose Plantings 0.904 1016 0.353 0.001
V. Upper North Island
a) All Plantings 0.593 0.838 0.542 0.008
b) Braeburn Plantings 0.950 1002 0.229 0.005
c) Granny Smith Plantings 0.905 1004 0.419 0.004
d) Royal Gala Plantings 0.976 1016 0.157 0.069
e) Gala Plantings 0.926 1.008 0.268 0017 .
f) Pacific Rose Plantings 0.929 1.013 0.289 0.000
VI. Southern North Island
a) All Plantings 0.692 1.007 0.373 0.070
b) Braeburn Plantings 0.934 0.975 0.211 0.005
c) Cox's Plantings 0.855 1.037 0.455 0.002
d) Fuji Plantings 0.892 0.994 0.333 0.000
e) Royal Gala Plantings 0.945 0.986 0.225 0.003
f) Pacific Rose Plantings 0.912 1.029 0.339 0.004
VII. New Zealand
a) All Plantings 0.903 1.001 0.207 0.018
b) Braeburn Plantings 0.969 0.972 0.129 0.014
c) Cox's Plantings 0.947 1.006 0222 0.020
d) Fuji Plantings 0.903 1.039 0.219 0.002
e) Royal Gala Plantings 0.797 0.999 0.213 0.085
f) Gala Plantings 0.849 1.004 0.436 0.059
g) Pacific Rose Plantings 0.893 1029 0.349 0.002
Out of the 42 apple varietal planting equations estimated for the six modelling
equations and for New Zealand as a whole, 22 equations had a correlation co-
efficient of over 0.900 between actual and estimated values, 16 equations with a
correlation co-efficient of between 0.700 and 0.900 between actual and estimated
values and the remaining four had a correlation co-efficient ranging between 0.593
(Upper North Island All Plantings) and 0.692 (Southern North Island All Plantings).
The other two incidence of lower CORR was observed for Hawkes Bay Royal Gala
plantings (0.644) and Canterbury All Plantings (0.633).
Most regression Co-efficients of actual on predicted were closer to one in the range
of 0.975 to 1.025 (27 planting equations). 37 out of the 42 equations had a REGR
value ofbetween 0.950 and 1050, the four exceptions being the Canterbury
(0834), Otago (0.878) and Upper North Island (0.838) All Plantings equations and
the Fuji planting equation in Nelson-Marlborough (1.216). The lack of appropriate
data series for prices, and more importantly gross margins, for the important
alternative enterprises in these minor and other apple regions appear to be the major
constraint here.
The Theils Inequality co-efficients reported in table 8 suggests that only 10 out of
the 42 equations estimated had a value ofover 0.40, exhibiting some level of turning
point problems. Most equations (22 out of 42) reported a Theil value of under 0.30.
The Error due to Bias (consistent overs or unders) was quite low (under 0.01) for
24 out of the 42 equations estimated and reasonably low (under 0.02) for 37 out of
the 42 apple planting equations estimated.
Validation of the Apple Yield Equations
Table 9 sets out the validation results for apple yield equations estimated for the
important varieties by regions. Overall, the correlation co-efficients, regression co-
efficients of actual versus predicted values and other model validation measures are
satisfactory, even though they are not as good as those for the apple planting
equations reported in table 8. Ofthe 21 apple yield equations estimated, 14 have a
correlation co-efficient of0.750 or higher and 13 have a regression co-efficient in
the range of0.950 to 1050. Theil's inequality co-efficients in effect were better for
the yield equations reported than for the apple planting equations in table 8 and the
error due to bias was also comparable.
In all regions modelled, Royal Gala yields were explained the best by the estimated
equations followed by the Braeburn yields. Granny Smith, Cox's and Red Delicious
yields had somewhat poorer model validation results. None of the Pacific Rose yield
equations were estimated as they are still in the process of maturing and data was
available for only a limited number ofyears.
Appendix Tables
41
APPLE MODEL: PLANTINGS EOUATIONS BY REGIONS AND VARIETIES
L HAWKES BAY (1982-1996) ~ E 1m:'.
a) All Plantings
ALLHBPL, = 132,321 + 54,306 RATAPKF, + 92,122 RATAP~'.2) - 190,924 DTC 0.899 31.3 2.24
(1.38) (3.07**) (3.09**) (-3.65**)
b) Braebum Plantings
BRHBPL, = -162,000 + 0.141 ALLHBPL, + 187,649 RATBRNAV, 0.899 21.1 2.03
(-1.76) (2.26**) (2.85**)
+ 126,002 RATBRRG('.I) - 98,409 RATBRFU('.2)
(2.19**) (-1.36)
c) Fuji Plantings
FUHBPL, = 4,087 + 0.095 ALLHBPL, + 25,198 RATFUNAV, 0.739 5.1 1.54
(0.62) (2.41**) (1.95*)
+ 41,468 RATFURG(,.!) - 24,609 RATFURDU_!)(2.59**) (-2.99**)
~) Granny Smith Plantings
GSHBPL, = -47,098 + 0.221 ALLHBPL, + 74,401 RATGSNAV, 0.723 7.8 2.58
(-0.86) (3.02**) (0.203)
+ 9,640 RATGSB~"2)+ 48,910 RATGSCO(,.2)
(1.03) (3.87**)
e) Royal Gala Plantings
RGHBPL, = 12,895 + 0.146 ALLHBPL, + 24,986 RATRGNAV(I-1) 0.548 2.5 1.81
(0.16) (2.37**) (1.32)
+ 74,818 RATRGGS('.2) + 507,489 RATRGB~'_2)
(1.24) (1.35)
~ Pacific Rose Plantings
PRHBPL, = -12,193 + 0.104 ALLHBPL, + 57,655 RATPRNAV, 0.856 30.8 1.45
(-1.83) (3.78*') (3.98**)
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ALLNMPL, = 123,304 + 5,481 RATAPKF("2) + 4,875 RATAPLB('.2) - 140,856 DTC 0.905 32.0 1.59
(2.85*') ( 1.55) (0.88) (-5.98**)
J) Braebum Plantings
BRNMPL, = -96,747 + 0.148 ALLNMPL, + 148,247 RATBRNAV, 0.872 13.3 2.70
(1.29) (2.84'*)
+ 11,069 RATBRRD("2) + 22,719 RATBRRGu.l )(1.82) (1.58)
:) Cox's Plantings
CONMPL, = -58,054 + 0.124 ALLNMPL, + 44,281 RATCONAVu.l ) 0.727 5.8 2.28(1.74) (1.95)
+ 3,793 RATCORD('.2) + 27,124 RATCORG("2)
(1.61) (1.62)
:I) Fuji Plantings
FUNMPL, = -210 + 0.052 ALLNMPL, + 14,673 RATFUNAV, 0.560 4.5 1.49
(1.03) (1.99*)
+ 11,126 RATFUCO('.2) + 1,545 RATFURG(,.!)
(1.04) (1.79)
e) Royal Gala'Plantings
RGNMPL, = 12,895 + 0.165 ALLNMPL, + 5,761 RATRGNAV(,.!) 0.750 12.4 2.08
(5.18'*) (1.32)
+ 42.8 RATRGGS('.2) + 1,113 RATRGB~t'2)
(1.10) (1.12)
~ Pacific Rose Plantings
PRNMPL, = -2,318 + 0.054 ALLNMPL, + 14,461 RATPRNAV, 0.619 4.1 1.64
(2.04') (1.28)
169
APPLE MODEL: PLANTINGS EOUATIONS BY REGIONS AND VARIEmS (Coutd.)
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In. CANTERBURY (1982-1996) ~ E IllY
a) All Plantings
ALLCBPL, = 123,940 + 30,468 RATAP~'_2) + 15,389 RATAPLB('_2) - 62,822 DTC 0.550 2.5 1.45
(1.79) (2.18*) (-1.48)
b) Braebum Plantings
BRCBPL, = -64,303 + 0.344 ALLCBPL, + 18,320 RATBRNAV('_I) 0.815 13.4 2.25
(5.97**) (1.60)
+ 4,649 RATBRRD('_2) + 23,319 RATBRCO('.2)
(1.16) (1.48)
c) Fuji Plantings
FUCBPL, = 386.6 + 0.287 ALLCBPL, + 19,663 RATFUNAV('.2) 0.710 3.9 1.70
(2.41**) (1.41)
+ 8,452 RATFURD('_2) + 10,200 RATFURG('_I)
(1.05) (1.26)
d) Royal Gala Plantings
RGCBPL, = 2,954 + 0.251 ALLCBPL, + 1,119 RATRGNAV(,.I) 0.896 31.1 1.50
(9.78**) (1.10)
+ 10,841 RATRGCO('.2) + 4,709 RATRGB~'.2)
(1.65) (1.64)
e) Gala Plantings
GACBPL, = -27,625 + 0.061 ALLCBPL, + 22,728 RATGANAV('_2) 0.780 10.2 1.84
(3.48**) (1.91)
+ 20,240 RATGARG(,_,) + 1,562 RATGAB~'.2)
(1.57) (1.83)
f) Pacific Rose Plantings
PRCBPL, = -1,227 + 0.009 ALLCBPL, + 12,551 RATPRNAV, 0.881 17.7 1.66
(1.51) (4.90**)
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ALLOTPL, = 110,312 + 1,821 RATAP~'_2) + 8,939 RATAPLB('_2) - 77,876 DTC 0.537 4.1 1.47
(1.06) (1.64) (-2.15**)
b) Braebum Plantings
BROTPL, = -37,664 + 0.036 ALLOTPL, + 3,192 RATBRNAV(t.2) 0.682 3.4 1.94
(1.72) (1.07)
+ 1,045 RATBRRD('_2) + 20,819 RATBRCO('.2)
(1.25) (1.90*)
c) Cox's Plantings
COOTPL, = -17,889 + 0.039 ALLOTPL, + 8,632 RATCONAV('_I) 0.679 3.4 1.84
(1.53) (1.41)
+ 2,609 RATCORD('.2) + 16,270 RATCORG('.2)
(1.46) (1.25)
d) Fuji Plantings
FUOTPL, = 5,550 + 0.156 ALLOTPL, + 10,278 RATFUNAV('_2) 0.708 2.8 2.43
(2.80**) (1.27)
+ 1,948 RATFURD('_2) + 3,610 RATFUB~'.2)
(1.36) (1.10)
e) Pacific Rose Plantings




APPLE MODEL: PLANTINGS EOUATIONS BY REGIONS AND VARIETIES (Coutd,)
Yo UPPER NORTH ISLAND (1986-1996) ~ E Ill¥.
a) All Plantings
ALLUNIPL, = 52,791 + 10,405 RATAPKF, + 17,496 RATAPWG('_3) - 13,253 DTC 0.481 3.1 1.56
(1.10) (1.76) (-1.59)
b) Braebum Plantings
BRUNIPL, = -10,158 + 0.379 ALLUNIPL, + 1,460 RATBRNAV('_I) 0.838 13.9 2.30
(5.01··) (2.84··)
+ 22,337 RATBRCO('.2) + 14,038 RATBRFU(t.l)
(2.52··) (1.54)
c) Granny Smith Plantings
GSUNIPL, = -19,246 + 0.016 ALLUNIPL, + 22,375 RATGSNAV, 0.546 3.0 2.76
(1.23) (1.58)
+ 12,905 RATGSB~'_2) + 45,221 RATGSG~'.2)
(1.54) (1.57)
d) Royal Gala Plantings
RGUNIPL, = -7,157 + 0.432 ALLUNIPL, + 31,271 RATRGNAV, 0.841 8.6 2.62
(5.19···) (2.11·)
+ 11,210 RATRGCO('_2) + 35,596 RATRGFU(,.I)
(1.37) (1.93·)
e) Gala Plantings
GAUNIPL, = 2,869 + 0.027 ALLUNIPL, + 3,579 RATRGNAV, 0.645 4.0 2.64
(2.16·) (2.29·)
+ 6,609 RATGARG(t.l) + 1,469 RATGAGS('_2)
(1.80) (3.12·)
f) Pacific Rose Plantings
PRUNIPL, = -1,453 + 0.104 ALLUNIPL, + 1,879 RATPRNAV, 0.657 4.2 1.72
(4.2\··) (1.72)
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APPLE MODEL: PLANTINGS EOUATIONS BY REGIONS AND VARIETIES (COUld,)
Y1. SOUTHERN NORTH ISLAND (1982-1996)
R: I illY.
a) All Plantings
ALLSNIPL, = -22,245 + 6,768 RATAPBF("2) + 2,387 RATAPWG(t.3) 0.478 2.1 1.96
(2.17·) (1.63)
b) Braebum Plantings
BRSNIPL, = -7,826 + 0.236 ALLSNIPL, + 6,811 RATBRNAV, 0.828 15.5 2.24
(5.43··) (1.75·)
+ 8,522 RATBRG~'_2) + 934 RATBRGS(t.2)
(2.49··) (1.04)
c) Cox's Plantings
COSNIPL, = -1,625 + 0.064 ALLSNIPL, + 3,266 RATCONAV(,_I) 0.589 5.0 2.60
(3.06··) (1.88·)
+ 469 RATCORD(t_2) + 1,001 RATCOB~'_I)
(1.65) (1.5\)
d) Fuji Plantings
FUSNIPL, = 928 + 0.157 ALLSNIPL, + 10,579 RATFUNAV(t.l) 0.649 5.3 2.07
(3.05··) (1.99·)
+ 6,985 RATFURG('_I) + 5,655 RATFUG~t-1)
(1.76) (1.79)
e) Royal Gala Plantings
RGSNIPL, = 3,299 + 0.203 ALLSNIPL, + 2,973 RATRGNAV, 0.826 15.2 2.36
(6.44···) (1.26)
+ 3,760 RATRGB~'_I) + 3,180 RATRGCO(,_I)
(2.43··) (2.27·)
f) Pacific Rose Plantings












The macroeconomic forecasting system of the Treasury produces regular forecasts
which are based on a number of assumptions. Two of these assumptions are that the
current policy plans of government remain constant and that the real exchange rate
remains constant. This is problematic because the two interact. Current government
policy is perhaps best seen as a time sequence (over a number of years) of intended
policy settings. They will usually include a range of micro and macro levers which
will influence private sector behaviour either because they signal particular directions
or because the manner of policy implementation by the State uses real resources or
forces the use of resources through compliance costs on the private sector.
There are a number of theories which attempt to explain the relationship between
government policy and the real exchange rate. Current policy can potentially induce,
at least, short term deviations of the real exchange rate from its longrun equilibrium
trend. If this is the case and price level implications are involved then the current
procedures will tend to place too much adjustment on interest rates. The objective of
this project is to attempt to produce a forecasting approach for the real exchange rate
so that this key variable can be made endogenous.
The forecasting system could then operate in an iterative fashion. A set of forecasts
could be made at an initial assumed value of the real exchange rate (RER). The RER
could then be forecast over the period based on the initial outcome and the macro
forecast recalculated at the new RER trend. One iteration should suffice in most
circumstances but where forecasts involve larger changes in RER, second or
subsequent iterations may be required.
Review of Literature
Two recent studies have attempted to explain the behaviour of the New Zealand RER.
Hansen and Hutchison (1995) expanded the models of Pitchford (1994), Blundell-
Wignall and Gregory (1990) and Buiter and Purvis (1983) to build a 9 equation model
which focuses directly on the behaviour of two components of the RER, the consumer
price index and the nominal exchange rate. Their quarterly error correction model is
estimated over the period I979Q2 - 1993QI. The long-run steady state equation of
the RER (termed c in their model) inherent in their model was:
I Agmardt Professor of International Trade Policy. Lincoln University. PO Box 84, Canterbury. E-
maillaltimor@lincoln.ac.nz.
, The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Stuart McMillian of the International Trade
Policy Research Centre. Lincoln University.
c = -0.89t + 2.32rf +3.27yn - 6.58g + 0.14 D84q3
where t, rf, yn and g represent the terms of trade, foreign interest rate (with 3 months
to maturity), the supply of non-traded goods and income adjusted by the terms of
trade. All the variables arc in log form. D84q3 is a binary variable to account for the
reform and deregulation of financial markets. The 20 percent devaluation of the NZ
dollar in July 1984 is presumably also encompassed by this variable. This long-run
model is designed to represent the equilibrium RER in the presence of money
neutrality with actual values deviating from equilibrium for short periods ofaround
two quarters. The model is generally a better forecaster than real or nominal random
walk models.
The above model does not explicitly incorporate policy variables. This was attempted
by Lattimore et al (1996) who made preliminary estimates of Edwards (1989) models
incorporating monetary and fiscal policy variables. The econometric results were
promising but hardly conclusive. The work here is designed to attempt to improve on
this work in the forecasting sense using annual data.
f3efore doing that, however, the paper explores a range of theoretical influences. In
short. the evidence is explored along with the theory.
Hackground
The real exchange rate has been subject to long significant swings in New Zealand
since 1984. It has appreciated and depreciated for years at a time. Furthermore, the
amplitude of the swings is on a par with the RER changes which accompanied the
very large international and domestic policy shocks of the early 70's and 80's. This is
important because there is a the close association between the RER and growth. These
swings are inducing large changes in the level of prosperity. This behaviour has been
recently analysed by a number of researchers including Arthur Grimes (1996). He
focused on three recent periods. The period immediately before, the period during
and the period immediately after the 1984 economic policy changes had induced price
stability in New Zealand.
The deflationary period, 1985-89, resulted in an appreciation of the RER with its
associated very low growth in output and a loss ofemployment. This outcome is
reasonably well understood to be the result of unbalanced policy change from 1984 to
1987 which tended to put too much emphaisis on liberalising the capital account
ahead of the current account, Silverstone et al (1996). The experience mirrors
overseas experiences with economic reforms. Stewart et al (1985), Buckle (1987) and
others postulated that this might occur given reform announcements at the time.
These behaviours are peculiar to attempts to deflate the economy bringing the rate of
inflation down from the high teens to less than that of our trading partners (0-2
percent, initially). Grimes (1996) argues that these deflationary issues are different
Irom the issue of maintaining price stability at low levels of inflation - particularly at a
level of inflation below that of our trading partners.
?
Graph 2. Real Exchange Rates. NZand Trading Partners
----_. -_. --- -- -- - -----
---~~~~I~. "'''' ]
However, once price stability was attained, the RER depreciated monotonically till
1993. Record growth in output and employment was experienced at first,
approximately three years after the RER began depreciating in 1988-89. [This is
consistence with the estimates of exportable output response lags by Lattimore et al
(1996).] Record growth did not persist though employment continued to expand.
From 1994, the RER began appreciating strongly again and continued to do so for 4
years with a concommitent reduction in output growth. At the end of FY 1997, the
RER was as high as it's peak during the deflationary period (1988).
The period of price stability post-reform has accordingly seen these two large swings
in the RER trend and more recent data suggests that another downward trend began in
mid 1997 associated with the growing current account deficit compounded by events
in some important Asian economies which began at roughly the same time. The RER
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Source: Real effective exchange rate, Treasury. The 1998 value is actually for
December 1997.
These are large movements and the challenge is to try to understand ex ante how these
cycles are induced.
One perspective is how New Zealand has fared relative to other countries. The
following graphs track RER's for Japan, the US, Australia and New Zealand. The
main period of interest here is from the time of the New Zealand float in March 1985.
It might be hypothesised that since the Reserve Bank Act (\ 989), New Zealand has
had the most narrowly focused Monetary policy and accordingly that the RER in New
Zealand ought to show the greatest amplitude. Japan has clearly varied more than for
other countries over the period - but then Japan has been dealing with almost crisis
conditions during the 90's. Eyeballing the data, New Zealand's RER has been
somewhat less volatile than the Yen and US dollar rates but then the latter rates are




One possibility is that export and import prices affect the RER differentially. Hansen
and Hutchison (1995) and others have raised this issue. The following 2 graphs show
the series independently.
The real exchange rate is an important indicator of the state of the economy because it
is an indicator of the de&ree of resource pull on the tradable sector versus non-tradable
sector of the economy. This has important implications for both cyclical and
longterrn growth in output and employment.
Thc real exchange rate is defined in a real two or three sector model of the economy
as the price of the price ofnon-tradables relative to tradables l . [Empirically, the RER
may be estimated indirectly in a number of ways including deflating the nominal
exchange rate.) In this framewore, the real exchange rate (RER) is influenced by the
usual set of production and consumption incentives including expected differential
technological improvements by sector (exportables, importables and non-tradables)
and international prices for exportables and importables. International prices are
given in Graph 2 as the terms of trade.
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Thc terms of trade rose strongly over most of the deflationary perod, from 1986 to
1990. This rise can be expected to have supported the appreciation of RER from 1986
to 1988. Likewise the falling terms of trade in 1990-91 supported the depreciating
RER at that time. However in the gap, 1988-90, other factors appear to have driven
RER down. From 1991 onwards, the terms of trade was flat, so again, other factors
appear to have been responsible for the appreciating RER.
Data: Export Price index deflated by the dop deflator.
During the deflationary period (1984-88), the RER was appreciating yet export prices
were falling. The RER was appreciating after 1993 when again export prices fell.
These periods do not appear on the surface to be consistent with the theory (RER
appreciating in the face of rising export prices). Between 1988 and 1993 there are two
hrief periods when the falling export price index is associated with a depreciating
RER (1990-91).
Graph 5. Import Price Index
Looking at import prices, there may be a closer association. From 1988-93, import
prices rose while the RER depreciated. The reverse happened from 1993-97. This is
not consistent with the findings of Hansen and Hutchison (1995, p.14) who found the
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Graph 3. Terms of Trade
Source: Statistics New Zealand, March quarter.
I This is the inverse of the standard formulation but is used in New Zealand because exchange rates are
normally defined in terms of New Zealand dollars rather than the standard manner.
'See for example. Dornbusch (1974).





The RER is also thought to be affected by policy variables which impact on the
production or consumption of each of the three goods. There is a long list of potential
policy candidates - tariff rates, anti-dumping duties, government demand for non-
tradables, the price and supply of non-tradables [in key sectors like education and
health where government is large], the compliance costs ofextensive regulatory
programmes (RMA, OSH, IRD), government fees, government wages and the like. It
is indeed possible that more esoteric influences might be at work like a developing
culture of "management by best-seller"). In short, any pervasive influence (inside or
outside government) which influences non-tradable prices differentially will cause a
change in the RER.
Three examples of such effects might illustrate (ignoring savings and capital flows for
the moment). In this real sector environment and treating the three goods as
substitutes, the RER can be expected to appreciate if the government sector (non-
tradables) is a wage leader especially if this occurs in less competitive industries.
Similarly, regulatory compliance costs will tend to raise the price ofnon-tradables
relative to tradables. A decrease in tariffs can be expected to increase import demand
and cause a depreciation of the RER to maintain balance of payments equilibrium.
Elaborated real sector models which can analyse such effects are provided in
Edwards( 1989, chapter 2).
After 1984, the degree of export subsidisation has been reduced to zero and the
nominal rate of import protection (of the importable sector) has been reduced from
around 30 percent to around 6 percent today. Taken by itself, an elasticities approach
to the balance of payments would imply that the trade policy change would involve a
depreciation of the equilibrium RER by somewhat less than 24 percent (the tariff
drop) depending on the elasticities of export supply and import demand. If the
clasticities are around two in absolute magnitude, the equilibrium RER might be
around 12 percent lower than in 1984. That needs to be contrasted with the fact that
in the trough of 1993, the RER was still about the 1984 level and on average has been
significantly higher than its post-devaluation 1984 level. The explanation must lie
elsewhere.
Differential productivity growth between tradables and non-tradables is one
possibility. Fare et al (1996, p.85), have estimated that total factor productivity
growth from 1984-94 amounted to 4.88 percent for the exportable sector, 0.9 percent
lor importables and 1.66 percent for non-tradables. This amounts to around 2.8
percent for tradables which is 1.1 percent higher than productivity growth in non-
tradables.
.1 I am indebted to Marie Kovecsi for this snappy description of the tendency for firms in the current
environment to be less discriminating in their choice oforganisational structures and business systems
and to change them frequently. To the extent such choices occur more frequently in the non-tradable
sector and are extensively applied through emulation, the RER might be expected to appreciate. at least
in the short-term.
, The nominal rate of import protection was declining prior to 1984 but certainly accelerated from that
time.
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It is perhaps worth repeating that there appears to be a three year lag in the supply of
exportables in New Zealand on the upside (Lattimore, Bollard and Silverstone, 1995).
This may be explained by the high proportion of tradable production in New Zealand
which is based on natural resources (including cattle, sheep, fish and pine trees).
These products have investment periods of2 -25 years. Furthermore, t,he capital stock
is also a consumption good. In these circumstances output is increased almost
immediately if the RER moves against the sector by selling capital stock. Once the
new lower equilibrium level ofcapital stock is reached, output falls. However, on the
upside, output can only increase with a long lag if the RER moves in favour of the
sector. Joumard and Reisen (1992) have demonstrated shorter period general
hysteresis effects of this type in New Zealand manufactured exports. In non-natural
resource based products, beachhead effects and menu costs can cause similar
behaviour.
The importance of this is obvious. Tradable output will respond to a depreciating
RER only after 2-3 years. This perhaps helps to explain the high levels ofoutput
growth in the early 90's after the RER began depreciating in 1989. Conversely,
tradable output will stay up, and may even rise, when the RER appreciates as it did
after 1993 but after the capital stock has been reduced to its new lower equilibrium,
output will fall. This latter phenomenon may help explain the modest 2-3 percent
growth experienced from 1996-97. Other things being equal, future tradable growth,
however, cannot be expected to resume until the RER has depreciated for 2-3 years.
This would take us to 2001 without accounting for the effects of the 1997 drought and
the Asian Process.
Macroeconomic Models
In the microeconomic framework above, changes in the RER can come about either
by adjustments in the nominal prices oftradables or non-tradables, all that is
important is that price relatives change. However, there are a number of other
important influences on the RER stemming from the behaviour of money, capital and
labour markets and from government fiscal and monetary policy. In particular, the
inclusion of the money market affects nominal prices. Accordingly, the RER is
potentially subject to shortrun macroeconomic influences. These influences are
summarised by Corden (1994) and Edwards (1989).
Of particular importance here are the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on the
RER. There is some uncertainty in this area because the New Zealand
macroeconomic management system is both recent and novel. Accordingly, we do
not have a large body of econometric research nor much international experience to
call upon.
Following Grimes (1996), Table 1 provides economic performance data for New
Zealand in three periods. The first, 1979-84, is a period immediately prior to the
comprehensive economic reforms. The second, 1985-91, corresponds to the
deflationary period following the reforms and the final period is the period ofprice
stability and improving fiscal balance. The New Zealand data are adjusted by the
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OECD average in an attempt to remove general glohal events and the trading
environment including, for example, the 1979 and 1986 "oil shocks".
Table I. New Zealand's Economic Performance 1979-97
Adjusted for OECD Trends, Calendar Years
growth. However, it may be significant that the relationship is stronger if the price
stahility period is truncated in 1994. On the other hand, Grimes was able to conclude
that the correlation coefficient between the RER and inflation (0.48) was consistent
with the view that, if anything, the RER is forced downwards by having an inflation
rate lower than the world average. When the 1995-97 data are included the sign of the
correlation coefficient is reversed (-0.34). It would appear that the appreciating RER
more recently has changed the overall pattern.
Table 2. Macroeconomic Linkages in New Zealand, 1978-97
Correlation Coefficients, 1979-97 (1978-94 in brackets)
Sources: OECD and Treasury. The numbers in brackets refer to the periods 1978-84
and 1992-94 calculated by Grimes (1996, p.273).
The performance data for the 1995-97 period also changes the earlier period results
ohtained by Grimes in a potentially important dimension. This is illustrated by the
differences in correlation coefficients presented in Table 2 based on the data from
Tahle I (i.e. New Zealand performance adjusted for overall OECD performance).
The data are presented for the three periods referred to earlier - pre-reform, the
deflationary period and the price stability period. Pre-reform, New Zealand's growth
was higher than the OECD average though this is not typical of the period before
19R5 - it results from omitting the very low growth year 1978. Employment growth
was lower than for the OECD and inflation was 2.7 percent higher per annum. During
the deflationary phase, growth in output and employment was lower and inflation
higher than for the OECD. Since 1991 (the price stability period), output and
cmployment growth have been higher and inflation has been 2.9 percent lower than in
thc OECD. No!ice that New Zealand's superior performance is sensitive to the period
choosen. The estimates for the 1992-94 period for output and employment are
considerably higher than for the 1992-97 period.
I would argue that this framework is too narrow; that the real wage is but one of a
number of potential rigidities that could produce the same RER "overvaluation".
Rcmember that the rational for real wage rigidity is sometimes thought to result from
lahour union power. It might be argued that a number ofother groups in New
Zealand have similar levels of power to prevent or at least slow down, downward
adjustments in their factor rewards. Highly concentrated business might be able to
hutTer downward adjustments in their margins. Government (civil service) might be
ahle to buffer downward adjustments in their "margins" [overmanned regulatory
systems, for example].
This is to argue that there is the possibility that the ECA and a range ofother policies
might have increased real wage flexibility in the narrowist sense but not in the broader
sense of real margins. Accordingly one might hypothesise that monetary policy is
raising the trend level of the RER and accordingly lowering longrun growth potentiaL
This changing evidence invites us to reopen the questions raised a decade ago about
the effects of using a monetary policy with a target inflation rate lower than that ofour
trading partners, Grimes, op cit. At the root of that argument is the degree of
downward rigidity in the real wage. Put perhaps overly simply, there are two
contrasting schools of thought;. One argues that the real wage is quite flexible
downwards and that central bank reputation effects add to that behaviour. In this
environment, inflation can be maintained below that of our trading partners with no
adverse effects on the tradable sector. The second school used to argue that
inflationary expectation are at least somewhat regressive and accordingly, that
attcmpts to hold inflation lower than for our trading partners is likely to cause what
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A possible contender for pressure on the RER is capital flows. Joumard and Reisen
(1992) ruled these out based on data for the deflationary period using the Harberger
index of net capital pressure on the RER. Extended data for the Harberger index is
presented in Graph 3. The Harberger index is the sum of net capital inflows, net
inflows of investment income and the reduction in official foreign exchange reserves,
expressed as a percentage ofGDP,
The correlation coefficients show very similar patterns when calculated over the short
period (1978-94) and the long period (1979-97). For both periods they are consistent
with the view that higher RER's are associated with lower output and employment
, Actually, Grimes discusses three positions but the two mentioned here are sufficient to make the
point. In some senses, the third school,is intennediate between the other two in lenns ofdegree of
market rigidity.
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Graph 6. Harberger Pressure Variable
1991-93 increasing the demand for non-tradables but the RER continued to
depreciate. Again the period 1994-96 is one of an increasing fiscal surplus and an
appreciating RER - not a consistent relationship. On this basis one is inclined to rule
out fiscal pressure on the demand or excess demand for non-tradables.
The extended data in Graph 6 tell the same story. Capital flow pressures on the RER
have tended to decline since 1984 and have usually heen negative. This implies that
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The excess demand for non-tradables might be affected by the government supply of
such goods or by fiat prices set for government services. Health insurance and private
school fees might be included in such a list. This avenue is not explored further here.
Capital Markets and Monetary Policy
New Zealand monetary policy tends to affect short-term interest rates and the
exchange rate through targetting. Tight monetary policy tends to invert the yield
curve and lead to recessions, Kozicki (1997). Alternatively, private agents may
predict the onset of a recession and lower their expectations of long term interest rates
relative to short rates. In either case these actions can be measured directly by the
hasis in the capital market -long rates minus short rates. The recent history of this
hasis in New Zealand is shown in Graph 8.





Fiscal policy is potentially important through the demand and supply ofnon-tradables
hy government. The fiscal deficit is a measure of non-tradable demand pressure.
Data on the financial surplus/deficit of government is provided in Graph 5.












Source: Dalziel and Lattimore (1998), forthcoming.
There was a steady reduction in the deficit during the deflationary period to 1988.
This-is not consistent with fiscal pressure on the RER as Joumard and Reisen (1992)
argued. However, the decreasing deficit from 1988-90 is consistent with the
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Source: Author's calculation. The difference between the interest yield on 10 year
New Zealand Government bonds and the 90 day bill rate in nominal terms.
The history of the basis prior to 1984 is difficult to interpret due to capital market
regulations. However, the long period of inversion from 1984 to 1991 coincides with
the low growth associated with the deflationary period. The recovery in the basis
during the deflationary period can be dated from 1987 which some believe was the
point at which policy reform reputation was established in capital markets vis a vis the
tradable sector [it was remarked at the time that the (deflationary period) recession
hottomed out in 1987 with the recovery starting that year via expectations in Winton -
a wealthy Southland retirement centre]. Perhaps this is a precursor to RER
depreciation which commenced in 1988. The bull run in the sharemarket in 1986-87
and the subsequent crash in October 1987, makes it potentially difficult to disentangle
real versus monetary effects at this time. It is an area where higher frequency data
might valuably be used.
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A normal basis developed in 1992 a year before positive growth resumed in New
Zealand. It may be significant that the basis began falling almost immediately in
1993. This coincided with the beginning of the recent appreciation of the RER. The
capital market inverted again in 1995 a year before the growth rate fell to the lower
\evels that have been experienced since that time. Again, the basis moved upwards
from 1996, a year before the RER began to depreciate.
The RER turning point in 1993 and the probable 1997 turning point appear to have
been missed completely by manufacturing managers. Accordingly this avenue is





A second hypothesis in this area derives from the Dornbusch overshooting exchange
rate theory. On the basis of real short-term interest differentials vis a vis Australia,
.Ioumard and Reisen (1992) argued that the RER would continue to appreciate (during
the deflationary period) until expected future depreciation was large enough to
overcome the differential. They presented data which conformed to the RER turning
point in 1988.
The theory is symmetric so that the RER turning point in 1993 ought to reflect a
cUlllulative period of negative real interest differentials. This is difficult to see in the
annual data.
Business Opinion
Finally, an attempt made to find a relationship between business managers opinions in
the tradeable or non-tradable sector which might lead changes in the RER. This is
most unlikely given that managers can be expected to be more influenced by current
and lagged sales rather than the prospective investment outlook. The business opinion
survey ofNZIER was used and the manufacturers net percentage taken as a measure
of the degree of confidence in the tradeable sector. This data is given in Graph 9.
The coincidence of political factors and the RER turning points is very clear but it is
not so clear why RER moved the way it did. The RER began depreciating in 1988
shortly after the disagreements between Prime Minister Lange and Sir Roger Douglas
developed into a political crisis. The flat tax proposals of December 1987 by Douglas
were an attempt to inject cash into the economy following the share market crash in
October that year. Following that proposal the divisions widened including
disagreements over the forecast size of the fiscal deficit. Given that the economy was
very weak at the time, these major political disagreements might have precipitated a
lack of confidence in the NZ dollar with an ensuing accomodation of monetary and
liscal policy which fueled the 4 year depreciation of the RER. Environment: weak
growth. result: RER depreciation.
The year 1993 was similarly spectacular with the disagreements between Prime
Minister Bolger and Ruth Richardson which lead to her eventual resignation. Here
the economy was booming. New Zealand was gowing faster than any in the OECD
and the international press was lauding the economic performance of New Zealand in
the face of a worldwide slow down. Can we argue that these political events
increased confidence in the NZ dollar because the sidelining of Richardson meant a
slowing down of restructuring and perceptions of higher growth propects as a result.
Environment: record growth, result: RER appreciation.
Graph 9. Manufacturers Opinion Survey
Source: NZIER
The key turning points in the price stability period (1988-98) are in 1988, 1993 and
probably in 1997. It is not obvious that manufacturing business managers are able to
forecast these turning points as was expected. There is some evidence from the run up
in confidence from I988QI. that the depreciating RER was noticed hy managers hut
confidence fell in 1989 as that depreciation continued through to 1993.
The political events might be treated as exogenous shocks followed by accomodating
actions by fiscal and monetary (particularly the latter) which continues the trend that
has been started.
If the inferences above are correct then it points to fragile expectation mechanisms. Is
this typical of the economy are merely eccentuated in the high foreign debt
environment and continuing uncertainty over major policies affecting savings and
investment including longterm superannuation policy and user pays health and
education?
The RER began depreciating again in early 1997 at the time early news from Thailand
was beginning to emerge on the extent of bad loans in the financial sector. The
economy was growing quite modestly. About this time Kim Hill was making remarks
about "what economic boom?" in reference to the two year wonder in 1994/95.
Closer to home however the Coalition Government had just been organised with
significant restraints in the Agreement on further restructuring. The Coalition was
perhaps seen as soft fiscally. Fundamentally, this would lead to an increasing demand
for non-tradables and an appreciating RER but the confidence factor offset this
(conjecture only). The RER turning point coincided with the issues surrounding the
Aoteroa television scandals. Environment: slow growth, result: RER depreciation.


















The various frameworks discussed in this paper may be brought together in the
f()lIowing hypothesised framework. Since 1988, monetary policy has accomodated a
cycle in the real exchange rate causing it to depreciate through to 1993 and then to
appreciate to 1997. T~e turning points are related to political instability. Real
tradable output did not respond until 1992 due to the usual production gestation lags
especially in the resource based industries. This stimulate total GOP and record
growth was achieved. In 1993, monetary policy induced an appreciating cycle in the
RER and tradable output stayed up because capital stock was being sold to reduce its
equilibrium level at the now lower terms of exchange (appreciated RER). By, say,
1996 the new lower tradable capital stock level was achieved and output declined.
With higher imports at the high RER, lower output contributed to the current account
deficit.
The RER began depreciating in 1997 under looser monetary policy but tradable
output can not be expected to grow at a fast rate till 2000 or 2001 even if the terms of
trade don't change. This effect will he compounded and delayed by any 1998/99
terms of trade shock resulting from the Asian crisis. That leaves the economy very
vulnerable in the interim given the foreign debt level.
This framework has echoes in the dependant economy models of New Zealand from
the 1930's. The economic reforms have changed the way in which the economic
structure vents exogenous shocks but the result is the same - a real cycle of output and
employment of higher amplitude caused by monetary policy (rather than fiscal policy
in the 1950's through early 80's.
At the micro level, a number of developments may be ameliorating and compounding
the problem since the 1950-84 period. Global markets and the culture that drives
them have hecome much more fragmented which increases the number of products
New Zealand exports. Deregulation of the producer boards could be seen as a further
step to increasing export flexibility even though the relative importance of natural
resource based exports are increasing following trade liberalisation.
Summary and Conclusions
The paper reports on a small scale project to explore the behaviour of the RER in New
Zealand, particularly over the last decade since price stability has been achieved in
part as a result of the new monetary policy. The objective of this search has been to
attempt to find leading indicators or patterns of indicators that might be useful in
forecasting the RER. In this narrow sense the search has not been successful. This is
not surprising in a rational expectations world. In the superficial approach taken here
it can be said that it appears the behaviour of the RER is contemporaneously
determined by a range of real and monetary factors including the terms of trade,
differential productivity change, trade policy and macro policy.
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This does not provide a basis for formal forecasting model building so this aspect was
not pursued further. Nevertheless there may be some lessons here for further work.
The two large swings in the RER since 1988 appear to lead the business cycle and the
lead appears to be consistent with the lag length for exportable output, which in tum is
related to overall GOP. If this is correct it makes fiscal and monetary management
and their coordination potentially difficult. There appears to be some evidence that
the RER cycle since 1988 has been at least partly, policy-induced. This is a stability
argument regarding monetary policy rather than the levels argument raised by Grimes
commenting on the work of the late Jan Whitwell.
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Abstract
Due to their eradication offoot-and-mouth disease Argentina and Uruguay have recently been
granted access to the fresh beef markets of the USA and Canada. This raises the prospect of
Latin American suppliers gaining access to other Pacific Rim markets. and of increasing the
integration of the Pacific and non-Pacific beef markets. A two-commodity spatial equilibrium
model with asymmetric demands is constructed for the base year 1995. Projections are then
made for the year 2001 under various policy and other scenarios. In some instances. major
changes in trade patterns may result.
INTRODUCTION
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) exists in many parts of the world. and affects cloven-footed
animals. It is the prospect of disease transmission by the international movement of livestock or
livestock products that has lead some countries to ban the import of these commodities from
infected regions. Such bans constitute technical barriers to trade (Hillman 1991). Infected animal
products can contain large quantities of the FMD virus. although some further processing
activities can prevent the spread of the disease. FMD has been present in Latin America for many
years, and has prevented infected regions accessing the major Pacific Rim beef markets. Thus
Iheir fresh beef has been directed to regions that have not imposed trade bans for FMD-related
reasons, or to products exported in a further-processed form and with perhaps lower returns.
Authorities in the USA and Canada opened their borders to imports of fresh. frozen or chilled
imports of beef from Uruguay (in 1996) and Argentina (in 1997). Although initial volumes are
small, access to these importing countries could be expanded in future, and other Pacific Rim
beef importers could also grant access to beef from Uruguay and Argentina.
THE PACIFIC RIM BEEF MARKET
We define this market as those countries that are recognised as free of foot-and-mouth disease.
Major exporting countries are Australia, Canada. New Zealand and the USA. while major
importers are Japan. the Republic of Korea and the USA. The predominant trade flows are from
North America to Northeast Asia, between Canada and the USA and from Australasia to both
North America and Northeast Asia. All these countries impose bans on the import of fresh,
chilled and frozen beef from regions where FMD is endemic, which separates this market from
other beef markets within the Pacific Rim or elsewhere.
The FMD-free Pacific Rim beef market comprises (at least) two integrated markets,
differentiated by product type. Australia and New Zealand have produced grassfed beef
reflecting the climatic conditions that exist in these two countries. In contrast, the North
American and Northeast Asian cattle industries are geared to grain feeding. The latter production
system is also being adopted in Australia. Both types of beef are important in consumption in
Japan, Korea and the USA. Since Argentina and Uruguay are producers of grassfed beef, analysis
of their entry to the Pacific Rim beef market should consider the strength of the substitution
relationship between both types of beef in consumption.
The USA is both a major exporter and importer of beef and exports have recently increased
rapidly; those for 1997 are forecast to be 43% above the 1991-95 average (OECD 1997). Beef
imports into the USA and Canada are predominantly grassfed product from Australia and New
Zealand, with smaller quantities now admitted from Argentina and Uruguay.
- require that if no trade exists between two countries, then the price in the importer nation
must be less than that in the exporter plus the relevant transport costs and tariff charges.
Beef was modelled as two differentiated products, named 'grainfed' and 'grassfed' beef,
although this is still an approximation to the reality - for example we assume all beef produced in
Japan is identical to 'grainfed' imports. Table I indicates the types of beef that were assumed to
be produced, consumed and traded in each region. For example, both 'grainfed' and 'grassfed'
beef are produced in the USA, but we assume all their exports are 'grainfed' and all imports are
'grassfed' beef.
Regions and products
Seven Pacific Rim beef markets were modelled: North America (USA and Canada), Japan,
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Uruguay. A rest-of-the-world region was
also represented, accessible only to Argentina and Uruguay. In the 1995 base year, the latter two
countries exported no fresh beef to the above Pacific Rim markets, and the rest-of-world region
was designed to allow for the possible continuation of their substantial non-Pacific trade. Thus
whether Latin American exports occur to Pacific Rim markets will be influenced by the returns
those exports could receive elsewhere.




The two largest import m.atkets in Northeast Asia are Japan and Korea. While production in
Japan has stabilised, it has increased in Korea by 72% between 1989 and 1995. Self-sufficiency
has continued to fall in both countries in response to trade policy reforms and continued demand
growth. Per head consumption of beef is relatively low in both countries, providing scope for
further growth as the trend towards increased consumption of high-protein products continues
and imported beef prices fall due to reforms of import policies.
Beef production in Australia and New Zealand has been affected during the 1990s by droughts
and falling prices, although both countries have shown some recent recovery . Whi Ie production
in both countries is predominantly grassfed, grainfed production is becoming more important in
Australia in response to Asian demand. The share of grainfed beef in Australia's exports to Japan
has been forecast to increase from 40% in 1994 to 58% by 2000 (Doyle et al 1995).
For the first time in over 60 years, Argentina was able to export fresh (ie uncooked) beef to the
USA in 1997. Uruguay benefited from the same measure the previous year, and in each case a
quota of 20,000 tonnes (product weight) was allocated. Uruguay and Argentina were also granted
access to the Canadian market in the same year that US access was granted. Although drought
reduced the size of the Uruguay cattle herd in 1989, cattle numbers have been increasing. They
were expected to reach II million head in 1997 and to continue to expand in recognition of
positive export prospects. Export volumes increased 32% from 1995 to 1996, and major
destinations include the EU, Israel and other parts of South America. In Argentina, beef
production reached over 2.5 million tonnes (carcass weight equivalent) in 1996, which was
almost as great as the combined production of Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay. While cattle
numbers are the lowest since 1971, higher future production could see export volumes by 2000 at
56% above the level forecast for 1997 (WTO 1997). The EU has been Argentina's major export








Note: gn = 'grainfed' beef






















The quadratic programming model
A quadratic programming spatial equilibrium model was constructed to study the impact of Latin
American entry to the Pacific Rim beef market'. Solutions derived from such a model are
equilibria in the sense that they:
- specify a set of national prices that determine the levels of production and consumption in
each country or region;
- require each country's production to be equal to its exports plus that portion of its
production that is consumed domestically;
- require each country's consumption to be equal to its imports plus that portion of its
production that is consumed domestically;
- require that if trade occurs between two countries, the price in the exporter nation will equal
that in the importer less the relevant transport costs, tariff charges and quota rents; and
I This was fonnulated in the quantity domain, as a multi-commodity model with asymmetric demand
coefficients - see Martin (1981).
The trade flows permitted in the model are, for 'grainfed' beef, those from North America to
Japan and Korea, and that from Australia to Japan. 'Grassfed' beef trade flows modelled are
those from Australia and New Zealand to North America, Japan and Korea and, in the relevant
scenarios, from Argentina and Uruguay to North America, Japan, Korea and other non-Pacific
destinations.
Base period quantities and prices
The model was initially constructed to simulate prices, quantities and trade flows in the base
period of 1995. All ensuing scenario analyses involve projections to the year 2001, when the
GATTIWTO Agreement on Agriculture is to be implemented..
Data on beef production, consumption, trade and stocks were taken from national sources and
from the WTO (1996, 1997) and were converted, where necessary, to a carcass weight equivalent
(cwe) basis2• These data then required adjustment for a number of reasons - inconsistencies
l A conversion factor of 0.7 was used in all instances.
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between national and WTO data, the required absence of stocks in our model, and the 'netting
out' of exports to and imports from countries not included in our model. Total 1995 exports and
imports for North America are net of the trade flows between Canada and the USA.
Beef exports from Argentina and Uruguay include substantial quantities of manufactured beef
products, and some scenarios examined the implications of this beef being diverted to the
chilled/frozen beef Pacific Rim trade. Their exports also include sales to the European Union
(EU) which provide returns above those that might be expected from Pacific Rim markets, and
we assume this beef would not be diverted to Pacific Rim markets.
In some countries, the production or consumption data required disaggregation to 'grassfed' and
'grainfed' categories. For USA production, the data presented by Brester and Wohlgenant (1991)
along with the assumption that all beef imported into the US is 'grassfed' and all that exported is
'grainfed', implied that 65% of total US beef production was classified as 'grainfed'. The same
proportion was applied in the case of Canada. It was assumed that 15% of Australian beef
production was 'grainfed' in 1995, based on an estimate of Australian grainfed exports to Japan3•
Consumption data for North America, Japan and Korea was disaggregated into the two types of
beef given the definitions of the types of beef produced by and imported into those countries.
Border prices were estimated from national trade data as unit values (cif or fob), and converted to
US$ at 1995 exchange rates. Domestic prices of both types of beef in Japan and Korea, and for
'grassfed' beef in North America, were set equal to the border price plus tariffs or tariff
equivalents. Otherwise, domestic prices and border prices were identical. Beef prices in
Argentina and Uruguay will be discussed in later sections, as the appropriate scenario is
introduced. From international freight costs for Australian and New Zealand beef shipments to
Japan, Korea and the USA, the relationship between cost per tonne and distance was estimated
and then used to estimate freight costs for all other routes.
Domestic demand and supply relationships
Beef production was assumed to be influenced by the price of beef, the price of maize (for
'grainfed' beef production only) and productivity growth. Maize prices were included since
changes in feedgrain costs could affect the relative competitiveness of 'grainfed' and 'grassfed'
supplies. Price elasticities were taken from Sullivan (1992). In the cases of North America and
Australia, where both beef types are produced, lack of data required the assumption of identical
supply elasticities for 'grainfed' and 'grassfed' production. FAO data on beef production and
slaughterings over the period 1985-95 were used to estimate the average annual growth in
production per head, and was projected to 200 I.
Cap (1995) reports a study of the growth potential of Argentina's agricultural sector, under
various assumptions about the future adoption of currently available technologies. A number of
factors that constrained the rate of adoption of productivity-enhancing innovations in the past are
being eased and provide the potential for a major shift in the sector's supply capacity by the end
of this century. Cap (1995) examined the implications of new technology adoption on several
beef production systems under a number of adoption scenarios. That considered 'most likely'
implied a future growth rate in beef output per hectare of 4.75%. We used this rate of
productivity growth in some of our scenarios.
•Personal communication, Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation.
Beef consumption was modelled as a function of beef prices, incomes per capita and growth in
the total population. For those countries where both 'grainfed' and 'grassfed' beef consumption
was modelled, demand relationships were specified for each beef type. In these situations,
consumption of either type of beef could be influenced by changes in the prices of both
'grainfed' and 'grassfed' beef. This allows, for example, the entry of 'grassfed' supplies from
Latin America to influence primarily the price of 'grassfed' beef, but also the potential
substitution of 'grassfed' for 'grainfed' beef in consumption. Thus the markets for 'grainfed' and
'grassfed' beef are separately specified but interrelated.
Estimates of the various demand elasticities were taken from Brester and Wohlgenant (1991) for
the USA, from Hayes et al (1990) for Japan, from Doyle et al (1995) for Korea', and from
Sullivan (1992) for remaining countries. The Brester and Wohlgenant study was based on
improved estimates of 'ground' and 'table-cut' beef consumption in the USA, and their definition
of ground beef was assumed to be identical to ours of grassfed beef. The Japanese results of
Hayes et al were estimated for Wagyu beef and 'import quality' beef, the latter defined as either
Japanese dairy beef or imported beef. While this does not match our own product definitions, it
can be noted that the cross-elasticities from the Japanese study are within the 0.1 to 0.4 range of
the USA cross-elasticities.
The USA estimates were assumed to apply to North America (ie including Canada) while the
cross-elasticities for Japan were also assumed to apply in Korea. The Japanese income
elasticities of Hayes et al were specified in terms of changes in meat (rather than total)
expenditures, so were replaced by the estimate found in Rae (1995) which was assumed to apply
to both types of beefS.
Both Argentina and Uruguay export substantial quantities of manufactured ('cooked') beef,
which in 1995 amounted to 245,000 and 22,000 tonnes (cwe) respectively. In addition, they
exported in that year 92,000 and 22,000 tonnes (cwe) of fresh beef respectively to the Elf. All
beef used for manufactured products, plus all fresh beef exports to the rest of the world with the
exception of that to the high-priced EU market, was assumed available for diversion by
Argentina and Uruguay as fresh product exports to the Pacific Rim. Two rest-of-the-world
demand functions were constructed, namely those facing Argentina and Uruguay for non-Pacific
sales. These functions were calibrated to the weighted average returns from non-EU chilled and
frozen sales plus all manufactured beef sales, and the appropriate (cwe) quantities from 1995
trade data. The export demand elasticities were taken from Goddard (1988). They provide a
mechanism to allow an equilibrium to be reached between sales from Latin America to the
Pacific Rim markets and to non-Pacific markets.
Projections of beef demand required projections of future population and income growth in each
region. Future growth rates of GDP were based on the projections of the OECD (1997) for the
• Doyle et al quote Korean own-price and income elasticities for 'beef as a homogeneous product. Their
data are applied here to both 'grassfed' and 'grainfed' beef.
, Hayes et al found that the income elasticities for both types were beef, with respect to total expenditures on
meat, were almost identical
'In 1995, average fob returns for Argentina were U8$I,393 per tonne for manufactured beef products,
U8$ I,347 per tonne for non-EU sales of fresh product and U8$4,543 per tonne for fresh beef sales to the
EU. It is conceivable that returns from North American or Asian markets could encourage at least a
portion these exports to be diverted as fresh sales to the Pacific Rim.
-'"Q)
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USA, Canada, Australia, Japan and Korea?, on IMF data for Argentina and Uruguay, and on
NZIER (1997) projections for New Zealand. Population projections were based on past growth
rates from national data for Argentina and Uruguay, and from the same sources as above for
remaining countries.
The linear demand and supply relationships were initially calibrated so that they simulated the
1995 data and exhibited the assumed elasticities. The demand relationships were determined for
the projection year of 2001 by first projecting 1995 consumption given data on population and
income growth and income elasticities, and then recalibrating the relationships so that they
predicted that projected level of consumption at base period prices. For the supply relationships,
the 2001 production projections were made by first applying the productivity growth rates to
1995 base data8 and then recalibrating the functions so that they predicted the correct supplies at
base period prices, and were then further adjusted to reflect a projected 22% increase in com
prices9•
Trade policies
Whether specified for the base year of 1995 or for projections in the year 2001, the model
replicated the trade policies as set out in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. No
quotas applied in Japan and tariff rates were 49.4% in 1995 reducing to 38.5% in 2001. Import
quotas and other impediments to Korean imports have increased their domestic beef prices well
above international prices. Doyle et al (1995) estimate the tariff equivalent of these non-tariff
trade barriers as 89.7% in 1995. By the year 2001, Korea must remove its quantitative
restrictions on beef imports and can apply a tariff of 40%.
Canada and the USA have a system of tariff rate quotas. Quotas have been allocated to specific
countries. Within-quota tariffs are US$44 per tonne (product weight) for the USA, and zero for
Canada. Over-quota tariffs in each country were 30.3% in 1995, reducing to 26.4% in the year
2001.
RESULTS
We first compare a 2001 projection with the base situation in 1995. This scenario assumes that
Argentina and Uruguay can access Canada and the USA under existing tariff rate quotas, but not
other Pacific Rim markets. We next allow Latin American access to Japan and Korea, under
similar policies as would be experienced in 2001 by other exporters and explore solution
sensitivity to changes in transport costs from Latin America. The final scenario assumed an
integration of NAFTA and MERCOSUR that would include free trade in beef between the
countries of North and South America. This scenario also explored the impacts of higher beef
productivity growth in Argentina.
, We halved the published growth rate for Korea, given the economic situation that developed in that
country in late 1997.
• Unles~ otherwise stated, zero productivity growth was assumed for Argentina and Uruguay, rather than the
negative historic rates of Appendix Table 3.
"The OECO (1996) projected a US export price of US$133 per tonne fob for the 1997-99 period, compared
with an actual average price of $109 per tonne for the 1991-93 period.
Results for the first scenario are summarised10 in the first two data columns of Table 2. Beef
consumption in North America is projected to increase by 9%, despite the projected 6% increase
in "grainfed" beef prices. The income elasticities employed ensure that per person consumption
of "grainfed' supplies increases, but that of "grassfed" beef decreases, with increases in incomes.
The price of 'grassfed' beef is projected to decline by about I% compared with 1995. Production
in North America is projected to rise ll by 10%, and that of "grainfed" beef at a faster rate than
for "grassfed" beef, encouraged by the increase in the 'grainfed' price and modest productivity
growth. While imports are projected to show some growth, exports from North America may
increase by over 30% due to continued export demand growth and improving access to those
markets by the end of the projection period. For Australia, Argentina and Uruguay, their quotas
are restrictive in the 2001 projection, but the price differences between those countries and North
America were insufficient to attract additional exports at the out-of-quota tariff of 26.4%. New
Zealand did not fill its quota to North America.
Beef production in Japan is projected to grow by 5% between 1995 and 2001, outpaced by the
14% increase in consumption. Income growth was assumed to have a relatively strong impact on
the demand for both 'grainfed' and 'grassfed' beef in Japan, and consumption will be further
encouraged due to price reductions as Japan's tariff reduced over the projection period.
'Grassfed' beef prices are projected to decline proportionately more than those of 'grainfed' beef
since prices of the former product were assumed to be more sensitive to changes in supply than
were those of 'grainfed' beef. Thus Japan's beef imports could increase by 20%, with
substantially increased supplies from North America and Australasia.
While beef production in Korea is projected to increase by less than 5% over the 1995-2001
period, consumption of beef increases substantially. Domestic prices of 'grainfed' and 'grassfed'
beef are projected to fall by around 22% and 27% respectively by 200 I due to replacement of the
import quota system with tariff-only protection of 40% in that year. Consumption could increase
by over 30% despite the assumed moderated growth in incomes l2• Consequently, growth in
import volumes is projected at 46%, supplied by increased shipments from North America and
Australasia.
In Australia and New Zealand, beef production is projected to increase by 10% and 4%
respectively due to productivity improvements, as prices of 'grassfed' beef are projected to
decline slightly in both countries. Exports expand at similar rates ll. Given the entry of the two
Latin American suppliers to the North American market, Australasian export growth is directed
at Northeast Asia.
10 All quantities have been aggregated over the two types of beef, and sometimes over countries, and are
measured in carcass weight equivalents. All prices are inclusive of tariffs or quota rents, and are relative to
the level of domestic prices in 1995.
" Our analyses recognise longer-term trends in productivity but do not attempt to replicate the USA beef
cycle, which may be in a down-swing over the period covered by the projection.
" Our original GOP growth projection for Korea was 6% per year. At this rate, Korean beef consumption
and imports would increase by 55% and 85% respectively over the 1995-2001 period.
'.1 Note that 'grainfed' exports as a proportion of total Australian exports have been restricted to the 1995
proportion (about 18%).
Table 2 Some impacts of Argentina and Uruguay access to Pacific Rim beef markets
1995 Projections to 2001
LA access LA access to NA + JK
to NA only
LA transport cost
Reduction nil nil 10% 20%
North America
Production 12,426 13,707 13,681 13,678 13,644
Consumption 12,512 13,647 13,684 13,687 13,738
Exports 612 809 809 809 807
Imports 697 750 811 818 901
from Australasia 697 686 747 754 837
from LA 0 64 64 64 64
Australasia
Production 2,001 2,175 2,164 2,162 2,147
Exports 1,328 1,437 1,420 1,420 1,398
JapanIKorea
Production 756 793 793 793 791
Consumption 1,998 2,353 2,354 2,354 2,354
Imports 1,242 1,560 1,561 1,562 1,562
from Nth America 612 809 809 809 807
~ from Australasia 630 751 673 666 561




Grainfed 100 106.4 106.3 106.3 106.2
Grassfed 100 98.6 97.7 97.7 97.6
Japan
Grainfed 100 98.0 97.9 97.9 97.8
Grassfed 100 91.3 90.5 90.4 89.4
Korea
Grassfed 100 72.7 72.3 72.0 71.1
Australasia
Grassfed 100 98.3 97.3 97.2 95.9
Notes: I. LA reFers to Argentina and Uruguay, NA to North America and JK to Japan and Korea.
2. Production (consumption) is net of exports to (imports From) non-model countries, and exports
and imports are those only involving modelled countries.
3. All volumes are in '000 MT (ewe).
Next we retain the same assumptions as above, with the exception that Japan and Korea offer
access to beef from Argentina and Uruguay under the same conditions as offered to North
American and Australasian suppliers. Tariff rate quotas are still assumed to apply in the USA and
Canada. South American exports to Northeast Asia have the opportunity to expand under this
projection scenario (Table 2, third data column) until their marginal return equals that obtained
from export sales outside the Pacific Rim arena (but excluding the higher-price EU sales). At the
new equilibrium, these exports are projected at 79,000 MT from Uruguay to Japan, in addition to
the 64,oooMT exported in total from both suppliers under quota to North America. Compared
with the previous scenario where Pacific Rim sales from South America were limited to the US
and Canada, the South American expansion into Northeast Asia displaces "grassfed" sales from
Australia and New Zealand. Thus while North America's share of the Japanese and Korean
import markets remains a little over 50%, that of Australasia is projected to decline from 48% to
43%. No beef trade occurs under this scenario from Argentina to Northeast Asia: adding the
Japanese import tariff to the landed cost of beef from Argentina makes beef from that source
uncompetitive at the originally-estimated freight costs.
South American access to Asia has little impact on prices. Those of 'grassfed' beef in
Australasia, North America, Japan and Korea are projected to be about 1% lower than they
would have been had South American Pacific exports been restricted to the North American
market, while those of 'grainfed' beef remain almost unchanged. At these prices, out-of-quota
exports from South to North America would not occur. Average Argentina and Uruguay fob
returns are estimated to rise by between 5 and 10% which produces a positive supply response in
both countries. However, the projected income and population growth in these Latin countries
gives rise to increases in domestic consumption so that the combined export surplus of beef
(excluding fresh exports to the EU) falls from 277,000 to 124,000 tonnes. Further, medium-term
demand expansion in the EU and other non-AsialPacific markets (ignored in this analysis) could
further reduce the available supplies for Pacific Rim markets.
We next examined the sensitivity of the projections to reductions in the estimated freight costs
from Latin America to Pacific Rim markets - all transport costs per tonne out of Argentina and
Uruguay were reduced by 10% and 20%. The former reduction implied that Latin American
freight costs per tonne to North America and Northeast Asia were about 10% less and 45%
above, respectively, those from Australasia. A 20% freight cost reduction meant these costs were,
respectively, 20% below and 30% above those from Australasia (Table 2, final two columns).
Substantial quantities of Argentinian beef are diverted to Northeast Asia once their transport
costs have been reduced by at least 20% from the original estimates. As these freight rates are
successively reduced, increased sales from Latin America to Northeast Asia displace 'grassfed'
sales from Australia and New Zealand. The latter countries respond through increased sales to
North America - Australasian suppliers have excess quota in North America which can be
utilised, whereas exports to that region from Latin America are constrained by their quotas - and
through adjustments within their domestic markets. Only minor adjustments to prices occur - a
20% reduction in Latin American freight costs and the ensuing trade flow changes would have
the effect of reducing prices of 'grassfed' beef in North America, Japan, Korea and Australasia
by only 1%.
North American beef import policies could undergo further change over the medium term.
Should the tariff rate quota system be retained, individual supplier allocations might change. The
existing allocations to Argentina and Uruguay are relatively small, and could result in quantities
of beef from those sources being shipped to Northeast Asia and causing a re-direction of
Australasian sales from the latter markets to North America. One development that could change
the quota allocations would be the integration of the MERCOSUR14 free trade area with
.. Argentina and Uruguay joined with Brazil and Paraguay in the common market called MERCOSUR in
1995. It is the third-largest Free trade area after NAfTA and the EU and has eliminated most internal
tariFFs hetween the memher countries. As a result trade amongst the memher countries has inereased




NAfTA I5 • The Summit of the Americas initiated a plan to create a free trade area of the
Americas by the year 2005. This was seen as integrating all countries of North, Central and
South America. Provided this free trade agreement was to cover all agricultural products, then
the beef trade between South and North America would be duty free. This is of no little
importance to Australia and New Zealand since it could have a considerable trade diversion
effect.
To illustrate what such a diversion of trade might be with regard to beef. the final scenario
assumes that North American tariff rate quotas currently applied to Argentina and Uruguay are
eliminated and the beef trade between those countries is duty free. The North American tariff rate
quotas that potentially restrict imports of beef from Australia and New Zealand remain in place.
Otherwise. this scenario is similar to the previous ones.
Exports of beef from Argentina and Uruguay to Northeast Asia that might have resulted under
earlier scenarios are redirected to either the USA or Canada where entry is free (Table 3. first
two columns of data). Consequently. Australasian exports to North America are displaced and
redirected to Northeast Asia. This diversion of trade, however, may be thought of as a correction
of the trade diversion caused in earlier scenarios by the quota restrictions on South American
beef into North America which encouraged their trade with Northeast Asia.
While the total quantities of grassfed beef imported into Japan and Korea show little change
(only the sources are different). quantities of beef imported into North America increase by
around 25%. Sales of 'grassfed' beef from Argentina and Uruguay to North America could reach
almost 400.000 tonnes. compared with today's quota allocations that allow a maximum of 64,000
tonnes (cwe). Projected imports of 'grassfed' beef into North America in 2001 amount to more
than I million tonnes compared with the projection of 811,000 tonnes under the TRQ system,
exerting downward pressure on beef prices in North America, especially of grassfed beef. Market
shares change substantially - that of Australasian exporters .could fall from over 90% in the
previous scenario to 60% of total North American imports.
This projection assumes no growth in Argentinian beef productivity between 1995 and 200 I -
should productivity grow by 4.75% per year, exports from Argentina and Uruguay to North
America could reach 776,000 tonnes, or 60% of projected North American imports (Table 3,
third data column). And if the South American freight costs used in the model are reduced by up
to 20%. Latin American sales could exceed I million tonnes and would dominate the North
American import market (Table 3, final two columns). Clearly, this combination of events would
produce major changes to Pacific Rim beef markets. The Australasian 'grassfed' industries adjust
through a reduction in total production and exports. Beef prices in Australasia could be reduced
by more than 10% from the level that would have applied had the tariff rate quotas been
maintained, and could be almost 15% below 1995 prices.
"The North American Free Trade Agreement, involving the USA, Canada and Mexico.
Table 3 Impacts of North-South American integration on Pacific Rim beef markets: 2001
Existing NAFfA-MERCOSUR Integration
TRQ's
Argentina productivity 0 0 4.75% per year
growth
LA transport reduction nil nil nil 10% 20%
North America
Production 13.681 13,598 13,477 13.438 13,400
Consumption 13.684 13,802 13,979 14,034 14,090
Exports 809 805 800 798 797
Imports 811 1,008 1,302 1.394 1,486
from Australasia 747 611 526 499 472
from LA 64 397 776 895 1,014
Australasia
Production 2,164 2,127 2,072 2,055 2,038
Exports 1,420 1,369 1.290 1.266 1.239
Japan/Korea
Production 793 791 790 790 790
Consumption 2,354 2,354 2,354 2,354 2,354
Imports 1,561 1,563 1,564 1,565 1.564
From Nth America 809 805 800 798 797
from Australasia 673 758 764 767 767
from LA 79 0 0 0 0
Prices (1995=100)
North America
Grainfed 106.3 106.0 105.6 105.4 105.3
Grassfed 97.7 95.1 91.2 90.0 88.7
Japan
grainfed 97.9 97.7 97.3 97.3 97.1
Grassfed 90.5 88.0 84.2 83.0 81.8
Korea
Grassfed 72.3 70.0 67.0 66.1 65.2
Australasia
Grassfed 97.3 94.2 89.5 88.0 86.5
Notes: I. LA refers to Argentina and Uruguay
2. Production (consumption) is net of exports to (imports from) non-model countries, and exports
and imports are those only involving modelled countries.
3. All volumes are in '000 MT (ewe).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
If South American entry to the Pacific Rim beef market was limited to existing quotas in North
America. results suggest that impacts on Pacific Rim markets would be minimal. However,
importing countries such as Japan and South Korea may have opened their markets to beef from
FMD-free regions of South America before the year 2001. This presents the potential for more




South American export supplies of fresh beef might be expanded through the diversion of
product from use in 'manufactured' beef to fresh uses, or through productivity gains. Our
analysis indicates that these are important determinants of Argentina's penetration of Pacific Rim
markets. Considerable exportable surpluses are likely to result and could find their way to Asian
markets given competitive freight costs.
Whether or not South American suppliers would choose to export to Asian markets depends
critically on their freight costs. Under some circumstances, our results show that South American
suppliers could win substantial market share in Northeast Asia should their freight costs per
tonne be no more than 20%-30% above rates from Australasia.
North American beef import policies could undergo further change over the medium term. For
example, the tariff-rate-quota allocations could be adjusted should the MERCOSUR free trade
area be integrated with NAFTA. In this case, exports of 'grassfed' beef from Argentina and
Uruguay to North America could reach well over 500,000 tonnes compared with today's quota
allocations that allow a maximum of 64,000 tonnes (cwe). This would produce major changes
into the Pacific Rim beef markets.
Our analyses have attempted to differentiate beef products depending upon whether they derived
from grainfed or grassfed animals. This required estimates of the relevant cross-elasticities of
demand. The estimates used for North America were derived from product classifications that
fitted rather closely to those adopted in this study. However, further work is required on the
degree of substitution in Japan. It is possible that the actual strength of the substitution
relationship for our beef aggregates could be somewhat higher than that employed here. The
implications for our results are that we may have over-estimated the degree of independence of
the two beef markets in Japan, and hence over-estimated the impacts of Latin American entry on
the grassfed beef market.
Both Australia and Argentina are major producers of grain. Australia has already begun
producing grain-finished beef for the Japanese market, and is expected to increase that product's
share of total exports to Japan. In this way the beef sector can to some extent be separated from
the implications of South American entry into grassfed beef markets. Although our analyses
assumed that South American producers do not adopt grainfeeding, a move in this direction
would lessen the impacts on grassfed beef markets of their entry to Pacific Rim markets.
Finally, integration of the North American Free Trade Agreement with the Latin American free
trade area MERCOSUR is already under discussion. Our results indicate that should this occur,
South America wins a large share of the North American market at the expense of New Zealand
and Australian suppliers. Should the beef industries of Australasia wish to maintain a substantial
presence in the US market, work will be required to improve access conditions. One approach
would be to push forward the idea for closer relations between Australasia and NAFTA. Unless
something like this occurs, Australasian suppliers are likely to lose important North American
markets, and not just those for beef, in the advent of a North American-South American free
trade area becoming a reality.
REFERENCES
Brester, G.W. and Wohlgenant, M.K. 1991, "Estimating interrelated demands for meats using
new measures for ground and table cut beef', American Journal ofAgricultural Economics
73: 1182-1194.
Cap, EJ. 1995, Argentina: The sustainable growth potential of the production possibilities
frontier in the agricultrual sector - an outlook, National Institute of Agricultural
Technology, Buenos Aires, November.
Doyle, S., Bui-Lan, A., Rodriguez, A., Benard, A. and Whish-Wilson, P. 1995, "Pacific Basin
beef trade: the influence of South Korea", Australian Commodities 2(3):326-339.
GATT 1993, The Final Act, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round. Trade
Negotiations Committee. GATT Secretariat, 15 December 1993.
Goddard, E.W. 1988, "Export Demand Elasticities in the World Market for Beef', Ch 8 in
Carter, C A and Gardiner, W H (eds.), Elasticities in International Agricultural Trade,
Westview Press, Boulder.
Hayes, DJ., Wahl, T.!. and Williams, G.W. 1990, ''Testing restrictions on a model of Japanese
meat demand", American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 72: 556-566.
Hillman, J.S. 1991, Technical Barriers to Agricultural Trade, Westview Press, Boulder.
Martin LJ. 1981, Quadratic Single and Multi Commodity Models of Spatial Equilibrium: A
Simplified Exposition Canadian J. ofAgr. Econ. Vol 29 (I): 21-48.
NZIER, Quarterly Predictions (various issues), New Zealand Institute of Economic Research,
Wellington.
OECD 1996, The Agricultural Commodities Outlook Database. 1970-2000, Paris.
OECD 1997, The Agricultural Outlook 1997-2001, Paris.
Rae, A.N. 1995, East Asian Food Consumption Patterns: Projections for Animal Products.
Agricultural Policy Paper No. 18, Centre for Applied Economics and Policy Studies,
Massey University, November.
Sullivan, J., Roningen, V., Leetma, S. and Gray, D. 1992, A 1989 Global Database for the Static
World Policy Simulation (SWOPSIM) Modeling Framework, Economic Research Service,
United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
World Trade Organisation 1996, International Bovine Meat Agreement, Second Annual Report.
The International Markets for Meat, 1995/96, Geneva, November.
World Trade Organisation 1997, International Bovine Meat Agreement, Third Annual Report.
The International Markets for Meat, 1996/97, Geneva, August.




Institute of Veterinary, Animal and Biomedical Sciences, Massey University, Palmerston North
ABSTRACT
A period of practical work is a requirement of agricultural degrees and diplomas at Massey
University. In recent years dairy farmers in particular have been criticised for their management of
labour. To quantify the experience and perspective of students concerning practical work, a survey of
DipAgr (n~36) and BApplSc (n~76: year 3) was undertaken. Most work was for 8-10 hours per day
(70%) and from 41to 60 hours per week. Pay rates varied between $7 and $11 per hour or $300-399
per week, but not by gender ($320/week). Almost all students found practical work to be a positive
experience and encountered few problems. Most dissatisfaction related to aspects the employer had
lillie or no control over e.g. the weather, gelling up early to milk cows, the "unsavoury" nature of
some farm work. "Bad" employers appear to be a small minority but have a disproportionately large
effect on the general perception of farm employment.
Survey data were coded and entered into an Excel© file for analysis using the SAS software.
Descriptive statistics were derived and the relationships between some variables were further
investigated using correlations and the chi-square statistic.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Student profile
Eighty one students were male (72%) and 32 were female (28%). A greater proportion of females
were doing the degree course: 38% of degree students were female compared to only 8% of diploma
students. All but two students were full-time (98%). Most were either in their first (30.4%, diploma
students) or their third year of study (65.2%, degree students), with only 5 students in their second or
fourth year of study.
The students' ages ranged from 18 to 50, with most students in the 19 to 21 year old age bracket
(Table I). The mean age was 22.4 ± 5.3. There was no significant difference in mean age between
degree (22.6 years) and diploma (22.0 years) students. reflecting the greater practical experience of
the laller students at enrolment. The median age for degree students was 21 years and 20 years for
diploma students. When students were grouped according to age, a significantly greater proportion of
diploma compared to degree students were in the 20 and under age groups (66.7% compared to
32.9%."t the 95% confidence level).
Keywords: Farm employment, student practicum, job satisfaction. Table I: Student age and background information (percentage in each category).
Diploma Degree Total
Age (n~112)
18 - 19 years 27.7 3.9
20 years 38.9 28.9
21 years 13.9 35.5
22 years 5.6 7.9
23 - 25 years 5.6 9.2
26 • 30 years 0.0 7.9





Employment on farms generally has a negative image (Ellis, 1997; Reid, 1997). A common
perception is that pay is poor relative to the hours worked (Westbrooke, 1997) and that the job tasks
are repetitive and "boring". Farmers can exercise considerable influence over employment conditions
and for this reason there are likely to be significant differences between farms in the quality of
employment. This study reports on farm work experiences of Massey University Bachelor of Applied
Science (BAppISc) and Diploma of Agriculture (DipAgr) students who are required to complete a
minimum number of weeks of practical work as part of their programme of study (see 1998 Calendar
p. 368 and p. 402, respectively for details). For degree students most practical work is carried out
during vacation breaks while the qualification is being obtained. The DipAgr students, on the other
hand, are required to have at least one years farm work experience before enrolling at Massey
University. The aim of the student survey was to quantify the work experience of students, identify































A questionnaire was designed to obtain data on: student details; their opinions on farm employment;
details relating to their last job including farm type, stock numbers, time worked, how the position
was obtained. pay and accommodation, employer information, and opinions on aspects of the job; and
general comments on past work experiences on farms. The DipAgr and third year BApplSc students
were surveyed. The diploma students complete a double semester programme of study and come to
the university with a minimum of one year of practical farming experience. On the other hand, the
work experience of the degree students is much more variable. There is a requirement to complete a
minimum of 30 weeks of practical work before graduation, and while students are encouraged to
complete this during holiday breaks over the duration of the degree, some defer all or most of their
farm practical work until course work is finished. The survey was completed by 113 students: 36
DipAgr students (32%), 76 BApplSc students (67%). The single BHort student, a member of the
BApplSc year 3 class, was classified as a BApplSc candidate.
The work background of students' parents or caregivers was predominantly farming, followed by an
urban business or service industry (Table I). The only significant difference between degree and
diploma students in parents' occupations Was that more of the former group came from an urban
business or service background than diploma students (P<O.I0). There has been a general trend in
New Zealand for an increased proportion of students in "agricultural" courses to come from an urban
background. These students (35% of the degree students in this survey) can be expected, ceteris
paribus, to have less practical farming experience than those raised on farms. Farmers need to be
cognisant of the background and level of prior experience when inducting students to their property.
Livestock numbers on the farms worked on by students varied considerably (Table 4). Data on farm
size or stock units would have provided a better indication of the farms worked on, particularly for the
arable, horticultural, and sheep and beef cattle properties. Generally the farms were larger than the
industry average (e.g. 300 cow dairy herds vs. 198 cow industry average (LIe, 1998». The
percentage of students working on dairy farms with between 140 and 200 cows was 28.6%, similarly
for 201 to 300 cows; for 301 to 400 cows this was 20.4% and for over 400 cows, 22.4%. The data
was skewed to the left for all stock types except deer, consistent with the expectation that larger farm
businesses employ more labour.
Opinions on farm employment
Students' opinions on statements related to farm employment are presented in Table 2. Overall,
students were either neutral or moderately agreed with all of the statements. Degree and diploma
students did not differ in their opinions concerning farm employment. Approximately 30% of
students disagreed with the statements, except for those regarding the capability of female employees
(23%) and whether the solution to employment is in the farmers' hands (23%). Nearly half the
students (49%) agreed 'with the statement that "most farmers are good employers". However, a
similar percentage also believed that "the image of farming as a career is poor" (53%). About 30% of
students disagreed with these statements. Most also believed that "the solution to employment is in
the farmers' hands" (47%): only 23% disagreed with this.
Table 4: Numbers of animals on farms worked on by students.
No. Median Mean Std Dev.
Description of students' most recent farm employment
t I = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree.
Table 3: Type of farm students worked on in their most recent farm employment (percentage and
number of students choosing each option: total replies = 109).
Most students had worked on a dairy (47%) or a sheep and beef cattle farm (29%) (Table 3). Othet
animal-based farming enterprises on which work was carried out were deer (n=I), pigs (n=2), horses
(n=l) and poultry (n=2). "Other jobs" included contracting, cropping, council work, irrigation
services, dairy industry work, engineering and tutoring. Degree students were more likely to work on
"other farms" (horticulture and other animals) than diploma students (15% vs. 6%), and on "other"
jobs (research and other), (18% vs. 0%), and less likely to work on sheep and beef cattle properties


























Weeks worked 103 16
Days per week 104 6
Hours per day 103 9
Hours per week 103 54
Table 5: Time worked by students in their last farm job.






Hours worked per week were calculated from days worked per week and the average number of hours
worked per day. These data (Tables 5 and 6) were highly variable. Almost all students had worked
from 5 to 7 days per week (96%). Most worked from 8 to 10 hours per day (70%) and from 41 to 60
hours per week (51 %). The median number of hours worked per week was 54. Students working on
dairy farms worked significantly more hours per week than those on sheep and beef caUle farms (64
hours vs. 48 hours, P<O.OO1). Those working on "other farms" worked an average of 44 hours per
week, and those in "other" jobs, 52 hours per week. Westbrooke (1997) reported estimates of
average hours worked per week by dairy farm employees (and employers) to be 48 (38) during winter,
75 (68) over the calving-mating period, and 60 (52) for the rest of the year. Employers' estimates
were consistently less than those of the employees in Westbrooke's study, and this bias may also exist
in the student's estimates of the hours they worked.
The time worked by students in their last farm job is shown in Tables 5 and 6. The maximum number
of specified weeks worked was 312, although 500 weeks was arbitrarily allocated by one mature
student who had spent "years" farming. The figures reflect the "holiday nature" of the work for most
students, although some students, mostly in the diploma class, had worked on farms for a longer -
period: 20.3% of students had been in their last job for over 50 weeks and of these (n=21), 19 were
diploma students. The median number of weeks worked by diploma students was 52, compared to

















Table 2: Student opinions of farm employment (percentage of students choosing each option).
Level of agreement'
No. Median I 2 3 4
Female employees are as capable as male III 4 1.8 21.6 20.7 28.8
employees
Image of farming as a career is poor 111 4 10.8 19.8 16.2 39.6
Solution to employment is in the farmers' III 3 4.5 18.9 29.7 27.0
hands
Good employees are hard to find 111 3 4.5 26.1 23.4 35.1
Most farmers are good employers 111 3 8.1 20.7 22.5 38.7
Students from an urban upbringing find it 110 3 12.7 18.2 23.6 36.4
harder to find aglhort employment
Farm Type %
Dairy 36.4
Dairy with other animals 10.3
Sheep and beef cattle 19.6
Sheep and beef caule with other animals 9.3
Horticulture 6.5






Table 6: Time worked by students in their last farm job (percentage and number of students choosing
each option).
Time variable % responses No. responses
Weeks worked (n= 103)
Up to 10 weeks 8.8 9
II to 20 weeks 52.4 54
21 to 30 weeks 3.9 4
31 to 40 weeks 10.7 II
41 to 50 weeks 3.9 4
51 to 60 weeks 12.6 13
Over 60 weeks 7.8 8
Days per week worked (n=I04)




Average hours per day (n=103)










'""'" Hours per week (n=103)CO I to 20 3.9 40 35 to 40 14.6 15
41 to 50 27.2 28
51 to 60 23.3 24
61 to 70 13.6 14
Over 70 17.5 18
The amount of pay received (before tax) was given as either an hourly rate or a weekly rate (Table 7).
Most students were paid between $7 and SII an hour (hourly rate) or between S300 and $399 per
week (weekly rate). The average hourly rate was $9.53 ± 1.99 (n=33), and the average weekly rate
was $321 ± 96 (n=71). The average weekly pay was S329, when two students who had previously
worked for S35/week (cadet training) were excluded. The above rates, when converted to hourly or
weekly rates, based on the hours students said they worked, gave an average weekly rate of $465 for
the 32 students who had given an hourly rate (SIlO to S936 per week), and an average hourly rate of
S5.73 for the 71 students who specified a weekly rate (from $0.73 to $15.37 per hour). This suggests
the students probably overestimated the hours they worked (as noted earlier), or that pay may be
calculated on a "standard week" and the hours worked are actually longer. This was also
demonstrated by the six students who gave both an hourly and weekly rate; for five of these students
the weekly rate calculated using the hours and the hourly rate exceeded the given weekly rate.
At the time the students completed their most recent practicum, the minimum wage for 16·20 year
olds and adults was S3.75 and $6.25/hour, respectively (Lincoln University, 1996). Guidelines for
sheep and beef callie, and dairy farm wages/salaries were in the range S269 to S535 per week
depending on experience, age and responsibility. The students therefore were paid within the industry
guidelines, although as noted above, the hours worked could have substantially reduced the effective
earning rate per hour.
Older students were paid more than younger students (n=7I, r=O.30, P<0.05). Students working on
sheep and beef cattle farms were paid less than those working on dairy farms (S280 vs. S329,
P<0.05). Those working on "other farms" were paid an average of S340 per week (n=4) and those
doing "other" work were paid S527 per week (n=3). Students with a written contract were paid more
than those with a verbal contract, who in turn were paid more than those with no contract: S388
(n= 14), S332 (n=25) and S282 (n=32), respectively. This in part could be a reflection offarm type:
sheep and beef cattle farm workers who were paid less than dairy farm workers were less likely to
have signed a contract. Degree students were paid more than diploma students (average of S343 per
week vs. S293 per week, P<0.05). Diploma students were also more likely to work on sheep and beef
cattle farms and be younger than degree students. Average pay per week was the same for male and
female students (S320). In directly comparing rates of pay, it should be remembered that for some
types of employment, particularly farm employment, some remuneration is likely to be non-financial
e.g. free accommodation, phone, power, milk and/or meat and pay may be expected to be lower than
for other jobs.
Table 7: Rate of pay received by students in their last in their last farm job (percentage and number
of students choosing each option).
Pay variable % responses No. responses
Hourly rate (n=33)
S5.oo - S6.99 9.1 3
$7.00 - $8.99 24.2 8
$9.00 - $9.99 15.2 5
$10.00 - SIO.99 24.2 8
$11.00 - $11.99 6.1 2
$12.00 - $12.50 21.2 7
Weekly rate (n=71)
$35 - S249 15.4 II
$250 - $299 14.1 10
$300 - $349 31.0 22
$350 - $399 22.5 16
$400 - S615 16.9 12
In most cases students were offered accommodation on the property, in the farmer's home (25.5%), a
sleepout (17.3%) or a separate house on the property (29.6%). In 27.6% of cases accommodation was
not available on the property. Students were asked to provide details on accommodation and meal
allowances and costs. Means for non-zero values were calculated: accommodation costs were S52
(n=32), the accommodation allowance (S47, n=6), meal costs (S40, n=17), and a meal allowance
(S50, n=I).
There were 104 replies to the question on the employment contract the student had agreed to before
commencing the job. Forty seven students had no contract (45.2%), 21 had a written and signed
contract (20.2%) and 39 (37.5%) had a verbal agreement. Of those with a contract, 23% (12) had
made a change to their contract during their employment. Three of the 12 students indicated they did
not agree to this change. Students working on sheep and beef cattle farms were more likely to have
no contract (68%) than those working on dairy farms (38%), "other farms" (38%) and "other jobs"
(20%). Written contracts were more common for "other jobs" (50%) and "other farms" (46%), than
dairy farm jobs (18%) and sheep and beef callie farms (3%).
Options given in the question seeking information on how students obtained their last position were:
publicly advertised, contacted by owner, asked to apply by a consultant, and "other" (Table 8).
Responses to "other" were coded into six options. The question was answered by 103 students, and in
some cases the responses to categories may overlap e.g. a student may have applied for a position
after seeing it advertised on the Faculty of Agricultural and Horticultural Sciences job notice board
and interpreted this as "publicly advertised" or described it as "other - practical work office or
approached employer". The most common means of gaining employment was contact by the owner
(32%), approached employer (18%), via family and friends (16%) and publicly advertised (14%)
.....
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In the past, New Zealand apple growers relied on calendar spraying to meet export
requirements. But with growing concerns about pesticides residues leveL~ amongst its
European customers, ENZA is now promoting uptake of Integrated Fruit Production
(IFP). This paper reports on a multiple case study of both IFP and conventional apple
growers. Using Rogers' (1995) model of the innovation-decision process, growers'
strategic and tactical decisions were investigated. Information search behaviour in the
frrst stage of the innovation-decision process proved to be a good indicator of the fmal
decision, grower assessment of innovation attributes in the persuasion stage showed
remarkable differences, and implementation of IFP required investment in monitoring
and on-going learning.
INTRODUCTION
Many of New Zealand's horticultural industries produce for overseas markets where
they experience growing competition from other producers. It is generally accepted that
New Zealand's export future will not be in bulk production, as it will be hard to compete
with low-cost countries such as Indonesia, Chile and China on price alone. Instead, New
7..ealand's horticultural export will have to service selected markets with highly
differentiated products that have perceived qualities that will help to fetch premium
prices.
In order to achieve this position, a pro-active agricultural industry is needed. One
that is well integrated and flexible, and that is geared towards identifying and satisfying
customer demands. When trying to benefit from identified marketing opportunities, the
quick adoption of new, and sometimes complex, technology at the production level can
be a determining factor.
This paper examines the adoption and implementation of such a technology
cluster by New Zealand's apple growers. Integrated Fruit Production (IFP) can be
defmed as the economical production of high quality fruit, giving priority to ecologically
safer production methods, minimising the undesirable side effects and use of
agrochemicals, to enhance the safeguards to the environment and human health (Muller,
1990). IFP is a complex technology cluster because it requires the grower not only to
make significant changes in orchard management, but also to develop a new perspective
on pest and disease levels, spray usage, natural predators and the risk ofcrop damage
due to higher pest levels in the orchard.
The paper is based on post-graduate research conducted at Massey's Institute
of Natural Resources. The objective of the research was to study why and how apple
growers adopt or reject IFP, and how adoption has changed the daily management of
their orchards. The research used a multiple case study approach; five conventional and
five IFP growers took part in the research. The IFP growers had at least one year
experience with using IFP teChniques, all but one have their whole orchard under IFP,
and all but one carry out the monitoring activities themselves. Semi-structured phone
interviews were used to study their decisions relating to the adoption or non-adoption
of IFP. Furthermore, their pest monitoring and spraying decisions, together with the
learning activities they engaged in, were monitored for an extended period (September
1997 until February 1998).
The frrst part of the paper provides a brief overview of the New Zealand apple
sector, integrated fruit production, and some of the literature on grower decision
making. The second part of the paper presents fmdings from the research. The paper
concludes with ten hypotheses drawn from these fmdings.
Keywords: Integrated Fruit Production (IFP); adoption; innovation;
decision making; horticultural management. NZ's APPLE SECTOR
Apples are New Zealand's second most important horticultural crop, accounting for
approximately 26% of New Zealand's income from horticulture in 1995/96 (The
Orchardist, 1998). There are an estimated 14,000 hectares planted in apples and pears,
owned by 1,650 growers, with an estimated 8,500 people directly employed by the
industry (New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation, 1997).
New Zealand's apple industry is export driven. In the 1996/97 season, nearly
300 million kg of apples were exported, to over 50 countries. The two most important
..Jo.
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export markets are the US and Europe, which take respectively around 25% and 60%
of the apples exported (New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board, 1997). Revenue
earned by the export of apples totalled $338.1 million (July '96- June '97) (The
Orchardist, 1998). Despite the importance of the New Zealand apple industry to the
local economy, it is a very small player by world standards. In 1997, New Zealand
produced less than f% of the world's apples (Batchelor et ai, 1997)
New Zealand apples are exported under the control of a single desk structure.
This structure, the New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board, was established by
the government in 1948. Permits to export must be granted by this Board. Because of
its monopoly powers, ENZA (the Board's international fruit marketing company) is ahle
to set grade standards which growers must meet if they want to export their fruit. Such
standards have enabled ENZA to avoid being a commodity trader. Instead, ENZA claims
to supply "superior" quality, highly branded fruit which can be sold for premium prices
in the market place (New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board, 1997).
Until recently, most growers relied on spray schedules to achieve the standards
set by ENZA For apple production aimed at the US market, where ENZA's customers
are so far more concerned about pests than pesticide use and residues, this is still the
case. Growers who supply fruit that meets ENZA's standards for the US market
receiving a premium. But the European market has changed. There is growing consumer
concern about pesticide residues in apples. According to the Chairman of the British
National Consumer Council, "the main determinant of consumer behaviour has shifted
from price to quality, and is now changing again to conscience" (quoted in Stafford,
1993). These consumers demand "healthy" fruit (without pesticide residues), produced
in a manner that does not harm the environment. As a consequence, ENZA's European
customers (such as Sainsbury, UK) who supply these consumers, now become more
discerning in selecting their suppliers.
We feci that this development should be secn hy the New Zealand apple growers
and ENZA as an opportunity, instead of being perceived a~ a threat. The opportunity lies
in supplying and promoting apples from what outsiders often consider to be "green and
clean New Zealand". There is research that suggests that consumers are willing to pay
more for products that are perceived to be healthier and less environmentally harmful
(Coddington, 1993; Davis 1993; Ottman 1992). On the other hand, price advantages for
ENZA in the European market have not yet materialized. And there is research that
suggests that green marketing has its pitfalls; three problems often encountered are: the
potential loss of credibility, consumer cynicism, and consumer confusion over claims
(Mendleson & Polanski, 1995). Nevertheless, the shift to Integrated Fruit Production
(lFP) is an important step towards both meeting European requirements and making real
changes at the orchard level.
INTEGRATED FRUIT PRODUCTION (lFP)
Integrated Fruit Production (IFP) has its origins in Integrated Pest Management (IPM)
programmes implemented in Western Europe in the late 1950s (Stewart, 1997;
Sansavini, 1990). The interest in such integrated programmes arose because, following
World War II, widespread use of broad-spectrum agrichemicals, such as DDT, caused
disruptions to the agro-ecosystem, and new pests became dominant. Natural enemies
were eliminated and resistance by pests to the various chemicals became a prohlem. New
pesticides had to be developed, costs rose, further pesticide resistance was found and a
vicious cycle developed (Candolfi-Vasconcelos, 1995). Furthermore, as Basler, Boller
and Kohlet (1991) explain, the intensive use of agrichemicals became an important
political issue in Western Europe where agricultural lands are often in close proximity
to populated areas.
Alternative pest management systems, now called IPM, were developed in
response to these problems. IPM can be simply described as: (I) determining how a pest
can be manipulated so that its population can be reduced to below economic thresholds;
(2) applying biological knowledge and technology to modify the pest population; and (3)
using procedures that are suited to current technology and which are also compatible
with economic and social goals (Luckmann & Metcalf, 1994). IPM represents a radical
step away from the ''total eradication" philosphy that had been in place when chemical
control was the only approach, to an approach where pests are managed in the light of
the economic and social context (Dent, 1991).
Integrated production systems such as IFP just take this philosophical approach
further, so that IFP protocols not only include IPM practices but also consider the whole
orchard system, from variety development and selection through orchard establishment
to production systems and post-harvest management (Stewart, 1997; Suckling & Ioratti,
1995). Such integrated production systems are now commonplace in Europe where it
has been found that by 1996, 35% of plantings were being managed in such as fashion.
In Switzerland and Italy nearly 70% of orchards are believed to be operating under such
a system (Batchelor et aI, 1997).
UK supermarket buyers, such as Marks and Spencer and Sainsbury, which are
very active in Europe and which are ENZA's biggest buyers, have quickly developed
a preference for their fruit supplies to have been produced under an IFP system and now
expect countries outside of the EU to supply IFP grown fruit (Mannering, 1996). New
Zealand's southern hemisphere competitors, South Africa and Chile, have IFP
programmes (Mannering, 1996). To maintain market access, ENZA had to develop an
IFP programme too (Anonymous, 1996). ENZA began trialling its Integrated Fruit
Production-Pipfruit (lFP-P) programme in the 1996/7 season. This programme, which
involved only the pest and disease management components of IFP initially, is intended
to be utilised by all New Zealand pipfruit growers by the 2000/1 season. The protocols
are provided for growers in the programme in an IFP-P manual which will eventually
include 16 sections covering all aspects of orchard management.
GROWER DECISION MAKING
Management is in essence a decision making activity (Giles & Stansfield, 1980). Rational
decision making is organised in a series of logical steps (Kay & Edwards, 1994): identify
and define the problem; collect data and information; identify and analyse alternative
solutions; select the best alternative; implement the decision; monitor and evaluate the
results; and accept responsibility for the decision.
When studying grower decision making in relation to a complex technology, such
as IFP, it is useful to: (a) distinguish between three decision making levels (strategic,
tactical and operational), and; (b) be familiar with the innovation-decision process as
described by Rogers (1995). We will flfSt briefly describe the three decision making
levels, hefore we highlight some aspects of the innovation-decision process that are




Stratel:jc tactjcal and Qperational decision makjnl:
Strategic decisions relate to the whole farm business. They determine the overall
direction or focus of the business (Dryden, 1995), and are taken from a long-term
perspective. Examples ofstrategic orchard decisions include decisions on what varieties
to grow, planting densities and whether or not to adopt IFP. Tactical decisions focus on
hu.w to achieve strategic goals (Griffm, 1990), and deal with within-year variations in
farm performance (Parker et aI, 1997). Labour scheduling, crop load planning and
setting of harvest dates are all examples of tactical decisions. Operational decisions
involve specific tasks and include the day-to-day management of the orchard. Examples
of operational decisions are the choice of a specific type of pesticide over another, the
actual timing Of spraying (morning, afternoon), and the dilution rate.
The innoyation-decisjon process
According to Rogers the innovation-decision process is "the process through which an
individual (or other decision-making unit) passes from the frrst knowledge of an
innovation, to forming an attitude toward the innovation, to a decision to adopt or
reject, to implementation of the new idea, and to confirmation of this decL~ion (Rogers,
1995, p. 163). Rogers distinguishes between five stages in the innovation-decision
process: knowledge; persuasion; decision; implementation; and confirmation ( Figure 1).
Figure 1: The innovation-decision process.
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In the ''knowledge'' stage, someone gains knowledge of the exisistence of an innovation
and some understanding of how it functions. In the "persuasion" stage, someone
develops a favorable or unfavorable attitude towards the innovation. In the "decision"
stage, the actual choice to adopt or reject an innovation is made. When someone decides
to adopt, the next stage is the "implementation" stage, where the innovation is put into
use. Consequently, in the "confirmation" stage someone reassesses the decision to adopt
or reject the innovation (Rogers, 1995). A decision to adopt or reject an innovation
presumes information. Someone's information search and processing behaviour is
therefore an important factor throughout the innovation-decision process, although the
character of the information needed changes as the process progresses. For example,
-feedback on the actual "perfonnance" of the innovation is essential for the confrrmation
stage.
In the second stage, persuasion, the information gathered on the perceived
characteristics ofan innovation allows someone to form an overall attitude towards the
innovation (ranging from very favourable to very unfavourable). According to Rogers,
people assess an innovation using five categories of "perceived innovation attributes":
(I) relative advantage; (2) compatibility; (3) complexity; (4) triability; and (5) observa-
bility.
Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being
better than the idea it supersedes; this might be measured in economic terms, but
convenience and social prestige are also important. Compatibility is the degree to which
an innovation is perceived as being consistent with existing values, past experiences, and
needs. For example, some dairy farmers will never adopt inductions (even though they
see the economic benefits) because they are not compatible with their existing animal
welfare values. Complexity is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as difficult
to understand and use. Limited uptake of Pes by farmers is often believed to be
associated with a high degree of perceived complexity. Triability is the degree to which
an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis. A new maize variety is an
example of an innovation with a high degree of triability. Observability is the degree to
which the adoption of an innovation by others can be easily observed. Adoption of 4-
wheel motor bikes is a good example of an innovation with a high level of observability.
Technologies that have a large "hardware" component (such a~ machinery) are more
observable than technologies comprising of mainly "software" components (such as the
use of formal planning tools).
We have used the literature on the three decision making levels and the
innovation-decision process as the starting point for our study of the adoption and
implementation of IFP by the 10 case study growers. It is clear that the decision to adopt
or reject IFP is a strategic one as IFP, being an integrated system, influences the whole
business. But the actual implementation of IFP also asks for decision making at the
tactical level throughout the production season. The rest of this paper is therefore split
up in two section: (a) one called ''the strategic level" that deals with some of the aspects
that influenced the growers to adopt or reject IFP; and (b) a section called ''tactical
level" that outlines some of the actual changes due to implementing IFP.
THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
The decision to adopt IFP, or not, is a strategic one. Our research has focussed on the
first two stages of the innovation-decision process (the "knowledge" and the
"persuasion" stages) as they often determined the outcome reached in the third stage
(the "decision" stage).
Knowledl:e
In the knowledge stage, a grower learns that such a thing as "IFP" exists (awareness
knowledge), and gains some general ideas about what it is and how it works ("how to"
knowledge). Lack of awareness and 'how to' knowledge regarding IFP was common
amongst all conventional growers studied and seems to coincide with a low level of
interest in IFP. It appears that selective exposure by ignoring information on IFP has
played a role (as one grower said: "it's a decision to be uninformed"). The most
common source of the information on IFP the conventional growers did gather was their




accustomed to seeing their spray representatives regularly and receiving information
from them regarding all aspects of spray and chemical usage.
An initial understanding of the IFP system was an important factor for the IFP
growers to become interested and start to search for additional information that might
help to make an informed decision. Evaluation of this information is part of the second
stage (persuasion)..
Persuasjon
Persuasion involves, according to Rogers, developing a positive or negative attitude
towards an innovation. From the growers' interviews it appears that those who
eventually adopted IFP not only spent much more time in gathering and assessing
information that might help them make a decision, but also gathered information from
a wide variety of sources. These information sources included spray representatives,
consultants, entomologists, other growers, discussion groups, the ENZA Manual, and
the New 7-ealand Plant Protection Proceedings. A common complaint, though, was the
lack of relevant and timely information about IFP they received from ENZA.
Rogers distinguishes between ftve perceived innovation attributes that influence
the attitude towards an innovation, and therefore guide the outcome of the resulting
decision. They will he discussed one by one.
Relative Advantage
Conventional growers identifted two important advantages of IFP adoption: the
perceived reduction in spraying ("As far as I'm concerned spraying is the one joh I
actually hate doing", "I'd rather be checking pheromone traps than spraying"); and
environmental safety and health issues (many growers live on the orchard). These
advantages, however, were not considered important enough to persuade them to
change to IFP due to the magnitude of the perceived disadvantages of IFP adoption. The
most important disadvantages the conventional growers associated with IFP adoption
were the perceived higher risk of incrca~d pest and disease occurrence, reduced control,
and loss of quality ("With IFP, if you get down the track and you have got a problem,
it's probahly too late then"), and the fact that IFP growers can not supply the US
market and therefore lose out on the existing US premiums.
The IFP growers (who all had at least one year experience with IFP) identifted
several additional advantages of IFP, and in general also placed more weight on the
advantages they identifiCd. One additional advantage commented on by all IFP growers
was the increa~d understanding of their own orchard ("The amount of knowledge you
can gain of your own orchard by actually looking at what's there"). Another advantage
that the IFP group recognised was the fact that, as IFP will be compulsory by the year
2001, early adoption would give them a "head start" with the expectation of extra
support and back-up. Another advantage mentioned was reduced costs due to reduced
spray usage ("It's [IFP] cheaper for me, especially as we do our own monitoring").
Compatibility
Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as consL~tent with
existing values and past experiences and needs. For at least one conventional grower his
past experiences with a changed spray regime was an important reason not to adopt IFP
("I did in the past try a new spray ... and there was an awful plaster because it ran out
... That was sort ofa lesson .... I've been there, done that, and I'd rather let some one
else fmd out ftrst").
For many of the IFP group, IFP provided an opportunity to grow apples in a
manner more compatible with their personal beliefs and convictions. In particular, these
belie(~ centred on environmental, health and safety issues. Comments such as "It's nice
to know the children can play safely in any part of the orchard, any time" show just how
consistent IFP is with these growers' existing values and beliefs.
Complexity
The more complex an innovation is perceived, the less likely it is to be adopted. The
conventional growers all felt that IFP was quite difficult to understand and use. They
viewed IFP as complicated and confusing compared to their current system. In contrast
to the conventional group, the IFP growers perceived IFP as easy to understand and
relatively straight forward. For example, one grower commented: "I really wish that they
[conventional growers] would all try a small area to see how easy it is, instead of just
trying to guess, you know you really don't know how easy it is".
Trialability
Trialability is the degree to which an innovation can be experimented with before full
adoption. The fact that IFP can be trialled relatively easily seems to favour its adoption.
On the whole the trialability of IFP was not mentioned by the conventional case studies
as a reason for non-adoption, but as an important factor for if they would ever seriously
considering adoption ("...and probably if I was going to do IFP, I'd do one block and
monitor it and cost it").
Trialability had been very important for the IFP growers in their decision to
adopt IFP. It has helped them to assess and reduce the potential risks involved with the
adoption of IFP. In general, the IFP growers all began growing IFP in a "small way" so
that they could trial the system for themselves ("Last year, I only had part of my orchard
under IFP, more because I just wanted to have a play with the new concepts and be in
at the ground level"). By trialing IFP on a small scale, the grower gained valuable
experience, while limiting the risk involved.
Observability
Observability is the degree to which (the results 00 an innovation can he observed on
someone else's property. According to Rogers (1995), the more observable an
innovation is, the faster it will be adopted. IFP is an innovation that is dominated by
"software" aspects, for this reason IFP is not highly visible or observable to the average
grower. Because of this, very little comment was made regarding the observability of
IFP by any of the case study growers.
TACTICAL LEVEL
Every week, from September 1997 till February 1998, the participating growers filled




then faxed it to us. The growers were asked to supply information on three aspects
especially: monitoring activities. spray applications. and learning activities.
Monjtorjn~ actiyjties
The conventional growers carried out very few monitoring activities on their orchards.
Only one grower reported once that he had monitored insects (shoot and fruit sampling
for the presence of mites and apple leaf curling midge); an activity that only occurred
because the spray representative, who did the work, was present and gave his time
freely. But still it is felt that the conventional growers did more than just follow a spray
calender. For some spray decisions they did indeed use monitored data. in the form of
published weather reports or Mills periods data from newspapers or the radio. As a
consequence. this information now and then shows up in the reasoning behind certain
spraying decisions (e.g. "Sprayed for Black Spot - Mills period").
In comparison to the conventional growers. the IFF growers reported upon
extensive monitoring. on a regular basis. and for a wide variety of pests and diseases. All
IFF growers indicated that they monitored the weather. This was normally carried out
by the growers themselves. and took between 15 and 35 minutes per week. Regular
monitoring did not begin until bud burst I green tip. at which stage black spot. powdery
mildew and the weather, were regularly monitored. After flowering. pest monitoring
began in earnest. Codling moth and leaf roller pheromone traps were regularly
monitored from this point forward. usually by the growers themselves. On average it
took between 10 and 20 minutes a week to check these traps. Other regular monitoring
included that for mites. woolly apple aphid and leaf curling midge. Methods used to
monitor these included shoot. leaf and fruit samples. There were variations between the
IFF growers. as to how much monitoring actually occurred. One grower in particular
reported less monitoring than the other growers. This may be a reflection on the
grower's confidence in his monitoring skills or in his understanding of the system. On
the whole. however. a regular pattern of monitoring activities carried out on each
orchard emerged. The IFF growers used this as a basis for spray decisions.
Reasons for spray appHcatjons
The question sheet asked the growers why a certain spray was applied during that week.
Many conventional growers merely stated the name of the pest or disease the spray was
expected to control, or a brief comment like "Dictates of ENZA for US [market
export]".
IFF growers often supplied a lengthy explanation for why a spray was applied,
often using data from their monitoring activities. It appears that they used more of a
non-programmed approach to make their spray decisions than the conventional growers,
who on the whole relied on a programmed approach. The difference that became most
noticeable between the IFF and conventional growers. was not just the amount of
information used. but also the thought given to each decision. This was reflected in
comments such as: "Four live leaf roller larvae found having lunch of apples. Although
'this is not a threshold for this time of year. I felt that risk management required a spray".
or "Although leaf roller trap catch thresholds exceeded I did not feel a Mimic was
justified as I was monitoring fruit and shoots too".
Grower educatjon
It was our expectation that IFF growers would spend much more time on educational
activities as learning about a complex technology cluster as IFF needs considerable
commitment.
The results from the question sheets showed that it was not uncommon for a
conventional grower to report that he had not partaken in any educational activity in a
given week. On average. the conventional growers spent between 30 minutes and one
hour a week engaged in 'educational' activities. Their main source of information was
their spray representative. with whom they were in regular. if not weekly then
fortnightly. contact. The time spent with the spray representative varied from 15 minutes
to four hours per visit. Another source of information used by the conventional growers
was the consultant. Consultants were used on average three times over the season for
about half an hour each time. The main reasons for contacting a consultant related to
concerns about thinning practices and thinning sprays. The conventional growers read
sporadically: mainly the industry magazines. for a range of general topics. and often
lasting no more than 15 minutes a week.
IFP growers reported spending a lot more time each week on educational
activities. and they also engaged in a much wider range ofeducational activities. It was
not uncommon for an IFF grower to report being involved in four different types of
educational activities each week. such as discussion groups. discussions with spray
representatives and/or consultants. reading. and visiting focus orchards. The average IFF
grower spent three hours a week involved in such educational activities. Compared to
conventional growers. the IFF growers used spray representatives a lot less frequently,
and for a narrower range of subjects. instead preferring to get a lot of information from
other sources. These other sources of information and education included consultants,
IFP meetings, the ENZA Manual and other reading material. Consultants were used
regularly. at least once a month. for a variety of topics. The time spent with a consultant
varied between half an hour and two hours per visit. IFF meetings were mentioned by
all IFP growers. Their frequency depended on the time of year, with a meeting at least
once a month and no more than once a fortnight. Meetings lasted between one and three
hours. Topics discussed included: general IFF information; the use of fungicides; how
to best control insect pests. Reading. including magazines about orcharding, spray
pamphlets and ENZA material, was also a common occurrence amongst IFF growers.
The time each grower spent on this activity varied between 10 and 30 minutes each
week.
Although there was a remarkable difference between the number, variety and
time conventional and IFF growers spent in educational activities every week. care must
be taken when interpreting this. IFF growers are very aware that they are using a ''new
system" and hence are very conscious of the learning they are doing. Conventional
growers on the other hand may see their learning activities as part of their weekly
routine and therefore have not explicitly reported upon them.
CONCLUSION
The study involved only 10 apple growers (five IFF and five conventional). It is
therefore difficult to make defmitive statements for the whole sector. But the research
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ABSTRACT
Land-owners in the Tinui district were surveyed in late 1993 to establish their views on farm forestry.
Trees for timber, shelter and conservation had been established on 41 of the 43 respondent's farms
(7.3% of the total farm area). This was primarily funded out of cash flow (92. 1%). The work for this
was completed by the farmer (62.4%), with help from a spouse (9.5%) and/or children (7%). Trees
were planted mainly for erosion control, "best" use of marginal land and a source of retirement
income. Pruned sawlog prices were expected to improve by 2018 relative to those paid in 1993. Of
the 40% who quoted a current price for logs, 77% provided an estimate that was more than 20% above
or below the current price. Silvicultural management, quality of stems and pruned height were rated
most highly by farmers as the factors determining net income from trees. Farmers did not think the
risks associated with forestry would affect farm business viability. While farmers seemed well-
informed on farm forestry, this was not always reflected in practice, particularly for silviculture.
Keywords: farm forestry, risk, price expectations, planting plans
INTRODUCTION
Financial and social factors affect farm forestry development (Sherlock and Parker, 1994). Hill country
farmers with limited financial flexibility primarily base land-use decisions on short-term cash flow (Gray
el al., 1989) and in this respect a tree crop with a "harvest horizon" of 30 years is viewed less favourably
than livestock. Further, anecdotal evidence suggests alternative ownership structures, such a< joint
ventures, are viewed with suspicion by farmers due to a perceived loss of autonomy. Also, returns from
farm forestry, until 1993-1995, often did not meet expectations due to poor siting, small scale or incorrect
silvicultural management of the trees. Farm forestry has therefore tended to be regarded as a retiremcnt
option for marginal land, rather than a productive crop in its own right and this was manifested by 77% of
sheep and beefcallie farms having no production trees on them in 1989 (Knowles, 1994). Formal
information concerning hill country farmers' allitudes toward forestry risks, knowledge of forestry
technology and management practices, and future intentions with respect to tree plantings is scarce. This
lack of information prompted the survey of land-owners reported in this paper.
METHOD
Survey district
The Tinui district is situated 50 km east of Masterton. It is characterised by hill country of medium to high
livestock performance and productive capacity. Sheep and beefcallie are the main farming enterprises:
land titles are also held by non-farmers. Three severe rainfall events in 1992 and 1993 caused extensive
soil erosion and property damage in the area. Erosion on the mudstone hill soils, which dominate in the
district, is cumulative in nature, hence the area affected expands with each successive heavy rainfall event
unless corrective strategies, such as conservation planting (King, 1970) are adopted.
Ouestionnaire design
A survey of all the farms (ca. 60) and other landowners in the Tinui district was designed to gauge the
commitment of individual farmers to, and knowledge of, farm forestry. The questionnaire sought data on:
farm physical characteristics and productivity; land use, the methods used for establishing and financing
forestry, farmers' views on forestry and the relative profitability of products off hill country in 25 years
time, alii tudes toward risk and future intentions with respect to tree planting. Detailed infonnation
concerning the existing areas established in trees, silvicultural practices and opinions concerning the
effect of various factors on the profitability forestry was obtained. The questionnaire was pre-tested with
three farmers in the district, and as a result of their input, minor changes were made to some questions.
The pre-test data were included in the final sample due to the minor nature of the changes. Of the 100
questionnaires mailed, 40 were returned with a full data set suitable for analysis. All except one
respondent (40 ha property, no farming income), were primarily involved in farming. A further 8
questionnaires were returned, but not completed, by addressees not directly involved in pastoral fanning.
Data were subjected to descriptive statistics to derive the mean (or median for non-parametric data),
minimum and maximum values, and the standard deviation using the SAS software (Version 6.11,
SAS Institute Inc.).
RESULTS
Farm description and farmer objectives
The average property was 658 ha or 542 effective hectares. This supported 9.5 sulha at a sheep:callie
ratio of 2.38 ssu:csu (Table I). Flock size ranged from 0 to I 1,969 ewes (2,813 ± 2,084; mean ±
standard deviation) and beef callie herds from 0 to 1571 head (304 ± 304). Thus, not all farms had all
stock classes: 3 had no ewes, 4 had no ewe hoggets, 3 had no other sheep and I had no callie.
Table I: Farm size, erosion, and livestock wintered in the Tinui District.
Parameter Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Farm area (ha)
Total 658 496 40 3055
Effective 542 397 38 2438
Erosion
TOlal ha. 67 107 0 400
% total area 10.1 0 62
Severe (%) 20.8 26.4 0 90
Moderate (%) 35.6 27.3 0 100
Minor(%) 35.9 28.5 0 100
Livestock wintered (I July)
Breeding ewes 2813 2084 0 11969
Ewe hoggets 870 738 0 4180
Other sheep 254 562 0 3607
Callie 304 304 0 1571
Total SUi 5145
Sheep:callie ratio (ssu:csu) 2.38
Stocking rate (suleffective hal 9.49
I Winter livestock numbers x class stock unit (su) conversion factor: ewes = 1.0,
ewe hoggets = 0.7, other sheep = 0.8 and cattle = 5.0.
Table 2: Value placed on different objectives for managing the farm (percentage of responses in each
category). The factors are listed from the most to the least important in terms of their
median score.
About one tenth of the overall farm area was affected by erosion (Table I). This ranged from 0.0% to
6\.9% of the area per farm. The proportion of the farm affected by erosion was positively associated
with the area in trees (r = 0.43, P<0.05). On average, 20.8% of the erosion was severe, with the
amount of moderate and minor erosion being similar (35.6% and 35.9%, respectively). Thirty-two of
the 43 farmers (74.4%) had a farm plan with the Wellington Regional Council.
Table 2 shows the value farmers placed on different objectives for managing the farm. While, all were
considered to be of high to medium importance, increasing the farm's value and achieving long-term
family ownership were rated less important (see Table 9 also). As expected, the 71 % who planned to
leave the farm to family members (Table 15) considered long-term family ownership to be of medium
to high importance. The average age of the farmers was 44.7 ± 9.0 years.
Value
Objective No. None Low Medium High
As a business 43 0.0 0.0 18.6 8 \.4
Median'
High(7n)
Age of tree plantings
The estimated mean age of the 67 woodlots on the farms was 15 years (I to 40 year range). Other
types of plantings, except shelterbelts (ca. 29 years), were of a similar or slightly younger age. The
planting ofagroforestry was relatively recent with the average age of plantings per farm being 3.7
years. The average woodlot age per farm was 14.1 years. Twenty three of the 29 farms with woodlots
(79.3%), had plantings ten years old or older.
Labour
Most labour was provided by the farmer (62.4%) (Table 4). Hired staff (19.5%), spouse (9.5%) and
children (7.0%) were other sources of labour. As farm size increased the amount of labour provided
by hired staff (r = 0.42, P<0.05) and other (e.g. contractors) (r = 0.46, P<0.05) increased. Labour
used to manage and establish trees was predominantly provided by contractors (50.4%) and family
labour (29.2%) (Table 4). The larger the farm size, the greater the likelihood labour for forestry would
be provided by contractors (r = 0.33, P<0.05).
Table 4: Labour available on-farm, labour problems associated with tree planting and labour used to
establish and manage trees.
Property development
As a way of life

























































Tree planting and its financing
The majority (95%) of farmers had planted trees for either timber production or soil conservation
(Table 5). Most used farm cash flow to finance silviculture (92%), with 79% using this as the only
means of financing. Only 13% had used joint venture capital and 8% had borrowed money.
Catchment Board subsidies, used by 62% of farmers, and tax deductions (31 % of farmers), were the
main means of financial assistance for establishing farm forestry.
The main labour problems associated with the planting and management of trees were the availability
of on·farm labour (23.8% of farmers) and the inconvenience of extra labour (28.6% of farmers) (Table
4). About one fifth of the farmers therefore had difficulty in finding time for tree planting or appeared
to prefer to do this work themselves rather than go through the "hassles" of hiring labour for this task.
Lack of skilled labour was also considered to be a problem by 14.3% of farmers. However, the




I Median score is for a 1-7 scale where: I = None; 2-3 = Low; 4-5 = Medium and 6-7 = High.
Area planted in trees
Trees were grown on 41 farms: an average of 2.05 forestry enterprises (e.g. woodlot and conservation)
were grown per farm. Trees were used for woodlots, shelterbelts, agroforestry, conservation and
amenity/other purposes. There was considerable variation in the area planted for various purposes
within and between farms (Table 3). For example, the area in woodlots ranged from 1 to 150 hectares.
Table 3: Area of tree plantings per farm in the Tinui district.
Type of planting Area (ha)
No. farms Mean sd min max No. lots' Total area
Woodlot 29 31.3 35.9 I 150 68 909
Shelterbelt 9 5.2 5.2 I 15 9 47
Agroforestry 10 29.6 17.7 3 65 14 296
Conservation 24 28.0 43.0 2 200 36 671
Amenity/other II 12.1 17.4 I 55 13 133
TOTAL 41 50.2 55.2 I 243 140 2056
I A lot is a planting ofa particular species at~articular time.
The estimated proportion of the farm planted in trees ranged from 0.85% to 57.2% (mean = 8.8%, sd =
10.8%). An average 7.3% of the total area was planted in trees. Of the farms with tree plantings, 71%
had woodlots and 59% had conservation plantings. Fewer farms (24%) had agroforestry or amenity
plantings. Only nine farms (22%) had plantings specifically for shelter, although shelter was a
secondary reason for some of the other plantings. Woodlot and agroforestry plantings were
predominantly Radiata Pine: 95.7% and 94.9%, respectively. The remaining timber plantings were
.mostly Macrocarpa and Douglas Fir. Pinus species covered 68% of the planted area. Radiata Pine
was used for 55%,36% and 4% of the shelter, conservation and amenity plantings, respectively.
Labour used for establishing and
managing trees (n=39)




Labour problems associated with tree
planting (%; n=42)
Availability of on-farm labour
Availability of off-farm labour
Quality of available labour
Inconvenience of extra labour






















In general, the respondents expected the returns from pastoral farming to be similar or slightly higher
in 25 years time relative to those received in 1993 (Table 7). Returns from pruned sawlogs were
expected to be greater than those in 1993 and prices for unpruned sawlogs to be similar (or slightly
higher) relative to current prices. Most farmers (75%) required forestry returns to be higher than
pastoral returns in order to invest in forestry.
All farmers (n=43) answered the question concerning their knowledge of market prices (November
1993) for lamb, wool, beef, deer and logs (Table 8). Most farmers thought they knew the prices for
lamb, wool and beef: 90.7%, 95.3% and 93.0%, respectively. However, knowledge of deer and
sawlog prices was less certain with only 25.6%, 39.5% and 39.5% of the farmers providing an estimate
for the price of deer, pruned sawlogs and unpruned sawlogs, respectively. Most knew the price within
±20% for lamb (81.4%), wool (88.4%) and beef (74.4%) (Table 8). In contrast, very few knew the
Wool (Romney fleece, greasy) 42 2.4 47.6 50.0 SIU(5.5n)
Beef (30 month steer, 250 kg cc) 42 0.0 64.3 35.7 S(5n)
Deer (3 year hind) 40 7.5 70.0 22.5 S(4n)
Sawlog, pruned (m' at mill door) 41 2.4 36.6 61.0 U(6n)
Sawlog, unpruned (m' at mill door) 41 4.9 63.4 31.7 S (5n)
I Median score is for a 1-7 scale where: 1-2 = Down; 3-5 = Same and 6-7 = Up.
Table 6: Importance placed on reasons for planting trees (percentage of responses in each category).
The factors are listed from the most to the least important in terms of their median score.
Importance
Factor No. Low Medium High Median'
Erosion control 43 2.3 21.0 76.7 High (6fT)
Best use of "marginal" farmland 43 2.3 30.2 67.4 High (6fT)
Source of retirement income 43 4.7 30.2 65.1 High (6fT)
Timber crop profits 43 7.0 28.0 65.1 High (6n)
Best land use 43 9.3 23.3 67.4 High(6n)
House shelter 43 7.0 30.2 62.8 High(6n)
Future income for children 42 7.1 40.5 52.4 High(6n)
Stock shelter 43 4.7 58.2 37.2 Med(5n)
Increase farm value 43 9.3 58.1 32.6 Med(5n)
Landscape appearance 43 9.3 60.5 30.2 Med(4n)
Firewood, timLer, posts 43 34.9 51.2 14.0 Med(4n)
I Median score is for a 1-7 scale where: 1-2 = Low; 3-5 = Medium and 6-7 = High.










Expectations of prices in 2018 (plus 25 years) for agricultural products relative to those
received in 1993 (percentage ofresponses in each category).
Lamb (15 kg cc and PM grade)
Product
Table 7:
The farmers' rating of the importance of various reasons for planting trees is shown in Table 6. All
reasons had a medium to high rating. Erosion control and the best use of marginal land were the most
important reasons for tree planting and these factors were ranked to be of medium to high importance
by almost all farmers. Factors related to financial reasons (source of retirement income, timber crop
profits) were ranked next with 65% considering these to be of high importance. About half (48%) of
the respondents included forestry in their retirement plans.
Factors encouraging tree planting
'<5iiler assistance (n=4) included a government loan grant scheme, government subsidies, the sale of
old trees and other money.
All except four of the farmers had a mortgage (Table 5). On average, 92.9% of the annual income was
provided by farming (one farmer received 0% of income from farming, 39.5% received between 66%
and 100%, and 59.5% received 100% of income from farming). Indebtedness constrained investment
in forestry for 38.1% of farmers. This was less than for off-farm investment (52.4%) and improved
lifestyle (45.2%), but greater than for farming (28.6%) and education (21.4%) (Table 5). The initial
negative effect of tree planting on cash flow was the greatest constraint to the planting and
management of trees, and affected 48% of the farmers. The need to borrow, or the amount that needed
to be borrowed, was less of a constraint (38% of farmers). One third of farmers identified all three
factors as a constraint to the planting and management of trees. Of those who indicated the level of
debt was a constraint to investing in forestry, almost two thirds also said either the need to borrow
money or the amount needed limited the planting and management of trees.
Table 5: Tree planting and its financing.
Parameter Number Percentage
Trees planted for production or soil conservation (% yes) 43 95.3
Method used for financing tree planting or silviculture
Farm cash flow (% yes) 38 92.1
Farm cash flow only (% yes) 38 78.9
Borrowing (% yes) 38 7.9
Join! venture (% yes) 38 13.2
Assistance for financing tree planting and silviculture
Equity partnership (% yes) 35 8.6
Catchment Board subsidy (% yes) 37 62.2
Tax deduction (% yes) 36 30.6
Other' (% yes) 37 10.8
Farm mortgage (% yes) 42 90.5
Proportion of annual income earned from farm 42 92.9
(sd = 17.0, max = 100, min = 0)
Level of debt a constraint for investing in:
Forestry (% yes) 42 38.1
Livestock farming (% yes) 42 28.6
Family's education (% yes) 42 21.4
Off-farm investments (% yes) 42 52.4
Improved lifestyle (% yes) 42 45·.2
Financial considerations a constraint to the planting and
I\) management of trees in terms of:
0 Need to borrow money (% yes) 42 38.1
~ Amount needed to borrow (% yes) 42 38.1
Initial negative effect on cash flow (% yes) 42 47.6
Table 10: Ranking of preferred investment of $10,000 per annum over 5 years.
Investment option Number of Median rank' First priority
responses (% responses)
Farmers were asked to rank how they would spend $10,000 per annum if this was made available to
them. Fertiliser and debt repayment were ranked highest overall for an investment of $10,000 per
annum over 5 years (Table 10), with 63% ranking fertiliser as a first or second choice and 51%
ranking debt repayment as a first or second choice. The three highest ranked choices all related to the
farming enterprise, with 55% specifying establishment of forestry as fourth or fifth choice. Education
of children was of high priority for some farmers, but of little importance to others (39%), which is
likely to reflect their family circumstances. OtT-farm investments and superannuation were low
priority investments.
price for deer and logs: 14.0%,9.3% and 9.3% for deer, pruned logs and unpruned logs, respectively.
The range of prices given also demonstrates this level of uncertainty: $150 to $1000 for deer, $80 to
$300 for pruned logs and $20 to $120 for unpruned logs.
Table 8: Farmers' knowledge of market prices (November 1993) for agricultural products relative to
actual prices (percentage of farmers).
Actual Mean Accuracy of estimate
Product No. ($) ($) + 10% 11-20% >20%
Lamb 05 kg carcass, PM grade) 39 43.90 41.70 74.4 15.4 10.3
Wool (Romney fleece, 1.0 kg greasy) 41 3.00 2.81 78.0 14.6 7.3
Beef (30 month steer, 250 kg carcass) 40 677 727 45.0 35.0 20.0
Deer (3 year hind) II 220 335 9.1 45.5 45.5
Pruned sawlog (m', pine, @ mill door) 17 260 163 11.8 11.8 76.5
Unpruned sawlog (m', pine, @ mill door) 17 80 77 11.8 11.8 76.6
Fertiliser
Paying off debt












, Median rank is for a 1-7 ranking.where: I = Mo~!important and.? = Least important.
Nevertheless, 75% of the farmers were planning to establish further areas in trees as summarised in
Table II. If all plans were fulfilled a total of 10.8% of the farmed area would be in trees by 1998.
Sources of risk that could potentially affect the viability of farm forestry were generally considered by
the farmers to be of average to low importance (Table 12). The three most important risk factors were:
a change in export log prices, local body laws and regulations, and extremes in climate. Labour
problems and changes in partnership goals or marital status were not considered to be important
overall, but were highly rated by some of the respondents. In general, the risk of the farm business
failing at current debt levels or with 30% lower forestry returns was, in the opinion of the farmers,
small (Table 12).
Farmers rated the three most important factors in determining net income from trees as: silviculture
management, stem quality and pruned height (Table 9). In fact, the five most important factors were
all affected by silviculture management in some way. Surprisingly, only 61% and 56% of the farmers
indicated that they followed recommendations for thinning and pruning, respectively. The next most
important factors determining profitability related to costs for roading, transport to the mill and
harvesting. These were followed by slope of land, which affects harvesting costs. Plantation size, soil
type and loss of pasture were considered less important in determining forestry returns.
I\) Table 9: Farmer assessment of the importance of various factors in determining the net income from
0 trees (percentage of responses in each category). The factors are listed from the most to the
1\). least important in terms of their median score.
Importance
Factor influencing income No. Low Medium High Median'
Silviculture management 43 0.0 9.3 90.7 High (In)
Quality of stems 43 0.0 9.3 90.7 High on)
Pruned height 43 0.0 9.3 90.7 High On)
Stump size 43 0.0 46.5 53.5 High(m)
Stems per hectare 43 0.0 48.9 51.1 High(m)
Cost of roading 43 2.3 46.6 51.2 High (m)
Cost of transport to mill 43 0.0 58.1 41.9 Med(3n)
Cost of harvesting 43 7.0 55.8 37.2 Med(3n)
Slope ofland 43 4.7 65.1 30.2 Med(3n)
Plantation size 43 7.0 60.5 32.6 Med(4n)
Soil type 43 4.7 76.7 18.6 Med(4n)
Loss of pasture 42 33.3 59.5 7.1 Med(5n)
I Median score is for a 1-7 scale where: 1-2 = High; 3-5 = Medium and 6-7 = Low.
Table II: Projection of area planted in tret:s,by 1998.
Parameter No. farms
Total farm area 43








Total plantings to 1998 42
---
Sources of risk










Table 12: Rating of sources of risk that could potentially affect the viability of farm forestry
(percentage of responses in each category). The risk factors are listed from the most to the
least important in terms of their median score.
Source of risk Not Average Very Median
Important Important
No. I 2 3 4 5
Change in export log prices 42 4.8 16.7 35.7 28.6 14.3
Change in local body laws 42 4.8 31.0 26.2 21.4 16.7
and/or regulations
Extremes in climate (rain, 42 14.3 19.0 28.6 19.0 19.0
wind. temperature)
Change in world economic 42 2.4 28.6 38.1 21.4 9.5
and/or political situation
Change in NZ economic 42 7.1 26.2 33.3 26.2 7.1
situation
Change in input costs 42 9.5 28.6 33.3 23.8 4.8
Change in interest rates 42 23.8 19.0 21.4 31.0 4.8
Disasters (fire. floods. 42 23.8 16.7 26.2 28.6 4.8
earthquakes)
Plant diseases and pests 42 19.0 28.6 33.3 14.3 4.8 3
Hired labour/contractor 42 21.4 38.1 28.6 9.5 2.4 2
problems
Change in partnership goals. 42 31.0 45.2 11.9 2.4 9.5 2
marital status
I\) Assessment of risk of farm None Minimal Some Medium Large Median0
W business failing: No. I 2 3 4 5
At current debt level 43 18.6 32.6 30.2 16.3 2.3 2
30% lower forestry returns 43 53.5 30.2 14.0 2.3 0.0
Knowled2e and information sources
The respondents' assessment of the usefulness of alternative information sources concerning tree
planting and management is shown in Table 13. Forestry consultants were considered to be very
helpful. followed by other forestry-related sources (e.g. forestry magazines) and Regional Councils.
Farming magazines. neighbours and friends, and farm consultants were considered to be less helpful,
but not 'useless'.
Virtually all of the farmers (91 %) considered their knowledge of tree management did not limit them
going into farm forestry. Half of the farmers believed adequate information was available on the
productive performance of alternative timber species such as eucalypts and poplars in a farm forestry
situation; 15 farmers (37.5%) believed there was inadequate information and 5 farmers (12.5%) were
unsure whether there was adequate information. Some 42% required easier access to farm forestry
information and 38.5% expressed a desire for better quality farm forestry information. Where required
information was specified this related to: the number of stems per hectare; pruning; options for logs off
hill country; and species other than pine e.g. eucalypts. walnut. accacia. Comments made with respect
to forestry information included "there is a wide opinion on forestry in remote sites" and "that more
specific. rather than general information was required". Only 28% required cheaper access to farm
forestry information. and one farmer commented that he would "rather pay for good constructive
infonnation".
Table 13: Usefulness of alternative information sources concerning the planting and management of
trees (percentage of responses in each category). The factors are listed from the most to the
least important in terms of their median score.
Information source No. Useless Useful Very useful MediallT
Forestry consultants 43 7.0 32.6 60.5 V.useful (217)
Foreslry magazines 43 9.3 44.2 46.5 Useful (3n)
Farm Forestry Association 43 11.6 48.8 39.5 Useful (3n)
Regional Councils 43 13.9 48.8 37.2 Useful (3n)
Forest Owners' Association 41 12.2 65.9 22.0 Useful (3n)
Farming magazines 43 9.3 60.5 30.2 Useful (4n)
Neighbours and friends 43 13.9 72.1 14.0 Useful (4n)
Farm consultants 42 19.0 73.8 7.1 Useful (4n)
T Median score is for a 1-7 scale where: 1-2 =Very useful; 3-5 =Useful and 6-7 =Useless.
DISCUSSION
The survey defined the extent and nature of farm forestry in a lower North Island hill country farming
district and a baseline of current practice. A comparison of the average farm area (658 hal from the
Tinui study with that of other Wairarapa hill country farm surveys suggests the sample was
representative of this sector in general (e.g. 602 ha for north east Wairarapa hill country. Parker. 1984;
748 ha. Baker et al.• 1993; 762 ha, Parker et al., 1993; 621 ha for summer dry hill country, Gavigan.
1994). The average stocking rate of 9.49 sulha compares favourably with that reported by Gavigan
(1994) of9.6 sulha in 1992193 (9.7 sulha for summer dry farms), and the Wairarapa Farm
Improvement Club (9.4 sulha. Baker et al., 1993). The sheep:cattle ratio of 2.38: 1.00 was similar to
that reported by Gavigan (1994: 2.45:1.00) for summer dry country in 1992193.
Tree plantings on virtually all of the farms (41143) reflects the strong historical emphasis on
conservation planting and private woodlots in the Wairarapa (King. 1982). Shelterbelts in particular
were well established (average age 28 years) but mature (30 - 40 years) stands of woodlots were also
present on 12% of the farms. While Pinus Radiata was easily the dominant species in terms of the area
established, other species. notably Eucalyptus and Macrocarpa. had been established. Alternative
timber species have been trialled at the Ngarnu State Forest for several decades and this is likely to
have raised farmer awareness of, and interest in, macrocarpa and eucalyptus. The strong overall
preference for Pinus Radiata was reflected in the farmers' belief that this was the most profitable
species to plant. Further tree planting was planned by all respondents. and if all of this is completed,
an average of 10% of the farm area in the Tinui district will be established in trees by late 1998. Farm
timber production from the district around 2020 to 2025 will be significant.
However, further tree planting was not a priority for discretionary expenditure by the farmers. Instead,
they would. in general, prefer to use 'surplus' funds for purchasing fertiliser and paying off debt. Only
5% of farmers nominated investment in forestry as their first choice for additional spending. This may
reflect the relative importance of forestry to farm revenue. but also the fact that fertiliser and debt
reduction are likely to give more immediate and tangible benefits to the farm business. Specific details
on the farm income and expenditure were not obtained through the survey, but the Wairarapa Farm
Improvement Club (1993194) summary of financial performance for hill country properties shows only
about 3% of revenue was from non-livestock sources (Baker, 1995). This factor, combined with the




Almost half (47%) of the farmers had incorporated forestry in their retirement plans. Forestry has
been promoted as a "superannuation" fund by investment companies in recent years, and this was
reflected by two thirds of the farmers rating forestry as a "highly" important source of funds for
superannuation (indicating that some farmers had yet to formulate their financial plans for retirement).
Although farm forestry is not without risk, farmers generally rated the sources of risk as being average
to low. Farmers did not strongly discriminate the various sources of risk (all except two of eleven
factors listed had a medium ranking 00 = average). Martin (1994) studied aspects ofrisk in New
Zealand agriculture and found that market risks (changes in product prices and input costs, changes in
the World economic and political situation, changes in New Zealand's economic situation), rainfall
variability and accidents or health problems were the greatest concerns of sheep and beef cattle
farmers. In general, the farmers from the Tinui district were confident about the future of their farm
business and a 30% decline in forestry returns would have little impact on viability. This also reflects
the fact that forestry is a relatively minor business activity (in terms of both expenditure and revenue)
on most farms.
Farmers seemed to be well aware of the primary factors that influence net income from farm forestry.
The failure in some cases (39-44%) to apply correct silviculture management, probably reflects a
financial or labour constraint to completing the required work and/or a judgement that the net gain in
income from this work would not be worthwhile. Information on the economic impact of the siting of
new plantings with respect to slope, soil type and proximity to roading was not obtained and farmers
may have underestimated the influence of these variables on costs at harvest (MacLaren, 1993). Loss
of pasture was not generally rated highly as a negative effect on the net income from trees, which is
consistent with the research reported on agroforestry by Knowles et al. (1992) and King (1970). Tree
spacing and thinning has an important influence on pasture production under agroforestry (Percival
and Knowles, 1988), whereas virtually all access to pasture for grazing is lost from years I to 3 and
from 13 to harvest under a woodlot situation. The effect of this loss of pasture on net income is a
function of the sward's productivity (generally poorer areas of pasture on farms are planted in trees)
and the price of livestock products relative to those received for logs of various grades (Knowles et al.,
1992).
The survey suggests farmers were well aware of the technology and management practices for farm
forestry. A lack of knowledge of the profit potential of farm forestry was not explicitly shown to be
restricting further investment in trees. Rather, labour and ability to fund more expansive tree planting
from cash flow were more legitimate constraints to farm forestry growth.
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Technical Requirements of Agriculture, Science and Policy
by R.W.M.Johnson l
Summary: The policy framework for agriculture is largely determined by the technical
nature of agricultural production. But there still appears to be a gap between perfect
practice and political decision making. Is this a problem with the underlying science or
the acceptance of such science? Similiar problems underlie the concept ofacceptable
risk in the international trade area. This paper suggests a unilYing risk management
framework for assessing agricultural policy.
Key words: Agriculture, risk management, science, public policy, international trade.
Introduction
Recent experience with ReD indicates that there is a gap between perfect practice and
political decision making. Perfect practice is based on scientific norms and not public
perception. Introduction ofexotic pests and diseases is characterised by problems of
risk assessment, risk management and risk perception. As Box I (over) demonstrates,
such problems are not confined to agricultural examples but seem to be a universal
condition of human existence.
This paper examines the role of science in risk management, economic models of risk
trade-offs and risk management. the role ofgovernment agencies, risk analysis, and
standardisation of risk management. As Box I shows, the phenomenon suggests a
generic problem of risk so that one would expect a generic response to the problem.
Such a response is the manual Risk Management, published by the Australia and New
Zealand Standards Association. What role can it play?
Generic Nature of Risk
The case studies in Box I all exhibit the common features ofassessment of risk and the
containment of damage. They show that there is a difference in decision making
between those who carry out the assessment and those who carry the responsibility for
the decision. They demonstrate that the public have a derisory view of
politicaVadministrative decision making in some of these areas. The public have a view
that absolute protection from threats is preferred. Politicians have a view based on
reducing embarrassment to them. Excessive capital costs can arise when planners are
guided by these perceptions. Who is right?
Assessing risk is a technical matter for engineers and scientists and can usually be
reduced to a formula type basis like' a 100 year flood' or 'so many parts per million is
safe' [in New Zealand based on overseas evidence often]. Yet dams burst, electricity
supply is broken, and an ineffective virus (with unmeasured side-effects) is spread
willy:nilly. What can we say about this? What generalisations are possible?
I Private consultant. The views expressed arc lhose of the author. Comments rrom Janet Gough and
Bruce Burdon have been incorporated.
BOll I: Casestudies
Apples: the import ofapptes into AustmIla depeDds on the ~lative pen:eptions ofNew Zealand and
Austrnlian scientists on the risk of fire blight spreading from New ZeaIand to AustraIia and the
political cboices sunounding the decision.
Sheep semen: the import ofmodified sheep semen (forimp~tingNew Zealand bred ewes to
produce offspring with desirable pharmaceutical properties) is restricted bec:ause political and cultunl1
factolS are against it while scientists agree that the risks invotved can be contained.
RCD: the import of the RCD virus is banned bec:ause scientists do not believe the stnIin is~ and
containment, once introduced, is not practical. Fanners import the virus anyway. It is illegal.
Politicians condone the importation and fOlbid prosecution of the offenders.
SPS: the new sanitary and phytosanitary agreement with the wro AgricuItunI1 Agreement is based
on the principles ofscientific evidence and proof. Yet the agreement has a clause defining aetqllable
risk as that which is acceptabte to the importing country. New Zealand ~tens to take the
disagreement on apples to the wro on these grounds.
Hazardous substances: new legislation provides for a risk agency [ERMA) to manage the importation
of new substances and new organisms including modified organisms, The legislation is vague as to
the role of science and acceptable risk. Departments cannot agree on what the role of the new agency
is.
Electricity generation: under state control. the MOW used to overbuild dams and power bouses 110 that
politicians would not be embarrassed in years of low water flows. What is the level ofaetqllable risk?
Electricity delivery: Mercury Energy does not replace aging supply cables to the central AucIdand
business district; the cables break down successively during a heat wave and no back-up mechanism
appears to be in place. What was the level ofacceptable risk on the life of the cables and on back-up
procedures?
Dam building: a small catebment is dammed in the South Island for electricity generation and
irrigation water. The unfinished dam bursts in a summer flood and ruins the structure and causes
damage downstream. W= the chances ofsummer flooding assessed? W= back-up procedures
(temporary spillways) in place? Was a risk assessment carried out? By whom?
Airport runways: The length ofWellington's airport runways has been questioned from a safety point
ofview (North and South, May 1993). Should the runways be extended OYer the sea at both ends?
What are the risk management implications?
Cave Creek: in this case building structures w= faulty and the Building Code not followed. What are
the risk management implications?
Rural roads: Concern has been expressed that rural roads will decline under a proposed user pays
policy. Engineering standards will be compromised (Ibe Herald, Feb 4, 1998). The Institution of
Professional EngineelS replied to the Herald: 'The traditional role ofengineers has been to assess the
consequences ofparticular courses ofaction..... Engineering will provide the standards appropriate
for public health, safuty and wealth-generation.....It is vital that in forming policy for roading,
professional engineering advice is sought'.
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The role or science
At one level, the role of science is to give unifonn, and objective advice based on
research into the issues ofthe day. Scientists have a technocratic role in giving advice
in that they are not responsible for the consequences. Scientists tend to be logical
positivists with an ultimate belief in the ethics of the research method with its
underpinnings in hypothesis testing and statistics. At another level, scientists are in
involved in the socio-political process, and tend to ignore their foundations in logical
positivism (Salter 1988, p 168).
In the international arena, the harmonisation oftechnical standards for agricultural
trade in the WTO is based on the technical expertise of three international scientific
organisations in the case ofdisputes ( The Codex Alimentarius Commission, 7he
International Office ofF:pizootics, and the International Plant Protection
Commission). The proposal was that in the case ofdispute, scientific consensus could
provide guidance toward indicating which regulations are based truly on
environmental, health or safety grounds and which are motivated by protectionism that
is not sanctioned under the WTO.
However, Hillman (1994) notes that the Codex Commission voted in 1991 not to
establish maximum residue levels for four growth-promotant hormones that are widely
used in livestock production. This was contrary to the advice ofthe Commission's
own scientific advisory committee, as well as its Committee on Residues of Veterinary
Drugs in Foods. The decision was reversed in 1995, by a narrow majority, and after a
lengthy debate on whether to base a decision on currently available scientific evidence
or to take into account factors other than health concerns (Codex 1995).
In the climate change arena there are similar conflicts. The World Meteorological
Office (WMO) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) set up the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988 (IPCC). In 1995, the IPCC
reported that' the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human
influence on global climate' with a lot of provisos. A report approved by the world's
governments at the IPCC meeting in Madrid in 1995 and published in July 1996
included alarmist post-plenary changes in the emphasis on the impacts ofclimate
change without any of the qualifications (1he Independent 18 Feb 1998).
Hillman refers to the public's heightened perceptions as to the risks ofcontamination of
food products. Laboratory instrumentation of food and other materials has become
more sophisticated, technicians can detect smaller and smaller amounts of residue of
harmful substances, and product approval is held up for longer periods. These
processes raise fears among consumers, whether justified or not, and more and more
restrictions are imposed. The ultimate restriction in the US was a total ban on any
products containing carcinogenic substances (the Delany clause). These have since
been amended for pesticides but not for food additives (S.Rajasekar, pers com).
The BSE debate in the UK is an example of mixed messages about the management of
risk. In 1990 scientists believed that controls aimed at preventing high-risk cattle
material entering the public food chain were firmly in place. The chairman of the
scientific advisory committee stated .the view was that the present risk, which could
not be said to be zero, was not greater than the risks of everyday life, and thus beef
could be said to be safe'. In 1995, the committee noted 'that previous reports had
given them a' falsely reassuring picture". Tighter controls were then introduced (Daily
Telegraph, March 24, 1998). At the same enquiry, another witness declared 'there was
no scientific proof that scrapie has crossed the species barrier into cattle or that BSE
may be a cattle disease in its own right which had lain undetected for many years'. 2
The role or risk
Risk is about the probabilities ofsome event (or combination ofevents) happening.
Strictly speaking we are talking about risk and not uncertainty as economists define the
terms. Risk management is about ameliorating threatened risk to acceptable levels (as
in the case ofdisease control). Risk assessment is about establishing the probabilities of
the likely event or events.
The GATT secretariat set out some useful observations on risk assessment in 1991
during the Uruguay Round discussions on agriculture (GATT 1992). They recognised
three principal steps in risk management that might give rise to restrictions on trade,
inadvertent or otherwise. First, risk assessment involves an evaluation ofthe likelihood
ofa pest or disease becoming established or its potential consequences, or, in the case
of additives, contaminants and toxins, the potential adverse effects on human or animal
health. Second, risk assessment involves determining the acceptable level of risk. That
is, meeting societal preferences through 'neglible risk' levels for food quality, or
through acceptable' tolerance' levels for contaminants. Third, risk assessment involves
the selection and application ofhealth and sanitary risk management measures by
governments. The first is a question ofscientific assessment or evaluation; the second
is a question ofchoice; and the third is a matter ofdesign. Evaluation is a matter for
science and statistics; choice is a matter ofpolitical/consumer preferences; while design
is what policy advisors and legal experts do.
In the SPS Agreement itself, risk assessment is defined as 'the evaluation ofthe
likelihood ofentry, establishment or spread ofa pest or disease within the territory on
an importing Member according to the SPS measures which might be applied, and of
the associated potential biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of
the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of
additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages, or
feedstuffs' (GATT 1994).
PoliticaVconsumer preferences are related to risk perception rather than risk
2 In New Zealand, there is currently a debate about exports of logs to the US. A US Court in
California is investigating whether US Agriculture's current biosecurity controls on foreign wood
imports are adequate. The case has been put forwanl by US environmental interests with the cwbs 00
the usc of indigenous timber in mind. NZ Forest and Bini has joined the fray. As the NZ Forest
Industries Council puts it: 'It's not 7.cro risk, but its low risk. If you're talking zero risk, you will need




# the pathogen in the flesh must survive storage and processing and be present
in an infectious dose;
# the pathogen must be able to establish infection either by being swallowed
or by being absorbed through the skin ofthe host fish in NZ, or an
infectious dose must find its way into contact with a susceptible fish
host by some other means.
Taking these factors into consideration, a non-quantitative risk analysis led to the
conclusion that ofthe 23 diseases present in N. American salmonids, furunculosis,
caused by the bacterium Aeromonas salmonicida, was the disease which would be
most likely to be carried in the type ofcommodity under consideration. Quantitative
risk analysis then established the prevalence, distribution, survival, and processing
susceptibility on A, salmonicida in relation to introduction to NZ waters. The resulting
model found that there is a 95% probability that there would be fewer than one disease
introduction per ten miJljon tonnes importedl The risks associated with other diseases
would be cumulative so that any risks posed by one of the other diseases must be
added to those posed by furunculosis.
Management regimes can be introduced to lower risks. JapanMAF has accepted New
Zealand apples on the basis of the assurances given by NZMAF that the production
and transport ofNew Zealand products is equal to or better than Japanese standards.
On the other hand, the Australian authorities have not accepted similar assurances that
apples exported to Australia would be free from fire blight.
In the case ofMercury Energy, it was the mistakes made in carrying out the
assessment ofrisk and its consequences that led to the c1ose-down ofthe business
district ofAuckland. This has been confirmed by various experts (see National
Business Review, 27 March 1998, p.24).
Generic risk management
The wide prevalence of risk in everyday life would suggest that there needs to be a
more organised and coordinated response to risk management. There is in fact an
AustraiianlNew Zealand Standard for Risk Management (1995). The Standard has the
objective of providing a generic framework for identification, analysis, evaluation,
treatment and monitoring of risk (preface). It is designed to be independent ofany
specific industry or economic sector, Individual risk management systems will be
influenced by the varying needs oforganisations, their particular objectives, products
and services, and the processes and practices employed.
The risk management process should be applied to any situation where an undesired or
unexpected outcome could be significant or where opportunities are identified.
Decision makers should know about possible outcomes and take steps to control their
impact. Risk management should become part ofan organisation's culture.
The Standard uses the term 'risk analysis' to mean the objective judgement ofa level of
risk, and ' risk evaluation' for the decision making process whereby a level ofrisk is
compared against criteria and risks are prioritised for action.•Risk assessment' is
defined as the overall process ofrisk analysis and risk evaluation.
The Standard appears to derive from engineering and insurance principles and not from
economic principles.6 Cost is defined in the Definitions (S 1.3) but not Benefit. On the
other hand, the authors claim that the Standard may be applied to a very wide range of
organisations and applications in which are included: asset management and resource
planning, business interruption, construction activity, emergency planning,
environmental issues, investments, project management and others. Thus their
procedures are recommended for various situations where economics might also have
a bearing on the outcome.
The main elements ofthe risk management process are based on: establishing the
context; identifYing risks; analysing risks; evaluating and prioritising risks; treating
risks; and monitoring and review (S 3.2, as amended in 1997). Under assessing risk
treatment options, the Standard comes nearest to economic prescriptions. 'Options
should be assessed on the basis ofrisk reduction, and the extent ofbenefits or
opportunities created. Selection ofthe most appropriate option involves balancing the
cost of implementing each option against the benefits derived from it . The cost of
managing risks needs to be commensurate with the benefits obtained. Where large
reductions in risk may be obtained with relatively low expenditure, such options should
be implemented. Further options for improvement may be uneconomic and judgement
needs to be exercised as to whether they are justifiable. Decisions should take account
of the need to carefully consider rare but severe risks, which may warrant risk
reduction measures that are not strictly justifiable on strictly economic grounds'.
The Standard does not refer to international responsibilities and trade, though its
applications do refer to human, animal and plant health. The MAF Regulatory
Authority, for example, does have a risk management plan which particularly
encompasses the impacts of trade on human, animal and plant health. Their plan
identifies four stages in the risk analysis process: risk (hazard) identification, risk
assessment, risk management, and risk communication. The latter stresses
communication with stakeholders as befits a government organisation.
In general, The Standard is confined to risk management planning within organisations.
It would certainly be applicable to the Cave Creek or the Mercury Energy examples if
it had been followed and adopted by senior management ofthose organisations. It only
briefly refers to economic principles and appears to believe it can co-exist without an
economic framework. This appears to have wide implications for processes where a
knowledge ofcost-benefit techniques for decision making is a priority.
Summary
Risk is far more widespread in every day life than is generally understood. The risk
industry seems to be divided into many parts not all ofwhich are coordinated with
each other. There are generic similarities and problems which could be resolved by
6 Janet Gough infonns me that the standard is largely influenced by financial managers tather than
engineers. Because of its generic nature it excludes communication. Sector specific guides arc being
prepared for finance and business continuance. I would add the need for monitoring as in the case of




greater coordination among the respective professionals.
The role ofscience needs to be understood. Both the international agreements on
sanitary and phytosanitary matters and risk management plans cited in The Standard
rely on scientific evidence to establish the nature ofhazards, the degree of risk, risk
containment and resolution. It appears that political resolution of matters with a risk
component is not a very satisfactory course ofaction, though sometimes the
responsibility lies at the very highest level ofdecision making.
There needs to be wider agreement on goals and objectives for risk management, and
coordination ofdifferent approaches to it. There is a role for public education in these
matters so that there is wider appreciation of responsibilities and duties. The Standard
for risk management has to be seen in this light and recognised as a very important
management tool for all organisations. Some recent problems could have been avoided
by stricter application ofthese principles.
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EVALUATING SCIENCE OUTCOMES IN NEW ZEALAND:
A REVIEW
...... it is essential for scientists, however distasteful the task may be, to prove to
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ABSTRACT
Over the last decade interest in evaluating the outcomes of science investment has
increased considerably, both in New Zealand and overseas. This paper starts with a
theoretical framework for outcome evaluation including the justification for science
investment and for government involvement. Two distinct research evaluation styles
are evolving in New Zealand. The agricultural sector has generally favoured a
quantitative approach, while MORST and FRST have been moving towards
qualitative approaches in their quest to increase accountability and to improve the
science priority setting process. The paper concludes with a review of recent
developments overseas and suggests three research priorities for New Zealand in the
field of outcome evaluation.
research resources". Pockley (1998) provides anecdotal evidence both for and against
the reforms, while Simpson and Craig (1997 p. 75) state that "there is mounting
anecdotal evidence to suggest that both the quality and quantity of the science [the
CRIs1 are producing is on the rise". Stewart (1995) is critical of the attempt to
impose formal priority-setting models onto the science funding process. She uses a
system-based analysis to suggest that "New Zealand may have changed its science
priorities in ways which were not intended and politicised some aspects of choice-
making under the guise of objectifying them"(Stewart, 1995 p. 124). Alston et aI
(1998 p. 30) are also concemed over the possible effects of reform in New Zealand
and other developed countries. They highlight two potentially serious adverse
effects; the removal of long-term guarantees of employment may reduce incentives
for competent and gifted individuals to embark on research careers; and the shift in
research resources towards agribusiness and food processing research may have
reduced the rate of retum to public research investments.
Overall, it is too early to give a definitive answer to 'the big question' and in any
case the necessary data collection and analysis has not been undertaken. All of the
authors cited above base their views on theory or anecdotal evidence rather than on
any representative quantitative analysis.
This paper starts by presenting a theoretical framework for outcome evaluation
including the justification for science investment and for government involvement.
This is followed by a review of recent developments in the evaluation of science
outcomes in New Zealand. The paper concludes with a look at recent developments
overseas and suggests three research priorities for New Zealand in the field of
outcome evaluation.
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Over the last decade interest in evaluating the outcomes of science investment has
increased considerably, both in New Zealand and overseas. In the United States, the
1993 Government and Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires all U.S. federal
agencies to set measurable goals and report on whether they are meeting them.
(Cozzens, 1997 p. 87). This has had a major impact on the way in which research
outcomes are evaluated. In Australia Research and Development Corporations and
others use benefit cost analysis as an integral part of the priority-setting process.
(Prinsley, 1992 p. 42). In New Zealand the Ministry of Research Science and
Technology has given priority to development of an economic evaluation programme
"in order to understand the nature and value of the benefits" from its investments
(Ministry of Research Science and Technology, 1996 p. 30).
Interest in outcome evaluation in New Zealand can be traced in part to 'the reforms':
the series of major changes to the organisation of science funding which started in
1991. Upton who was the Minister at the time states that "the science reforms ... were
not a case of applying a theory to a sector. Rather particular outcomes were sought
which the machinery of state sector reform ably aided and abetted" (Upton, 1995 p.
2).
Whatever the original rationale, the big question now is whether the reforms have
done any good. Jacobsen (1991 p. 35) outlined the rationale for reform and suggested
that "the changes in science policy to date have encouraged more efficient use of
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Why Invest in Science?
We invest in science because we believe that this will grow the economy and so
contribute to a better standard of living for all. Neoclassical growth theory tells us
that growth is a function of the quantity of capital and labour and of technological
change (e.g. Solow, 1957). Technological change is "the process by which
economies change over time in respect of the products they produce and the
processes used to produce them" (Stoneman, 1983 p. 3), while technological advance
implies that an increasing level of output has been obtained from the same level of
input.
Research and development (R&D) involves the investment of scarce resources in the
production of knowledge. This is done with the objective of increasing productivity
thus contributing to the achievement of society's economic and social objectives. At
any moment in time, firms and organisations have a pool of knowledge
encompassing all known techniques. Research is seen as the process which changes
the characteristics and content of the set of possible techniques by increasing the pool
of knowledge (Smith, 1991 p, I).
There are two main avenues by which R&D may lead to economic benefits: product
innovation that improves the performance characteristics of products and process
innovation that improves production technology. Both types are closely associated
and both are characterised as cost reducing activities within economic analysis.
Smith summarised these points and pointed out that measurement of returns to R&D
is possible in principle and in practice:
R&D is thus seen as a process of knowledge creation. with the knowledge
applicable as a production technique. either directly or indirectly. Enhanced
knowledge improves the productivity of existing inputs and these productivity
gains - taking the form of cost reductions - are the returns to R&D. Both the
input cost (R&D expenditures) and the returns (cost reductions/productivity
gains) are measurable in principle and practice. and the problem of returns to
R&D then becomes one of investment appraisal or measurement technique
(Smith. 1991 p. 2)
often devote significant resources to policies for research, science, technology and
the encouragement of innovation.
Evaluation of Science Outcomes
Governments invest in science because they believe that there are imperfections in
the market for knowledge. Science investment is intended to encourage innovation
and increase the rate of technological change. A useful starting point in the
evaluation of science outcomes is to consider a framework which allows us to relate
science investment to all the other factors which may affect innovation. Identification
and assessment of all of these factors would be a huge topic encompassing most
branches of economics and management. However the OECD (1997b p. 31) have
devised a concept which they call the innovation policy terrain (see Figure I). They
describe four categories of factors relating to innovation:
the framework conditions of national institutional and structural factors
e.g. economic. financial and educational setting and the rules and range of opportunities for
innovation
the science and engineering base
the accumulated knowledge and the science and technology institutions which underpin
innovation
transfer factors
which strongly influence linkages and flows of information etc which are essential to
innovation
the innovation dynamo
dynamic factors shaping innovation at the level of the firmN
~
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Rationale for Government Involvement
Government expenditure on R&D was originally justified by market failure
arguments such as those given by Nelson.
a competitive market will invest less than the optimum in basic research. This is
because a profit seeking firm cannot be sure of capturing all the benefit of the
basic science that it sponsors. given major uncertainties about the benefits for the
sponsoring firm. and the difficulties it faces in extracting compensation from
subsequent imitators (Nelson. 1959) quoted in (Pavitt. 1991 p.III).
More recently Lundvall (1992 p. 18) argued that knowledge is different in crucial
respects from other resources in that it is characterised by market failure.
"it does not decrease in value when used ... Knowledge is not easily transacted
in markets and not easily privately appropriated ... When it comes to knowledge
market failure is the rule rather than the exception".
Other aspects are stressed by Pavitt (1991 p. 117) who proposed a revised case for
public subsidy of basic research based on
the considerable uncertainties in knowing if, when and where the results of
basic research might be applied;
Figure I: The Innovation Policy Terrain (based on OECD, 1997b)
FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS a
The general conditions and institutions
which set the range of opportunities for innovation
internationalisation such that government provision of basic research
facilities may attract foreign firms; and Mil
TRANSFER FACTORS
Human, social and cultural factors
influencing infonnation transmission
to finns and learning by them
training in research skills which private firms cannot fully benefit from since
researchers once trained can and do move elsewhere.
This search for a revised case for public subsidy has perhaps been stimulated by the
paradox in public policy towards science and technology. This has seen governments
taking an ever greater interest in science policy intervention, in direct contrast to the
general trend towards market oriented policies in other areas of the economy.
Governments have focussed their attention on the transformation of developed
economies into knowledge societies. Information, knowledge and the service sector
are becoming ever more important; and this trend is generally expected to continue.
Governments around the world are searching for ways to address these changes and
$ SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING BASEScience and technology institutions underpinning theinnovation dynamo
In other words, science investment is only one of a large number of factors that affect
the rate of innovation. Even the best managed science investment may have poor
outcomes if other aspects of the innovation policy terrain are in poor shape:
• if there is a shortage of appropriately trained staff;
• if the economic climate discourages innovation; or
• if the network of institutions firms and organisations do not have a system of
linkages which encourages the effective dissemination of results.
A more formal approach to research evaluation is provided by the use of production
functions. Alston et al (1995 p. 24) state that "the increment to useful knowledge
arising from a particular research investment is likely to depend on a number of
factors, including for instance, the existing stock of knowledge and the available
research capital". They specify a research (or knowledge) production function with
the general form:
As they rightly point out "the challenge is to provide operational content to these
elementary principles of investment" [italics added). Ex post evaluation has similar
objectives but is also concerned with issues of accountability. It has the advantage of
dealing with actual (rather than expected values) but has the disadvantage that the
past may not be a good guide for the future. Three of the main strands in the
literature centre around production functions, cost benefit analysis and output
indicators. In the first approach, a production function, generally based on the Cobb-
Douglas form, is used to make econometric estimates of the contribution of R&D to
improved total factor productivity. Most studies have found a positive rate of return -
generally over 20%, but suffer from major measurement and methodological
problems. This is highlighted in a recent paper by Alston, Craig et al. (1997). They
argue that previous studies of the effect of agricultural research on productivity,
imposed arbitrary restrictions on the length and shape of the R&D lag profile. Using
a revised lag specification they found that the returns to research are less than 10% as
compared to almost 50% found in previous studies using the same data set.
Evaluation Ex Ante and Ex Post
• the objectives - against which the research should be evaluated; and
• the alternatives - what would have happened if the research had not been
undertaken?
The term evaluation is used to refer both to estimation of expected outcomes - ex
ante and to estimation of the outcomes of completed or on-going research - ex post.
In either case the evaluator needs to establish:
I, Increments to useful knowledge
R, Investment in research
L,. Maximum research lag that keeps earlier research investment from affecting the current
research induced increment to knowledge
K, Stock of knowledge
Z. Other factors that affect the productivity of a given amount of research resources such as the
commodity, technology or problem focus of the research as well as the institutional and
management environment within which these resources are deployed.
The State of the Art
Cost benefit analysis has the major advantage of being understandable by non-
economists. Unfortunately the benefits of research are often very difficult to measure
and always uncertain, thus opening this approach up to new criticisms. A number of
methods for direct measurement of research output have been developed, partly in
response to problems with production function and cost benefit approaches. Two of
the most significant measures are patent counts and bibliometrics. In the first
method, the number (and sometimes the value) of patents is used as an indicator of
inventive input and output. Bibliometrics is based on the assumption that the
published scientific literature is a good indicator of a scientist's knowledge output.
Both methods have made a useful contribution to the field, but suffer from similar
problems e.g. variations in patent and publication rates across fields and over time;
difficulty in quantifying the value of individual counts; and variation in the strength
of the link between the indicators and the variables being measured.
Overall assessments on 'the state of the art' range from the optimistic to the
despairing. Alston, Norton et al. (1995) are leading practitioners of priority-setting in
agricultural research. They have developed economic methods that they believe cali
be successfully used in the agricultural sector and which may be adapted for use in
other sectors. They suggest that:
processes for planning and evaluating research can be helpful at every stage in
the research system ... structured quantitative methods are most beneficial when
research priorities are being set across broad .. programs and research problems
(Alston, Norton et aI., 1995 p. xxii)
At the other extreme, Roessner reporting on the applicability of quantitative methods
to support decisions about fundamental research found that such methods are used to
only a very limited degree whether in business or in government.
the reasons for minimal use of quantitative methods in basic research ... are
similar in business and government. They are rooted in the features of
fundamental research ... inappropriate application of quantitative methods ...
would ... reduce[d] credibility of both the decision process and its outcome
(Roessner, 1993p, 201-202).
where:I, =i(R" ..... ,R,.u;K"Z,)
In other words increments to useful knowledge depend on investment in research
now and in previous time periods and on the stock of knowledge and other factors.
Using this approach Alston et al suggest a "relationship between investments in
research and output (or productivity) in which current output ... depends upon
current flows of conventional inputs and uncontrolled factors, as well as current and
past investments in agricultural research and extension" (Alston, Norton et aI., 1995
p.26).
Ex ante evaluation is normally undertaken with a view to deciding how much to
invest; and in what areas it should be invested. The economist's initial answer to
these two questions has been clearly stated by Scobie and Jacobsen:
the answer to both questions is conceptually straightforward: invest until the
return is equal to the next best allernative...The allocation of ... investment across
research areas should be such that the expected return to the last dollar spent in







The main features of fundamental research which Roessner refers to are the "high
level of uncertainty about payoff and the extreme difficulty in measuring and
predicting payoff'. As research becomes more applied, uncertainty and measurement
problems tend to fall, but Roessner finds that use of quantitative methods will remain
problematic because of the "more complex, value-laden setting of govemment-
sponsored applied research".
OUTCOME EVALUAnON IN NEW ZEALAND
An early example of research evaluation in New Zealand is provided by Dick,
Toynbee et al. (1967) who investigated innovations in artificial breeding of dairy
cattle, diffusion impregnation of timber, leather research and weed killer
development. They made "conservative estimates for the internal rate of return of the
order of 20%".
The 'classic' study of the benefits of agricultural research in New Zealand was
carried out by Grant Scobie and Wilhelmina Eveleens (1987). They found that
research had contributed significantly to the growth of productivity generating a real
rate of return of 30 percent per year. A finding of particular interest was the length of
the time lags over which research produced benefits; these were found to average 23
years.
Eveleens later investigated R&D and innovation in other sectors of the economy, but
was seriously constrained by lack of data and measurement difficulties. She used a
new measure of innovation based on infonnation obtained from published sources
but found little correlation with existing measures such as R&D expenditure and total
factor productivity (Eveleens, 1995).
A major attempt to describe the New Zealand innovation system was commissioned
by the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MRST) in 1993. The stated
aim was to identify the factors that innuence the interest and ability of enterprises to
innovate (Frater, Stuart et aI., 1995). To this end a questionnaire wa~ mailed to a
sample of 2500 companies in manufacturing or involved in the export of services. It
covered topics such as goals, sources of innovation, human resources and
organisational culture and technology strategy.
The final report presents a large body of factual data including influences on
innovation, characteristics of innovative companies and the importance of research
institutes. Some of the conclusions from the main report are noted below.
• Research institutes (CRIs, and other research organisations) are a low priority
source of innovative infonnation and ideas. This was largely explained by the
very small scale of most manufacturing enterprises in New Zealand.
• The extent of collaborative linkages with small firms is limited both by the
outlook of the research organisations and by the interest and ability of the
finns.
• Without bridging services or institutions, the potential for effective
interaction between most New Zealand manufacturers and exporters and the
CRIs is limited.
The CRI culture appears to be breeding a rather insular "science for its own
sake" culture with an accent placed on research publications, professional
exchanges and conferences.
Only limited progress appears to have been made in developing and testing fonnal
models of the factors innuencing innovation in New Zealand. This may be contrasted
with surveys carried out in the United States (see Levin, Klevorick et aI., 1987;
Mansfield, 1991) where the original survey data has been analysed by many
researchers and has been a source of active discussion in the literature.
Two distinct research evaluation styles are evolving in New Zealand. The
agricultural sector has generally favoured a quantitative approach and has been
assisted in this by developments in the international literature and by data
availability. Meanwhile MORST and FRST have been moving towards a far more
qualitative approach in their quest to increase accountability and to improve the
science priority setting process. The briefing notes for the new Minister (Ministry of
Research Science and Technology, 1996 p. 30) stated that.
"A lack of quantifiable data on the economic benefits for RS&T can frustrate
better management of the Government's investment. An economic evaluation
programme for the public investment in science and technology is now being
actively developed in order to understand the nature and value of the benefits .....
However both MORST and FRST have concluded that quantification of economic
benefits is generally too problematic and are concentrating on qualitative evaluation
methods which include the collection of some quantitative infonnation. MORST
used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in a trial outcome
evaluation of two PGSF output classes (Ministry of Research Science and
Technology, 1997). They are now supervising outcome evaluations of all remaining
PGSF output classes in an exercise which is due to be completed in time for the next
round of the science priority-setting process.
Another recent example of the qualitative approach is provided by the Foundation
For Research Science and Technology (1997) which "used technological innovations
as the entry points...through which the benefits of meat research can be evaluated".
The FRST study on 'the Benefits of Meat Research in New Zealand' was based on
17 innovations that were analysed using primarily qualitative case study
methodologies. The study concluded that New Zealand has benefited substantially
from meat research but that it is not possible to compare the benefits of meat research
with those arising from other PGSF outputs.
The large volume of qualitative data produced by the study certainly increased our
understanding of innovations arising out of research in the meat sector. But the data
was expensive to collect and is of only limited use in helping FRST to answer more
general policy questions e.g. what is the magnitude of benefits from meat sector
research; what is the optimal level of research funding in this area?
FRST is now in the process of developing an outcome evaluation system which
according to the draft proposal "aims to assess the materiality and the broad
magnitude of these outcomes" (Foundation For Research Science and Technology,
1998 p. I). The intention seems to be to identify and a~sess benefits that are judged
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ROYALTY ALLOCATION FOR CAPTURING THE VALUE OF GENETIC
IMPROVEMENT· THE CASE OF THE COMMERCIAL FORESTRY
INDUSTRY
Svetlana Bohorova l , Frank Scrimgeour
SUMMARY
Capturing the value of genetic improvement is a relatively new and important task when considering
the commercial deployment of genetically engineered products. When private interests are at stake,
well defined contracts and excludability criteria for the access to genetic improvement are usually
present. In order to maximise the benefits from the use of the new technology, product-specific
royalty schemes need to be formulated to ensure that the rents from technological advance are
captured by the technology company. The precise design of such schemes will depend on the
characteristics of the specific product, the organisational and marketing strategies of the technology's
owners, and the demand for licensed deployment of the product. In the case of commercial forestry,
genetic improvement of trees is a purpose-specific, mainly private initiative, which incorporates both
trait-specific improvement of trees, as well as inter-temporal issues of tree growth.
Key words: royalty; licensing agreement; genetic engineering; commercial forestry.
INTRODUCTION
A common issue in the literature is that licensing agreements are effective
mechanisms for capturing the value of technological innovation, which is transferred
between interested parties. Within this common framework, however, there are a
number of opinions regarding the factors that detennine efficient technology transfer,
the importance of technology specification, the infonnation failures regarding
contractual agreements, and other competitive issues.
Some authors regard the type of technology as an exogenous factor to the
fonnulation of the appropriate technology transfer mechanisms (Wright, 1993a). The
importance of the type of technology to decisions of technology transfer or diffusion
is only explicitly considered in some of the consulted literature (Wright, 1993b';
Shapiro, 1985; Caves et al., 1983; Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Another dominant
feature is that licensing models focus on the allocation of royalty revenue when the
process of technological innovation is licensed to competing finns, i.e. when the
technology itself is licensed rather then the product of technological innovation. In
this framework, asymmetric infonnation problems and competition issues are
discussed (Wright, 1993b; Shapiro, 1985). A third common factor regarding the
process of licensing is related to the need for technology patenting as a benchmark or
excludability mechanism for technology diffusion (Shapiro, 1985; Wright, 1993b;
Tirole, 1988; Kaufer, 1989; Katz and Shill""'. 1985).
I Graduate student, Department of Economics, Univelsity ofWaikato, Hamilton.
2 Director of Environment and Management Programme, University of Waikato, Hamilton
, Technology type is identified through an R&D expenditure scheme, where the greater the R&D
expenditure the greater the probability of a low-cost technology occurring. Thus, given the probability
of technology type, the technology transfer mechanism is chosen.
The present article argues that the choice of technology type is crucial for
detennining: (i) the type of technological transfer, (ii) the nature of the licensing
agreement, and (iii) the respective optimal royalty scheme. Thus, the type of
technology would be regarded as an endogenous factor in the fonnulation of the
value of the technological improvement. It is also established that there is no need to
disclose and/or transfer knowledge about the process of technological innovation,
when the product of the technological innovation can be licensed. This would reduce
the degree of horizontal competition that the licenser is likely to face if the process
was licensed to competing finns, while increasing competition between licensees,
which could stimulate competitive bidding for licenses.
On the other hand, specifying the technology type and focusing on a specific product,
derived from the stated technology type, would reduce problems related to
asymmetric infonnation between the licenser and the licensee. A royalty scheme for
the specific product could be identified as a signalling mechanism of the cost
minimising (and thus, profit-maximising) characteristics of the technology type.
Thus, both the licenser and the licensee are likely to reach an optimal licensing
agreement. These arguments are applied to the case of genetic engineering in the
commercial forestry industry.
The article is divided into four main sections. In the first section the nature of
licensing agreements, as a type of technology transfer, is evaluated. Particular
attention is drawn to the role of royalty fonnulation and allocation. Section two
focuses on the characteristics of genetic engineering in the forestry industry, where
the choice of technology is a detenninant of inter-temporal and product worth
changes of the product. An exploratory model of royalty allocation between the
licenser (genetic technology owner) and licensee (tree grower) is developed in the
third section. It represents possible strategies for capturing the value of genetic
engineering for both the genetic technology owner and the tree grower. The
advantages and disadvantages of the exploratory model are discussed in section four.
AN EVALUATION OF LICENSING AGREEMENTS -
THE ROLE OF ROYALTIES
In the framework of technology transfer, the value of the technology to be transferred
(which in the literature is mainly referred to as an innovative process) can be
captured in the following ways:
(i) by exporting the final good;
(ii) by producing abroad in wholly owned subsidiaries; and,
(iii) by licensing.
The magnitude of the captured value would depend on the type of technology
transfer, or, in other words, on the mechanism of diffusion of the given technology'.





The value would also be conditional on the type of technology to be transferred'.
This suggests that the type of technology is an endogenous factor in the process of
capturing the value of the improvement potential of the new technology.
The interest of the present paper focuses on licensing, due to the inter-temporal and
R&D-intensive nature of the technology types discussed". In other words, we believe
thata transfer of such technologies through a subsidiary carries risks' associated with
developing and applying the technology in both developed and developing countries
(e.g. spillover of secret information, imitation, other economic, cultural and political
factors), implying higher transaction costs.
Caves et al. (1983) identify several factors that promote licensing over alternative
mechanisms of technology transfer:
(i) large minimum efficient scales and fixed costs, and focus on small target
markets;
(ii) no need for accumulated knowledge and experience about foreign markets in
order to manage an efficient-scale investment abroad;
(iii) fast-changing technology that requires an equally rapidly adjusting transfer
mechanism;
(iv) reduces risks associated with foreign investment (e.g. expropriation, punitive
taxation, etc.); and,
(v) circumstances that favour reciprocal licensing and lead to the reduction of
uncertainty, transaction costs, and opportunism that otherwise impair the
license market.
Shapiro (1985) argues that "licensing contracts should arise for any innovation for
which the transactions costs are low..."(p.26), even though the efficiency of the
'arm's-length' market for technology licenses "like other markets for intangible
knowledge, is susceptible to market failures from small-numbers bargaining,
appropriability problems, uncertainty, transaction costs, and impacted information
coupled with opportunism" (Caves et al., 1983; p. 264). Thus, the substance of
licensing agreements as a leading transfer mechanism should reflect the nature of the
technology type, the characteristics of the product, as well as the imperfections of the
license market.
, Identifying the type of technology before technology transfer type is decided upon could prove
useful in finding the right or optimal way of transferring the technology and appropriating a greater
value for it.
• It is assumed that the other two types of technology transfer are not likely to capture a high value for
the particular technology type. In the case of a subsidiary it could be argued that related costs of
establishment abroad and knowledge acquisition are likely to reduce the benefits from the new
technology.
1 Caves el 01. (1983) argue that "R&D laboratories in overseas subsidiaries of multinational
enterprises frequently grow to independence from statTs established to receive and adapt technology
transferred by the parent" (p. 256).
The technology types discussed in this paper are associated with three genetic
engineering techniques for quality and performance improvement of a given tree
species8:
(i) technology for engineering insect-resistance in trees (i.e. new genes insertion
into the host genotype);
(ii) technology for engineering herbicide-tolerance in trees (Le. new genes
insertion into the host genotype); and,
(iii) technology for modifYing the genotype of the tree (i.e. there is no insertion of
new genes into the host genotype, rather the already existing genes are
modified for quality enhancing purposes).
Each technology type is purpose specific and is associated with different costlbenefit
ratios and other inter-temporal factors.
We agree with Shapiro (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985) that drastic innovations9
(which grant the licenser a monopoly), such as the technologies mentioned above,
will not be licensed. However, we argue that the products of the drastic innovations
could be licensed in a way so that the licenser enjoys the profits of the technological
improvement, but also shares the risks associated with the uncertainty of its
performance with the licensee. "Clearly, the way in which the gains to trade from
licensing are split between the licenser and the licensee is a critical factor influencing
firm's incentives to develop" (Shapiro, 1985; p.29).
The Parties to a Licensing Agreement
The process and substance of any licensing agreement are important contractual
factors. The licensing agreement could be interpreted as a way of transferring limited
property rights from the licenser to the licensee, specifically stated and agreed upon,
with the purpose of commercialising the products of technological know-how. The
right of "owning" the product of the know-how would impose a cost on the licensee,
i.e. a royalty value (with or without a lump-sum fee attached to it) which will
represent the inter-temporal value ofa superior quality product.
Before the structure and functions of the royalty value are discussed, it is necessary
to define who is a licenser and who is a licensee. A licenser in this paper is defined as
any person or company who invests in R&D and produces the technology types
specified above, i.e. the licenser is the owner of the technology types. A licensee in
this case would be any person or company willing to pay a royalty in return for a
right to utilise the products of the technology types. Thus, if the forestry industry is
taken as an example, the licenser would be the genetic engineering company, while
the prospective licensees would be growers of the genetically improved seedlings.
'The technology types considered are low-cost, i.e. they are not cheap to develop, but they are
developed in order to reduce the cost of producing, as well as to enhance the quality of a certain
product.
'Kamien and Tauman (1986) define a 'drastic' innovation as "one where the monopoly price with the
new technology does not exceed the perfectly competitive price with the old technology" (p. 472),
and argue that they should be licensed to a single producer. Kaufer (1989) refers to 'drastic'





In most of the literature, a licensee is referred to as a competing company within the
same industry (i.e. a rival), and a licensing agreement implies the licensing of the
technology rather than the product of technological innovation to a rival. Thus, if the
licenser grants the licensee with the rights to utilise the technology, the licensee
could become a potential competitor to the licenser and undermine his monopolistic
power (based on the acquisition of a patent) by not complying to the licensing
agreement. On the other hand, licensing contracts are also seen as collusion-inducing
mechanisms in some of the literature (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Tirole, 1988; Lin,
1996).
The competition could be reduced or 'monitored' in a way that the licenser "could
charge a royalty per unit of output that just equals the reduction in per unit costs that
the licensee achieves on account of the new technology. This would leave the
licensee indifferent between licensing and not, and let the licenser enjoy the gains
from the licensee's improved efficiency" (Shapiro, 1985; p. 25; idea also shared by
Caves et al. (1983)10; Wright (1993a); Lin (1996); Kamien and Tauman (1986)";
Katz and Shapiro (1985); Kaufer, (1989». The licenser would therefore control the
licensee's marginal costs, while capturing the full gain from licensing. Another way
of 'monitoring' competition is by imposing a market share restriction in a licensing
agreement in order to provide each of the parties with monopoly power over a certain
segment of the world market (Wright, 1993b; Tirole, 1988).
In general, the type of competition that the literature focuses on is based on licensing
between companies of similar technological interests and potential. We call this a
"horizontal" licensing scheme.
'Vertical' Licensing Scheme
This paper concentrates on a different type of competition, i.e. competition between
licensees rather than between the licenser and the licensee. In other words, their
technological interests and potential are different, and therefore a licensing
agreement is likely to benefit both parties rather than stimulate competition between
them. We call this as a "vertical" licensing scheme. The licenser would be able to
exploit competition among the potential licensees to his own advantage, while
licensees would be able to exploit the cost reducing potential of the new product.
Some approximations to a 'vertical' framework are found in the literature. Katz and
Shapiro (1985) develop a three stage R&D game, where they identify as a starting
point an upstream research laboratory, which is the owner of the input (i.e.
technology) and two producers who are downstream rivals, but their analysis is
,. When the licenser applies the appropriate royalty rate to the licensee's sales in a shared market "the
rate should be equal to the difference between the licensee's marginal costs and the price that
maximises the two parties' joint profits" (Caves et al., 1983; p. 259).
II The authors argue that when the royalty equals the entire reduction in the marginal cost of
production, the innovation is not drastic.
concentrated on a 'horizontal'-type framework between the rivals. However, the
authors see the potential of a 'vertical' scheme by acknowledging the possibility for
the researcher to sell partial property rights (i.e. issue licenses himself) to the
producers which bids highest for them, with the requirement that the producer used
the innovation but didn't license it. Here, however, technology, rather than product
licensing are at stake.
As mentioned above, competition is likely to occur within potential licensees, as to
who would bid the highest and appropriate the 'right' to use the better quality
product'l. Moreover, Kamien and Schwartz (1982) broaden the notion of competition
and argue that "competition through innovation is more important than price
competition because it is the more decisive means of gaining an advantage over
competitors", suggesting that licensees who adopt the new product13 will possess a
greater competitive advantage in a technological-innovation-driven market.
The mechanisms for reducing horizontal competition are interpreted differently under
the vertical framework. A royalty per unit of output would reflect the reduction of
costs due to improved quality and performance of the product, as well as it is likely
to consider factors such as risk associated with the novelty of the technology, the
time-span of revenue collection for the licensee, the number of licensees in the
market, and the characteristics of the targeted market segment. "A [new]
technology's economic performance is uncertain, the technology may not work
properly in the location; the demand for the product that embodies it may change;
newer technologies may displace it" (Caves et al., 1983; p. 250). This suggests that
the per-unit royalty would be associated with a significant profit-maximising
potential for the technology firm, and a number of other factors which can outweigh
this potential, and therefore should be shared between both parties.
The royalty revenue should be shared between the contracting parties in a proportion
that satisfies the production interests of both parties (i.e. further investment in R&D
for the licenser, and the adoption of the products of the new technology by the
licensee). "We would expect a license to be issued if and only if doing so raises the
joint profits of the licenser and the licensee (in which case they could split the gains
in some fashion)" (Shapiro, 1985; p. 27). "Reduction of risk and utilisation of skills
and capacities already in hand predominate in the gains that licensees expect from
licensing" (Caves et al., 1983; p. 256). Moreover, "licensees [would] not take
licenses unless the transactions offered clear and specific gains that could offset the
costs of using an imperfect market" (Caves et al., 1983; p. 257).
Therefore, per-unit royalties could be identified as mechanisms for spreading the
value and the risks associated with technological innovation between the contracting
parties, rather than mechanisms for extracting maximum profit and competition
'control' for the licenser in the case of the 'horizontal' licensing scheme.
12 Risk taking licensees are likely to adopt the royalty scheme and the product of technological
development, i.e. bid higher and earlier than risk averse licensees.
Il The early adopters of the genetically engineered seedling will be licensees with high weed and pest
management costs, as well as "those who can better utilise other inputs which are complementary to




The role of market share restrictions in a vertical framework is also interpreted
differently. Such a restriction could be present in a licensing agreement in order to
determine the margins of operation of the potential licensees (assuming that more
than one licensees are interested in the license), by granting them some monopolistic
power for 'product' development and supply. Thus, a "vertical" licensing scheme
would also mean that the technology company doesn't need to operate "big" abroad,
i.e. small operation would imply granting licenses to different interested parties
around the world l4 (a so-called niche-filling strategy). Caves et al. (1983) argue that
small-scale production backed by the acquisition of a licensing agreement can alter
the terms of trade, since the domestic production of an importable product would be
possible. Thus, "if the technology required for these import-substitutes can be
acquired by license, what would otherwise be a fixed cost of developing technology
in-house becomes a variable cost of compensation to the licenser. Local production
can become viable at a small scale even though variable costs are higher than
otherwise" (Caves et al., 1983; p. 257).
Another advantage of a vertical licensing agreement is the fact that a licensee would
have a better knowledge about the specific local environment. According to Caves et
al. (1983) a license agreement" complements the development of a variety of in-
house skills by the licensees. Thus, "contacts with the licenser provide not just
updated technology but also information on conditions in the licenser's home market
that may anticipate trends in the licensee's own market" (p. 256).
In the case of the forestry industry, growers would know the environmental
characteristics and expected growth performance of a given tree species in particular
sites. Knowledge of such factors would also influence the bidding decision of a
licensee for a specific technology type. In other words, if a grower is aware of the
fact that a certain type of insects is likely to attack the seedlings, it would be in the
grower's interest to minimise the effects of insect attack l< by bidding for a license for
insect-resistant seedlings. This suggests that each technology type would be linked to
the development of purpose-specific products, which, on the other hand, would be
linked to site-specific characteristics.
The Market for Licenses and the Number of Licensees
Caves et al. (1983) summarises the interactions between licensers and licensees in
the market for licenses. On the supply side, licensers possess vast stocks of
technological knowledge available for license, which is likely to increase the number
of available licensing agreements. This also suggests that the number of licensing
I' Differentiating between licensees across countries is likely to lower the risks of country-dependent
international operations (e.g. country-specific economic problems).
IS The license agreements in this case are divided into those that convey only the licensor's current
technology, and those that also promise the licensee access to any future improvements by the
licensor ('current and future' agreements).
16 An insect problem could be considered in the following way. It is likely to increase the cost to the
grower, as more of an insecticide would be applied; it is also likely to reduce revenue, as the final
quality of a 30-year old tree would be affected. Thus, the NPV of growing a tree in an insect-ridden
environment will be low, due to the increased costs over time.
agreements would depend on the nature of the technology at stake l '. On the demand
side, licensees possess needs that could be met by acquiring licensable technology,
i.e. the need for a technology related to products that they are already producing, or,
the need for technology related to product diversification. The authors argue that a
common pattem for the acquisition of licenses by the licensees is related to the fact
that "licensees are not randomly drawn firms that acquire a license and then procure
the complementary assetsl8; only if those assets lie at hand and command low
internal shadow-prices, do they seek the missing technology in the licensing market.
This process of natural selection for licensees extends to the traits of the license
agreements and the technologies that they license" (Caves et al., 1983; p. 254).
Another factor in the relationship between contracting parties is the actual number of
licensees. The optimal number of licensees in the 'horizontal' licensing scheme is
widely discussed in the consulted literature. Mariti and Smiley (1996) argue that
horizontal agreements are likely to reduce the number of competitors in a specific
industry by exploiting the gains from economies ofscale.
Shapiro (1985) summarises the view that "the added richness [of a number of
licensees] arises because one firm's willingness to pay for a license depends upon the
set of other firms that are also purchasing licenses. This interdependence of demands
is a consequence of the fact that the new technology reduces each licensee's marginal
cost, and hence alters its reaction curve in the final pricing or output game....Both
the optimal licensing scheme and the pattern of dissemination to which it leads
depend heavily upon whether the demand interdependencies are 'negative' or
'positive'" (p. 27). Kamien and Tauman (1986) argue that the amount a potential
licensee would be willing to pay for a license depends on the incremental profit it
will realise by the use of the superior technology, which magnitude will depend on
the number of other licensees and non-licensees, as well as on the type of innovation.
On the other hand, for 'vertical' licensing, and particularly in the case of commercial
forestry, the number of licensees is likely to be determined not only by the number of
potential licensees in the market, but also by other factors, such as the characteristics
of the new seedling and the site-specific factors for maximising-tree growth. It this
respect, Caves et al. (1983) argue that only a few firms possess technology that could
be licensed, and "potential licensees are clearly scarce in some markets" (p.250),
which are factors that determine small-numbers bargaining conditions for licensing
agreements.
Determinant Factors of the Royalty Value
The choice of a per-unit royalty by the licenser would depend on a wide array of
factors. Firstly, the royalty value should be transparent in a way so as to differentiate
17 The technology refers to both product and process development, i.e. development of process
technology and improvements in existing products, and new product development (Caves et 01.,
1983).
I' The authors refer to a set of skills useful for diversifying into new products by the licensees (e.g.




between different technology types. In this fashion, technology types that lead to a
greater reduction in costs of production (Le. higher net present value (NPV» are
likely to demand a significantly higher royalty value. Secondly, the royalty value
would depend on the nature of the product to be licensed. Products with improved
long-term quality are likely to attract higher value. Thirdly, the number of competing
licensees would also playa role in determining a royalty value, where the greater the
amount of bidders, the more likely for the royalty value to be higher.
The Problem of Asymmetric Information
In the literature, the factors related to the value of the royalty are considered in a
framework of asymmetric information, where the licenser knows the process of
technological innovation, Le. technology type, and expected qualities of the product,
and the licensee doesn't. "If the licensee could fully evaluate the proffered
technology, the license agreement would dwindle to a right to infringe the licenser's
patents" (Caves et al., 1983; p. 250), which seems to be a common outcome. Thus,
"an information asymmetry cannot be overcome by allowing potential licensees
access to the technology to discover its type, for in the process, they can assimilate
the technology and no longer need to buy it" (Wright, 1993b; p. 47).
Process Patenting Versus Product Licensing
Another common feature in the literature is the need for patent protection if licensing
is to take placel9• Patent licensing is regarded by most authors as the main channel
through which dissemination of innovations takes place. However, in the present
article, patenting of the technology would not be regarded as an efficient way of
diffusing technological innovations or overcoming problems of asymmetric
information, due to the complex nature, lengthy process and the possibility of
intemational evasion of patents. Other concerns regarding patent licensing are related
to the possible anti-competitive effects on the structure of an industry. "It is well
recognised that certain types of licensing agreements among horizontally-related
firms may facilitate collusion in the product market ... - restraints in licensing
agreements are per se illegal if they involve naked price-fixing, output restrictions, or
market division among horizontal competitors" (Lin, 1996; p. 443).
In general, "the emergence of a new innovation system is fraught with difficulties
resulting from its incongruence with existing systems of incentives and property
rights" (Foray, 1995). The disclosure of crucial information required for the granting
of patent, added to the inconsistencies of enforcement and inability of complete
monitoring of an international patent system are likely to create a suitable
environment for imitation, where technology information would be gathered at zero
cost. "In these circumstances it is in the interest of the owner of the new technology
to keep details of the technology secret" (Wright, 1993b; pA7). The possibility of
19 A very detailed and comprehensive analysis of the economics of patents and specifically the
mechanisms for determining the value of patent licenses for cost·reducing production process
inventions is presented by Kaufer (1989).
keeping production techniques secret is also contemplated by Gallini and Winter
(1985). In other words, the owner should keep secret the process of production, while
relying on other ways to transfer the product, Le. if the product is licensed, the owner
would monopolise commercial deployment without the need to disclose process
information in a patent framework.
Furthermore, a 'vertical' licensing scheme is not likely to lead to collusion between
the licenser and the licensee, since they represent different industry interests and
market shares within their respective industri°. Mariti and Smiley (1996) argue that
a patent license, being the most common form of technology transfer, "implies a one
way flow of information, while ... technological complementarity is for long term
transactions where technology is exchanged or shared between two parties. Each of
the [contracting] firms will possess some unique knowledge ... ,and the co-operative
agreement provides for sharing of the knowledge of the two firms" (p. 279). The
authors find that such agreements dominate where markets are expanding rapidly
and/or technology is changing quickly.
Royalty Value as a Signalling Mechanism
We suggest another way of minimising the problem of asymmetric information. If
the royalty value is a function of the cost minimising characteristics of the
technology type, as well as of a competitive bidding for a better quality product, then
it could be argued that the royalty value itself would be a signalling mechanism for
the technology type and the product quality (which would significantly reduce the
cost of the information asymmetry and associated inefficiencies). This identifies an
optimal royalty, which is likely to capture the value of technological improvement in
a way beneficial for both the licenser and the licensee, Le. both parties are likely to
maximise their revenues. The royalty revenue to the licenser would cover extensive
R&D costs and it could stimulate further product development, while the revenue to
the licensee would be based on the appropriation of a better product, which will bring
greater retums (Le. the value of the royalty should be such so that the licensee would
receive a greater revenue from the new product, compared to the old product).
Supporting the above proposition, Carlson et al., (1997) examine the effects of a
technology fees in agricultural production and conclude that "the technology fee
charged to final users is relatively new in agricultural input industries but it used so
farmers know the component prices of the genetic traits, [and therefore] the
combining of technology fee and seed price represent the traditional pricing of
genetic improvement" (p. 34).
Royalty value could as well be linked to product premiums, since a high premium is
associated with better quality and plant performance, and this would lead to
improved cost-reducing capacity for managing the plant, and therefore, the royalty
should be also be high in order to capture all the value-adding associated with a
20 When 'horizontal' licensing is at stake, "a licensing contract with output royalties can also facilitate
collusion because it enables the licenser to manipulate the Me of their licensee and, hence, its output




product premium. Carlson el al. (1997) present some actual figures associated with
the premium price (determined by the degree of quality enhancement due to genetic
engineering) of transgenic crops: for Bt com21 the cost premium is about $10 per acre
(equivalent to 30% increase in seed cost); for Roundup22-ready soybeans the patent
holder (Monsanto) charged a $5 technology fee per acre; for a Bt cotton "farmers
paid the $32 per acre technology fee2l to the patent holder, Monsanto; a seed price
premium of about $1.50 per acre; and the opportunity costs of providing the
resistance management areas" (p. 32).
Furthermore, the provision of more symmetric information regarding the value of the
license could be embodied in the type of product. The licenser, knowing the expected
quality characteristics of the product would be willing to provide those, since
describing the product would not disclose the details of the process by which the
product was generated. Thus, it could be argued that it is in the licenser's interest to
provide all the information available regarding the expected characteristics of the
product. Any asymmetry in information would be based only on the biological as
well as genetic engineering uncertainties of how 'better' is the 'better' product, rather
than on the licenser's unwillingness to provide information. Thus, quality
improvement is constrained and could be partially predicted, and based on this, full
information can't be expected.
Gallini and Winter (1985) examine the issue of information sharing through licensing
in the context of the theory of innovation, and particularly at the underlying
incentives for licensing - ex-post (royalties for more efficient means of production)
and ex-ante (associated with the choice for paying for a license, rather than
developing the technology).
Gallini and Wright (1990) further develop the issue of information sharing through
licensing to approach our proposition that "the licenser signals her technology type
with an output-based payment (or royalty) and may leave some of the rents with the
licensee" (p. 146), and thus, address the issues of a royalty sharing scheme between
the licenser and the licensee. There seem to be a number of common features
between Gallini and Wright (1990) arguments and in our proposition:
1. the licenser has an invention and chooses a licensing contract, which maximises
profits as well as discourages imitation, as a binding agreement for allowing a
licensee to use the invention;
2. the focus is on product or drastic process innovations;
3. a number ofpotential licensees is assumed to exist;
4. the possibility of a non-exclusive license for the diffusion of the valuable
invention when several potential licensees are interested in the product of the
invention;
21 A Bt com is a plant with Bacillus Thuringensis (Bt) toxins being inserted into its cells.
" Roundup is a broad-spectrum herbicide utilised for weed control (against broadleafs and grasses)
for herbicide resistant crops.
13 The high technology fee is associated with the potential reduction in insecticide use.
5. potential licensees are informed of the innovation type before the contract is
signed without the need to reveal the specifics of the innovation (Le. the value of
the innovation is a private knowledge to the licenser);
6. an output-related royalty is a mechanism for capturing the value of the innovation.
However, our proposition establishes that the inventor or the owner of technology
does not hold a patent, and that imitation is constrained (in the short-run) due to the
complex nature of undergoing genetic engineering. This paper also closely examines
the links between the theory of technology transfer and the case of technological
innovations in the forestry industry, which gives specificity to each proposition.
Moreover, Caves el al. (1983) found that license fees and royalties are not the only
factors in a licensing agreement. There also seem to be a number of restrictive
clauses such as market share restrictions, production location restrictions and
technology tlowback requirements. Wright (I993b) argues that a market share
restriction clause in a license contract would play the role of a signal of technology
type, and in this framework "per-unit royalties play no role in license contracts as
they increase the marginal cost of the licensee and distort the allocation of production
between home and foreign [country] away from the cost minimising allocation"
(Wright, 1993a; p.II).
We argue that a market share restriction would be a mechanism of controlling the
physical allocation of licenses by the licenser. In other words, such a mechanism will
allow the licenser to license the product to licensees around the world, thus
stimulating a natural monopoly for each of the licensees. Per-unit royalties would
still play a role in the licensing agreement, as they would capture the value of the
product, and thus represent the opportunity cost of that product to the licensee. If the
per-unit royalty is ignored, technology type signalling would be impossible, and
therefore, the marginal cost to the licensee, from the resulting asymmetric
information problem, is very likely to increase. Thus, a market share restriction
should be an option for the licenser and the licensee to agree upon in a framework of
licensing contracts with per-unit royalties.
The licenser does not need to monitor the licensee's output so as to charge per unit
royalties (except when royalties are captured at harvest). The only interest the
licenser would have in terms of the licensee's output is the performance of the
licensed product. In other words, there could be a clause in the licensing agreement
in which the licenser can require the licensee to provide annual or other period-based
information regarding the actual performance of the product. Such provision would
be beneficial for both parties: the licenser would compare the expected quality of the
product with its actual performance, while the licensee would expect the licenser to
consider the characteristics of the actual performance for further improvement of the
product. This is also a way of providing a guarantee to the licensee that a repeat
purchase from the same licenser is likely to be better than the previous one24. Such an
information back-up system (which Caves el al. (1983) call a 'technology tlowback
" The aspects of guarantees and repeat purchases as mechanisms for reducing information asymmetry
are broadly discussed by Tirole (1988).
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requirement') could result in more effective way of providing higher quality
products, as well as to play as a guarantee for compliance by both parties with the
requirements of the specific licensing agreement.
Finally, all of the above characteristics of 'vertical' licensing contracts and royalty
value show their greater transparency, cost-effectiveness, and flexibility in the
process ofcapturing the value of technological innovation, in terms of the following:
(i) different products - dependent on different technology types;
(ii) different licensees - interested in different technology types, as well as
located in different geographical areas;
(iii) different royalty values - according to the technology types embodied; and,
(iv) different market share restrictions (if required) - based on the type of product
and market segment, as well as on a specific geographic region.
This suggests that both the licenser and the licensee would share some ownership
advantage, where the former owns the technology types, while the lalter owns the
right to utilise and explore the products of a specific technology type; as well as
some market location advantage (licensees within and across national borders).
The following diagram summarises the most important issues discussed in the
previous sections regarding the proposed 'vertical' licensing scheme, where the
licenser knows the technology types and their cost-minimising capacity, and expects
a certain product quality for each technology type, while the licensee would be able
to identify the expected quality type by knowing the value of a per-unit output. Thus,
a licensing agreement would be drawn only if the royalty value is such so that both
parties could benefit from the transaction, i.e. the licensing agreement.
innovation. The gains associated with per-unit royalty are compared with the gains
obtained by the use of fixed-fee licensing. The effects of competitive bidding on the
value of the license are also briefly dis<;ussed.
Fixed-Fee as a Mechanism
A fixed-fee or a royalty are determined in order to maximise the licenser's profit.
Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Lin (1996) argue that a fixed-fee licensing is
superior then a per-unit royalty since it is more profitable for the licenser and it
doesn't affect the level of production of a firm. Katz and Shapiro (1985) argue that a
fixed-fee licensing would occur when technology is transferred and it might not be
possible to monitor a rival's output (which is necessary for the enforcement of a
royalty provision).
"The licenser determines the relationship between the magnitude of the license fee
and the number of purchasers of a license, given a fixed number of firms in the
industry. He does this by finding the fee, for each given number of licensee, such that
no buyer of a license would find it more profitable not to buy it and no non-buyer
would find it profitable to buy it. Each buyer of a license does this calculation by
comparing his profit with the use of the new technology and payment of the fee,
given the number of other licensees, with his opportunity cost, i.e. the profit he
would realise by employing the existing technology and not paying the fee" (Kamien
and Tauman, 1986; p. 476).
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"When licensing cannot raise the licensee's marginal costs, as is the case for fixed
fee licensing, it will tend to increase the licensee's output, and total industry output
as well" (Shapiro, 1985; p. 27). With a per-unit royalty, however, output is likely to
be restricted. "Thus, a royalty alone does not affect the final number of firms in an
industry, while a fee may" (Kamien and Tauman, 1986; p. 484).
Focusing more specifically on the commercial forestry industry, Hyde and Sedjo
(1992) give a very comprehensive analysis of the substance and effects of different
royalty25 schemes for the capture and distribution of rent in commercial forest
extraction. Their arguments are based on the need to formulate adequate royalty
schemes that would capture rent while accounting 'explicitly for external effects'.
The discussed royalty types are associated with charges on the volume of timber
harvested (i.e. fees per unit of harvest volume):
Fixed-Fee, Royalty and Competitive Bidding as Mechanisms for Value Capture
One of the most discussed features of the structure of licensing agreements in the
literature is the mechanism for capturing the greatest possible value of technological
I. Fully differentiated royalty - it is designed to discriminate among tree species and
qualities, as well as land quality; "they intend to extract [for the rent collector]
everything between the delivered resource price and the short-run private marginal
" In Hyde and Sedjo (1992) the royalty is collected by the Forest Ministry and is paid by private
entities, e.g. concessionaries, at harvest. Therefore, the stump value and volume of timber at harvest




cost curve" (p. 346), without affecting the marginal harvest volume decision26 -
(this type of royalty corresponds to the definition of royalty discussed in the
'horizontal' licensing section of this paper);
2. Flat rate (ad valorem) royalty - it is a percentage charge on net revenues that does
not affect the marginal harvest volume decision; in this case the net private gains
are smaller than in (i); the authors argue that in this case the concessionaries have
the incentive to 'high-grade'27, as well as to contract and avoid some royalty
payments (especially for better quality trees or higher-valued species) "because
[the price] is greater than the function explaining ad valorem royalties on all
hectares" (p. 346);
3. Fixed rate (uniform) royalty - it is a flat fee per unit of harvest that alters the
marginal harvest decision (Le. induces the harvest of a smaller volume); "the
uniform fixed royalties may be an efficiency improvement on the ad valorem
royalty ... [since] the uniform fixed royalty leaves intact both the incentive to
high-grade and the incentive to avoid payment" (p. 346), as well as it could
increase royalty revenue - (this type of royalty corresponds to the definition of
royalty explored in the 'vertical' licensing section of this paper and is the
preferred royalty for the purposes of the paper).
The authors point out that "the more homogeneous the forest or the timber stand
being contracted for, then the greater the ease of discriminating but the fewer the
gains from discrimination because the marginal cost curve would be flatter" (p. 346).
The importance of this argument for this paper stems from the fact that genetically
engineered trees are characterised with uniformity in terms of their wood quality
properties, and in terms of their growth potential. Therefore, the adequate royalty
type should incorporate the nature of the tree as a decision factor for optimal rent
capture. This suggests that a fixed rate royalty would be the most effective and
efficient way of value capture in the present analysis considering the uniform nature
of the tree and the short-period rotations.
Competitive Bidding as a Mechanism
Hyde and Sedjo (1992) expand further their analysis of royalties, by focusing on a
forth form of rent capture through a competitively bid lump sum fee2s for the right to
harvest on a designated site, which is independent of the harvest volume. This
scheme has the potential to capture the full rent, as well as it is likely to shift the risks
for accurately bidding the contract from the licenser to the licensees. "Where
26 The need for differentiated royalty is explicitly studied by Vincent (1990) in the case of the
Malaysian forest industry, who argues that inefficient royalty systems lead to undervaluing of the
resource (i.e. timber), as well as to "reduced revenue generation. creating the false impression that
alternative land uses are more productive" (p. 218).
"Hyde and Sedjo (1992) define 'high grading' as the removal of high-valued timber, while leaving a
degraded residual stand.
" This fee equals the true rent and captures all long-term and environmental timber management
costs.
information is lacking, the risks are borne by the bidders and variability in bids
would indicate different appraisals in an uncertain environment" (p. 347). It is also
noted that a reasonable degree ofcompetition is required for effective bidding.
Furthermore, where bidding determines who becomes a licensee and who doesn't, an
auction would yield the licensee a higher profit then a fixed fee. In this respect,
Kamien and Tauman (1986) present their argument about the superiority of licensing
- "the opportunity cost of being a licensee is lower when a fixed number of licenses
are auctioned than when they are sold for a fixed fee" (p. 478). Shapiro (1985) argues
that "it is not optimal [for the licenser] simply to set a price per license and let the
firms each decide whether or not to purchase a license at the set price. The reason the
price system does not maximise the seller's revenues is that it has no built-in ability
to "threaten" the buyers. When one buyer decides not to purchase a license, his
decision has no effect on the purchase pattern of the other firms"(p.28). This suggests
that an auction of a fixed number of licenses is likely to yield higher revenues to the
licenser, since only the highest bidders would get a license. Only if it is optimal to
issue licenses to all the licensees, then the licenser would employ the price system.
Overall, licensees will bid for acquiring the right to use a valuable 'input' (seedling)
into their production process (growing a tree and producing timber). "This input can
be anything that permits a uniform lowering of the costs of production. It may be a
process innovation, [or] a lower-cost source of a natural resource that is not subject to
exhaustion ..." (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; p. 506).
A combination of a competitively bid lump sum fee for the right to harvest and a
fixed per-volume royalty for logs is a possible option for rent capture and it receives
support from some of the literature (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Tirole, 1988). "The
higher the royalty, (a) the less [licensees] would bid for the contract, and (b) the
greater the share of the risk assumed by the [licenser]" (Hyde and Sedjo, 1992; p.
347). Thus, the royalty value should reflect the quality of the natural resource (in
terms of wood quality properties, type of species, and site-specific characteristics,
and respective silvicultural regimes), as well as it shduld acknowledge the market
dynamics between the licenser and the potential licensees. Otherwise, "distorted
price signals from inefficient royalty systems give an unduly negative indication of
the potential financial returns to forest management" (Vincent, 1990; p. 212).
GENETIC ENGINEERING AND FORESTRY OUTPUT
Biotechnological developments for commercial forestry are not news for commercial
growers. Traditional techniques include commercially useful operations, such as
breeding, selection and a number of tissue culture techniques29• Modem improvement
methods further develop the process of improvement by dealing with more complex
issues, such as the introduction, deletion or enhancement of a particular trait of
2. These techniques are used in the process of genetic engineering and offer and alternative approach
to delivering genetic variation without the complexities associated with the recombinant methods to
introduce foreign genes. Among these techniques are clonal propagation. somatic embryogenesis,




interest in an organism, by either inserting foreign genes, or by altering the existing
genetic makeup of the organism. This is the basic principle of genetic engineering,
and this has been the focus point of the commercial application of the technique for
the production of 'better' and purpose-specific crops and trees. Genetic engineering
is currently used to confer resistance to herbicides, insects, viruses, and fungal and
bacterial diseases in crops and woody plants, as well as to improve the control of
plant functions, and thus increase quality (Bohorova, 1997).
Genetic engineering in the present framework is the process of producing improved
tree seedlings from selected embryos. The process itself should be considered in
greater detail, considering that different techniques are used in genetic engineering
(e.g. Agrobacterium Tumephasiens and Biolistic Transformation among the most
common ones) for the improvement of different traits of interest. Three technology
types are considered, where each is identified with its relative product rather than a
technical name ofa specific genetic engineering technique:
I. Insect Resistance (IR) - insertion ofa new trait in host genome
2. Herbicide Tolerance (NT) - insertion ofa new trait in host genome
3. Quality Enhancement (QE) - modification of an old trait in host genome (e.g.
this could be any wood quality characteristic)
Each of the identified technology types is characterised by a different cost-
minimising capacity, quality change, and other inter-temporal issues of tree growth.
Even though there are a number of concerns related to the magnitude of genetic
engineering and its effects on bio-diversity and sustainability, the aim of the present
article is to identify the possible gains that could be captured by the commercial
utilisation of genetic engineering, rather than to justify an argument of possible
shortcomings associated with genetic engineering.
In the framework of the article it is important to highlight that with genetic
engineering improvement occurs in a shorter period of time, it is more closely
monitored (due to the use of molecular markers), and a large number of genetically-
engineered and uniform seedlings can be produced and steadily supplied. Thus,
genetic engineering increases productivity by decreasing the costs per unit of output
and by increasing wood quality per unit of input - the value of the resource (tree) is
maximised.
The value of genetic engineering is incorporated throughout the whole production
process of the forestry industry, and could either be captured after each stage of
production or when the final wood product is sold. The overall quality improvement
of the seedlings and their expected superior performance as trees has significant
implications as to the changes in the worth of wood per cubic meter, as well as to the
characteristics of tree-growth on site-specific characteristics and under purpose-
designed silvicultural practices.
Inter-temporal and Product Worth Changes
Genetically improved seedlings are likely to modify the traditional cost structures of
the forestry industry. In other words, the net present value (NPV) of growing such
trees would not only be positive, but significantly higher that the NPV associated
with conventionally bread and selected trees. There are a number of characteristics
associated with such differences.
Changes in the cost-benefit ratios are due to the following factors:
I. Production of a great number of uniform, genetically-engineered seedlings;
2. Reduction in maintenance costsJO, associated with the uniformity and greater
resistance of trees to adverse external factors, as well as with planting of a lower
number of trees per square mete~l;
3. Shorter rotation periods, which will significantly influence the magnitude of
discounting and thus the NPV and the intemal rate of return of planting better
trees. Shorter rotation periods would be possible due to the uniformity of a more
resistant raw material, as well as due to purpose-designed and site-specific
silvicultural regimes for the maximisation of the tree value.
Therefore, gains are made due to the improved quality of the seedling, that is
transferred onto a greater performance of the growing tree, which is less or non-
susceptible to adverse factors (e.g. insects, herbicide sprays). The reduced number of
trees per square meter further enhances the growing potential of the 'better' trees.
These factors lead to a significant inter-temporal modification of the length of the
rotation period.
Shorter rotation periods are traditionally associated with a bad quality and low output
of the lower logs (i.e. PI1P210gs). However, it could be argued that when the planted
resource is superior in terms of wood quality configuration, then shorter rotation is
not necessarily detrimental and could prove quite profitable.
These are the underlying characteristics of the following section, where the gains
associated with a 'better' tree (in terms of quality and rotation length) are attributed
to the specific technology types and are captured in a form of a royalty per unit of
output (i.e. seedling).
AN EXPLORATORY MODEL
In the present section the factors associated with both the structure of a licensing
agreement and the gains of genetically engineered trees are considered under one
30 Costs of planting, releasing, pruning, thinning, pest control, etc.
" A lower number of trees are likely to be planted if a greater wood out-tum is sought in the future,
i.e. a greater amount of PIIP2 logs, for the production of a specific high quality wood product.
Planting more trees per square meter would mean a tree growth in height rather than width, mainly for




framework, with the purpose of identifying a dynamic, and easily applicable
mechanism for capturing the value of technological improvement.
Underlying Qualitative Assumptions
Each product is developed by using a specific technology type. There are three
technology types, previously identified as JR. HT, and QE. Each technology type
corresponds to a specific product: insect resistant seedlings; herbicide tolerant
seedlings; quality enhanced seedlings. Each technology type is associated with a
different cost-minimising as well as quality enhancing capacity, which increase the
value of the corresponding product, and lead to the realisation of a different
(technology-type-specific) NPV gain over some fixed period of time.
There is a single producer of three genetically engineered products. The producer is a
technological company that owns the process as well as the product of genetic
engineering, in the sense that the company is in a position to either patent the process
of technological innovation or keep it secret. Given the nature of the process of
production (a very complex, multi-step, time and cost-intensive exercise) imitation
would not be possible in the short run. Considering the 'drastic' nature of the process
of applied genetic engineering, we would assume that the process should not
necessarily be patented for profit maximisation purposes. A well defined licensing
agreement for the licensing of the product (Le. seedling), not the process (Le. any of
the technology types) should be able to establish the excludability criteria for the
right to use the product, if a specific royalty is paid in return. The licenser would
possess a monopoly power (even with no patent in place) due to the fact that an
essential input into the production process (the seedling) is controlled by the licenser
and could be utilised only if a license is obtained at a certain cost.
In the present framework, possible risks associated with not complying to the license
agreement are low, considering that a specific product is licensed for a certain period
of time, and the product can't be regenerated to produce similar products (Le.
plants)32, while if the process was transferred via a contract, a non-complying
outcome might prove detrimental for the licenser.
Furthermore, it could be assumed that there are a small number of potential licensees
interested in acquiring the product of technological innovation. The licensees are
well-experienced tree growers who foresee the benefits associated with genetically
engineered trees, and would like to be first to have the right to utilise them. These
licensees are likely to be risk-takers due to the 'new' and partly unknown nature of
the type of tree to be grown. Moreover, the potential licensees could be from
different countries.
'Vertical' (non-exclusive) licensing is thus likely to occur, since the technology
company is willing to license the three types of seedlings to a number of interested
" This assumption is based on the fact that a regenerated tree (a second·generation transgenic tree)
might not have the performance characteristics of the original transformed tree, therefore, the grower
would rely on the technologist for the provision of further improved trees.
tree growers. Competition between the technologist and the grower is unlikely due to
their different industrial interests and industry-specific market shares. However,
competition between growers could emerge, since each product has specific cost-
minimising characteristics, which would lead to profit maximisation for those
growers who choose to adopt it and can afford its price. A licensee would be
identified either by competitive bidding, or by an agreement on a royalty split
scheme between the licenser and the licensee.
In the licensing agreement, technology type need not be disclosed, in the sense that
the grower would like to know about the expected characteristics of the seedling
rather than the sequencing of the process of genetic engineering for its production.
Thus, the technologist would know the technology, while the grower would know the
type of product, and it is in the best interest of the technologist to best represent the
expected quality of the product. The value of each product would thus be based on
the cost-minimising (Le. gain maximising) capacity of each product, with some
weight attached to it to represent the possible sources of risk.
This suggests that a per-unit royalty should not be equal to the reduction in per unit
costs that the licensee would achieve on account of the new technology, since this
would not leave the licensee indifferent between licensing and not. There are two
reasons for this - one is associated with the weight of uncertainty that the licensee
faces by choosing to adopt the new product, the other one is related to the long period
of time for value realisation by the licensee (Le. trees are harvested and logs are sold
for further utilisation after a minimum of 25 years, which is a long time to wait for a
return on a risky investment).
The gains need to be shared by the licenser and the licensee. In other words, the
returns to the licenser should be such as to stimulate further R&D, while the returns
for the licensee should also be significant given that the licensee agrees on growing
the 'new' tree for 25 years, Le. the opportunity cost of money of an inter-temporal
investment. In both cases the return should offset net costs for the agreement to be
optimal. The inter-temporal issues for the licenser are related to the time span of
technological innovation, while for the licensee - to the time span of biological
growth of the tree. Having this in mind, royalty schemes are designed in a way to
generate gains to both the licenser and the licensee over time. According to Caves et
al. (1983) licensers enjoy an average of about 40 percent of the gains to trade from
licensing. Vincent (1990) finds that royalties are based on an average figure of 10
percent of current log price for most of the tropical hardwood producers in Malaysia,
which he argues is a significantly low royalty and simply undervalues the resource
rather than capturing its value in real terms.
Furthermore, problems of asymmetric information are likely to be greatly reduced
under the present 'vertical' agreement, since the type of technology is signalled by
the value of the per-unit royalty, and the differences in royalty value would be
associated with the distinctive characteristics of each product. Since there is
incomplete information regarding the field performance of a genetically engineered
product, any asymmetric information between the parties is likely to be based on this
rather than on other game-strategic purposes. To reduce the impact of such lack of
The values in the table are associated with a hypothetical model of the forestry
industry, where:
(i) NPV gain per hectare (as well as the associated IRR) is captured by
comparing figures of un-engineered trees with expected performance (in NPV
terms) ofengineered trees
(ii) NPV gain per tree and cubic meters is captured by spreading the above value
across the number of planted and harvested stock.
Each technology type is associated with a specific trait of interest within the genetic
mix of the seedling and thus has a different impact on the cost-efficienciesll of
growing the modified tree, and NPV gains vary according to. that. Such gain is
associated with both inter-temporal issues related to a shorter rotation period, and
product-worth issues related to the enhanced quality of the tree stock and the
likelihood of trees to grow faster due to reduced number of planted stock and related
maintenance cost savings. Thus, the NPV gain could be expressed per hectare, per
tree at harvest or per cubic metre of wood at harvest (Bohorova, 1997).
















The licenser chooses the per-unit royalty. Then the licenser and the licensee agree on
the value of the royalty. For simplicity, we will assume that there is one licenser and
one licensee. The royalty rate can't be greater than the per unit savings the licensee
enjoys with the new product, i.e. "the licensing contract cannot raise the licensee's
marginal (production plus royalty) costs. With this restriction, the optimal contract
would set the royalty rate as high as possible (i.e. at the per unit cost savings afforded
by the new technology). Such contract gives all of the licensing gains to trade to the
licenser. Depending upon the bargaining power of the two parties, a lower royalty
may arise" (Shapiro, 1985; p. 26).
An optimal per-unit royalty would be a positive value, such that it makes it profitable
to transfer the product via licensing. An optimal royalty scheme, on the other hand,
could be defined as one where both parties have something to gain from the licensing
agreement. Thus, having differentiated between a royalty value and a royalty scheme,
attention is drawn to the practical representation between both.
Capturing the Value ofa Genetically Engineered Product through Royalty Schemes
Moral hazard problems could emerge here, but they are not in the interests of both
parties, since tho licensee, by providing more information about the field
performance of the seedling, would expect the licenser to further improve each
product, while the licenser would expect the licensee to provide performance-based
information for further improvement of the product. This is like a strategy game that
mayor may not have dominant strategies.
Market share restrictions need not be a part of the licensing agreement if a small
number of well-dispersed licensees exists. Such a provision could be considered only
if the product is licensed to two similar and closely located licensees.
information, it is important that the licensing agreement requires the exchange of
information between the licenser and the licensee regarding the performance of the




Trait Specific Gain Expectations
As said before, the royalty value for a specific product (i.e. seedling) signals the type
of technology utilised for its production. Each technology type generates a tree with
different inter-temporal and product worth characteristics. In other words, each
technology type could be related to a specific cost minimising scheme. Thus, royalty
schemes should be designed to capture the gains associated with different technology
types employed.
The difference between the values identified with each trait is based on the
underlying assumptions regarding the expected cost-minimising performance of the
engineered seedling. Herbicide tolerant and insect resistant seedlings are expected to
capture similar values, since genetic engineering has improved their resistance
capacity rather than stimulating a specific growth gene. In the case of quality
enhancement, however, the assumption is that greater gains would be made due to a
greater volume of better grades per tree, compared to the previous two cases. The
values per tree and cubic meter at harvest are associated with these assumptions of
NPV gain, as well as they depend on the number of planted stock and recoverable
volume.
" Carlson el al. (1997) find that in the case of herbicide tolerant soybean average weed control costs
are reduced from about $25-$30 for conventional herbicides to $13 per acre for Roundup (plus a $5
technology fee); in the case of insect resistant cotton, the reduction of the use of insecticides generates
insecticide savings, as well as it increases the "beneficial insect numbers, thereby reducing the costs
ofcontrolling other pest types" (p. 33).
o I 3263 I 0
28.06 I 0 I 3,263
31.82 I 0 I 3,263
34.07 I 0 I 3,263
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NPV gains under non-shared, and shared royalty schemesTable 2:
1.20 I 11.02 I 1,631
The following table summarises the possible outcomes of value captured and
distributed (or not) through the utilisation ofa royalty.
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0.60 I 14.78 I 1,631
2.40 I 3.50 I 1,631 I 1,631
2.40 I 20.54 I 0 I 3,263
0.24 I 17.04 I 1,631
The fact that genetic engineering has been undertaken in order to improve specific
tree characteristics (in terms of enhancing their resistance to adverse factors and
pathogens, as well as enhancing specific wood quality properties) implies that a price
charged for a genetically engineered seedling is likely to be greater than the price
charged for a conventionally improved, but not engineered seedling. This is due to
the higher costs of R&D, risks associated with expected performance, as well as
product novelty. These are internalised by the value of a royalty paid for the right to
utilise the product of technological innovation (Bohorova, 1997).
Royalty Schemes for Value Capture and Distribution
Overall, the gains presented above are not a general formula for defining expected
gains for trait specific characteristics, since they are based on a wide array of
assumptions, and not on practical experiences. However, these numbers help
illustrate the fact that there are significant gains to be made by utilising improved and
engineered seedlings, and that these gains would vary according to the underlying





The area of interest here is how more effectively to distribute the gain .form
technological improvement between those who produce the seedling, and those who
grow it, in order to stimulate further investment in R&D for the producer, and a
greater demand for a modified seedling from the grower. The timing of the royalty is
also of significant importance given the inter-temporal issues associated with
technology development as well as tree growth (Bohorova, 1997).
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0.24 I 13.63 I 1,957 I 1,305
0.60 I 11.37 I 1,957 I 1,305
1.20 I 7.61 I 1,957 I 1,305
2.40 I 0.10 I 1,957 I 1,305
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When presenting the gains associated with each trait of interest, the cost of seedling
to the grower is considered to be constant in order to evaluate the overall cost-
reducing capacity associated with technology type. However, for the purposes of the
present sub-section the dynamics of this cost/revenue figure need to be examined,
since the cost per seedling is a factor that influences the overall value of the royalty
that a technologist would charge a grower.
0.24 I 20.45 I 1,305 I 1,957
0.60 I 18.19 I 1,305 I 1,957
1.20 I 14.43 I 1,305 I 1,957
2.40 I 6.91 I 1,305 I 1,957
Source: Bohorova, 1997
The price of a seedling would reflect the costs of R&D involved in its production, as
well as the royalty paid for the utilisation of the product of technological innovation,
i.e. the right to benefit from the genetically improved seedling. Thus, the optimal
price range for selling an engineered seedling depends not only on the cost of R&D
involved, but also on the magnitude of the royalty. Thus, for a given price per
seedling, as little as 20% could represent the associated cost of production, while as
far as 80% could be captured by a royalty. This would also imply that charging a
higher price would increase the proportion of royalty captured, given that the cost of
production is unaltered (Bohorova, 1997). Therefore, the magnitude of the royalty is
crucial for identifYing the balance between revenue maximisation for the producer
and the cost-minimisation for the grower, in a way so that gains from genetic
engineering are spread between both.
The figures in the table are derived from a hypothetical model, where the NPV of the
royalty corresponds to the difference in NPVs between modified and unmodified
trees, i.e. it corresponds to the NPV gain of genetic engineering (or technology). The
NPV of the royalty encompasses the cost of seedling and volume planted, as well as
the value and quantity of cubic metres of wood harvested. Thus, the NPV of genetic
engineering could be distributed not only between the producer and the grower, but
also between different periods of time - before planting a seedling and after
harvesting a tree.
One feature to be noticed is that under each category of royalty sharing, the higher
the initial price per plant, the lower the NPV of the royalty at harvest. Another
important feature is that when gains are captured only by the producer, the NPV of
royalty at harvest is considerably higher than the same value (for the same price




the grower both when the seedling is bought and when the tree is harvested, since the
technologist captures the whole gain.
The above table represents another hypothetical figure, based on a number of
underlying assumptions regarding the net present worth of genetic engineering, as
well as inter-temporal factors captured at period 0 (when the seedling is sold) and
final period (when tree is harvested and sold as a log). The number help illustrate the
role of royalty as a signalling mechanism for the type of product, and a dynamic
factor in a multi-period licensing framework.
Formulation of Licensing Contracts
A non-shared royalty scheme is not likely to result, since gains are not allocated
efficiently. The whole gain is not likely to go to the grower since the producer sets
the royalty value and would expect to generate gains. The producer, on the other
hand, is not likely to capture the full gain, since this would make the price of a
seedling prohibitively high for the grower to consider. Even though this scenario
might seem desirable for the grower and the technologist individually, it is not a
rational allocation of the royalty, considering that only one party will capture the
returns for a product that involves two parties to develop. The grower would not be
able to achieve such gain in NPV without the producer adding value to the genetic
structure of the tree, while the producer would not be able to capture the gains from
technological improvement unless the grower is willing to buy and grow the
seedlings (Bohorova, 1997).
Thus, a shared royalty is the most likely outcome: In a shared royalty framework, the
grower is not constrained to bear the costs of the new product in only one period. No
losses are to be made by the producer either, considering that the royalty values at the
final year are discounted and presented in NPV terms (Bohorova, 1997).
The ratio for gain sharing is not a set figure, and it represents a negotiatmg
mechanism in the formulation of the value of a royalty in the framework of a typical
licensing agreement. Each party would consider the expected gains to be made under
each sharing ratio (based on a cost-minimising potential of the product) and a game-
theoretic outcome would emerge, where each player would either accept or reject the
ratio, given the possible pay-offs. It should be noted, however, that no matter in what
proportion is the royalty to be shared, there is an overall gain to the producer and the
grower from co-operating.
The agreement is likely to be non-exclusive, since the potential interest in three
products is likely to attract a number of licensees within and across national borders.
However, the exclusivity of each agreement will be based on the specific contract
conditions associated with the utilisation of the genetic material. "Access to local
[tree growers] who tailor varieties to local growing conditions will remain important"
(Carlson et al., 1997; p. 34).
Thus, a licensing agreement of the type above is an explicit and written arrangement
amongst two or more firms. This agreement involves financial remuneration for both
parties - in terms of shared royalty payment for the engineered material; as well as
some exchange of information, regarding the field performance of the planted
engineered material. The agreement could be a short term contract, implying a one
time purchase of the seedlings, but it could also be a long-term contract, where the
engineered inputs are bought from the same supplier (re-purchase of seedlings) over
a longer period of time.
DISCUSSION
Advantages of the Proposed Scheme
There are both a wide array of advantages and some disadvantages associated with
the discussed royalty allocation. This article makes a comprehensive evaluation of
the literature of technology transfer by adapting the theoretical framework of
licensing agreements to the characteristics of a specific technological innovation -
genetic engineering of trees (or woody plants). Therefore, the advantages of the
developed ideas stem from the novelty of analysing rapidly changing and
commercially oriented applications ofgenetic engineering.
The importance of technology type as an underlying factor for selecting licensing as
a means of technology transfer, and in the formulation ofcost-minimising capacity of
the specific products provides the grounds for a more exhaustive consideration of the
potential benefits for value capture through a well designed, purpose-specific,
industry-oriented, and product quality-sensitive royalty scheme.
On the other hand, the nature of a proposed 'vertical' licensing agreement represents
a good starting point for constructing a more quantitatively supportive argument. In
general, the propositions and arguments in this article open up a new framework for
analysis in the area of licensing and the diffusion of technological innovations, by
focusing on the dynamics of a specific technological process, which products are
commercially deployed and are crucial inputs into the production process of a
specific industry.
Shortcomings of the Proposed Scheme
The proposed royalty schemes, and all the underlying assumptions and propositions,
formulate a credible mechanism for value capture. However, a number of potential
shortcomings should be given some consideration. One main feature that should not
be undervalued is the complex nature of genetic engineering and the associated
difficulties with generating fully uniform plants that could perform in an exactly
perfect way. New genetic make-up of trees narrows down the gap between quality
and growth characteristics of trees (which improves the management of the resource),
but it doesn't determine their performance in different environments. Therefore, there
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is a limit of how much genetic engineering reveals, and this is probably overlooked
by concentrating on how much genetic engineering is expected to do.
The uncertainties associated with genetic engineering (as with many other new
technologies) suggest the existence of information asymmetry between a technology
producer and a licensee, and increase the degree of risk associated with formulating a
licensing agreement, as well as risks associated with the field deployment and bio-
safety of genetically engineered organisms.
Future Directions of the Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme provides the possibility for the analysis of a wide array of
additional factors which are directly or indirectly related to royalty formulation in the
field of genetic engineering. Focus should be given to the general inter-temporal as
well as social welfare effects of licensing, Le. the effects of licensing today on
development activities and value capture mechanisms tomorrow.
For example, since genetic engineering is still regarded as a 'new' technology and its
products are beginning to be more commercially deployed, attention seems to be
given to so called first-generation products. A more exhaustive and long-run oriented
approach to royalty schemes should focus on the effects of expected second-
generation products on present and future royalty values. Carlson et al. (1997) briefly
mention the importance of collecting technology fees for improved varieties to
partially support the development of second-generation products (which will be
needed as pests or weeds become resistant or when improvements are made).
Following the same lines, second-generation transgenic plants that combine both
insect-resistant and herbicide-tolerant characteristics would imply a change of the
cost-effectiveness of these plants and a royalty value should be able to capture such
improvements.
Furthermore, focus should be given to a more complex pricing system which will
include both linear and non-linear pricing arrangement - a per unit royalty
accompanied by some type of a flat technology fee. In this case, the royalty would
capture the value of incremental product worth and inter-temporal features of the
tree, while the technology fee would be associated with technical advice or simply a
price premium for the adoption of the better product. This would call for a more
detailed quantitative analysis of the proposed royalty scheme.
Another point for future reference could be the effects of the scheme on social
welfare)· Katz and Shapiro (1985) argue that "licensing generates a number of
benefits. Its primary effect is to spread the use of a superior technology and thus to
lower the licensee's costs for any given level of output. This cost reduction is a clear
social as well as private benefit. The cost reduction typically will lead to an increase
in industry output. This output expansion creates a second, indirect social benefit,
.. More literature in the area of social vs. private returns from research and development has been
gathered in Mansfield and Mansfield (1993; pp. 67-132).
which accrues to consumers via lower prices, because output is initially insufficient
from a social viewpoint owing to the exercise of market power" (p. 510). The authors
also argue that socially beneficial fixed-fee licensing agreements are not a rule, in
other words, in some cases welfare is reduced by licensing.
One last area widely discussed in the literature, but given a limited attention in this
article is the notion of the quality of licensed technology, and generated products
(Rockett, 1990; Tirole, 1988; Grossman, 1981). In the present framework the quality
of a licensed product should be further analysed. Price-quality gradients would be
supporting mechanisms for valuation and premium formulation associated with
technological novelty.
CONCLUSIONS
This article discusses the complex underlying nature of technology transfer
mechanisms and focuses on the substance and mechanisms of licensing agreements.
The study doesn't intend to analyse the distribution or reduction of transaction costs
or the motivational problems associated with complete contracting, both associated
with the formulation of licensing agreements. It rather concentrates on the substance
of such agreements and their applicability to the value capture of genetic engineering.
The focus is not on valuing the intangible assets, represented by technology types,
but on capturing their value through licensing the tangible products of each
technology type. This leads to a formulation of per unit royalty schemes, which
posses an inter-temporal element (providing the option for payment in two periods),
a genetic quality factor (associated with the greater resistance of trees, as well as
enhanced wood quality characteristics), and a dynamic mechanism for bargaining
(represented by the non-exclusiveness of the licensing agreement).
Such royalty schemes prove efficient in terms of capturing the value of a
technological innovation in a particular industry. They are also flexible and
transparent in terms of their adaptability to species-specific characteristics, as well as
their effectiveness across borders, exploring diverse site-specific, socio-economic,
and management approaches, but providing the result that they are designed to
generate - capture the value of genetic improvement in trees.
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SUMMARY
One of the major components ofafinancial institution's lending costs is risk-bearing.
Credit analysis is a primary method of reducing credit risk. A survey of six banks
lending to the rural sector in Canterbury was conducted in order to detennine their
credit analysis procedures and identify factors that they considered important in their
lending decisions. The study found that these financial institutions generally followed
the same procedures and used similar factors in evaluating the credit worth of
potential borrowers. There is a heavy reliance on the subjective judgement of lending
officers in detennining credit worth, suggesting substantial opportunity for the
complementary use of more objective credit evaluation procedures.
Key words: Credit analysis, Rural lending, Credit risk.
INTRODUCTION
One of the major components of a financial institution's lending costs is risk-bearing.
It includes possible delinquency and default by borrowers (known as credit risks),
unanticipated variations in the borrower's need for funds (called liquidity risks), and
the combined effects ofother institutional risks and methods of responding to risks.
Credit analysis is the primary method of reducing the credit risk on a single loan
request. In credit analysis the aim of the fum is to utilise objective and subjective
infonnation to predict the bill-paying behaviour of the future customer and to reduce
the risk ofnonpayment to an acceptable level. Two major problems in credit analysis
are the assessment of all important factors about an applicant simultaneously and the
evaluation of all applicants objectively and by the same standards. In practice, lenders
evaluate their borrowers' credit worthiness using various approaches ranging from
highly subjective infonnal methods to scoring techniques based on sophisticated
statistical analysis of the borrower's financial data.
I M. Commerce student and Lecturer in agribusiness management, respectively.
Very little infonnation is available about credit analysis procedures and tools
employed by agricultural lenders in New Zealand. This paper describes the tools and
procedures used by six major banks in Canterbury and aims to provide insights into
how financial institutions assess the credit worth of potential borrowers.
CREDIT ANALYSIS
The high risks in agriculture, growing competition in fann lending, and improvements
in the quality and computational processing of financial infonnation are all
encouraging agricultural lenders to more precisely evaluate and monitor the credit
worthiness of their borrowers (Lufburrow, et aI., 1984). Creditworthiness is evaluated
on the basis of evidence fanners supply to assure lenders that lending risks will be
minimised and that debt servicing will meet the tenns ofthe loan contract (Barry, et
al.,1981).
Factors Influencing Credit Worth
Rural lenders have used a number of criteria to analyse agricultural credit. Emphasis
has ranged from the asset-based collateral lending of the 1960's and 1970s to
primarily cash flow lending of the 1980s (Kohl, 1992). Success in agricultural lending
depends largely on how well the lender assesses the credit worth ofthe borrower. The
major variables determining credit worthiness generally include a borrower's
profitability, liquidity, solvency, collateral position, and repayment ability (Reinsel and
Brake, 1964; Bauer and Jordon, 1971; Evans, 1971; Johnson and Hagan, 1973; Dunn
and Frey, 1976; Hardy and Weed, 1980; Lufburrow, et aI., 1984). Profitability
indicates the borrower's overall financial progress usually measured as a rate of return
on investment. Liquidity reflects the fann's capacity to generate cash to meet its
short-tenn financial obligations. Solvency indicates the amount ofdebt relative to the
equity capital of the borrower. Collateral represents the pledge ofassets to secure a
loan in case ofdefault. Repayment ability is the borrower's prospects for successfully
meeting principal and interest obligations from future cash flows. Lenders use these
financial criteria in combination with other elements related to the borrower's
personal attributes such as character, integrity, and managerial ability in the credit
decision (Lufburrow, et. aI., 1984; Kohl, 1992; Meyer, et al. 1992).
Credit Scoring and Risk Rating
In general, credit evaluations have mostly occurred through personal observations and
subjective judgments of loan officers, using what data farmers have supplied
(Lufburrow, et aI., 1984). In today's competitive financial environment, lenders need
an effective credit evaluation system to ensure that loans are properly classified,
allowing them to identify profitable loans and develop appropriate financial packages
(Kohl, 1992). Traditional agricultural lenders are now increasingly adopting more
fonnal credit scoring and risk rating procedures which were fonnerly used mainly by
nontraditional agricultural lenders to assess credit related to equipment and operating
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loans -- areas in which quick decisions were needed (Barry and Ellinger, 1989; Kohl,
1992).
Credit scoring provides a systematic and comprehensive way ofassessing the
borrower's financial.data which, along with the lender's judgment and other relevant
information, are used to reach a valid assessment of the borrower's credit worthiness.
The basic steps are to identifY key variables that best distinguish among borrowers'
credit worthiness, choose appropriate measures for these variables, weight the
variables according to their relative importance to the lender, and then score each loan
as a weighted average of the respective variables. The credit evaluation results then
may serve as the basis for risk-adjusted loan pricing, as well as for assessing the
quality of loan portfolios, validating loan decisions to other loan personnel and
regulators, sereening loan applicants, and counselling with borrowers. (Barry and
Ellinger, 1989).
Kohl (1992) lists five basic characteristies of a good credit scoring and risk rating
system. According to Kohl, a credit scoring and risk rating system must be a) simple
enough that loan officers can compute and interpret credit scores in a timely manner,
b) accurate enough to contribute to sound lending decisions and to validate loan .
classifications, c) objective enough to be used to price loans and assist in developing
financial packages, d) parsimonious in its information requirement and e) statistically
validated and continuously refined and documented.
Differential Loan Pricing
Two main purposes of credit analysis include a) determining whether to accept or
reject a loan and b) determining the interest rate charged on the loan. Lenders
traditionally charged borrowers a uniform interest rate regardless of their credit worth
accounting for differences in farmers' creditworthiness through nonprice responses
that included differing loan limits among borrowers, and differences in security
requirements, loan maturities, loan supervision and documentation, and other means
of credit administration (Baker, 1968; Barry and Willman, 1976; Robison and Barry,
1977). However, loan pricing tailored to the risk characteristics of individual
borrowers is being increasingly seen in agricultural lending with lenders now routinely
categorising borrowers into several risk classes with higher interest rates associated
with higher risk classes (Barry and Calvert, 1983; Schmiessing et aI., 1985,
Lufburrow et aI., 1984).
An important component of the total interest rate charged for a loan is the risk
premium included to reflect the credit worthiness of the borrower (Federal Reserve
Bank, 1986). A risk premium is usually charged to borrowers with a relatively high
default potential because they maya) require above average servicing costs; b) reduce
-expected profits because of loan restructurings at terms less favourable to the lender
(Chesser, 1974); and c) frequently cause loan losses stemming from total loan default
(Federal Reserve Bank, 1986).
The traditional practice ofcharging a uniform interest rate for all borrowers leads to a
problem called adverse selection where low-risk borrowers who deserve a lower
interest are driven away, leaving the lender only with the high-risk borrowers who are
attracted by an interest rate that is lower than what they should actually be charged.
Credit risk rating and the accompanying use of risk-adjusted discount rates eliminates
the problem of adverse selection, enhances the performance of loan portfolios, lessens
rcliance on nonprice factors in credit allocation, and allows a more equitable treatment
of customers (Lufburrow et aI., 1984; Kohl, 1992).
DATA AND METHODS
Six major banks serving the Canterbury area were surveyed through personal
interviews with the agricultural credit manager at each bank. The interviews were
semi-structured, with open-ended questions so as not to restrict possible answers, and
in keeping with the exploratory nature of this study. For that purpose the interviewer
had a set of "guide questions", a copy of which was shared with the person being
interviewed.
The questions covered areas such as the general description of the institution,
evaluation procedure ofagricultural loan applications, and the use of formal credit
scoring techniques. A follow-up interview was also conducted to verifY the accuracy
of the generalised credit evaluation procedure deduced from the first interview.
RESULTS
The banks varied widely in terms ofsize with one bank having as much as three times
the size of another. The average agricultural loan size for each bank ranged from
$146,000 to $800,000, with the largest bank not necessarily having the largest
average loan size. The two banks with the largest average loan sizes actively sought
these types of loans. One bank had a preferred minimum loan size of $300,000, while
the other bank preferred $500,000 or over. The number of staff in the agricultural
section of the bank varied from a low of4 to a high of20 people.
Two banks had a strong preference for the type of enterprises financed. The preferred
enterprises are dairy, sheep and beef, cropping, and deer. Two banks had a preferred
minimum farm size. One preferred to lend only to farms with a gross farm income
(OFI) of$IOO,OOO and over while the other bank preferred farms with OFls over
$250,000. The latter was also one ofthe banks with a preferred minimum loan size.
All banks except for one considered the purpose for which the money is borrowed as
unimportant in the lending decision as long as the farm has the ability to repay the
loan.
The banks considered similar indicators of credit worth namely, a) debt servicing
ability, b) personal characteristics, and c) past financial performance. Only two banks
employed credit scoring worksheets in their loan evaluation procedure.
TRENDS IN DAIRY FARM SALES AND FACTORS INFLUENCING DAIRY
LAND PRICES IN NEW ZEALAND (1990-97)
G Rauniyar, W J Parker and A E Dooley
College of Sciences, Massey University, Palmerston North.
records included farms of all sizes. The analyses of farm size, sale price and productivity
were based only on the data for economic units (11= 3513), defined by VNZ as "a farm unit
capable of supporting at least one family". Economic units producing less than or equal to
5,OOOkg MS/year (11=24) were excluded from the data set. Nine other outliers, comprising
farms over 120 ha and producing less than 20,000 kg MS, were excluded as well to give a
final dataset of 3480 sales.
LRSALEIIA = ~O + ~I LSlZE + ~2 LPDPHA + ~3 NORTHLND + ~4 AUCKLAND +
~5 BAYOFPL + ~6 TARANAKI + ~7 LOWERNI + ~8 SISLAND + ~9 FSBN
+ ~IO FSSN + 1J1I BTSFRMI + IJI2 BTVFRMN + 1J13 MYR + U (I)
Buyer-seller relationships, as defined by VNZ, were examined for 1990, 1993 and 1997.
Farm buyers were classified as either expanding or not-expanding property owners, while
farm sellers were classified as either subdividing or not-subdividing. The farm buyer was
classified into one of the four categories: existing farmer, new farmer, business person and
other (Government/Local Authority and other). Similarly, the ownership structure of the
buyer was divided into one of the four types: individual, partnership, company and other (c0-
operative, trust, Government/Local Authority and other).
An econometric model was specified to explain dairy farm sale prices. Farm sale prices were
hypothesised to be function of farm size (-); production per ha (+); location (Waikato cf.
other regions); buyer attributes (operation type, new buyer and enlarging); and a seller
attribute defined as subdividing. Changes in technology and management practices were
captured in a variable representing time. The first half of 1990 was assigned a value of I, the
second half a value of 2, and so on. The time variable also captured changes in the market
environment, inclUding the MS price received by farmers. Farm specific MS payments that
reflected individual company performance and milk composition effects were not available.
The empirical model was specified as in Equation I. In the econometric model, farm level
revenue attributes were not included because information on actual revenues from milksolids
sale were not available. Furthermore, because of closer or merger of dairy companies
regional milksolids payout could not be ascertained. The authors are aware of this limitation
in the model specification and results should be interpreted accordingly. However, we





Dairy farm sale data (1990-1997) published by Valuation New Zealand are examined in lhis
paper. Trends and interrelationships involVing the number and size of dairy farm sales, land
prices, milksolids prices and dairy farm productivity are explored on a national and regional
basis. Buyer-seller relationships in dairy farm sales are also analysed. An econometric
model, constructed to explain dairy farm land prices (expressed as the logarithm of the net
sale price in 1990 dollars: r2=0.78) indicated each 10% increase in farm area would decrease
the sale price by 1.5% and that a 10% increase in milksolids would improve the price by
8.7%. In real terms dairy land sale values are projected to increase.
Keywords: dairy farm sales, land prices, farm size
INTRODUCTION
The oullook for the milksolids price, new technology, the relative profitability of alternative
land-use enterprises to dairying, interest rates and the motivation of herd owners all impact on
dairy farm land values, and the number and size of herds. The 1990-1997 period was
particularly dynamic for the dairy industry with significant growth in national milk
production (NZDB, 1997) due to expansion of existing herds, conversions of sheep and beef
cattle farms to dairying and improved productivity per cow (LIC, 1996). The signing of the
GATT agreement, lower interest rates, "bullish" projections for dairy products and relatively
good prices for milksolids from 1992/93 to 1994/95 all contributed to an optimistic outlook
for dairy farming (Kilsby et al., 1998). These factors were capitalised into dairy land values.
The optimism for dairying began to abate from around 1996 when milksolids prices declined,
the need to own shares in dairy companies proportional to the milk supply was foreshadowed
for the 1997/98 season and interest rates edged upwards. This paper presents an analysis of
dairy farm sales for the 1990-1997 period. Changes in land values by farm type and size are
reported.
METHODOLOGY
Valuation New Zealand (VNZ) six monthly data were obtained on size of property sold,
annual milksolids (MS) production, sale price and buyer-seller relationships. The VNZ
definition of net sale price of dairy farm implies sale price net of buildings and chattels on the
property. Production was recorded as kg milkfat up to 1996: this was converted to milksolids
using a conversion factor of 1.74. For each farm sold, MS/ha was calculated by dividing the
total production by effective area.
Dairy farm sales for the period 1990 to 1997, a total of 5,542 properties, were included in the
initial data set. The VNZ data subset was subjected to trend, bivariate and multivariate
analysis using the Excel and SAS packages. Net sales prices were converted to 1990


















= natural logarithm of net sale price per ha in 1990 dollars
= natural logarithm of farm size in hectare
= natural logarithm of milksolids production per ha
= farm located in Northland (I=yes, 0 otherwise)
= farm located in Auckland region (I=yes, 0 otherwise)
= farm location in Bay of Plenty (I=yes, 0 otherwise)
= farm location in Taranaki (I=yes, 0 otherwise)
= farm location in the lower North Island (I=yes, 0 otherwise)
= farm location in the South Island (I=yes, 0 otherwise)
= buyer type (I=enlarging, 0 otherwise)
= seller type (I=subdividing, 0 otherwise)
= buyer ownership (I=individual, 0 otherwise)
= buyer type (I=new, 0 otherwise)
= time of sale (I=first half of 1990, 2=second half of1990, ..., l6=second balf of
1997).
= error teno




The Waikato region was treated as a reference farm location. and thus was not included in the
regression model. All explanatory variables specified in Equation I were subjected to
collinearity diagnostics (Besley et al.• 1980). None posed a coIlinearity problem.
RESULTS
Trends In dairy farm sales
The overall national trend In the number of dairy farm sales from 1990 to 1997 is shown in
Figure I. Economic units accounted for 55% to 68% of total dairy farm sales per annum
during this period. The 'economic' units tended to be much larger in area than 'other' units.
allhough this difference narrowed over time (Figure 2). The number of economic unit sales
peaked in 1992 al 587. and thereafter trended downwards. The number of dairy farm sales. as
a proportion of the total number of national herds. ranged from 2.7% in 1990 to 1.5% in
1997. with a peak of 4.1 % in 1992. The least dairy farms were traded in 1997. at nearly half
those sold in 1996. however this may be partly because the database had not been completely
updated for 1997. The number of dairy farm sales peaked in 1992 in the North Island and
1994 In the South Island. Regional dairy farm sales were consistent with the national trends.
When farm sales were expressed as a percentage of total sales. proportionately more farms
changed hands in the North Island than the South Island (90% vs. 10% in 1997).
Trends in farm sales by farm size
Dairy farm sales. cross-tabulated by four farm size categories «40, 40-59, 60-79 and >79
hectares). are presented in Figure 3. On average. during 1990-1997, one in seven of the
farms sold was less than 40 ha. while 32% were between 40-59 ha. Slightly more than half
(54%) of the farms sold were 60 ha or larger. Over the study period the proportion of farms
sold in the smallest «40 hal farm category increased (12.7% to 18.3% of total farm sales in
1990 and 1997. respectively). Nationally, the proportions of sales across farm categories
were relatively stable (coefficients of variation less than 20%). However, variations were
larger when data were disaggregated by regions. For example. in Northland only 2% of total
sales were under 40 ha while two-thirds were 80 ha or larger. In 1993.77% of farms sold in
Northland (n=65) were larger than 79 ha. This possibly reflects the larger farms in
Northland (Appendix I).
Milksolids production
The productivity (kg MSlha) of farms sold was similar from 1990 10 1994 (approximately
526 kg MSIha), then increased by up to 13% (575 to 597 kgMSlha) during the following
three years (Figure 4). Small farms had the highest per hectare production (685 to 760 kg
MSlha for farms less than 40 hal and as farm size increased, MSlha declined (416 to 515 kg
MSIha for farms 80 ha or more). This trend was consistent across all years but the gap in
MSIha across farm size groups narrowed over the years. On average. milksolids production
was 92%. 82% and 62% of the production for farms less than 40 ha, for farms 40-60 ha. 60-
80 ha and 80 ha and over, respectively (i.e. 732.669. 599 and 452 kg MSlha. respectively).
A regional comparative analysis of the productivity of dairy farms sold (Appendix I). was
performed relative to the Waikato. where most New Zealand dairy farms are located. All
regions had lower MS/ha than the Waikato in all years. except in 1997 when Taranaki
produced 1.3% more MSIha. and in 1990 and 1997 when Canterbury produced 9-14% more
MSlha. However. the productiVity gaps between Waikato and other regions were typically
large in all years.
Trends in dairy farm net sale price
The per hectare net sale price Increased substantially from 1990 until 1995 (Figure 4). The
Inflation-adjusted net sale price for dairy farm land increased from $6.6161ha In 1990 to
$11,060Iha In 1997. with a peak In 1995 of$12.158Iha. In some regions. the price change
was quite dramatic from one year to another. For example. In the NelsonlMarlborough
region the average dairy farm land price increased from $3.916 in 1994 to $8.021 in 1995.
This was probably a farm size effect since the average farm size sold in 1995 was 75 ha
compared with 130 ha in 1994. In addition. annual sales in this region were small (Appendix
I). A similar effect between 1996 and 1997 was evident for this region (72 ha and is
$82461ha vs. 150 ha and $4252/ha). .
The South Island results were highly variable because of the small number of farms sold per
year (Appendix I). This ranged from 22 to 50 farms/year (3 to 20 farms/regionfyear)
compared to 195 to 542 farms/year in the North Island (7 to 209 farmslregionfyear). Prices
for South Island dairy land, on average. were $45701ha lower than in the North Island,
ranging from $29361ha less in 1990 to $58861ha less in 1994. Although farm land prices
started to decline in North Island after 1995. prices continued to increase in the South Island
The latter trend reflects the relatively higher land prices in the North Island and the greater
remaining potential for the conversion of sheep and beef cattle farms to dairying in the South
Island.
In terms of size effects. land prices increased proportionately more for large farms than small
farms (an increase in real price per hectare between 1990 and 1997 of 36% for farms less
than 40 ha. compared to 96% for farms 80 ha and over). This trend could be associated with
the greater demand for larger. and more economic. farms.
Trends in capitalisation of land values
The trend in the capitalisation of land values. as reflected by the land price per kg MS.
mirrored those for the land price per ha, but increases in the former were consistently lower
than the increase in per hectare price (Figures 5 and 6). Thus. gains in land productivity did
not keep pace with the increase in dairy land price. Land values increased with falls in
interest rates in the 1992-1994 period (r = -0.98 for annual interest rate by average per
hectare price for the eight years).
Land prices ($/kgMS) in the Waikato were generally higher than for the other regions. except
for Auckland for all years (5.5% to 61.9% higher), Taranaki for four years (3.1 to 6.4%
higher) and WanganuilWellington in 1992 (5% higher). Land prices per kg MS could be
expected to be similar in Taranaki and Waikato. both traditionally strong dairy farming areas.
with price differences per kg reflecting the size and quality of the farms sold High land prices
in the Auckland region reflects proximity effects of the city's expansion.
Seasonality in dairy farm sales
The average number of dairy farm sales per month for the period 1990-1997 is shown in
Figure 7. Farm sales were typically greatest during the summer-autumn (February-April)
and least during July-September. The seasonality in farm sales was consistent across years.
These results are not unexpected. as sales occur at the end of lactation to facilitate the
traditional June takeover. Few sales occur during the busy spring period when lactation
commences in seasonally calved herds.
Figure 5: Sale price ($/ha and $/kg MS) for dairy economic units sold bclwL'Cn 1990 and
1997, milksolills price', and intL'fest rates2• All prices are in real values ( 1990
dollars).
, Milksolids price is the season average across years, witb the 1989/90 year recorded as 1990 onlbe
grapb (LIe, 1996).
'Inlerest rates are for a 15 year tenn loan, from tbe Rural Bank (1990·1993) and lbe National Bank
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Figure 4: Sale price ($/ha) and milksolills production (kg MS/ha) for dairy economic units
sold between 1990 and 1997 (Real values - 1990 dollars).
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Figure 6: Sale price ($/kg MS) and milksolids production (kg MSlha) for dairy economic
units sold between 1990 and 1997 (Real values - 1990 dollars).
Table I: Buyer-seller relationships for not-enlarging (NE) and enlarging (E) dairy land sales.
Figure 7: Total number of economic dairy unit sales per month for 1990 to 1997.
1990 1993 1997
NE E NE E NE E
Buyer TJIPe
Existing Farmer No. 224 53 322 55 110 50
% 67.3% 88.3% 75.8% 94.8% 67.9% 90.9%
New Farmer No. 79 2 82 I 26 I
% 23.7% 3.3% 19.3% 1.7% 16.0% 1.8%
Business No. 29 4 16 2 17 2
% 8.7% 6.7% 3.8% 3.4% 10.5% 3.6%
Other No. I I 5 0 9 2
% 0.3% 1.7% 1.2% 0.0% 5.6% 3.6%
Total No. 333 60 425 58 162 55
Buyer TJIPe
Individual No. 75 11 78 12 37 7
% 22.5% 18.3% 18.4% 20.7% 22.8% 12.7%
Partnership No. 234 37 300 36 64 28
% 70.3% 61.7% 70.6% 62.1% 39.5% 50.9%
Company No. 23 10 33 7 46 11
% 6.9% 16.7% 7.8% 12.1% 28.4% 20.0%
Other No. I 2 14 3 15 9
% 0.3% 3.3% 3.3% 5.2% 9.3% 16.4%
TOlal No. 333 60 425 58 162 55
Seller Characteristic
Subdividing No. 32 7 18 13 15 15
% 9.6% 11.7% 4.2% 22.4% 9.3% 27.3%
Not SubdiViding No. 301 53 407 45 147 40
% 90.4% 88.3% 95.8% 77.6% 90.7% 72.7%







































Table 2: Determinants of dairy land prices in New Zealand (1990-1997).
Acroo\ll11 Variable definition OLS parameters
LS[ZE In (rarm size in hectares) -0.1520***
LPDPHA In (milksolids production in kg per hal 0.8667***
NORTHLND Farm located in Northland (l=yes. 0 otherwise) -0.2895***
AUCKLAND Farm located in Auckland region (l=yes. 0 otherwise) 0.1486***
BAYOFPL Farm location in Bay or Plenty (l=yes. 0 otherwise) -0.0762***
TARANAKI Farm location in Taranaki (l=yes. 0 otherwise) -O.oI08
LOWERNI Farm location in the lower North Island (l=yes. 0 otherwise) -0.1710***
SISLAND Farm location in the South Island (l=yes. 0 otherwise) -0.3860***
FSBN Buyer type (l=enlarging. 0 otherwise) -0.0179
FSSN Seller type (l=subdividing. 0 otherwise) -0. [32[ ***
BTSFRM[ Buyer ownership (individual = [. 0 otherwise) -0.0439***
BTVFRMN Buyer type (new: [. 0 otherwise) -0.0722***
MYR Time or sale (l=first hair ofl990. 2=second hair or [990... 0.0488***





First order autocorrelation 0.32
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Appendix I: Statistics for dairy economic units (means).
1991 1993 1995 1997
Northland
$/ha 3164 5209 6752 6526
kg MS/ha 352 378 388 376
$/kg MS 8.99 13.80 17.41 17.35
Size (ha) 105.9 104.1 95.4 90.1
No.ofrarms 59 65 38 23
Auckland
$/ha 9603 11654 16787 12590
kg MS/ha 460 533 544 499
$/kg MS 20.88 21.87 30.85 25.25
Size (ha) 76.7 53.7 57.9 57.6
No.ofrarms 22 22 20 7
Waikato
$/ha 8334 12769 15519 13552
kg MS/ha 647 644 685 671
$/kg MS 12.89 19.84 22.67 20.19
Size (ha) 64.6 60.6 61.9 60.1
No.orrarms 193 162 173 83
Bay or Plenty
$/ha 6277 9975 13354 12167
kg MS/ha 561 560 627 634
$/kg MS 11.\9 17.83 21.28 19.20
Size (ha) 83.3 77.5 79.2 68.0
No.orrarms 63 63 52 29
Taranaki
$/ha 7004 11160 15379 13816
kg MS/ha 562 535 638 680
$/kg MS 12.46 20.87 24.12 20.32
Size (ha) 62.3 69.6 59.7 52.0
No.oHarms 83 97 53 34
HBlWairarapa
$/ha 5024 8242 8495 8578
kg MS/ha 504 542 509 540
$/kg MS 9.97 15.22 16.70 15.89
Size (ha) 71.6 76.0 73.5 64.7
No.orrarms 13 21 21 10
WanganuiIWgtn
$/ha 6353 9634 10197 8844
kg MS/ha 564 553 562 578
$/kg MS 11.27 17.42 18.13 15.29
Size (ha) 59.6 57.3 68.3 78.1
No.oHarms 8 14 8 9
NelsonlMarl
$/ha 2431 3985 8021 4253
kg MS/ha 214 290 413 317
$/kg MS 11.37 13.76 19.41 13.40
Size (ha) 130.6 153.2 75.5 150.4
No.oHarms 5 7 5 3
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West Coast
Slba 2579 3320 4728 7059
kg MSlba 334 290 335 443
S/kg MS 7.72 11.45 14.12 15.93
Size (hal ll3.1 136.7 131.5 61.3
No. of farms 7 13 17 6
Canterbury
Slba 3767 10319 7755 9091
kg MSlba 449 531 589 767
S/kg MS 8.38 19.44 13.17 11.86
Size (hal 157.0 45.9 116.6 112.7
No. of farms 10 3 7 6
Otago
Slba 6181 8387 9233 9080
kg MSlba 552 568 502 668
S/kg MS 11.20 14.78 18.38 13.60
Size (hal 48.9 82.0 78.0 64.5
No. of farms 4 4 7 5
Southland
Slba 3749 7094 6478 5731
kg MSlba 467 560 525 581
S/kg MS 8.02 12.66 12.33 9.86
Size (hal 103.0 106.7 132.8 97.2
No. of farms 6 12 9 2
North Island
I\,) Slba 6724 10042 13370 11661~ kg MSlba 547 539 606 600en S/kg MS 12.30 18.62 22.08 19.43
Size (hal 73.1 71.6 68.1 64.4
No.offarms 441 444 365 195
South Island
Slba 3414 5098 6326 7309
kg MSlba 393 392 442 573
S/kg MS 8.68 12.99 14.30 12.75
Size (hal 119.6 117.8 114.9 91.5
No. of farms 32 39 45 22
New Zealand
Slba 6373 9418 12158 11060
kg MSlba 530 521 578 597
S/kg MS 12.01 18.08 21.05 18.54
Size (hal 76.2 75.3 73.3 67.1
No. of farms 473 483 410 217
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Appendix II: Buyer and seller type by farm size.
Buyer Expandinl1 Seller Subdividinl!
No Yes No Yes Total
Size
=< 40 ha No. 349 133 404 78 482
% 72.4% 27.6% 83.8% 16.2%
40-60ha No. 927 176 1022 81 1103
% 84.0% 16.0% 92.7% 7.3%
6O·80ha No. 704 91 745 50 795
% 88.6% 11.4% 93.7% 6.3%
80·100 ha No. 430 47 438 39 477
% 90.1% 9.9% 91.8% 8.2%
100·120 ha No. 201 26 206 21 227
% 88.5% 11.5% 90.7% 9.3%
>120 ha No. 361 35 357 39 396
% 91.2% 8.8% 90.2% 9.8%
Total No. 2972 508 3172 308 3480
% 85.4% 14.6% 91.1% 8.9%
Buver Tvoe Existing New Business Other Total
Size
=< 40 ha No. 379 78 19 6 482
% 78.6% 16.2% 3.9% 1.2%
40·60ha No. 858 178 52 15 1103
% 77.8% 16.1% 4.7% 1.4%
60·80ha No. 621 109 55 10 795
% 78.1% 13.7% 6.9% 1.3%
80·looha No. 366 65 35 II 477
% 76.7% 13.6% 7.3% 2.3%
100 - 120 ha No. 182 30 9 6 227
% 80.2% 13.2% 4.0% 2.6%
>120 ha No. 305 41 42 8 396
% 77.0% 10.4% 10.6% 2.0%
Total No. 2711 501 212 56 3480
% 77.9% 14.4% 6.1% 1.6%
Buver Type Individual Parlner. Company Other Total
Size
=< 40 ha No. 125 288 46 23 482
% 25.9% 59.8% 9.5% 4.8%
40·60ha No. 229 715 99 60 1103
% 20.8% 64.8% 9.0% 5.4%
6O-80ha No. 202 470 89 34 795
% 25.4% 59.1% 11.2% 4.3%
80·looba No. 98 294 58 27 477
% 20.5% 61.6% 12.2% 5.7%
100 - 120 ha No. 48 137 26 16 227
% 21.1% 60.4% 11.5% 7.0%
>120 ha No. 70 222 83 21 396
% 17.7% 56.1% 21.0% 5.3%
Total No. 772 2126 401 181 3480
% 22.2% 61.1% 11.5% 5.2%
II;
